

Lone Wolf and Autonomous Cell Terrorism

Edited by
Jeffrey Kaplan, Heléne Lööw and
Leena Malkki

ROUTLEDGE

Lone Wolf and Autonomous Cell Terrorism

President Obama has declared that the greatest terrorist threat which America faces is attacks by lone wolf terrorists. This volume expands the lone wolf rubric to include autonomous cells: small groups of terrorists who cooperate, but operate independently. The challenge presented by lone wolves and autonomous cells, unlike the threat emanating from established terrorist groups like Al Qaeda, has proven intractable because of the difficulty of gathering intelligence on these actors or effectively countering their actions. Lone wolves operate under the radar, staging deadly attacks such as that at the Boston Marathon, and the 2011 attacks in Norway. This volume includes theory and policy studies, individual case studies, and the technological impacts of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons as well as the impact of social media in the process of recruitment and radicalization.

This book was originally published as a special issue of *Terrorism and Political Violence.*

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Introduction

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The most likely scenario that we have to guard against right now ends up being more of a lone wolf operation than a large, well-coordinated terrorist attack.

—President Barack Obama[1]

Lone wolf and autonomous cell violence is as old as time itself. Phineas, the biblical figure who might well be considered the archetypical Lone Wolf (Numbers 25:1-9) is credited with averting the wrath of God from the Hebrews by taking it upon himself to murder an Israelite man and a Midianite woman whose miscegenatistic coupling threatened the survival of the Hebrew people. Phineas' act was cited by the Sicarii, a radical offshoot of the 1st-century Zealots, as the inspiration for the doomed uprising against Roman rule, which ultimately led to the expulsion of the Jewish people from the Holy Land. In recent years, Phineas inspired eponymous organizations or networks in the American Racist Right and the Israeli Radical Right.[2] The "Lone Avenger" motif has appeared in every era and in virtually every culture in the world.

The Lone Wolf Threat Today

As evidenced by the quotation by President Obama which precedes this introduction, “lone wolves” have become a term of art which is found in government and security circles no less than in the popular media. Even if lone wolves have always existed, it is commonly believed that it is a phenomenon distinct to our times that reflects many general trends in terrorism, conflicts, and societies in general.[3] The Internet and social media are among major recent developments that have enabled communication in ways and in scope that was not possible before. More generally, in today’s globalized world, the power of an individual to do good or bad is believed to have increased greatly. Lone wolf terrorists are essentially an extreme manifestation of the feared “super-empowered angry men”[4] who are believed to be next-to-impossible to detect in advance, but capable of major destruction.

One example of what such angry men can do was given on July 22, 2011, when the Norwegian Anders Behring Breivik decided to turn the fantasies that had been flourishing in radical anti-Muslim subcultures into reality with a frightening determination and cold bloodiness. Breivik took lone wolf terrorism to a new dimension; he carried out two totally different kinds of attacks, one a car bomb in Oslo, and the other a shooting spree on the island of Utøya, Norway. His targets were mainly youngsters and no lone wolf has single-handedly killed more people in a single shooting spree than he did. His case is discussed in depth by Mattias Gardell in an article in this volume.

It is feared that lone wolves may be capable of much more than this. The ultimate threat scenario combines the unpredictability of lone operators with worries about the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons in the post-Cold War world. Until now, this scenario was found disturbing but unlikely because the terrorists seemed to have neither motivation nor capability for such kinds of attacks. Now, many feel that it is not safe to assume that anymore. Two articles in this volume explore this scenario. Gary Ackerman and Lauren Pinson provide a thorough analysis of the CBRN pursuit of lone actors in history, while Patrick Ellis looks at what capabilities may be within the reach of the lone operators or small groups in the future, as well as a discussion about possible countermeasures to secure against this kind of an attack.

This apocalyptic scenario partly explains why so much attention is paid to the lone wolf threat. The U.S. is not alone in its focus on lone operators.

Lone wolves are defined as the most significant terrorist threat in Europe as well. EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator Gilles de Kerchove has stated that EU intelligence and other "terrorism experts" have pegged the number of lone wolves operating on the continent to be somewhere in the 400 s:

> "It is a phenomenon of 'Lone Wolves,' as we call them," EU top Counter-Terrorism Coordinator Gilles de Kerchove told the German news agency DPA. "We can estimate that they are in the 400 s all across Europe."[5]

These comments were offered in the context of the killings of Mohammad Merah, a French-Algerian allegedly operating in the name of Al Qaeda. This makes Merah's identification as a lone wolf dubious. Rather than being taken alive, Merah jumped out the window with "guns blazing," making it impossible to know the degree to which Merah may have operated as a lone wolf.[6] More dubious still is the claim that 400 lone wolves are operating in the EU. By its very nature, lone wolf terrorism is opportunistic and unpredictable. There is no way to reliably estimate the number of lone wolves in the EU or anywhere else. If it was that easy, detection and thus presumably intervention would not be such a big challenge.

While Breivik's actions transfixed European observers, lone wolf actors in the United States have undertaken more focused, but no less effective, attacks. The most well-known recent American lone wolf actor is Maj. Nidal Hassan. Major Hassan, an army medical officer based at Ft. Hood in Texas, was reportedly disaffected by American actions in the Islamic world and was himself facing deployment when he went on a shooting spree, killing thirteen and wounding another thirty persons. Found guilty of the murders, Major Hassan has been sentenced to death.[7]

A similar attack at an American base in Kuwait occurred when a U.S. Army Sergeant, Hasan Akbar, lobbed a grenade at fellow servicemen and followed up with automatic weapons fire, claiming that his act was intended to stop Americans from killing more Muslims in the Middle East. Then on April 15, 2013, two brothers acting as an autonomous cell set off ingenious home-made pressure cooker bombs near the finish line of the Boston Marathon. Miscalculating the design of the bombs, the blast scattered shrapnel only at knee level, killing only three but seriously injuring over two hundred. The act was soon followed by a massive police operation to capture the suspects. One of the brothers, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, was killed

during the chase and his younger brother Dzhokhar Tsarnaev was finally captured. The Boston Marathon bombing was the most effective act of domestic terrorism since the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. Oklahoma City too was the act of a two-man autonomous cell. Timothy McVeigh carried out the bombing and Terry Nichols dealt with the logistics of the act.

The contrast between the Oklahoma City bombing and all of the lone wolf and autonomous cell actions considered in this volume is instructive. In the post-9/11 cases, lone wolf attacks are by default and often erroneously identified with radical Islam. Oklahoma City by contrast was motivated primarily as revenge for the deaths of the Branch Dravidians who died in a standoff with the FBI and was carried out by a far right-wing actor. Nonetheless, many of the 21st-century lone wolf and autonomous cell attacks center around either Islamist or anti-Muslim extremists.[8]

The Islamic element of the contemporary lone wolf phenomenon is what most concerns governments and security services. The decade-long War on Terrorism has degraded the most threatening of the established Islamist terrorist groups. Al Qaeda central, for example, has been pushed to the periphery of the Islamic world and its leaders forced to live furtive lives ever in fear of the next cruise missile to fall on their heads. Its charismatic leader, Osama Bin Laden, was killed by a team of Navy SEALs in Pakistan in 2011. He was only the most well-known AQ casualty. Bin Laden's second-in-command Saeed al-Shihri was also killed by an American drone. While there has been a great deal of controversy over the accuracy of U.S. military claims and increasing reporting of a vast underestimation of civilian casualties in the drone campaign,[9] it is widely believed that between military pressure and the cruise missile campaign, AQ central's command and control now constitutes a virtually negligible terrorist threat.

What remains of AQ is the third leg of the Command, Control and Communication (C3) triangle: namely, communication. Arguably the most significant casualty of the drone war was the American-born propagandist Anwar al-Awlaki, who personified the new breed of Islamist radical. A convert to radical Islam, he transcended the world of Western AQ wannabes by making contact with his distant heroes, finding acceptance in their closed and highly compartmentalized ranks, and utilizing digital media to attract an unknown number of Western Islamists—many of whom like himself were recent converts to Islam.

Awlaki and the Western jihadists that he targeted in his writings constitute a nightmare for Western intelligence agencies. As border controls in the U.S. and to a much lesser degree the EU become increasingly effective, a 9/11 or 7/7 style mega-event utilizing imported jihadists is today taken less seriously as a threat. However, there is little defense against an individual citizen of a Western country with no record of radical activity in the past who, for reasons of his or her own, decides to strike a blow against the powers who are perceived as waging a war on Islam. To be sure, there is nothing innovative about this kind of proxy war. Western citizens acting in the name of foreign terrorist groups is a venerable terrorist tactic. Such actions may actively involve members of the organization. One example of this is the case of Murielle Degauque, a young Belgian woman who was convinced to carry out an Islamist-inspired suicide bombing with the aid of her husband and other terrorist operatives.[10] Her case stands out as an example of the near impossibility of detecting and deterring homegrown terrorist strikes so long as the lone wolf actor avoids the mistake of seeking contact with the group or publicizing their beliefs or intentions on social media or the Internet. How then to counter cases in which the decision to strike and the means with which the action is to be conducted are left entirely to the would-be terrorist? Articles by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Gary A. Ackerman and Lauren E. Pinson, Christopher Hewitt, and George Michael examine various aspects of the problem of detection and deterrence.

It is important to keep in mind that, contrary to popular perception, lone wolves are not alone in the true meaning of the word. This point is highlighted throughout this volume. Lone wolves do not sit in dark cellars becoming self-radicalized (to use a term currently popular in the EU) in front of a computer, contrary to popular perceptions of the phenomenon. Lone wolves, however lonely they seem to be, are very much part of larger communities of likeminded actors. The fact that some seem to have spent most of their time in front of a computer does not mean they are alone—modern communication technology is just exactly what the word say, a technology to communicate with others.

The primary means of detecting and hopefully deterring lone wolf attacks is believed to be an effective monitoring of the Internet for signs of radicalization or incipient violence. This approach applies to both lone wolf terrorists and school shooters. Particularly in the world of school shooters,

there are often traces of incipient violence that appear with little or no effort to shield these communications from outside observation. Failing interdiction, as the paradigmatic case of Anders Breivik demonstrates, the on-line traces of the perpetrators serve a forensic function, offering lessons to authorities as they prepare for the inevitable next violent tragedy.

The technical aspects of Internet surveillance are the subjects of the paper co-written by Katie Cohen, Fredrik Johansson, Lisa Kaati, and Jonas Clausen Mork from the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI). Their article demonstrates the inherent difficulties involved in monitoring the Internet. It documents ways in which police and intelligence agencies in Europe go about the nearly impossible task of mining the unfathomably vast sea of messaging on the Internet. It is no surprise that the United States has gone light years further in its efforts to mine the Internet for signs of foes real or imagined. The revelations of the National Security Agency's overreach involving their obtaining on-line data on virtually every American citizen and every foreign national who might correspond with American citizens began with Edward Snowden's leak of a trove of classified NSA files.[11] In light of these revelations, the warning contained in Cohen et al.'s article seems prescient:

> It also challenges the feeling of a place—in our case the Internet—being truly public, in the sense of allowing and accepting the presence of people who fall outside of current norms. A recurring worry is the function creep of surveillance systems: will they really only be used to reduce criminality or will they in fact become powerful tools of oppression? And who will eventually pay the price?

This concern is shared by Christopher Hewitt, who asks in his article "to what extent is it legitimate to gather intelligence on extremist movements and activists if they have not actually engaged in violence?" Furthermore, his analysis of 47 terrorist plots in the U.S. after 9/11 demonstrates that undercover agents have often played a crucial role in discovering the plots. This unavoidably raises the question of how many of these plots resulted from a sting operation in the first place.

Hewitt's study also shows that tips from the general public have traditionally been important for identifying and capturing terrorists. A recent study by Paul Gill, John Horgan, and Paige Deckert shows that in almost two-thirds of the lone wolf cases they studied, family and friends had knowledge about the perpetrator's intent to engage in terrorist

activity.[12] This highlights the advantages that a good information flow from the public to authorities can have in preventing lone wolf terrorism plots from materializing. However, as Hewitt argues, encouraging public cooperation has its problems too; tracking down the numerous leads is costly and the repeated calls for vigilance may inflate public concerns about terrorism and increase the feeling of insecurity among the citizens. These concerns are also discussed by George Michael in his article in the context of applying counterinsurgency methods of winning hearts and minds in the case of lone wolf terrorism.

Research on Lone Wolves and Autonomous Cells

Until very recently, lone wolves have been largely overlooked in the area of terrorism studies. Alex Schmid's 2011 definitive update of the *Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* makes only passing mention of the phenomenon, and then primarily in the context of the American radical right. Schmid attributes the reasons for this lacuna in the terrorism literature to the belief that terrorism—or at least "serious" terrorism—was almost by definition considered to be a group activity that was driven by a coherent political agenda.[13] Bruce Hoffman's revised edition of his highly regarded *Inside Terrorism* does mention lone wolves and provides a working definition drawn from the FBI's Strategic Plan 2004–2009:

> The most significant domestic terrorism threat over the next five years will be the lone actor, or "Lone Wolf" terrorist. They typically draw ideological inspiration from formal terrorist organizations, but operate on the fringes of those movements. Despite their ad hoc nature and generally limited resources, they can mount high-profile, extremely destructive attacks, and their operational planning is often difficult to detect.[14]

Beyond the Unabomber however, Hoffman devotes little attention to actual cases. Finally, encyclopedias of terrorism have often proven unhelpful to scholars and at times misleading to students. This is the case with the second edition of Gus Martin's *The Sage Encyclopedia of Terrorism* which devotes too much of its limited space (or limited interest as the case may be) with a discussion of the psychological problems which the article's author believes to be the common thread in lone wolf terrorism.[15]

Following the increased policy interest in lone wolves, several new studies on lone wolves have been published during the last few years that

have improved our understanding of the phenomenon. For example, recent quantitative studies provide us with overviews about how common such attacks have been, what have been the preferred *modi operandi* and targets, and the background of the perpetrators.[16] There are also studies dealing with the history and development of the idea of leaderless resistance,[17] as well as analyses that predict the further development of the lone wolf threat.[18]

That said, there is still a lot to be done. The current debate on lone wolf terrorism is largely driven by the current focus on the problem by policy makers such as President Obama. It is widely believed that the lone wolves are more numerous in the post-Cold War world than in the previous decades and there are some quantitative studies that back up this observation. Ramón Spaaij, for example, found in his study on lone wolf terrorism in 15 Western countries that there has been a slight rise in the number of such attacks since 1968, especially outside the U.S. Still, only a very small minority of attacks are conducted by lone operators.[19]

There are good reasons to think that the current operating environment provides unprecedented possibilities for lone operators and leaderless resistance in particular. However, it is still important to ask whether the alleged rise of lone wolf terrorism could be partly attributed to the changing *interpretations* and *perceptions* of terrorism rather than from changes in the patterns of terrorist attacks and organization. While violent attacks themselves are all too real, what we call terrorism is, after all, ultimately a socially constructed category of events and actors. As Philip Jenkins, among many others, has pointed out, the interpretations of terrorism, like any other historical events and phenomena, tend to change over time.[20] These interpretations are strongly influenced by the contemporary politics and debates. While this is true for all phenomena, it is perhaps even more pronounced in the case of the highly politicized and securitized question of terrorism.

An important part of the ongoing debate about the changing nature of terrorism that started in the 1990s has been the argument that the organizational structures behind terrorist attacks have changed. Unpredictability, more than anything else, seems to be elevated as the key characteristic of terrorism currently. Part of this unpredictability is explained by the changes in terrorist organizations. The organization of “new” terrorism has been described with words such as networks,

transnationality, loose organizational structures, ad hoc groups, and a large variety of actors ranging from experienced professionals to complete amateurs.[21] In this world of "universes of like-minded individuals,"[22] "bunches of guys,"[23] and "lone-wolf packs,"[24] it seems to be extremely difficult to know from which direction the next major terrorist attack may come.

These views on the changing nature of terrorist organizations, coupled with the challenges it poses to the security and intelligence agencies, have changed the way we look at the violent acts perpetrated by lone individuals. As van Buuren and De Graaf aptly put it in their article regarding the Netherlands, while the fact that violence was perpetrated by an individual or an ad hoc group was earlier seen as a mitigating condition, it is nowadays seen as an aggravating condition. This development is hardly specific to the Netherlands.

Without denying that the dynamics of terrorism may have changed in ways that legitimate such a view, it is important to notice that our views about terrorism affect the way we look at the world. What sets in is a phenomenon that Philip Jenkins describes as "if I hadn't believed it, I wouldn't have seen it with my own eyes."[25] Looking at the world through the current understanding of the terrorist threat, we are much more likely to pay attention to violence perpetrated by lone individuals and interpret it as terrorism than we were, say, in the 1970s, when terrorism was understood by definition as a group activity. Therefore, it is possible that we find more lone wolf activity nowadays partly for the simple reason that we find it increasingly significant and actively look for cases of it.

For this reason, a mere look at the standard histories of terrorism does not necessarily provide a full picture about the changes and continuities in lone wolf and autonomous cell terrorism. Indeed, the recent upsurge of interest in lone wolf terrorism has led to the re-evaluation of terrorism in the earlier decades. As we state at the beginning of the introduction, lone wolves are a very old phenomenon. It has been widely pointed out that the anarchist wave of terrorism, as defined by David C. Rapoport, was also characterized by loose organizational forms, lone wolves, and autonomous cells. The manifestations of this wave of terrorism in Italy, Spain, and the U.S. are discussed by Richard Bach Jensen in this volume. More examples of lone operator and autonomous cell violence can be found in several other countries, including the Nordic countries which are mentioned much more

seldom in this context. For instance, in 1908, Algot Rosberg, Anton Nilsson, and Alfred Stern, members of the Young Socialists movement, blew up the ship *Almathea* in the harbor of Malmö. The attack was related to the ongoing strike in which the workers in the docks demanded better work conditions. The blast killed one person and injured 23.[26] In Finland, which at that time was an autonomous Grand Duchy of Russia, a Finnish-Swedish activist, Eugen Schauman, assassinated the highly unpopular General Governor Nikolai Bobrikov in 1904.[27] As Jose Pedro Zúquete shows in his article, the legacy of this era continues to inspire some anarchist-oriented activists at least flirting with illegal forms of protest.

The historical examples of previous lone wolf cases, loose networks, and leaderless resistance activity in the earlier decades are not limited to the anarchist wave, however. As Jelle van Buuren and Beatrice de Graaf demonstrate in their article, political violence in the post-World War II Netherlands has always been perpetrated primarily by loosely knit groups and lone individuals. Moreover, as Malkki has argued elsewhere, while the New Left wave has been portrayed mainly as a manifestation of "old" terrorism, if one looks at terrorism of that era with current interpretative glasses on, one can find imagined communities, transnational networks, and ad hoc groups not completely unlike what the researchers have found in jihadi terrorism.[28] However, lone wolves of the 1970s hardly exist in the terrorism literature, for the simple reason that they have not been considered as worthy of attention before.

The current focus on violence by lone individuals unavoidably raises the question of how lone wolf terrorism differs from other types of lone operator violence such as workplace shootings and spree killings. This question is explored by Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko in their article in this volume with regard to the radicalization process of lone wolf terrorists.

A unique aspect of this volume is its inclusion of school shootings, which are discussed briefly by Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko and more elaborately by Leena Malkki in their articles in this volume. School shootings and lone wolf terrorism have been largely considered as unrelated phenomena and they have been framed differently in the public debate as well as in the area of policy. A closer look reveals that school shootings and lone wolf terrorism actually have several things in common. Both are spectacular acts of indiscriminate violence perpetrated by a lone actor (or a

very small group) that deviate from the usual patterns of violent crime. Furthermore, both were seen originally as primarily an American concern, but have apparently become more common in Europe during the last decade.

One obvious difference between lone wolf terrorism and school shootings appears to be that school shootings do not have a political motivation or agenda. As Malkki argues in her article in this volume, this view can be contested. Several school shooters have explained their motivations in political terms and expressed the hope that their example would encourage others to join the struggle. The school shooting research community has typically rejected such statements as quasi-ideological or *post-hoc* rationalizations of an act that is in reality driven by the shooter's personal problems. But what about the cases that have traditionally been interpreted as unquestionably lone wolf terrorism? Can the same argument be made about some of these cases as well? Despite the vast literature dealing with the definition of terrorism, terrorism studies have very little to say about how to decide whether an act should be considered political or not.

If lone wolves have long been overlooked in the literature, still less attention has been paid to the threat of autonomous cells even though they are occasionally discussed in the context of the lone wolf phenomenon. In part, a reason for this state of affairs is that the notion "autonomous cells" calls up images of World War II when such cells operated behind enemy lines, whether that enemy was National Socialist Germany or the Western states that opposed it. More recently, cells operating in an autonomous fashion were ubiquitous in the anarchist wave of terrorism and a primary tactic of the COMITERN, and later Soviet efforts to operate in Western countries during the Cold War. In the age of the lone wolf, the autonomous cell has a somewhat archaic ring to it.

While cellular structures are easier to monitor than the true lone wolf, they may be far more numerous on the ground. Their ability to recruit members with particular skills further heightens the degree of potential threat that they represent. Like lone wolves, autonomous cells may take their inspiration from established groups, but they maintain no direct contact with the movements they seek to represent. Instead, they take their direction from the virtual world of the overt and covert aspects of the Internet, as in earlier days they took their inspiration from books and

pamphlets. They operate on their own, pick their own targets, and independently finance their operations. In many ways, they are the ones who turn the ideas that flourish in various radical subcultures into reality. In some respects, we can talk about different levels of activists; the producers of the ideology, the key intellectuals; the “keyboard warriors” active in numerous overlapping Internet communities and in various forms of social media. In these forums they promote their ideas and call for radical actions. Such actions may include stalking and harassing both declared opponents as well as groups and individuals whom they perceive to be symbols of “the enemy.”

In some cases, an organization can turn to the leaderless resistance strategy after failing to carry out attacks or when they lack the resources to carry out attacks directly. Even though loose organizations or acting alone are generally seen as providing a tactical advantage for terrorists, it should not be forgotten that for actors themselves, it is often rather a strategy borne out of desperation and failure than prowess. This is how the strategy of leaderless resistance was explicitly presented to the American far right by Louis Beam. The same can be partly said about the jihadists who, as noted above, have also come to embrace the leaderless resistance strategy.

This volume, in summation, is intended as a contribution toward filling in these lacunae in the terrorism literature by both offering cutting edge theory, in-depth case studies, and a number of elements that have had little consideration in the literature of lone wolf terrorism: a) the role of autonomous cells; b) the threat of CBRN weapons employed by lone wolves and autonomous cells; c) the inclusion of articles written or co-written by intelligence, police, and military personnel; and d) the inclusion of school shooters, who are analyzed in the context of lone wolf and autonomous cell operators. We believe that this volume represents a step forward in the interdisciplinary study of lone wolf and autonomous cell violence.

Future Directions

The contributions in this volume open up several avenues for further research on lone-wolf terrorism and autonomous cells. We know too little about the nature and scope of lone wolf activity, let alone autonomous cells, in the previous decades to have a comprehensive understanding of its

historical development. More research is also needed about the relationship between lone-wolf terrorism and other forms of lone operator violence. It is equally clear that all of the implications of the recent changes in the counterterrorism and intelligence, including moral and ethical concerns, are not well understood.

Few analyses address the “big picture” of lone-wolf and autonomous cell terrorism beyond contributions focusing specifically on jihadi terrorism or those discussing very generally the changing nature of terrorism. Jeffrey Kaplan, a career academic, and Christopher P. Costa, a former career military officer offer some insight into the possible future directions of lone wolf and autonomous cell research from the perspective of civilian and military security specialists in their article “On Tribalism: Auxiliaries, Affiliates, and Lone Wolf Political Violence.” The “New Tribalism” concept has attracted significant attention from senior American military officers and has attracted interest in China as well.[29]

Kaplan and Costa suggest that a motive force behind lone wolf violence is the desire on the part of the actor, even subconsciously, to become part of a cohesive and supportive milieu that is seen in explicitly tribal terms. It is not a remarkable finding that terrorist actors seek to become a part of a movement of world changing significance. The article borrows heavily from David Rapoport’s four waves model of modern terrorism to recast our understanding of tribalism in the post-bin Laden world.[30]

“The New Tribalism” however differs significantly from the international aspirations of the earlier waves of terrorism. In an increasingly anomic world, the attraction of primordial ties has rekindled the timeless dream of belonging—of family as experienced on a global level. Modern internet and social media technologies serve to bring the tribal dream within reach of a global audience of true believers who are prepared to take independent action as the price of belonging to the virtual tribe of the aspirant’s choice.

“The New Tribalism” differs significantly from the anthropological conception of tribe as being based on blood ties and centering on a particular geographic locus. In this model, “tribes” may allow for personal contacts with the leadership although in most cases a “virtual tribe” with no direct contact between Lone Wolf or autonomous cell actors and the established leadership of the virtual “tribe” is the norm.

The authors contend that there are two forms of the “New Tribalism”: ascriptive (membership based on primordial ties of blood and location) and

aspirational in which the actor aspires to become part of a tribal community. Both categories can be quite benign in terms of generating Lone Wolf terror. In exceptional circumstances however, both forms may manifest as malign.[31] The paradigmatic cases of the Acholi tribe in Uganda, which gave birth to the genocidal dreams of the Lord's Resistance Army and the remarkably similar apocalyptic visions of the Cambodian Khmer Rouge a generation earlier, are cases of malign ascriptive tribalism.[32] Examples of malign aspirational tribalism, ranging from Al Qaeda to Anders Breivik's quixotic defense of the "White tribe" in Europe are ubiquities in the modern world and it is from these ranks that the lone wolves and autonomous cells described in this volume come into being.

Finally, Kaplan and Costa offer the "New Tribalism" model into the ongoing strategic thinking in the United States where it has profound implications for irregular warfare, and special operations as a strategic option, when placed in a global rather than simply a regional context. Among the issues that concern the authors, and are only now beginning to capture the attention of Western security planners, is whether China's tribal unrest to take one example will emerge as a long-term security concern outside its borders, and whether U.S. interactions with tribal actors in this region could be leveraged into a strategic advantage on the model of the 19th century cases of T. E. Lawrence and Wilhelm Wasmuss.

In many ways, China brings us full circle from where we began by making a case that counter-terrorist planners must be conscious at all times of the implications of tribes, tribal space, and deeply sensitive to tribal members and their grievances; suggesting that tribal passions and tribal peoples on the peripheriesof the central state are both an opportunity and a threat. Taken together with the other essays in this volume, this reframing of tribalism should provide a deeper understanding of the complexeties and depth of the lone wolf threat.

We hope this special issue will trigger new research projects that will improve our understanding of the timely and multifaceted phenomenon. Our own joint effort was triggered and facilitated by the conference "Lone Wolf and Autonomous Cell Terrorism" that was held on September 24–26, 2012 at the Uppsala University, Sweden. The editors wish to express their gratitude for the Center for Police Research, Uppsala University for hosting and financing what turned out to be a very productive conference.

Notes

1. "Obama: Biggest Terror Fear is the Lone Wolf," C*NN*, August 16, 2011, http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2011/08/16/obama-biggest-terror-fear-is-the-lone-wolf/.

2. David C. Rapoport, "Moses, Charisma, and Covenant," *The Western Political Science Quarterly* 32, no. 2 (June 1979): 123–143. On the contemporary Israeli and American cases, see respectively Ehud Sprinzak, *Brother Against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination* (New York: Free Press, 1999) and Jeffrey Kaplan, *Encyclopedia of White Power: A Sourcebook on the Radical Racist Right*, (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2000), 242–244.

3. This is discussed by George Michael in his article for this volume. See also George Michael, *Lone Wolf Terror and the Rise of Leaderless Resistance* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2012).

4. Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization* (Newly updated and expanded edition) (New York: Anchor Books, 2000).

5. "EU Could Be the Home to 400 'Lone Wolf' Extremists, Expert Says," *EU-Digest*, March 22, 2012, http://eu-digest.blogspot.com/2012/03/eu-could-be-home-to-400-lone-wolf.html.

6. "Al Qaeda Fanatic Is DEAD: French Serial Killer Jumps Out His Flat Window With All Guns Blazing in Dramatic End to 32-Hour Siege," *The Mail on Line* (British Daily Mail), March 22, 2012, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2118052/Toulouse-shooting-Mohammad-Merah-dead-jumping-flat-window-guns-blazing.html. Given the excitement, Mr. de Kerchove might be forgiven for a bit of hyperbole.

7. The *New York Times* has posted its complete reportage on the Hassan case at http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/h/nidal_malik_hasan/index.html.

8. To be sure, there are other motives for lone wolf terrorism. For a partial table of lone wolf attacks, see Ramón Spaaij, *Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism: Global Patterns, Motivations and Prevention* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), 103–116. For a more comprehensive if not always accurate view, see Jeffrey D. Simon, *Lone Wolf Terrorism: Understanding the Growing Threat* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2013), 145–180.

9. The estimated ratio of civilians to terrorist dead is in the neighborhood of 50 to 1. Columbia Law School, *Counting Drone Strike Deaths*, 2011, http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/human-rights-institute/files/COLUMBIACountingDronesFinal.pdf.

10. Stephen Castle, "Girl Next Door Who Became a Suicide Bomber," *The Independent*, December 2, 2005, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/girl-next-door-who-became-a-suicide-bomber-517797.html.

11. "Statement by Edward Snowden to Human Rights Groups at Moscow's Sheremetyevo Airport," *Wikileaks.org*, July 12, 2013, http://wikileaks.org/Statement-by-Edward-Snowden-to.html.

12. Paul Gill, John Horgan, and Paige Deckert, "Bombing Alone: Tracing the Motivations and Antecedent Behaviors of Lone-Actor Terrorists," *Journal of Forensic Sciences* (forthcoming).

13. Alex P. Schmid, *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* (London: Routledge, 2011), 242–243. The Leaderless Resistance model analyzed by Schmid is drawn from Jeffrey Kaplan, "Leaderless Resistance," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9, no. 3 (1997): 80–85.

14. FBI, *FBI Strategic Plan 2004–2009* (Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Investigation, nd), 15–16; Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, rev. and expanded ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 40–41.

15. Randy Borum, "Lone-Wolf Terrorism," in Gus Martin and Harvey W. Kushner, eds., *The Sage Encyclopedia of Terrorism*, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2011), 361–362.

16. See, e.g., Spaaij, *Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism* (see note 8 above); Gill et al., "Bombing Alone" (see note 12 above); Jeff Gruenewald, Steven Chermak, and Joshua D. Freilich,

"Distinguishing 'Loner' Attacks from Other Domestic Extremist Violence: A Comparison of Far-Right Homicide Incident and Offender Characteristics," *Criminology and Public Policy* 12, no. 1 (2013): 65–91.

17. E.g., Michael, *Lone Wolf Terror and the Rise of Leaderless Resistance* (see note 3 above), Kaplan, "Leaderless Resistance" (see note 13 above).

18. E.g., Simon, *Lone Wolf Terrorism* (see note 8 above).

19. Spaaij, *Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism* (see note 8 above), 27–33.

20. Philip Jenkins, *Images of Terror: What We Can and Can't Know About Terrorism* (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 2003).

21. For discussion on the changes in organizational structures behind terrorism see, e.g., Bruce Hoffman, "The Confluence of International and Domestic Trends in Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9, no. 2 (1997): 1–15; Ian O. Lesser et al., *Countering the New Terrorism* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1999); David Tucker, "What Is New About the New Terrorism and How Dangerous Is It?," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13, no. 3 (2001): 1–14; Peter R. Neumann, *Old and New Terrorism* (Cambridge & Malden, MA: Polity, 2009); Martha Crenshaw, "'Old' vs. 'New' Terrorism," in Martha Crenshaw, ed., *Explaining Terrorism: Causes, Processes and Consequences* (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 51–66. See also Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Leena Malkki, "NO: The Fallacy of the New Terrorism Thesis," in Richard Jackson and Justin Sinclair, eds., *Contemporary Debates on Terrorism* (London: Routledge, 2012), 66–79.

22. Brian Michael Jenkins, "Terrorism and Beyond: A 21st Century Perspective," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 24 (2001): 324.

23. Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).

24. Raffaello Pantucci, *A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of Lone Islamist Terrorists* (London: ICSR, 2011), http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/1302002992ICSRPaper_ATypologyofLoneWolves_Pantucci.pdf.

25. Jenkins, *Images of Terror* (see note 20 above), 14.

26. Oscar Bjurling, "Tvedräktens Tid," in *Malmö Stads Historia* 4 (1985): 331–394.

27. See, e.g., Tuomo Polvinen, *Imperial Borderland: Bobrikov and the Attempted Russification of Finland, 1898–1904* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995).

28. Leena Malkki, "Radicalisation and Terrorism in History: Lessons From the Radical Left Terrorist Campaigns in Europe and the United States," in Rik Coolsaet, ed., *Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge: European and American Experiences* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 69–82.

29. Jeffrey Kaplan has been invited to offer a series of lectures on the topic from a "Sinocentric" perspective in the summer of 2014.

30. David C. Rapoport, "Modern Terror: The Four Waves," in Audrey Cronin and J. Ludes, eds., *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 46–73. The waves were, in order of appearance: (1) the Anarchist wave, (2) the National Liberation wave, (3) the Left Wing wave, and (4) the Religious wave.

31. Malign in the context of this article adopts the hostile Western view of foreign terrorist groups. We recognize the fact that global viewpoints do not necessarily subscribe to this perception. The Pew Global Opinion Survey tracks opinion trends and demonstrates the diversity of views on what does and does not constitute a malign entity; see http://www.pewglobal.org/.

32. Jeffrey Kaplan, *Terrorist Groups and the New Tribalism: Terrorism's Fifth Wave* (London: Routledge, 2010). This text posits the "New Tribalism" as constituting the "fifth wave" of modern terrorism in the context of Rapoport's Four Waves theory. In retrospect, aspirational and ascriptive tribal aspirations are a motive force in the fourth or religious wave of terrorism rather than being a distinct wave in and of itself. Fifth wave theory however was of key importance in forming our understanding of the "New Tribalism" with its global tactical and strategic implications.

On Tribalism: Auxiliaries, Affiliates, and Lone Wolf Political Violence

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In this article, we endeavor to shed new light on the consequences of tribalism in the present day, one of the most important of which is the threat posed by lone wolf actors and the emergence of autonomous cells that operate with no central direction. To better acquaint the reader with the theoretical models used in this article—in particular the Trinitarian model of Carl von Clausewitz—we begin with historic models dating back to Alexander the Great. The central focus of our article posits a reconceptualization of tribalism as a driving force behind the global jihadist phenomenon. We will go into the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan in some depth, believing that it is necessary to provide a close examination of these case studies to better understand the emergence of jihadist lone wolves who operate both in the ungoverned spaces of the Middle East and South Asia and in their Western homelands. We conclude with an examination of cases of jihadist lone wolf terrorism involving recent converts to radical Islam in the U.S. Finally, our article focuses on the emerging security threats posed by lone wolves, autonomous cells, and the challenges ahead for the military, security, and intelligence services.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the United States government.

Introduction

Few illustrations better typify the overused clichés of Alexander the Great's military adventurism in Afghanistan than his tribal alliances and clashes. One particular historical strand reveals that Alexander the Great and the Macedonian army—at the outset of his Indian Campaign in 327 B.C.—strategically sought ways to build necessary alliances with tribes for

geopolitical and tactical reasons. In return, these tribal auxiliaries launched an expedition—with a divided army in what is modern-day Jalalabad—toward the Indus River valley.[1] The Macedonian armies marched with their tribal auxiliaries, and were beset throughout their march by untold tribal intrigues—even from pre-Islamic Buddhist "holy-men—corresponding to the modern mullahs."[2] And so, that period of Alexander the Great's Afghan-Indian campaign was marked by a paradoxical combination of cooperation, resistance, and tribal betrayals.

The tradition of fighting with tribal auxiliaries or, better, by using tribal surrogates, took deep root in the Middle East. The Umayyad (661–750 A.D.) and the Abassid (750–1258) empires of classical Islam rose, held power, and fell according to their abilities to create and maintain strong alliances with local tribes. Both empires succeeded for a time in playing one tribal group against another. Both survived by maintaining fluid alliances, which could keep any single tribal group from amassing enough local power to challenge the empire's primacy. The Umayyads fell when the aspirations of recent converts to the faith were not met with the full acceptance and brotherhood envisioned by Mohammad. The fate of the Abbasids, who unseated the Umayyad caliphate by harnessing the resentments of the new Muslims, was in the end not greatly different.[3]

In the 19th century, Western imperial powers adopted the fluid alliance pattern to maintain their control of the region. American policy in Iraq inexplicably failed to recognize the tribal nature of Iraqi society until it was too late.[4] As one senior academic advisor responsible to the U.S. command lamented, "It took two years to convince senior commanders that there was such a thing as a tribe."[5] The United States eventually adopted the tribal alliance pattern to create the so-called "Sunni Awakening" that for a time allowed them to consolidate the power of the central government. Unlike their imperial predecessors, however, the U.S. could not adapt their traditions of maintaining lasting alliances to the Middle Eastern tradition that saw alliances as momentary and to be maintained only as long as the tribe could reasonably profit. In Afghanistan, the U.S. failed to adapt to the "great game" of tribal politics necessary to salvage U.S. objectives in the midst of the endless warfare that has engulfed the country since the Soviet invasion in 1979.

Today, jihadist fighters dream of reconstituting the classical empires, which is seen as Islam's "Golden Age."[6] In this vision, the global Islamic

Umma (community) is seen as one vast united and cohesive tribe. This idealization of the tribal model is not restricted to the Islamic world. Rather, the deep roots of tribalism are a global phenomenon. Africa, the historical epicenter of the tribe as the sole focus of group allegiance, is emerging as the focus of a great power struggle for the continent's resources. The primary antagonists in this competition, China and the United States, are both currently being challenged by tribal actors. The U.S. challenge is taking place in the Middle East and South Asia. The primary threat to Chinese interests is separation movements in heavily tribal areas that are together somewhat misleadingly designated as *autonomous regions* (although there is not a great deal of autonomy to be had in any of them). Lone wolf and autonomous cell-based terrorism is already a major concern to U.S. policy makers and, given the heavy-handed tactics employed by the Chinese in the autonomous areas, is presumably a possibility that must concern Chinese policymakers.

Clearly, the resurgence of tribalism is a global rather than a regional phenomenon. During the long-running battle against apartheid in South Africa, for example, opponents of the African National Congress often referred to their battle for the survival of the "white tribe." Mercenaries from around the world flocked to both South Africa and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) to fight for this racial/tribal flag rather than for any particular local party.[7] Similarly, the Euro-American radical right sees the white race in distinctly tribal terms, as do various emergent nationalisms, e.g., the Basques and the welter of Slavic "small nationalisms" that have turned to violence at various points in the 20th century.[8]

Radical racial and ethnic nationalisms are simultaneously ascriptive and aspirational. They are first ascriptive in that being born into the race or ethnicity is the price of admission. They become aspirational when a subset of the racial or ethnic group seeks to "reconstitute," "purify," or to bring to life a Golden Age based on the dream of a mythical past in which the race or ethnicity were believed to have had primacy over all others and had thus lived as the forbearers had originally intended. These Golden Age dreams are invariably expressed in tribal terms. Tropes of a "theft of culture," or a diving punishment administered when their forbearers had left the path on which they had been meant to be, are ubiquitous in these discourses. Such dreams are invariably cherished by a minority who, unable to convince the majority to see the world as they do, come to perceive themselves as

members of an elite—a righteous remnant in biblical terms—for whom the only hope to assure the survival of the idealized tribe or ethnicity is to embark on a campaign of purification and thus move from ascriptive to aspirational tribalism. Most of these aspirational tribes are benign. In the 19th century, movements like Pan-Slavism and Zionism appealed to secular intellectuals while British-Israelism appealed to a small number of eccentric British Bible believers who saw the Anglo-Saxon race rather than the Jews as the true heirs to the Covenant of Abraham.[9] Not all of these newly minted aspirational tribes are benign however. The history of the 20th and the 21st centuries are strewn with the corpses of those who were not included in the Golden Age dream. The killing fields of Cambodia, the Balkan wars in former Yugoslavia, and the destruction of the Acholi tribe in Uganda at the hands of the Lord's Resistance Army—a classic example of malign aspirational tribalism which arose from the heart of the ascriptive Acholi tribe—are just a few examples of this dynamic.[10]

This article argues that there are two forms of modern tribalism that impact the U.S. security environment. The first, *ascriptive tribalism*, refers to tribes, as we currently understand them: forms of organization based on kinship, blood, and quite often territory. The second, *aspirational tribalism*, is less understood, but there is an underside to this form of tribalism that constitutes an increasing menace to U.S. security interests. This form of tribalism occurs when those born outside of the tribal system desire to be accepted by tribal actors, actual or virtual. The tribes to which one might aspire may be ascriptive tribes, but more often they are aspirational tribes whose messages, no longer mediated by governments or corporate media, reach a global audience via social media. At the apex of aspirational tribes that constitute a security threat to the U.S. is al-Qaeda, but the Taliban in Afghanistan or Pakistan would be included in this definition. Not all aspirational tribes constitute a threat however. Benign aspirational groups, for example, would include the global Muslim community (*Umma*), which believes that every convert to Islam is accepted as a member as a result of the conversion process. Similarly included are the rare cases in which an outsider is accepted as a member of an ascriptive tribe. *Malign aspirational tribalism* (MAT) is normative, however, and from their number emerge lone wolf actors and the establishment of autonomous cells within the aspirants country of origin.[11] Explicit in our argument is the intricate and nuanced historical phenomenon of the interplay between warriors and tribes.

Just as it is necessary to look at ancient models of tribes in the context of warfare, it is equally as crucial to examine MAT today. This need is best illustrated by the patterns of jihadist movements, which share many core goals such as globalized Islamic unity and the rejection of Western values. To the extent that we recognize that tribes and tribalism are differentially rooted in societal patterns—including political violence and expedient tribal alliances—this new line of inquiry leads us to another theme that emerges in this article. It is in the context of warfare and a relentless Western counterterrorism strategy, then, that we may examine aspirational tribalism or, perhaps better labeled, *malign aspirational tribalism*—an extra-tribalism dynamic, which will threateningly give rise to the creation of autonomous jihadist cells or lone wolf forms of political violence.

The "New Tribalism"

This article takes as its theme the two forms of tribalism, though in either case, both patterns pose irregular challenges to those actors who focus on militarized coercion or political violence.[12] Even so, a common characteristic of tribes is the relative impermeability of the tribal structure, due to the fact that classic tribal patterns often are distinguished by land and blood, or with a more abstract pattern—aspirational tribalism—which retains its dominant ideology and passion, or some combination, while lacking direct blood ties.

An implicit assumption of this article, which underscores the need for the term "new tribalism," is that tribal patterns are not static, but are permeable to developments in the outside world. Within tribal societies, there are invariably strands of belief that may be thought of as modernizers, those who seek to adapt tribal patterns to the exigencies of national and global culture, and traditionalists who seek, to as great a degree as possible, to preserve the structures and patterns of the past. Within this struggle are constellations of clans and families that comprise the support for competitive leaderships representing their respective camps. However, in a globalized world that is the arena for the interaction of nation states, corporations, and NGOs, the dream of maintaining the continuity of tribal traditions is just that—a dream. Traditional patterns have long since adapted to the exigencies of the modern world, as this has been the price of survival in the modern world. The "new tribalism" is therefore seen for the purposes of this article as a

fundamentally modernizing force that bases its legitimacy on the maintenance of strands of tribal tradition while embracing modernity. In this model, traditionalism is a conservative force that seeks to maintain the dominance of traditional elites and to create institutional buffers to the encroachment of laws, ideas, and institutions, which they see as incompatible with tradition. Radical movements that seek to reconstitute what they see as a tribal "Golden Age" have in practice been forced to the realization that there has been a disruption in tribal traditions. For this reason, such movements have been forced to confront the need to "purify" their communities by removing all of those whom they believe to be contaminated (the disease metaphor is invariably used by these groups) by modernity. For radicals, traditionalists and modernizers are seen as equally symptomatic of the decline of tribal traditions, status, and the like. There is continuity to these radical attempts to reconstitute the lost "Golden Age," which links groups from widely disparate cultures and continents into an identifiable pattern of beliefs and actions. Examples would include the Cambodian Khmer Rouge and the African Lord's Resistance Army.[13] This pattern of traditionalists, modernizers, and radicals fits well into the categories that we refer to as ascriptive, aspirational, and malign varieties of each.[14]

The first part of this article focuses comparatively on Arminius, T. E. Lawrence, and Wasmuss. It combines into one theme questions on tribes and irregular warfare. As such, past tribal alliances with Western military regimes, no less than with royal central governments, variously resisted and welcomed influence for some political concessions. However, as the following survey shows, because broader strategic political considerations often imposed many of those engagements, the West often appeared predatory. So far, this has been the historical pattern. But we will then need to further define tribes and tribalism, and the relationship to political violence in particular. Through our analysis, it will be necessary to make the distinction between tribes and tribalism more precise.

The next part of this study expands and deepens the argument that tribalism is a manifestation of al-Qaeda's illusory strategic alliance with the Taliban, followed by the post-9/11 narrative that tribal alliances again played an important role in both Afghanistan and Iraq.[15] To date, most post-9/11 discussions of tribes and warfare are relatively familiar and are centered on America's two major wars. Still, in light of al-Qaeda in the Arabian

Peninsula, there are open questions that now focus on al-Shabaab in Somalia, ungoverned space, and on ideological aspirants and would-be-bombers like Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (a.k.a. the "Underwear Bomber").[16] So, doesn't the "underwear bomber" case, in which a Nigerian can gain access to Arab tribes in its Yemen sanctuary, dramatically illustrate an escalation in the importance of MAT?[17]

Even closer to home is the case of Anwar al-Awlaki, an American product of *malign aspirational tribalism* who succeeded in making contact with al-Qaeda. Until his death, Anwar al-Awlaki became a prime English language propagandist who had remarkable success in influencing Americans to undertake malign aspirational tribal routes to terrorist violence that impacted the home front.[18] We also ask where are the American al-Qaeda lone wolves? With that nagging question in mind, we will undertake a brief examination of Bryant Neal Vinas and the exceptional case of the Ft. Hood shooter, Dr. Nidal Malik Hasan. What we learn may influence our views of MAT and offer new considerations for more appropriate policy responses in the future.

What's more, tribalism poses serious questions about the nature of warfare. As a consequence, we will briefly consider future warfare. We ask, in the context of a "global war on terrorism," with blanket troop withdrawals in Iraq, and a post-withdrawal 2014 Afghanistan, then, will the United States revert back to a more conventional strategy and force structure for national security? If so, we argue that this is exactly the wrong strategy to address aspirational tribal threats. Finally, we offer a new threat model for consideration, which explicitly considers tribalism through an irregular warfare lens. In many ways, our detailed examination of *malign aspirational tribalism* (MAT)—as a result of unrelenting attacks and successes against al-Qaeda—brings us full circle from classic tribal engagements in the style of T. E. Lawrence, to the more lethal MAT threat, and the likely proliferation of lone wolf threats in the West.

So, where will all of this lead us? What seems to have changed, in short, is not the importance and question of Islamic militancy and radicalization movements so much as the notion that studies of terrorism demand a re-thinking of tribalism and modern warfare. Such an examination is at the heart of several cases considered here, not least the rise of malign aspirational tribalism. Our work should move forward, too, with the goal of

revealing the nature of tribalism so as to recast our understanding of the calculus for future threat streams.

Tribal Auxiliaries and Alliances

As seen in the dim light of historical clashes between conventional Western armies and irregular adversaries, Rome's confrontation with Germanic tribes in the Teutoburg Forest in A.D. 9 is a cautionary narrative. Whatever else we may say about the pre-Christian Roman Empire, it certainly used tribal auxiliaries and alliances to press beyond their frontiers. As we proceed to better understand tribalism and its explanation, as with Alexander the Great's west versus east asymmetrical campaign, it's easy to accept that Romanization was on a trajectory course to collide with tribes. From our viewpoint it was something even more; it seems that ancient Germany was in a sense the crucible in which tribalism was tested against Roman civilization.

The evidence of tribal treachery in Germany notwithstanding, we argue that the real danger lies not in tactical losses to an adversary, but in the acceptance of bad assumptions about tribal "friends." While in part this was the result of localized tribal dynamics, it also has roots in broader concepts such as "balanced opposition," which much later, helps to explain tribalism and political violence in the Middle East today.[19] Still, to understand both the underlying tensions of anti-Roman sentiments and Roman miscalculations about Germanic tribes, especially their potential will to resist Roman imperialism, it's important to draw from ancient sources. Tacitus suggested that the Romans wrongly believed that Germanic tribes were too preoccupied with internecine tribal disputes to unify and rise against Roman encroachments.[20] The final issue, in other words, is the idea that tribal cohesion eventually checked Roman military power.

It cannot be overemphasized, however, that Teutoburg Forest is an apt metaphor for asymmetric conflict. To be sure, Publius Quinctilius Varus, the Roman commander of the army of the Rhine, marched his three Roman legions deep into the heart of Germany's dark forests.[21] Varus marched into German tribal territory thought to be largely pacified. Fatally, Roman security rested with Arminius, a "Romanized ally," who had led tribal troops under the Roman banner.[22] Arminius consciously channeled Varus and his legions into unfamiliar terrain. Using the terrain to their advantage, the

Germanic tribes sprang their ambush and destroyed three entire legions. The Romans suffered a decisive defeat. Varus operated without sound reconnaissance on unfamiliar terrain. In the end, the Romans proved vulnerable to treachery, and to a tribal strategy deliberately crafted to circumvent their strength.[23]

By considering recent tribal patterns of warfare in Afghanistan, Iraq, and as part of the broader "war on terrorism" in places like Yemen, some analysts have consciously examined the relationship between T. E. Lawrence of Arabia and his connection to irregular tribal warfare.[24] For the past decade, a popular trope of irregular warfare theory among strategists is the analysis of Lawrence and his successful engagement with tribes. For example, in his recent book, *Hero: The Life and Legend of Lawrence of Arabia*, Lawrence biographer Michael Korda charted Lawrence's progressive "thinking about how the Arabs might win their war against the Turks."[25] In his own words, Lawrence "thought of the Arab aim, and saw that it was geographical, to occupy all Arabic-speaking lands in Asia."[26] Put simply, the key drivers for the cooperation between a non-Muslim, white Briton and Arab tribesmen were, in the end, about ancestral lands, power, and post-war political concessions. To sum up, geographical pragmatism, rather than ideological passions, created the post-war remapping of the Middle East—a tribal *Realpolitik*, as it were.[27]

Still, it's useful to comment that Lawrence pierced a tribal structure with the aim of creating an alliance that ejected the Ottoman Turks from Arab lands. In that light, it is clear that harnessing tribes, when aligned with military-political aims, proved a relatively fruitful effort. And later in our paper when we discuss the tribal awakening in Iraq, it will be clear to the reader that al-Qaeda, too, was challenged with building alliances—designed to counter Western interests in Iraq and foment wide-scale sectarian violence. We will examine in detail why that effort failed later. But now, from the benefit of our brief historical analysis, we may also preliminarily conclude that tribal alliances are not a new dynamic at all, and are a main empirical point of departure for understanding that modern warfare episodically includes building successful alliances with tribes, too. For some, tribal alliances and their insurrectionary patterns, as we can observe of the "Arab Revolt," promised that tribes remained an important feature of warfare, and is a relevant strategy for countering terrorism and political violence in this new millennium given the development of a nimble and

flexible policy toward tribal actors. Even as an uncertain and relative peace settles in among the modern tribes in Iraq and elsewhere, previously contending tribes struggling over local influence will likely remain a factor for future security questions in the West. We can conclude that while ascriptive tribes have considerable short-term utility as allies, these alliances have to date proven volatile and neither durable nor completely reliable.[28]

These tribal relationships and alliances particularly reveal their true character when they are not part of a natural order, rather when they are created artificially and are seen as expedient. Put differently, our examination so far reveals that tribal alliances do not demand deep anthropological knowledge, but instead are circumstantial, pragmatic, and convenient. In *The Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda*, for example, author Fawaz Gerges argues persuasively that "Al-Qaeda was a marriage of convenience" between two ideological camps—between Egyptians and Saudi-Yemeni jihadists. Gerges writes figuratively that this merger was an understandable alliance between "two Islamist tribes."[29] From our perspective, too, it is indeed understandable that ideologies can be stretched to accommodate two ideological and divergent al-Qaeda constituencies, mostly because they share common grievances and the same Western enemy. And so, through the prism of a common enemy, we can come to understand such a union. After all, even with our brief examination of Arminius and the Germanic tribes, we observed that internecine squabbles were set aside in order to channel hostilities toward a mutual Western enemy. This, in turn, leads us to remark that al-Qaeda may very well fit the pattern of a global tribe.[30] In these regards, by transcending boundaries, sharing a common enemy, and—as we will examine closer later—with MAT developing as a 21st-century phenomenon, we argue that post-ascriptive tribalism is a jihadist alternative to the more orthodox patterns of ascription with a tribe. To this day, balanced opposition in the context of the Middle East consists of coalitions of families who often adopt religious or ideological flags of convenience. In an uncompromising environment, this arrangement assures the survival of the tribe even if a significant segment of the tribe is killed.

It is beyond the scope of this study to examine a full accounting of Wilhelm Wasmuss's work with tribes in Persia during the First World War. Outside of Peter Hopkirk's magisterial volumes on the "Great Game," sources on Wasmuss fall disappointingly short. Thus, we examine Wasmuss only briefly because of his capacity to represent the nature of irregular

warfare, and because of his modest successes toward building a tribal alliance that had strategic implications, despite ultimately being on the losing side of a global struggle.[31] And using Wasmuss underscores our point that Westerners are not excluded by their birth or religion from attempting to wage jihad—this idea takes on a new sense of urgency in the West, as the threat of homegrown tribalism allows Muslim converts to seek and ultimately join al-Qaeda against their avowed enemies.

All of this makes an elegant, if nuanced, tool of warfare—as it was with T. E. Lawrence and his Arab tribal alliance. Historian Robert F. Baumann has suggested that were Clausewitz here today he might agree that, "the passions and rationales that move states to roll the dice of war differ little from those which arouse tribes or insurgents."[32] Indeed, witness the current crisis and passions in Syria, and tribalism in the context of insurrectionary violence and sectarianism ongoing there, including with al-Qaeda and their affiliates.[33] So, tribalism is alive and well in modern Syria; however, it remains uncertain if there are any personalities as colorful as Lawrence or Wasmuss attempting to pierce the milieu in today's Syria for winning influence, decisively.

According to author Peter Hopkirk, Wasmuss "was soon to prove himself an uncomfortable thorn in the flesh of the British, and a growing threat to their presence in the region."[34] Most important, perhaps, owing much to the phenomenon of jihad, Wassmuss's biographer, Christopher Sykes, systematically outlined German efforts to trigger a "Pan-Islamic rising" as well.[35] A closer look at the failed "Holy War," however, as well as later calls for jihad toward the end of the 20th century, suggests that it is important to carefully examine the tides of popular legitimacy with such strategies.[36] The key historical lesson is that, while Western engineered tribal alliances have seldom been completely successful, tribal alliances formed by Muslim actors have often been more fruitful, though Lawrence may well have been a notable exception. We have observed the Ottoman Empire in this context, but more recently the rousing of ascriptive jihadist tribal passions defeated a Western army for the first time in the age of imperialism when a self-styled *Mahdi* (redeemer) in Sudan built a short-lived Islamist state. In the 1930s, the alliance of Wahhabist *Ulama* (men of religion) and the princely al-Saud family unleashed a multi-tribal jihad, which brought them to power and formed the modern state of Saudi Arabia. In the latter case, the jihadist tribesmen had to be destroyed by a counter-jihad in order to stabilize the

newly created kingdom.[37] To further illustrate, al-Qaeda strategist Abu Musab al-Suri wrote that a jihadi campaign should not be undertaken "unless one has digested the principles, ideas and foundations [of jihad]."[38] All these considerations underscore the point that engagements with tribes possess varying degrees of popular legitimacy and, as such, have internal political dynamics to carefully evaluate.

So, we wrap up our examination of historical tribal alliances—as with our cases of Arminius, Lawrence, and Wasmuss—by making some sense of tribalism in terms of warfare and political violence. These ideas should not be dismissed as debates left for war college classrooms; tribalism is as relevant for studying warfare as it is for understanding terrorism and political violence in a broader social context. We consider the extent to which those tribal alliances shared a common thread, despite not always sharing the same religion, or were consummated in a Pre-Christian–Pre-Islamic era, as in the case of Alexander the Great, and with Germanic tribes in the Teutoburg Forest.[39] Here again, we turn to the other side of the coin—when Wasmuss paradoxically formed a tribal alliance to wage jihad with an Islamic partner against their predominantly Christian enemies. But in the case of Islam, how can significant religious differences between Muslims and Christians be overcome for the sake of forming a strategic alliance? Or is it just that our common framework for understanding political violence in the aftermath of 9/11—which seems to eschew tribalism[40]—has discouraged us from examining political violence through a more practical, less emotive, tribal narrative?

Rather, when explaining jihadi terrorism, Western strategists seem to focus on far more discordant and divisive questions on Islam and superficial interpretations of the Qu'ran. In part, though we are just beginning to scratch the surface of the implications of tribalism for U.S. national security, we must be prepared to accept the possibility that tribalism is an important social contract that transcends even religious factors. Tribalism is a dynamic force however, making its contours negotiable. Yet tribal ties can be harnessed with practical implications for warfare, albeit with unlikely partners. The very manner in which we reconsider tribalism in the context of terrorism may be the better narrative, and perhaps *the* critical variable that helps us re-conceptualize future threat streams.

9/11-Era Tribalism and Conflict: Afghanistan and Pakistan

Whatever else we might conclude about al-Qaeda's alliance with the Taliban in Afghanistan, it certainly had a dreamlike and scripted quality for bin Laden and his jihadists. Author Peter Bergen observed that bin Laden sought refuge in Afghanistan and was inspired to follow the metaphorical path that the "Prophet Mohammad had himself made fourteen centuries earlier to escape the Pagans of Mecca and to build his perfect Islamic society in the nearby town of Medina."[41] Of greater interest, however, is the argument that much of Mohammad's 7th-century strategy was about consolidating a base of operations in Medina, building a tribal coalition, and ultimately preparing for a final victory in Mecca. Richard A. Gabriel's *Mohammad: Islam's First Great General*, looks at the tribal alliances in prescient detail, and has achieved its place as a comprehensive examination of Mohammad's Generalship. Accordingly, Gabriel notes, "… no single tribe or feasible coalition of tribes in the Hejaz could hope to resist Mohammad and his Muslims through force of arms."[42] In his own right, then, Mohammad eventually became a powerful master of irregular warfare in his time, exactly the kind of "ideological cohesiveness and *assibiya*, or tribal solidarity" that bin Laden seemed to play out in Afghanistan—and much later in our narrative—with al-Qaeda affiliates in Yemen.[43] For example, both the Taliban and al-Qaeda utilize the pre-Islamic *baya* system. In this form of tribal organization, a man offers his personal *baya* (oath of allegiance) to mark his fealty to an ascriptive or aspirational tribal leader. On a larger scale, the *baya* links tribes to each other and to central regimes (or foreign armies). The legitimacy of the practice is unquestioned as the Prophet himself used this form of alliance-building behavior. However, just as a *baya* is freely given, it can be freely withdrawn at any time, which accounts in part for the instability of both Islamic states and tribal alliances.[44]

These historical circumstances should directly impact our view of bin Laden through a tribalism narrative, because a by-product of "Bin Laden-ism," which achieved little attention in the West at the time, was what Gerges called "raw tribalism,"[45] whereby bin Laden was able to harness passions, apply messianic religious fervor, and begin to unite disparate jihadists, while at the same time seeking Taliban protection in a tribal sanctuary. This is why bin Laden offered his *baya* to Mullah Omar, acknowledging the Taliban leader as al-Qaeda's "tribal chief."[46]

There are recent studies of tribalism in which scholars have explicitly contended that, “Islam, a civilizing force, has fallen under the spell of Islamists who are a tribalizing force.”[47] Still, few academics or terrorism experts have seriously considered tribalism and terrorism together in a broader study, because questions about malign tribalism are methodologically difficult, and are thus more contentious than conventional studies that settle on widely accepted themes on militant Islam. After all, we argue that malign tribalism should be classified with other destructive ideologies, which are difficult to be discredited or dismissed out-of-hand, because their patterns are so amorphous. And if we consider MAT, at its very roots it is: emotional, intensely personal, and undetectable on the surface, which is precisely why the phenomenon is potentially so dangerous.

Consider the case of Humam Khalil al-Bulawi, an al-Qaeda triple agent and aspirational suicide bomber—a loner who made an ideological conversion to al-Qaeda, and like Arminius, betrayed his supposed allies—his CIA and Jordanian “friends.”[48] It is important here to challenge the exclusivity of a sophisticated al-Qaeda intelligence operation, however, not just because it obscures the notion of MAT as another possible explanation, but also because it allows us to see how an ideological journey can lead directly to a tribal sanctuary in Pakistan, and then to lethal violence in Afghanistan. Again, access to the tribal areas was accepted on an ideological basis, rather than by al-Bulawi’s tribal lineage. Still, this sanguinary examination of a deceptive alliance gone bad, not only brings a discussion of warfare and tribalism to a context and level that has been almost completely ignored in most studies of political violence, but it also offers an argument for one of the most compelling and yet under-examined, and somewhat muted, aspects of Bid Laden-ism: the uniquely tribal contours of al-Qaeda’s ideological and virtual sanctuary, which inexorably becomes more important to comprehend as al-Qaeda struggles for its very existence in the tribal areas of Pakistan and elsewhere.

As the “global war on terrorism” winds down, we will likely continue to see patterns of malign aspirational tribalism. These patterns will be revealed by religious or ideological conversions and self-radicalization of those individuals alienated from their societies, and we will continue to see migratory movements to alternative and virtual tribal sanctuaries. There is the possibility of more localized Western terrorism, which will play out because it’s the safer sanctuary—the space that unmanned drones won’t

likely operate in. Without serious attention to tribalism and irregular warfare, a future counterterrorism strategy will be overlooking a crucial dimension. Following from this, it's especially pertinent to ask, then, what lessons might be learned from coalition interactions with tribes in Afghanistan?

Historical context is often brought to bear on strategy and national security decision-making. But, as the tribal experiences of Alexander the Great illustrate, tribal populations most often responded with rebellion or intermittent compliance. Yet, it is almost a certainty that tribal alliances are crucial channels through which those drawn to al-Qaeda will similarly seek to exploit local vulnerabilities. But the degree to which tribes were leveraged in Afghanistan as allies—the notable exception being the beginning of the ground war in 2001[49]—was not explicitly addressed publicly until 2010—a full nine years into the war in Afghanistan.

Then, *The Washington Post* elevated tribal warfare into open public discourse by highlighting "Jim Gant, the Green Beret who could win the war in Afghanistan." Reporter Ann Scott Tyson was quite explicit that Gant, a Special Forces Major, was fighting alongside Pashtun tribesmen in Afghanistan. However, she also reported that the "U.S. military had no plans to leverage the Pashtun tribal networks against the insurgents, so Gant kept his alliances quiet."[50] Even if tribal engagement was nested with a far-reaching, more coherent strategy for Afghanistan—which disappointingly it was not—by 2010, tribal engagement was far too little, and too late to affect a decisive outcome in Afghanistan. Moreover, the notion that tackling tribalism in Afghanistan as a path to decisive victory is Quixotism at best. Not surprisingly, episodic cases of tribal engagement as a strategy leading to victory in Afghanistan failed to cohere convincingly.

In turn, the public discourse over Gant's "Tribal Engagement Strategy"[51] instead exposed two opposing viewpoints for fighting in Afghanistan: employing the "Hearts and Minds" strategy of classic popular war, meaning counterinsurgency, or alternatively applying a less ground-centric, counterterrorism approach. Vice President Joseph Biden favored a combination of Special Operations Forces and drones—decidedly, a counterterrorism design that was to focus more on remnants of al-Qaeda, rather than the broader Taliban-Pashtun insurgency.[52] Consistent with the distinctions of two such strategies, it is fundamentally too difficult to square tribal engagement with that of a counterinsurgency strategy, unless there is a comprehensive process for carefully measuring and managing tribal

engagements on a grand scale. In other words, choosing, arming, and cultivating the right tribal partners has to be surgical and precise, or it risks undermining the central government, or the tribe in the next valley, which is more often than not, equally as dangerous.[53] In short, large-scale tribal engagement has to be managed as a political-military priority, or it is best not done at all.

Beyond the usual rhetoric that tribes are the dominant social system in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen, almost entirely missing from existing terrorism studies is a serious explanation of why counterterrorism policies do not explicitly address tribal engagement as part of a long-term strategy. Peter Bergen makes the case that even in the beginning of our ongoing war in Afghanistan, the Northern Alliance was too narrowly focused on going after bin Laden, rather than being "a strategic partner to defeat al-Qaeda and the Taliban."[54]

In any event, these points are now moot in the context of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. With troop withdrawals precipitously announced by the Obama Administration, and with all eyes on post-2014 Afghanistan, drone strikes in the tribal areas of Pakistan are still favored over any coherent or broad-based leveraging of tribal alliances.[55] Still, what remains as a tribal option for U.S. strategic planners is finding the means toward exploiting the self-defeating strategy of militants that push the limits of their own tribal engagements. Put differently, there is a tipping point where the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other militants trigger a cycle of insurrectional violence against themselves. We will later examine the closest analogue to this phenomenon in Iraq by examining the U.S. experiences with Sunni tribes. But this leads to another more pressing question as far as terrorism and tribalism is concerned: not so much how coalitions can partner with tribes, but rather learning how better to counter terrorists and their affiliates from building their own tribal alliances. Maybe, this path is the better course to follow.

It is worth emphasizing, as noted above, that al-Qaeda is susceptible—in reverse—to a lethal process that David Kilcullen in *The Accidental Guerrilla* calls "rejection." This virulent dynamic is summarized when, for example, al-Qaeda moves into tribal areas, builds their alliances, and predictably triggers a hostile Western response, whereby al-Qaeda "exploits" the tribal backlash against their Western interventionary adversaries.[56] This interventionary cycle happened throughout 3,000 years of Afghan history, back to Alexander the Great, the British, the Soviet Union, and eventually

with today's milieu in Afghanistan, but it follows a familiar historical pattern: the foreigner becomes bogged down by tribal alliances and by the often-incomprehensible particularities of tribalism.[57] It is crucial to remember that Arabs in Pakistan's Federal Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) are foreigners too, and perhaps have overreached with their tribal hosts to a certain extent; this is an al-Qaeda vulnerability.[58] Above all, this dynamic is at the very heart of tribalism, and Kilcullen references the powerful influences of tribal tradition, which elucidates our point: whether it occurs with a counterinsurgency, or with a counterterrorism strategy, tribalism will be a pattern that has to be considered, and in some cases, exploited by both sides of the fight.[59]

Parallel to rejection based on Western pressure is rejection based on overreach; the temptation to too quickly impose radical versions of Islamic law, to extort businesses or tribal elites for money, or to resort to arbitrary arrests and executions. These make tribes receptive to the intervention of foreign forces who then fail to either comprehend local cultures or to be indiscriminate in their choice of targets between local tribesmen and jihadist fighters. This in turn makes the same tribes susceptible to the return of the very same forces that they had sought Western cooperation to eject. Afghan tribal relations with the Taliban after the American intervention is a case in point.

Such an approach that overreaches with Afghan tribes would, of course, pose a grave danger for those who push beyond the "tipping" point. At some level too, there must be an effective counter narrative to go along with any U.S. efforts to accelerate a tribal interventionary backlash against al-Qaeda. Yet this sort of unconventional back and forth with tribes may still require a complementary variant of the U.S. interventionary strategy that worked in 2001: fewer conventional forces, a small footprint of Special Operations Forces left in place to work with Afghan partners,[60] and balanced with limited counterterrorism operations and discreet, surgical tribal engagements designed to co-opt and reward key tribes that will neutralize al-Qaeda. A primary value of this strategy is that fluid alliance relationships are traditional among Afghan tribes. These tribes are conservative by nature and highly suspicious of innovations (*bida*) of any kind. This makes tribesmen resistant to non-traditional tactical approaches in the military sense, as well as changes in their understandings of law, of gender, etc. On the other hand, the best possible outcome for the Taliban-Pashtun insurgency is some kind

of political arrangement for the cessation of hostilities, because strategists are already signaling the abandonment of any notion of counterinsurgency operations on an appreciable scale. In fact, the current U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine anywhere in the world is at risk.[61] The reaction to these kinds of open strategy discussions does little to deter the Taliban and al-Qaeda; rather, it is probably enough to lead them to escalate attacks now in order to gain as much ground as possible. This likely provides leverage for any potential peace negotiations or post-war political concessions.

So it goes, too, while we are debating a post-2014 strategy, our adversaries in the tribal areas have already waged a lethal and protracted tribal struggle. Alarmingly, traditional tribal leaders were systematically destroyed by the Taliban in some places, and were replaced by more "compliant" tribal leaders.[62] It seems that the Taliban have executed a lethal tribal campaign, while the Western coalition dismissed any serious notion of a tribal strategy beyond crucially effective drone strikes that raise the cost of any al-Qaeda gatherings or open training in their tribal sanctuary, at the risk of increasing alienation of local tribesmen. In covering that tribal ground, this paper argues another important point. We assert that the putative risk when all is said and done is not as much about whether militants hiding in tribal sanctuaries will be able to plan and execute attacks in Afghanistan, as it is about those militants that leave for the West or go to other sanctuaries to join al-Qaeda affiliates. As Jessica Stern labeled it, perhaps the greater concern, then, is the "protean" nature of our adversaries, and how they will adapt. Worse still, Stern reminds us that Mir Aimal Kansi's 1993 lone wolf attack against CIA employees in Langley, Virginia, meets our definition of malign tribalism at some level.[63]

Moreover, a logical consequence of post-ascriptive tribalism is that the al-Qaeda movement, while leaving in place an uncertain constituency in Afghanistan and Pakistan, will seek a greater appeal beyond the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas). Though the Manichean worldviews of the Taliban and al-Qaeda holdovers will likely persist at some level, we suspect that those extremists that break out and get to the West will be even better trained and more radicalized than was Kansi. In the end, tribes still matter. Our re-conceptualization of tribalism matters even more: radicalization waged under the banner of a slowing but still relevant global movement is a consequence of its very survival. In addition, the de-

territorialization of al-Qaeda in the FATA puts al-Qaeda under pressure to either move to other sanctuaries or to quietly reconstitute in the West.

9/11-Era Tribalism and Conflict: Iraq

If Afghanistan's original *mujahedeen* spread like an "Islamist contagion"[64] in the aftermath of Afghanistan's 1980s-era anti-Soviet jihad, what, then, are the global implications of leftover jihadist fighters from the war in Iraq? And having established a framework for thinking about tribes in Afghanistan, how, then, does our examination of tribes square with the war in Iraq? Briefly, we will demonstrate that tribes and tribalism in Iraq are indicative of our point that the de-territorialization of al-Qaeda in Iraq is a direct result of their overreach, and illustrative of just how far al-Qaeda's excessive use of violence and provocation led to their own destruction. Moreover, de-territorialization is not the same as destruction. Violence is fungible—forced out of one redoubt it will not disappear. Rather, it will reappear in other territories, often in more lethal and less detectable form. This is the deadly logic of the emergence of lone wolf terrorism emerging from the end game in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Ultimately, al-Qaeda's missteps set in motion their eventual implosion in Iraq. There were, of course, instinctive and effective U.S. responses to the tribal backlash, which exploited al-Qaeda's miscalculations. Only then did a new generation of U.S. military talent, freed from the indelible markings of a poorly conceived conventional military strategy—and their hunt for non-existent weapons of mass destruction—come to appreciate tribes as a crucial ally.

So far this study has implied that an examination of al-Qaeda's tribal strategy in Iraq might reveal useful threads for a broader terrorism narrative. Indeed, we agree that those foreign fighters who have fought in Iraq may live to fight on other battlefields. For example, Peter Bergen and Alec Reynolds argued relatively early on that foreign fighters drawn to Iraq would eventually seek out other fields for continuing their violence.[65] More alarmingly still, approximately four thousand foreign fighters were motivated to make their way to Iraq to kill its foreign U.S. invaders.[66] But as suggested throughout this paper, these kinds of alliances are key ingredients for making better-trained terrorists who are ripe for exporting political violence. Notwithstanding the lessons about leftover foreign fighters from

Afghanistan's first jihad, the real problem in Iraq was the strategic alliance of al-Qaeda with Sunni tribes. To be sure, Sunni tribes underwent an artificial re-tribalization process, which was a direct result of the power vacuum created by the U.S. invasion in 2003, which left them vulnerable to the "Shi'a Awakening," which for the first time allowed the Shi'ite majority to reclaim the power that Sunnis had monopolized since Iraqi Independence following WWII.[67] In other words, the U.S. invasion of Iraq disturbed the traditional tribal equilibrium, and al-Qaeda shrewdly aligned with Sunni tribes,[68] who rightly feared the emergence of the Shi'ite majority to positions of power. Taken together, one sees the danger of a disturbed social system that unleashed improbable mergers between otherwise disparate groups. Those violent extremists coalesced purely because they shared a mutual enemy, which is inherently a manifestation of tribal particularism.[69]

Before turning to investigate tribalism outside of Iraq, namely those drawn to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, this study needs to pause to finish our discussion of al-Qaeda's overreach in Iraq. Following from this, and especially important in terms of future regional policy calculus, we will also provide critical commentary on the implications of the U.S. overreach in Iraq. While this study has established the crucial point that al-Qaeda's strategy in Iraq proved largely counterproductive, other scholars are left to more closely examine the reasons why military planners missed so widely on implementing a tribal engagement strategy at the outset of the Iraq campaign. In the end, the U.S. exploited al-Qaeda's missteps, but it fundamentally miscalculated the importance of tribes early on, so perhaps the U.S. was more lucky than good.[70]

Yet, the future of Iraq is still an open question, and more time is needed to elapse before final conclusions may be drawn. But Iraq already seems to have compelled the U.S. to begin an inexorable, deliberate military disengagement from the Middle East. Will such a U.S. drift away from the region increase the potential for malign tribalism elsewhere in the region? And, what, then, does it mean when some of these fighters break out to exploit tribal passions beyond Iraq, because they have a shared enemy? And what has al-Qaeda learned about the numbing consequential cycle of reprisals and counter-reprisals of political violence against tribes? In point of fact, al-Qaeda affiliates in Yemen seem to be leveraging and building tribal alliances, and they have opened a new front.[71] There is little evidence to suggest that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula will make the same kind of

mistakes that were made with tribes in Iraq, which means that counterterrorism measures must exploit al-Qaeda mistakes.

Although lessons on insurgency and raw tribalism from Thucydides' era are explicitly sparse, some historical comparisons are worth considering. Words like "quagmire" and "slippery slope" were not only used to compare U.S. interventions ranging from Iraq and Afghanistan to Vietnam and Korea, but they can also be used to also to describe ancient examples of strategic overreach. Not surprisingly, historians have compared the ancient Athenian invasion of Sicily during the Peloponnesian War to the U.S. intervention in Iraq.[72] Correspondingly, at a time when the U.S. had not suffered from any major attacks in the homeland since 2001, the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, and opened a new military theater of operation as part of its broader "War on Terrorism." In short, some suggest that Sicily and Iraq are a metaphor for several ideas linked to our narrative: First, al-Qaeda and their affiliates will continue to exploit any U.S. miscalculations, such as they attempted to do with the U.S. intervention in Iraq, much like the Spartans did to the Athenians in Sicily. Secondly, the U.S. interventionary experience in Iraq—regardless of true U.S. intentions—reinforces a persistent narrative that the U.S. is attacking Islam. Thirdly, it demonstrates that al-Qaeda exercises remarkable operational flexibility for seizing strategic opportunities with tribes. Finally, al-Qaeda defeated itself in Iraq, as can be argued for the Athenians in ancient Sicily.

But Iraq may still be interpreted as a victory for al-Qaeda, because it energized insurrectional goals elsewhere, which already seem to be budding in Yemen. So, these reflections all give credence to our theme that tribal patterns pose challenges and opportunities for political violence, and those charged with countering political violence. In the end, a central element of any counter-strategy must consider tribal dynamics at some level. As such, leveraging tribes persuasively depends on a sophisticated, properly crafted strategy, and may very well be a decisive factor for undermining remnants of al-Qaeda.

On Tribalism and Irregular Warfare: A "New Trinity" Model

Yemen can be seen as a convergence of our re-conceptualized definition of malign tribalism and political violence, and can be summed up as a post-Iraq progression. Although no model is a panacea, it is a beginning point for

considering undercurrents of irregular warfare, which are manifest in other places where the state is weak and inherently tribal.[73] Yemen may be considered as a case study by which we can theorize about more MAT in the future. It not only fits our narrative, but it is illustrative of a harmful imbalance of a weak state with tribes as the dominant social fabric. Although not explicitly covered in this article, we argue that the lessons learned regarding tribalism in the Middle East would be of preeminent value in dealing with conflicts in Africa. The contigent is emerging as the key theater of U.S. operations in the post-Afghanistan era. Paradoxically, even when the weak state and its extremist actors are contained, or when the tribes "reject" a malign tribal influence, the West still has to contend with self-radicalized violent extremists who may resort to violence to achieve their ends. This model can just as easily be applied to Somalia, Pakistan, and other places where malign tribalism can be grafted to a dominant tribal landscape.

Still, as we have stressed throughout this article, the West must develop more sophisticated partnerships, which means that in the aftermath of Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. must work tirelessly with states and their security and intelligence services to accelerate the process of "rejection" in any ungoverned space that may be used as a sanctuary. In this respect, it is both feasible and vital for the U.S. to develop a model that will "red flag" malign tribal threats emerging primarily from failed states and ungoverned spaces. Although unilateral action still remains an option for the West, as the bin Laden raid demonstrated, there are socio-political consequences for such actions, and U.S. national security decision-makers must inevitably weigh and consider all options.[74] Working with partners more discreetly is likely more acceptable than large-scale U.S. military operations. In a time when many tend to regard U.S. unilateralism as a negative extension of power, such options remain available in any future U.S. strategic calculus. In places like Pakistan, and even Yemen, ungoverned and tribal space often straddle national boundaries. As a result, interventionary decisions are internationalized and complex, yet tribal affiliation is the social identity that matters most on-the-ground, so it is there that malign actors have to be relentlessly pressured.

The "New Trinity"

To the extent that the reader is now better prepared to recognize that this line of inquiry demands serious attention, it is time to better explain why this should be so. Thus we resort to our version of a "New Trinity" model[75] (see Figure 1).

Consider that geography, historical circumstances, and tribal affiliation are often constrained to a certain extent by political boundaries, although as we have seen throughout the Islamic world, these boundaries are artificial and thus less important than those that are based on ascription with a tribe. At the same time, because these areas of the world nonetheless progressed as nation-states, we can still consider the "Clausewitzean Trinity" as a useful way to think about irregular warfare, and to think about malign tribalism, too. Edward J. Villacres and Christopher Bassford, in a *Parameters* article, "Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity," wrote that Clausewitz defined the essential trinitarian parts as: "primordial violence, hatred and enmity; the play of chance and probability; and war's subordination to rational policy."[76] In addition, Villacres and Bassford highlight a more recent interpretation that defines the trinity as the "people, army, and government."[77] These definitions are incomplete for our purposes without some additional context on tribalism. Rather than learning the essential parts of Clausewitz's theory and defining what war is, at first glance, a somewhat useful way to understand that where societal patterns are essentially rooted to tribalism, and when the state is considered weak, groups like al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula will see strategic opportunities.

Before proceeding further with our model, it is prudent to provide a review of the most important terms we will use. The first term that requires revisiting is our specific re-conceptualization of an ideology: malign tribalism. Recall that we define malign tribalism as an idiosyncratic ideology that mimics primordial ties that would normally fit an anthropological definition of a tribe. Both ascriptive and aspirational forms of tribalism may emerge in malign forms. As such, we make the assumption that members acting out these ideologies would reject our assertion of tribalism; rather they would argue they are religiously inspired, and defenders of their faith. Inherent in such a claim however, is the conception of *umma* (community of believers), which was seen by the Prophet as the ultimate all-Muslim aspirational. A theological discussion here about jihadists only serves as an accelerant to fuel their quixotic pursuit for legitimacy, which we find counterproductive.[78] In short, our definition of ideology corresponds to a

malignant and corrupted strain of tribalism. Those adherents of violent extremist movements—like Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab—were inspired and drawn in to a malign transnational tribe in Yemen: a weak state with ungoverned and distinguishable tribal areas, where our definition of a "Trinitarian" imbalance holds true. Even if ascriptive tribal identities in places like Yemen are conceived as a traditional societal pattern, they can be both constraining and enabling. To be sure, once mobilized and protected in tribal areas, non-state extremist actors—like the late Anwar al-Awlaki—tend to be deeply embedded and suspiciously independent of whatever ascriptive tribes were responsible for supporting them and, therefore, they are not easily dismantled, and must therefore be targeted.[79]

Figure 1. Tribalism and the "new trinity" (color figure available online).

The case of Anwar al-Awlaki raises some controversial issues, which pit national security interests against core American values such as the right of free speech and the right to trial by jury as protected by the U.S.

Constitution. Al-Awlaki was an American citizen who converted to radical Islam and as shall be considered later in this paper, in a rare achievement was allowed access to the heart of the aspirational structure of al-Qaeda central. He was a propagandist in the English language, and was remarkably influential. Yet, he never took arms or directly engaged in battle with Americans. Before 9/11, he would probably have been placed on a watch list and monitored closely by intelligence services. A U.S. drone missile reportedly killed him on September 30, 2011. The legal framework for the action has significant ramifications for lone wolves seeking to join aspirational tribes. In a memorandum dated June 2010, the killing of American citizens abroad was determined to be in accord with U.S. law "only if it were not feasible to take him alive."[80]

The final concept that requires elaboration in terms of our model is the social phenomenon of aspirational tribalism—harnessing the passions of a globalized movement—where those seeking membership with a malign transnational tribe like al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula are subsequently trained in ungoverned tribal space in the hopes that they can eventually attack targets in the West. Our contention is that, in the long run, if those adherents that are inspired to make such a journey are either contained or killed in those weak states, then, it is indeed a localized problem. This, however, does not account for homegrown terrorism.[81]

The final caveat that should be taken into consideration is the downstream effect of successfully thwarting extremist movements in places like Yemen. In spite of the fact that counterterrorist efforts in Yemen might prove successful, MAT can still develop virtually through ideological messaging via social media channels to those who seek membership. The other threat to consider is those who self-radicalize and already reside in the West. Accordingly, emphasis must be placed on preventing lone wolf actors such as Major Malik Hasan, the Fort Hood attacker, which demands that we should expand future research on a more detailed examination of this solitary manifestation of MAT. Still, our "New Trinity" model seems to hold for Hasan too; al-Awlaki inspired Hasan to act from his tribal sanctuary in Yemen, with all of the dynamics associated with local tribes, a weak state, and a malign ideology taking root.[82] This trend of lone wolf actors, however, may very well prove to be exceedingly difficult to predict and to stop. If our examination of Yemen and tribal dynamics through a Clausewitzean lens challenges more conventional ideas of tribalism in the Middle East and

Afghanistan, this current trend may be the next chapter in the threat narrative, but it will certainly play out in the West.

Malign Aspirational Tribalism: American Lone Wolves, Al-Qaeda,[83] and Beyond

Our article focuses almost exclusively on tribalism, both ascriptive and aspirational, as these concepts apply to Islamist violence. Given the U.S. post-9/11 attention on jihadist threats—see for example the FBI's list of most wanted terrorists discussed below where 28 of 29 fugitives are Muslim jihadists—this is only natural in a security oriented study. Yet before examining Islamist lone wolves, we must pause to note emerging theoretical patterns in the study of global lone wolf and autonomous cell terrorism in the light of the "New Tribalisms."

When Texas Klansman Louis Beam wrote his seminal essay "Leaderless Resistance" for an audience of American radical right-wingers,[84] the tactic was already long in use in that milieu. Unknown to the radical right of the day, a long-active serial killer named Joseph Paul Franklin had been operating for more than a decade.[85] Franklin joined the National Socialist White People's Party (NSWPP) in 1966.[86] He became a lone wolf practicing leaderless resistance by circumstances rather than choice as no leader could long tolerate his malevolent presence. His coast to coast shooting rampage included such disparate targets as interracial couples jogging in Seattle, Vernon Jordan, a civil rights leader and later presidential advisor to Bill Clinton, and most famously the publisher of *Hustler* magazine Larry Flynt, whose transgressions included publishing photographs of interracial sex. He was captured and his crimes became public in 1980. William Pierce, a long-time American National Socialist leader wrote a novel, *Hunter*, which was dedicated to Franklin and which presented Franklin's tactics as models for emulation.[87]

Franklin was a successful killer but a poor terrorist. Terrorism as Franklin practiced it was certainly leaderless resistance, but it was also *messageless* resistance. He could operate over decades because of his constantly shifting locales, weapons, and targets. Law enforcement did not link the shootings, treating them as individual local criminal acts. The public was unaware that an active terrorist was attempting to terrorize them and likeminded would-be terrorists were equally unaware of Franklin's message. Few actually read

Beam's essay, although it was Beam who gave the term "leaderless resistance" to the world of terrorism, where it has been adopted by a wide array of belief systems well beyond the radical right. But it was *Hunter*'s glorification of Franklin that attracted an international group of terrorist killers to emulate his example, albeit with better results in terms of transmitting a message.

This brief consideration of non-Islamic lone wolves yields two points of comparison with the Muslim actors that we have considered thus far. First, in both sets of actors, a radicalization process is followed by actual contact with much admired domestic leaders as in the radical right or distant overseas fighters as in jihadist terrorism. Whether it is the ideological heirs of Joseph Franklin, Bryant Neal Vinas, or Anwar al-Awlaki, the encouragement of foreign fighters both energizes and legitimizes the violence of homegrown lone wolf or autonomous cells. Second, and more important, there appears to be a vast difference in the intent and implementation of terrorist acts between the Islamic and right-wing cases. With Islamic lone wolf or autonomous cell violence, the aim is for the epic—spectacular operations with large body counts. With suicide terrorism (self-martyring operations), the 7/7 attacks on the British subway system, or Bryant Neal Vinas' providing information to al-Qaeda on the Long Island railroad, the emphasis is on spectacular attacks to send messages that have global resonance. While not all, or even most, Islamic lone wolves intend to die in the operation, escape does not seem to be much of a consideration either. These attacks are one-offs, without any thought given to an encore performance once the terrorist has struck his or her appointed target. It is the act, not the actor, that is paramount. Terrorism is more a form of art, then, a statement with a lasting message.[88]

By contrast, non-Islamic terrorists largely focus on longevity at the cost of the spectacular. Even when the act of terrorism is large scale such as the Oklahoma City bombing (an outstanding example of autonomous cell violence), Timothy McVeigh did his best to escape. Terror in this sense is seen as an ongoing process. The purification of the race or tribe—both ascriptive and aspirational as we have described—is thus seen as a long and difficult process rather than the Islamist vision of victory as being in reach. Indeed, throughout the Islamic world, with the fall of the dictators in the Arab Spring and the inexorable American withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan, the Islamists' optimism seems more than justified.

At the same time, largely focusing on disrupting and destroying terrorist networks overseas, for all intents and purposes, the U.S. has not widely faced the negative consequences of their successful counterterrorism strategy in the homeland. Still, much remains an open question, because al-Qaeda and others are advocating individual acts of jihad and lone wolf attacks in the West.[89] So, what, then, are the deeper implications of MAT in the U.S. homeland? And where are the American al-Qaeda lone wolves? Attempting to consider such motivations for political violence is often a complex undertaking, but particularly so when the individuals under examination are drawn to a terrorist organization that arguably takes on the characteristics of a global tribe—a concept which is so strikingly alien to American cultural and sociological norms.

Not surprisingly, lone wolf actors are now indeed part of the U.S. post-9/11 milieu. Moreover, American lone wolf Major Nidal Hasan not only acted out violently based on his own beliefs, but al-Qaeda's American born propagandist Azzam al-Amriki (Adam Gadahn) praised Hasan's actions. Gadahn is not to be confused with the now deceased al-Qaeda English language propagandist Anwar al-Awlaki—whose e-mail correspondence helped to inspire Major Hasan's murder of 13 and wounding of 29 U.S. soldiers at Ft. Hood, Texas, on November 9, 2009. This raises some troubling questions in terms of lone wolf terrorism. In one of those e-mails, Hasan wrote to al-Awlaki: "I can't wait to join you in Heaven."[90] And Gadahn praised Hasan as "the ideal role model for every repentant Muslim in the Armies of the unbelievers and apostate regimes."[91] If Major Hasan's religious beliefs hold true, al-Awlaki awaits him in paradise. As to "the American" (literally "al-Amriki" in Arabic), little is known about him. The FBI, in a request for help, writes on its website:

> We are urgently seeking information on the identity of the person pictured here—a self-proclaimed American jihadist using the alias 'Azzam the American, aka 'Azzam Al-Amriki …
>
> He may currently be located outside the United States.
> We hope you might recognize him from his voice, his body language, or the style and content of his speech.[92]

Al-Amriki is believed to be hiding in the tribal areas in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border regions.[93]

Still, conclusively understanding motivations for religio-political violence is especially difficult, but particularly so in the case of Major Nidal Hasan, a U.S.-born service member with no history of political violence. Frustratingly, understanding Hasan's motivations for the Fort Hood killing are still not entirely clear. Along those same lines, why he was drawn to Anwar al-Awlaki's jihadist message may never be fully revealed either, but it does seem that his violence was idiosyncratic, deeply personal, and conformed to a worldview that was influenced by his direct contact with al-Awlaki.[94] It has been suggested that a strong anti-Islamic bias exists at Ft. Hood and perhaps throughout the military, which may have been a radicalizing factor as well.[95] Given the significant role of al-Awlaki's propagandist messaging, linked to his direct provocations against the West, it is necessary to change gears to comparatively examine one other violent U.S. actor drawn to al-Qaeda's lethal message.

Rather than making a tepid case that Bryant Neal Vinas[96] was a lone wolf along the same lines as Hasan, we will examine the most powerful spark in the mind of Vinas, which brings us circuitously back to our earlier "New Trinity" model, malign tribalism and the late radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki. Simply put, the connective tissue between two unrelated U.S. cases was al-Awlaki's inspirational messaging. Among the most powerful sparks for Vinas to take action were al-Awlaki's Internet teachings. Vinas watched and listened intently to al-Awlaki lectures that he found on YouTube. As a fellow salifist,[97] al-Awlaki's message seemed credible and coherent. Vinas knew the vagaries of the philosophical underpinnings of violent jihad from his own self-study. He knew of the 1960s-era Muslim Brotherhood religious scholar Sayyid Qutb; however, he was unfamiliar with more recent intellectual studies and writings available on-line, such as the teachings of al-Qaeda strategist Abu Musab al-Suri.[98] Curiously, al-Awlaki's message to wage a self-directed jihad in the U.S. may have resonated with Hasan, but that still remains an open question. Other social and psychological factors pre-dating his contact with al-Awlaki were in play in this case.

Nevertheless, it was al-Awlaki—an American who had no illusions about the level of Islamic education among his target audience—who made clear and unambiguous appeals for English-speaking Muslims to wage defensive jihad in places like Afghanistan. For Vinas, those appeals were firmly grounded in his limited understanding of the Qu'ran and *hadiths*. Vinas was impressed that al-Awlaki was bold enough to openly advocate violent jihad.

Moreover, Vinas thought al-Awlaki was gifted with an ability to leave a long and lasting impression on his audience. For this reason, due in large part to al-Awlaki's lectures, Vinas aspired to become a salafist militant in order to fight and defend other Muslims from oppression overseas. In the case of Vinas, his radicalization was indeed slow, and though he trained with militant actors in Pakistan, he was not necessarily on a trajectory toward lone wolf terrorism. From what we do know about the phenomenon of lone wolf terrorism, however, it's clear that the idiosyncrasies of Vinas' pattern suggests that there always existed a potential for lone wolf political violence, if the right influence had been exerted. Moreover, his attraction first to the overarching tribe of the Islamic *ummah* and then to the more focused membership in foreign salifist organizations is a clear example of malign ascriptive tribalism as we have described it. In addition, both Major Hasan and Bryant Neal Vinas responded to propaganda that emanated from a tribal sanctuary and directly led to violence. To sum up, this brief examination of al-Awlaki's propaganda demonstrated his influence over—at the very least—two solitary violent actors. To the extent that we have recognized that tribes and tribalism have distinct social patterns, this brief line of inquiry seems to confirm that tribal sanctuaries matter, too. While al-Qaeda's failure to concentrate exclusively on lone wolf messaging may signal strategic shortcomings—a consistent weakness since 9/11—al-Qaeda's challenge is still its own survival in tribal sanctuaries, which often competes with and distracts from provoking lone wolf violence in the West. In the final analysis, then, though time favors the jihadists, lone wolf terrorism does not pose an existential threat, and counter-sanctuary strategies in places like Yemen seem to be aggressively neutralizing malign ascriptive tribalism at its very roots.

Conclusions

In this article, we strenuously argued that an examination of aspirational political violence throughout history reveals that counterterrorism approaches have not yet been fully recast to distinguish tribalism and terrorism together as a compelling narrative. On the other hand, we demonstrated that tribalism not only has been an insufficiently recognized aspect of counterterrorism strategies against al-Qaeda and other forms of terrorist violence, but should policymakers and practitioners ignore malign

tribalism, they do so with some risk to Western security. To restate our central argument, malign tribalism is rooted in religio-political violence and expedient tribal alliances—in places like Yemen, Somalia, and perhaps most alarmingly, London, Stockholm, Texas, and New York. It is in the wake of a decade of post-9/11 warfare and a relentless Western counterterrorism strategy, then, that we see an extra-tribalism dynamic come into better focus, which leads to the likelihood of increasing lone wolf and autonomous cell forms of political violence.

Having established a viable model for re-conceptualizing malign tribalism in places like Yemen, this study demonstrated that where a harmful imbalance of a weak state with tribes is the dominant social structure, jihadists—such as al-Awlaki or William Pierce—can message would-be lone wolfs and draw in other aspirational terrorists such as Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab. In either case, tribalism matters for U.S. long-term security interests in foreign sanctuaries, as well as in the U.S. homeland. The U.S. buys down risk by front-end analysis of tribal dynamics, and by putting intense pressure with partners on ascriptive tribes overseas that host al-Qaeda, their affiliates and aspirants. The other side of the coin is the back-end work, and though not explicitly addressed in this article, we mean aggressive law enforcement-intelligence cooperation in the homeland, and with cooperative foreign partners, which seems to have been the case with American al-Qaeda aspirant Bryant Neal Vinas. And as viewed in the dim light of history, tribal alliances are both necessary and cautionary. Tribal alliances are necessary because such strategic relationships can be a relevant part of a counterterrorism strategy by surgically going after a mutual enemy on the ground, though such alliances are often neither durable nor reliable. While we used the Teutoburg Forest as a cautionary historical analogue, because it was the crucible that tested the durability of a Western alliance with its tribal partners in ancient history, exactly the same dynamic can be seen at play in the disastrous U.S. intervention in the Lebanese Civil War in the 1980s. In that light, harnessing tribal power may begin hopefully, but can still end in disaster.

Before moving to investigate U.S. experiences with tribes in Afghanistan and Iraq, namely those drawn to al-Qaeda’s narrative, the study paused to consider defining our re-conceptualized forms of tribalism. At the apex of aspirational tribes that constitute a security threat to the U.S. is al-Qaeda. We argued that not all aspirational tribes constituted a threat; however, a malign

aspirational tribalism dynamic is the incubator for lone wolf actors to emerge at some undetermined time, and for the establishment of autonomous cells within the aspirant's country of origin. Put another way, we set aside the constraining language of anthropology and settled on the idea that al-Qaeda and their affiliates are an idiosyncratic and insurrectional strain of tribalism, which is primordial to its core and turned dangerously outward.

Another contributing factor to misguided U.S. approaches with counterterrorism strategies and tribes appears to be the tendency to do too little, too late. It is not that U.S. Special Forces did not do some excellent work with tribes in Afghanistan, for example, but large-scale tribal engagement was not managed as a political-military priority, and counterterrorism policy does not explicitly address tribal dynamics. As a result, the United States is left hoping that its adversaries overreach with tribes and that they suffer backlash from their excesses, as they did in Iraq. Yet, we argued that this sort of unconventional back and forth with tribes may still require a small footprint of U.S. Special Operations Forces left in place to work with indigenous partners,[99] balanced with limited counterterrorism operations and discreet, surgical tribal engagements designed to co-opt and reward key tribes that will neutralize any remnants of a resurgent al-Qaeda. With Iraq still an open question, and the success of the al-Anbar Awakening notwithstanding, Iraq may still be interpreted as a victory for al-Qaeda, because it energized insurrectional goals elsewhere, as seen in Yemen. So as we have argued, all of these reflections give credence to our theme that tribal patterns pose challenges and opportunities for political violence, and those charged with countering political violence.

Whatever else we have illuminated about tribes and warfare, jihadists like Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, Humam Khalil al-Bulawi, Mir Aimal Kansi, Major Nidal Hasan, al-Awlaki, and American al-Qaeda aspirant Bryant Neal Vinas each exhibited some symptoms of malign tribalism, interwoven with their own complex personal psychologies. Our thoughts on the American actors like Hasan should be a warning, then, that incipient autonomous jihadist cells or lone wolf forms of political violence are out there somewhere, incubating in the West. Yet there is reason for optimism. Despite revealing our conclusions that lone wolf terrorism is inevitable at some level, jihadist lone wolf terrorism is mostly a strategy of desperation, and the result of unrelenting U.S. pressure on al-Qaeda in tribal areas overseas. This is still the most potent field for training budding jihadists. In turn, if we do indeed

find the U.S. in a protracted struggle against the forces of malign tribalism, the U.S. will need to depart from its more conventional strategies in favor of unconventional forms of warfare.

Final Policy Thoughts

In the end, a central element of any successful counter-strategy must now consider tribal dynamics at some increased level. This study's exploration and analysis of the impact that tribes and tribalism can have on counter-terrorist policy has opened the door for more expansive studies. Strategic thinking can now consider tribalism and terrorism together, and though it's more unconventional than widely accepted ideas about militant Islam, it also provides a framework that even vindicates elements of Clausewitzean thought, when applied to patterns of terrorism in contested tribal space. After all, we argued that malign tribalism should be considered like any other potentially destructive ideologies, which means historical lessons on irregular warfare and the Cold War are still relevant, too. In closing, leveraging tribes persuasively depends on a sophisticated, properly crafted strategy, and may very well be the decisive factor for undermining any remnants of al-Qaeda.

Notes

1. Arthur Weigall, *Alexander the Great* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1933), 274.
2. Ibid., 275.
3. Ira M. Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
4. Hanna Batutu, *The Old Social Classes and Revolutionary Movements in Iraq* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978). One suspects that if U.S. policy makers had attempted to read this 1200 + page tome they would have been less sanguine in their expectations for a post-Saddam Iraq.
5. Discussion with Jeffrey Kaplan, The name of the advisor is withheld.
6. In this they are correct. The Prophet Mohammad was a product of the tribalized culture of 6th-century Arabia who envisioned an Islamized world in terms of a single, vast, unified tribe. For modern variants, see Roxanne Leslie Euben and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, *Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought: Texts and Contexts from Al-Banna to Bin Laden* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).
7. David Harrison, *The White Tribe of South Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981). The book became the basis for a BBC series of interviews with members of the tribe. Jeffrey Kaplan and Leonard Weinberg, *The Emergence of a Euro-American Radical Right* (Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1998); Stuart J. Kaufman, *The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001).

8. Radical racial and ethnic nationalisms are simultaneously ascriptive and aspirational. They are first ascriptive in that being born into the race or ethnicities is the price of admission.

9. Sándor Kostya and Anne Fay Atzel, *Pan-Slavism* (Astor, FL: Danubian Press, 1981); Raphael Patai, *Essays in Zionist History and Thought,* Herzl Year Book (New York: Herzl Press, 1971). Edward Alexander and Paul Bogdanor, *The Jewish Divide Over Israel: Accusers and Defenders* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2006); Michael O. Friedman, *Origins of the British Israelites: The Lost Tribes* (San Francisco: Mellen Research University Press, 1993).

10. These examples are discussed in depth in Jeffrey Kaplan, *Terrorist Groups and the New Tribalism: Terrorism's Fifth Wave* (London: Routledge, 2010).

11. The terms *ascriptive* and *aspirational tribalism* were introduced by Dr. Jeffrey Kaplan, "Tribalisms and Mobilization: Irregular Warfare in the 21st Century," Program on Irregular Warfare and SOF Studies, National Defense University, Washington, DC, 2012. The term "malign" for ascriptive or aspirational tribalisms which threaten U.S. security, was introduced by Col. (ret) Chris Costa at that time.

12. Richard Schultz Jr. and Andrea J. Dew, *Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), x. We characterize irregular challenges and irregular warfare broadly here, and use Schultz and Dew's characterization that, in general, extremists will use "irregular warfare strategies and seek to employ all means, including catastrophic ones, to undermine the legitimacy and erode the will and influence of their state adversaries."

13. This argument does not include small, apocalyptic religious groups whose End Time visions are compatible with, but not identical to, the tribalism model. Aum Shinrikyo, the Family (aka the Children of God, the Family of Love, and currently the Family Foundation), the Manson Family, and a host of others have harbored dreams that are not dissimilar to the malign and benign tribal models. The research needed to explore these movements in sufficient depth to ascertain their relevance to our model remains to be done. In the meantime, see for example, Jeffrey Kaplan, ed., *Millennial Violence: Past, Present and Future* (London: Frank Cass & Co., 2002); Michael L. Karpin and Ina Friedman, *Murder in the Name of God: The Plot to Kill Yitzhak Rabin* (New York: Metropolitan Books, H. Holt and Co., 1998); Catherine Wessinger, *Millennialism, Persecution, and Violence: Historical Cases*, 1st ed. (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2000).

14. The "new tribalism" model is explicated at book length in Kaplan, *Terrorist Groups and the New Tribalism* (see note 10 above). See also Jeffrey Kaplan, "The Fifth Wave: The New Tribalism?," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 19, no. 4 (Winter 2007): 545–570; and Jeffrey Kaplan, "Terrorism's Fifth Wave: A Theory, a Conundrum and a Dilemma," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 2, no. 2 (2008), http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/.

15. Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, *An Enemy We Created: The Myth of the Taliban-al Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

16. Jason Ryan, "Underwear Bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab Pleads Guilty," *ABC News,* October 12, 2011.

17. Robert F. Worth, "Cleric in Yemen Admits Meeting Airliner Plot Suspect, Journalist Says," *The New York Times*, February 1, 2010; Cf. Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, "Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab Sentenced to Life in Prison for Attempted Bombing of Flight 253 on Christmas Day 2009," *Justive.gov*, February 16, 2012, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/February/12-ag-227.html.

18. Mark Mazzetti, Eric Schmitt, and Robert F. Worth, "Two Year Manhunt Led to Killing of Awlaki," *New York Times*, September 30, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/middleeast/anwar-al-awlaki-is-killed-in-yemen.html?pagewanted=all.

19. Philip Carl Salzman, *Culture and Conflict in the Middle East* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2008), 14–16. Salzman defines balanced opposition as a social system that, in part, explains collective security in tribal structures. In the context of the Teutoburg Forest, it's important because tribal

cohesion was not yet linked to religion, but to blood and land. Much later, with the arrival of Islam, we will see religion as the dominant unifying factor in the Middle East.

20. Rose Mary Sheldon, *Intelligence Activities in Ancient Rome* (London: Frank Cass, 2005), 187.

21. Adrian Murdoch, *Rome's Greatest Defeat: Massacre in the Teutoburg Forest* (Gloucestershire: Sutton, 2006), 99. Roman Legions XVII, XVIII, XIX.

22. Sheldon, *Intelligence Activities in Ancient Rome* (see note 20 above), 178.

23. Robert M. Cassidy, *Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 152. Teutoburg Forest is often cited as an example of asymmetric warfare. Cassidy suggests that Rome's conventional "Western way of warfare" confronted German barbarians. Consequently, the Romans lost their relative advantage to an irregular force.

24. See, for example, Basil Aboul-Enein and Youssef Aboul-Enein, "A Theoretical Exploration of Lawrence of Arabia's Inner Meanings on Guerrilla Warfare," *Small Wars Journal*, July 5, 2011, 10. The authors assert that Lawrence's "contributions as a modern guerrilla leader and political strategist of the emerging nations indelibly assured his place, perhaps not alongside Clausewitz, Jomini or Mahan, but certainly in the annals of insurrectionary warfare."

25. Michael Korda, *Hero: The Life and Legend of Lawrence of Arabia* (New York: HarperCollins, 2010), 29.

26. T. E. Lawrence and U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, *The Evolution of a Revolt* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1990), http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS68452.

27. Thomas Friedman, "Remapping the Middle East, Maybe," *The New York Times*, January 9, 2005. Popular *New York Times* columnist Thomas Friedman references T. E. Lawrence bragging about re-mapping the Middle East, though for a more comprehensive and well-documented accounting of Middle East post-war political geography, readers should start with David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1989).

28. Our contention here is that ascriptive tribalism, if understood through the lens of the model this paper suggests, is a global phenomenon and that a Western policy of tribal alliances and the use of tribal auxiliaries is not necessarily doomed to failure. Rather, given a system of rapid social and political intelligence which can feed into a flexible approach to tribes on a policy, diplomatic, and military approach that can rapidly adjust its relationships with given tribes could benefit U.S. geostrategic objectives. Given recent experiments with multiagency command structures such as was envisioned in the creation of AFRICOM, this goal is not as distant as has previously been the case. This is not just true of the Middle East where the U.S. faces a range of disadvantages such as their support of Israel, a history of support for authoritarian regimes, etc. Ascriptive tribes in Africa and Asia are in play as well, making our understanding of tribalism in both of its forms of global policy important.

29. Fawaz A. Gerges, *The Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 34. Gerges here speaks of the formation of an aspirational tribe comprised of jihadist elements of the many ascriptive tribes in Arabia and Yemen and the less tribalized actors in Egypt.

30. See David Ronfeldt, "Today's Wars Are Less About Ideas Than Extreme Tribalism," *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 27, 2006. In fact, the author convincingly writes that al-Qaeda members and affiliates are "extreme tribalists who dream of making the West start over at a razed, tribal level." The Islamist perspective would agree with this statement, but would change "razed" to "raised."

31. Salzman, *Culture and Conflict in the Middle East* (see note 19 above), 11. Again, we refer the reader to Dr. Salzman and the rich context he provides on balanced opposition, and how it relates to conflict in Arab cultures. Salzman further observes that "Arab culture addresses the universal problem of order and security in an ingenious and time-tested fashion." And, he also stresses, "balanced opposition is an ingenious way to organize security." So, the art of irregular warfare in the context of

tribes requires careful, nuanced engagements that tap into the societal patterns of tribalism at its roots, in order to create a malleable alliance to go after a mutual enemy.

32. Robert F. Baumann, "Historical Perspectives on Future War," *Military Review* 77, no. 2 (March–April 1997), 8.

33. See, for example, Tareq al-Abd, "Tribalism and the Syrian Crisis—Al-Monitor: The Pulse of the Middle East," *Al Monitor*, August 31, 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/culture/2013/01/tribalism-clans-syria.html. For the term "affiliates," see The White House, *the National Strategy for Counterterrorism*, June 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf. The strategy explicitly defines affiliates as groups that have aligned with al-Qaeda. In addition, the use of the term "adherents" includes those "inspired to take action." For the purposes of this study, "aspirational tribalism" is an important unifying theme that drives "adherents" to action.

34. Peter Hopkirk, *Like Hidden Fire: The Plot to Bring Down the British Empire* (New York: Kodansha, 1994), 106. We also learn that the British called Wassmuss the German "Lawrence."

35. Christopher Sykes, *Wassmuss* (London: Longman's Green, 1936), 43.

36. Gerges, *The Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda* (see note 29 above), 92. The calls for fighting the jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan resonated throughout the Muslim world. But Gerges makes the point that the call for jihad against the U.S. forces in Afghanistan did not have the same effect, meaning that calls for a "Holy War" possess varying degrees of popular legitimacy.

37. On Sudan, see Murray S. Fradin, *Jihad: The Mahdi Rebellion in the Sudan* (Lincoln, NE: Author's Choice Press, 1965, 2003). On Saudi Arabia, see Anthony H. Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid, *National Security in Saudi Arabia: Threats, Responses, and Challenges* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005). An enjoyable journalistic approach to this history is Robert Lacey, *Inside the Kingdom: Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia* (New York: Viking, 2009).

38. Brynjar Lia, *Architect of Global Jihad* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 86.

39. Steven Pressfield, "It's the Tribes Stupid," *Steven Pressfield Online Blog*, October 2006, http://www.stevenpressfield.com/ep-1/. Interestingly, Pressfield, a renowned fiction writer, soberly concludes that the so-called "clash of civilizations" is about tribalism, "not religion." Pressfield is one of only a handful of writers who have explicitly made the tribalism-terrorism linkage, especially the point that tribalism was a key factor for Alexander. Yet the Western-Eastern clash was in a Pre-Islam–Pre-Christian world. Indeed, tribalism is a blind spot in the literature, and this contribution seeks to address this gap, and provide a new analytical model to consider tribalism as a key component for further consideration.

40. Ronfeldt, "Today's Wars Are Less About Ideas Than Extreme Tribalism" (see note 30 above). The author convincingly makes the point that "tribalism sounds too anthropological for modern strategists, it has not taken hold." This was not always so. In 1964, the U.S. Army's Special Operations Research Office (SORO) recruited a group of American anthropologists for Project Camelot in which they gathered intelligence while undertaking their fieldwork. The positive response of many anthropologists was logical in the context of the Cold War in the 1950s and 1960s. The opposition of many academics to the Vietnam War provided the backdrop to the fate of these anthropologists when Project Camelot was made public. Careers were ruined, the field split into hostile camps, and tensions in the field lasted for a generation. The legacy of Project Camelot was the hostility with which formerly trusted anthropologists were met when they returned to their own fieldwork. Irving Louis Horowitz, *The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1967). In the post-9/11 atmosphere, anthropologists have once again been leveraged to support U.S. military ground forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. This suggests that the U.S. military and intelligence services may once again find social scientists willing to work with them. See also, for example, David Rohde's article, "Army Enlists Anthropology in War Zones," *The New York Times*, October 5, 2007.

41. Peter L. Bergen, *The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict Between America and Al Qaeda* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011), 21. Bergen asserted that bin Laden himself "would even come

to refer to Afghanistan as the Medina of the new age." The reference is to the *Hijra*, the flight from Mecca to Medina that marks the year 1 on the Muslim calendar. The concept has had a major influence in the development of Islamist terror, especially in Egypt where the Islamic Society, a group that embraced *Hijra* as modern metaphor, was responsible for the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981.

42. Richard A. Gabriel, *Muhammad: Islam's First Great General* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007), 189.

43. Fawaz Gerges, *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 176.

44. The *baya* relationship remains part of the modern Muslim world. See "Muslim Q&A," June 28, 2012, http://islamqa.info/en/ref/23320.

45. Gerges, *The Far Enemy* (see note 43 above), 176.

46. Michael Scheuer, *Osama Bin Laden* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 230–231, n. 70.

47. Ronfeldt, "Today's Wars Are Less About Ideas Than Extreme Tribalism" (see note 30 above), 50.

48. Richard A. Oppep Jr., Mark Mazzetti, and Souad Mekhennet, "Attacker in Afghanistan Was a Double Agent," *The New York Times*, January 5, 2010. See, for example, Joby Warrick, *The Triple Agent: The Al-Qaeda Mole Who Infiltrated the CIA* (New York: Doubleday, 2011).

49. [The former Secretary of Defense Donald] "Rumsfeld Explains His Vision for Military Reform," *Washington Post*, February 1, 2010. It must not be forgotten that U.S. Special Forces and CIA officers merged their capabilities shortly after the 9–11 attacks, employing a classic unconventional warfare strategy, and the Taliban were routed in Afghanistan. As such, Rumsfeld cited the transformational nature of warfare in Afghanistan as a model for the future. In particular, Rumsfeld noted that the battle of Mazar represents an unremitting linkage between U.S. conventional strength and unconventional necessity as demonstrated by Special Forces riding horses alongside indigenous forces and communicating with aging B-52's to direct new age, laser-guided munitions. Most dramatically, the employment of Special Operations Forces, Paramilitary CIA officers, and unconventional warfare was the right balance of tactical flexibility needed to route the Taliban and al Qaeda. See also, for example, Gary C. Schroen's, *First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terrorism in Afghanistan* (New York: Ballantine Books, 2005), and Gary Bernsten, *Jawbreaker: The Attack on bin Laden and al-Qaeda: A Personal Account by the CIA's Key Field Commander* (New York: Crown, 2005).

50. Ann Scott Tyson, "Jim Gant, the Green Beret Who Could Win the War in Afghanistan," *The Washington Post*, January 17, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/15/AR2010011502203.html.

51. Major Tim Gant, "One Tribe at a Time," http://blog.stevenpressfield.com.

52. James Dao, "Going Tribal in Afghanistan," *The New York Times*, November 4, 2009, http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/11/04/going-tribal-in-afghanistan/.

53. See, for example, Christopher P. Costa, "Phoenix Rises Again: HUMINT Lessons for Counterinsurgency Operations," *Defense Intelligence Journal* 15, no. 1 (2006): 135–154. Costa makes the case that tribal engagement had to be a priority in Afghanistan, but more importantly, tribal interactions have to be centrally managed—synchronized—to avoid becoming a series of disconnected tribal interactions, which potentially work at cross-purposes with broader political and military objectives, or even offset tactical objectives, too. Disappointingly, few of these prescriptions were adopted on a scale broad enough to make a difference in Afghanistan.

54. Bergen, *The Longest War* (see note 41 above), 42.

55. See, for example, Daniel Byman, "Taliban vs. Predator," *Foreign Affairs*, March 18, 2009, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64901/daniel-byman/taliban-vs-predator.

56. David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting the Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 34.

57. See, for example, Jonah Blank, "Invading Afghanistan, Then and Now," *Foreign Affairs*, August 19, 2011, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68214/jonah-blank/invading-afghanistan-then-and-now.

58. This pattern of Wahhabi fighters wearing out their welcome in Afghanistan is long-standing, with Afghan tribes disgusted by the unreasoning violence of the Arab fighters turned against them. In the anti-Soviet jihad a generation earlier, Arab fighters were for this reason relegated to isolated outposts. Their numbers were always considerably smaller than was apprehended by Western intelligence due to the emergence of what Giles Kapel called "jihadist tourism," where organized tours of young Arabs from Saudi Arabia would enter Afghanistan, pose for photos with AK-47 s, and then return to their country of origin with tales of jihadist derring-do backed with photographic proof of their exploits. Giles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 148.

59. Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla* (see note 56 above), 38.

60. See, for example, Bing West, "Both Sides of the COIN," *Foreign Affairs* 91, no. 1 (January/February 2012), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136960/christopher-sims-fernando-lujan-and-bing-west/both-sides-of-the-coin. Bing West defends his thesis that the U.S. military will "predictably" depart from broad counterinsurgency programs that embrace large-scale nation building. Still, he agrees with some alternative views on one salient point: that Special Forces advisory teams are crucial to future security in Afghanistan.

61. See, for example, David H. Ucko, "Counterinsurgency After Afghanistan: A Concept in Crisis," *Prism*, December 2011, http://www.ndu.edu/press/counterinsurgency-after-afghanistan.html.

62. Bruce Hoffman, "A Counterterrorism Strategy for the Obama Administration," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 10, no. 2 (2009): 366. Hoffman says "some 200 Maliks" have been murdered and substituted with more "compliant" leaders. This strategy of decapitation and replacement of traditional leadership is as old as insurgency itself. Stephen Lyon Endicott, *Red Earth: Revolution in a Sichuan Village* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1988), 103; James W. Trullinger, *Village at War: An Account of Conflict in Vietnam* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1980).

63. Jessica Stern, "The Protean Enemy," *Foreign Affairs* 82, no. 4 (July/August 2003), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/58995/jessica-stern/the-protean-enemy. Stern's thoughts on al-Qaeda's probable move toward "lone wolf" terrorism are somewhat dated, but completely consistent with our theme that this is the logical path for al-Qaeda adherents and their affiliates in the future. Moreover, Stern notes that Mir Aimal Kansi described his 1993 attack against CIA employees as something "between Jihad and tribal revenge."

64. John K. Cooley, *Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism* (London: Pluto Press, 2000), 10.

65. Peter Bergen and Alec Reynolds, "Blowback Revisited," *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 6 (November/December, 2005): 2–6.

66. Ahmed S. Hashim, *Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2006), 12. However, as in Afghanistan, foreign jihadists eventually alienated Iraqi tribes, leading in part to the Sunni Awakening. Defense Department, U. S. M. C. U., *Al-Anbar Awakening, V. 1, American Perspectives: U.S. Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004–2009* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2009).

67. This is somewhat confusing to Western observers who note that the Ba'ath Party that took power in 1968 was secular. In the Iraqi view, however, the Ba'ath leadership and its local officials were identified with their tribes and religious confessions before they were with the party. Under Saddam Hussein, the regime locus was in his native Tikrit rather than in the Baghdad seat of government.

68. Montgomery McFate, "The 'Memory of War': Tribes and the Legitimate Use of Force in Iraq," in Jeffrey Norwitz, ed., *Armed Groups: Studies in National Security, Counterterrorism, and Counterinsurgency* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2008), 296.

69. Salzman, *Culture and Conflict in the Middle East* (see note 19 above), 16. We say "inherently tribal" because it fits our examination of balanced opposition. Salzman says, "Balanced opposition emphasizes particular loyalties: my lineage against the other lineage; my tribal section against the other tribal section; my tribe against the other tribe; Muslims against infidels." See also, for example, Montgomery McFate, "The 'Memory of War': Tribes and the Legitimate Use of Force in Iraq," in Norwitz, ed. (see note 68 above), 298. McFate, a cultural anthropologist by training, asserted, "the most common form of tribal collective action is the blood feud." Accordingly, the U.S. intervention in Iraq, as with al-Qaeda's excessive violence, triggered a predictable cycle of tribal violence and counter-violence consistent with long-standing anthropological explanations for this tribal phenomenon.

70. See, for example, Najim Abed Al-Jabouri and Sterling Jensen, "The Iraqi and AQI Roles in the Sunni Awakening," *Prism*, December 2010, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/prism2-1/Prism_3-18_Al-Jabouri_Jensen.pdf.

71. Gerges, *The Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda* (see note 29 above), 137.

72. Victor David Hanson, *A War Like No Other* (New York: Random House, 2005), 213. Hanson calls the Athenians invasion of Sicily during the Peloponnesian War a "quagmire." Drawing largely from Thucydides' ancient account of the Peloponnesian War, students at the Naval War College studying lessons from ancient history during the height of the Iraq War often were led to consider Athenian overreach as a metaphor for the U.S. intervention in Iraq. See also, for example, R. B. Strassler, *The Landmark Thucydides* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 427–428.

73. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton University Press, 1976), 88. Clausewitz is frequently referenced on his conclusions on understanding "the war on which they are embarking." Clausewitz has been variously attacked and revered for his magisterial work. It goes well beyond the scope of this paper to delve too deep into the debates or make the mistake of shallow analysis that does not do justice to the work. Still, *On War* is a classic because it is timeless, and its principles transcend changes in warfare, but is still relevant as a common frame of reference for thinking about warfare, whether conventional or irregular.

74. Some of these adverse reactions can be planned for; others will invariably take planners lacking historical knowledge by surprise. A recent example is the U.S. intelligence community's reported use of a polio vaccination worker in Pakistan in a covert capacity in the operation that killed bin Laden. Just as the backlash against anthropologists resulted from Project Camelot in the 1960s, Pashtun tribesmen are now refusing to allow their children to be vaccinated as the action of this individual gave a dimension of truth to Taliban-inspired rumors that the vaccine was poisoned or contained a targeting agent for U.S. Predator drones. As a result, the first cases of polio in a generation have struck Pashtun children. Ismail Khan, "Anti-Polio Campaign Worker Is Shot Dead in Pakistan," *New York Times*, May 28, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/29/world/asia/anti-polio-campaign-worker-shot-dead-in-pakistan.html.

75. See, for example, Sebastian L.v. Gorka, "The Age of Irregular Warfare So What?" *Joint Forces Quarterly* 58 (2010): 32–38, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-58/JFQ58_32-38_Gorka.pdf. We believe that this article is an important and valuable contribution that coherently discusses Clausewitz in terms of today's irregular warfare—in theory and practice—in order to adapt the "Trinity" to current circumstances, but not to dispense with the work that has been so valuable to military planners for generations. Gorka recognized the "egalitarian" nature of the "Irregular Warfare Age," as we do, too, by stressing warfare, tribes, and their egalitarian nature as we have iterated throughout this paper in terms that anthropologists like Salzman and Kilcullen would recognize. So, we too use Clausewitz as a point of departure to make sense of irregular warfare in places like Yemen. Yet, we are more expansive in terms of setting a model that helps us better understand the future risks of aspirational tribalism.

76. Edward J. Villacres and Christopher Bassford, "Reclaiming The Clausewitzean Trinity," *Parameters* 25 (Autumn 1995): 9–10. See also, for example, Christopher Bassford, *Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America 1815–1945* (New York: Oxford

University Press, 1994). For a uniquely valuable resource on all things Clausewitzean, see "The Clausewitz Homepage," http://www.clausewitz.com/. Clausewitz was a prolific writer, but his text *On War* is the most central for English speaking readers. However, the text comes down to us in numerous translations, which, like the Bible, raises debate over which version is most true to the master's intent. For a definitive discussion of the issue see, for example, http://www.clausewitz.com/bibl/WhichTrans.htm. For this study we selected Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (see note 73 above).

77. See, for example, Harry G. Summers, Jr., *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982). Villacres and Bassford, in "Reclaiming The Clausewitzean Trinity," attribute the government, people, army definition to the late Colonel Harry Summers in his book, *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War.* There can be no doubt, however, that Summers was influential to a generation of officers in the aftermath of Vietnam; a generation that may have sought some catharsis because of their recent war in Vietnam, so we will take a moment to comment here on Summers' influential work. We have no fundamental argument with Summers' definition: people, army, government, as a model in the context of war; we do, however, caution those who might draw the wrong lessons from our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. Consider Stephen L. Melton's comment in, *The Clausewitz Delusion: How the American Army Screwed Up the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan* (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 2009), 17. Melton commented critically on Summers' interpretations of Clausewitz when he wrote: "If our cathartic reaction to defeat in Vietnam was the genesis on neo-Clausewitzean thought, our debacle in Iraq may be its swan song." In other words, there are limits to Clausewitz. Summers fundamentally used Clausewitz and the Vietnam experience to untangle and make sense of what he viewed as a complete failure to apply conventional Clausewitzean thought and principles to strategy in Vietnam. We worry that there is a yet-to-be-written work that will cause the same intellectual mischief that Summers precipitated with his work *On Strategy*.

78. Attempts have been made to engage jihadist theology with a counter reading of the sources. These efforts have proven of little value, and indeed, counterproductive, as in the massive bilingual text, Ghazi bin Muhammad bin Talal, ed., *True Islam: and the Islamic Consensus on the Amman Message*, third edition (Amman, Jordan: no publisher listed, 2006). Again, this reflects a lack of historical memory as a generation ago Israel pursued a similar strategy with regard to Islamic texts in the Occupied Territories, thus confirming to a Muslim audience the negative portrayal of Jews from both religious texts and imported European anti-Semitism.

79. Mazzetti, Schmitt, and Worth, "Two Year Manhunt Led to Killing of Awlaki" (see note 18 above).

80. "Anwar al-Awlaki," *New York Times*, August 25, 2012, http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/people/a/anwar_al_awlaki/index.html. On the memorandum, see Charlie Savage, "Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen," *New York Times*, October 8, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/world/middleeast/secret-us-memo-made-legal-case-to-kill-a-citizen.html?sq=anwar%20al%20awlaki&st=cse&scp=3&pagewanted=print.
Relatives of both Mr. al-Awlaki and Samir Khan, another American citizen, who was killed with al-Awlaki in the same Hellfire drone strike, have filed wrongful death law suites. These are unlikely to make much traction in the U.S. court system.

81. Bergen, *The Longest War* (see note 41 above), 246. Bergen notes that in 2009 there were "a record 43 Jihadist terrorism cases against US Citizens and residents." Bergen outlines other cases, too, that fit our definition of aspirational tribalism and lone wolf terrorism in a chapter titled "The United States of Jihad." Some of the cases Bergen examines will be addressed later in our paper, suffice it to say; those other examples are Somalis, Afghans, and even Jews who convert to militant Islam, although again our central theme suggests that many of those cases are a form of malign terrorism that can be studied and examined further using our "Trinitarian" framework.

82. David Johnston and Scott Shane, "US Knew of Suspect's Tie to Radical Cleric," *New York Times*, November 9, 2009. See also, for example, Scott Helfstein's *Edges of Radicalization: Ideas,*

Individuals and Networks in Violent Extremism (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2012), http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/edges-of-radicalization-ideas-individuals-and-networks-in-violent-extremism. These contributions outline the direct links between al-Awlaki and Major Hasan, which fits our model of aspirational tribalism to a certain extent. Hasan was inspired and motivated to act by al-Awlaki, while he was operating from ungoverned space in a tribal sanctuary in Yemen. Hasan self-radicalized and acted out his political violence in the West.

83. See, for example, Anderson Cooper's AC 360 segment on Bryant Neal Vinas, "American Al Qaeda," *CNN,* http://ac360.blogs.cnn.com/category/american-al-qaeda/. Strictly speaking, Bryant Neal Vinas was not a lone wolf, but his journey and those of fellow travelers in Pakistan may better fit the definition of Raffaelo Pantucci's "lone wolf packs" by his self-radicalization, finding a U.S. mosque with like-minded adherents, and eventual travelling to tribal areas to wage jihad. Vinas' pattern operationalizes Pantucci's definition. For more, see Raffaelo Pantucci, *A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of Lone Wolf Terrorists*, The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, March 2011, http://icsr.info/2011/04/a-typology-of-lone-wolves-preliminary-analysis-of-lone-islamist-terrorists/. Most importantly, for our purposes, we learn that Vinas was inspired by al-Awlaki. This is a crucially important point.

84. The essay can be found on Louis Beam's "The Seditionist" website: http://www.louisbeam.com/leaderless.htm.

85. Franklin's birth name was James Clayton Vaughn, Jr. For a wonderful timeline of his career, see Sam Brauer, Ryan A. Bruch, and Ashleigh Benois, *James Clayton Vaughn Jr. AKA Joseph Paul Franklin*, http://maamodt.asp.radford.edu/Psyc%20405/serial%20killers/Franklin,%20Joseph%20Paul.pdf. The first monograph on Franklin's life is Mel Ayton, *Soul of the South: The Life and Crimes of Joseph Paul Franklin* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2011).

86. Jeffrey Kaplan, *Encyclopedia of White Power: A Sourcebook on the Radical Racist Right* (Walnut Creek, CA: Altimira, 2000), 112–114.

87. Pierce's novel *Hunter* posited a character based closely on Franklin as a strategic suggestion to the radical right. His earlier novel, *The Turner Diaries*, about an apocalyptic race war in the U.S., had a seismic impact on the radical right of his day and was cited as the inspiration for Timothy McVeigh's bombing of the Oklahoma Federal Building. Today, both books can be purchased from Amazon.com.

88. What today is called lone wolf terrorism and the use of the violent act as an art statement was first recognized as the work of what Stoddard Martin called the "artist manqué"—a personality type that describes an individual whose self-proclaimed genius is doomed to go unrecognized in his time but will serve as a model for others in the future. Most of the actors we have examined in this study fit this profile rather closely. Stoddard Martin, *Art, Messianism and Crime: A Study of Antinomianism in Modern Literature and Lives* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986).

89. Ramon Spaaij, *Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism* (London: Springer, 2012), 98. The author provides evidence that the overall trajectory of lone wolf attacks is increasing exponentially, especially in Europe. This, too, he argues, may be related to largely successfully disruption efforts against group-actor terrorism, and the enabling role of the Internet. See also, for example, George Michael, *Lone Wolf Terror and the Rise of Leaderless Resistance* (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2012). This contribution provides an excellent and comprehensive review of lone wolf terrorism and the ideological elements of leaderless resistance. Cf. Jeffrey Kaplan,"Leaderless Resistance," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9, no. 3 (Autumn 1997): 80–95.

90. Brian Ross and Rhonda Schwartz, "Major Hasan's E-Mail: 'I Can't Wait to Join You' in Afterlife," *ABC News*, November 19, 2009 http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/major-hasans-mail-wait-join-afterlife/story?id=9130339.

91. See, for example, "Al-Qaeda on Alleged Fort Hood Killer: 'Ideal Role Model,'" *USA Today*, March 7, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-03-07-al-qaeda-fort-hood_N.htm.

92. Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Seeking Inforrmation*, http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2004/october. Al-Amriki is one of only four Americans on the FBI's most wanted terrorists list. The list is comprised of 29 people, all male, and with one exception (an animal rights activist), all Muslim. See Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Wanted by the FBI," http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/wanted_terrorists/@@wanted-group-listing. The strategy of releasing information to the public by law enforcement agencies is based on the arrest of the Unabomber when his brother recognized his writing style and turned him in to the FBI.

93. To hear the praise for Maj. Hasan from both al-Amriki and al-Awlaki, see respectively "Imam Amar Al-Awlaki's Message to American Muslims," *Youtube*, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2MjCDiSrfsc&feature=related, and "Al-Qaida Calls on U.S. Muslims to Attack America," *Youtube*, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BBmhKutfJ48-.

94. See, for example, "Stressors at Fort Hood Were Likely Intense for Hasan," *Time*, November 6, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1936085,00.html. This article suggests conjecturally that Hasan was likely "wrestling with the conflicting demands of being a soldier, a psychiatrist and a Muslim."

95. Joseph Rhee and Chris Cuomo, "Army Investigation Over False Accusations Ruined Our Lives, Say Muslim Soldiers," *ABC Nightline*, May 13, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/soldiers-allege-army-investigation-anti-muslim-harassment-ruined/story?id=13590030#.UE5P5FI19MI; Kari Huus, "Outrage, Calls for Action Over Anti-Muslim Materials in Military Training," *NBCNEWS.com*, May 11, 2012, http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/05/11/11659853-outrage-calls-for-action-over-anti-muslim-materials-in-military-training?lite.

96. The authors jointly prepared questions for an extensive interview of Vinas in a Federal Correctional Institute in New York, June 27, 2012. This access is part of an ongoing collaboration with the Program for Irregular Warfare and SOF Studies, an initiative with the National Defense University (NDU). What follows on Vinas is used as unclassified background and was approved for publication by the office of the United States of America District Court, Eastern District of New York.

97. For our purposes, it is enough to say that the Salafiyya, whose theological interpretation is similar to the Saudi Arabian national religious ideology of Wahabbism which the Saudis have exported throughout the Islamic world, are a form of radical Islam dedicated to ridding Islam of innovations (*bida*) that have occurred in the faith since the time of the Prophet and the closing of the era of permissible interpretation of the faith in light of current events (*ijtihad*) in the 12th century CE. They believe that an ideal Islamic society will invariably emerge from the implementation of a stringent school of Islamic law (*Shar'ia*) on the Islamic community (*ummah*). For a view which contextualizes the movement strictly in terms of the recent history of U.S. security studies, see Richard H. Shultz, "Global Insurgency Strategy and the Salafi Jihad Movement," *INSS Occasional Paper 66*, April 2008, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA482684; "Yūsuf al-'Uyairī and the Making of a Revolutionary Salafi Praxis," *Die Welt des Islams* 47, nos. 3–4 (2007): 422–459.

98. See, for example, Gabriel Koehler-Derrick, *A False Foundation? AQAP, Tribes and Ungoverned Space in Yemen* (West Point: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2011), http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-false-foundation-aqap-tribes-and-ungoverned-spaces-in-yemen.
Interestingly, this CTC report references both al-Suri and al-Awlaki in terms of their inspiring potential jihadists and the explicit message to those adherents in the West to commit violence autonomously with little to no direction. In short, al-Awlaki's "leaderless Jihad" message did not resonate with Vinas; his personal jihad, when fully realized, was waged overseas with the understanding that he was part of the AQ organization. Moreover, recall our reference to al-Suri earlier in the article, where we cited his admonitions to potential jihadists on completely "digesting" the "principles" of jihad before taking such action. Vinas was wholly unfamiliar with al-Suri and perhaps, too, with the deeper meaning of jihad and the growing drift trending toward committing jihad independently, without direct support from a terrorist organization. He is typical of alienated young men of limited education or intellect who join movements of any violent ideology.

99. We note, too, the dangers that U.S. forces left on the ground may unknowingly be pulled into the host tribe's leveraging of extra-tribal rivals rather than jihadist forces.

Counterinsurgency and Lone Wolf Terrorism

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This essay examines strategies to counter the threat of lone wolf terrorism. Lone wolves implement a tactical approach dubbed "leaderless resistance," which has become popular in several extremist subcultures. Although most episodes of lone wolf terrorism have not been highly destructive, there are notable exceptions that have claimed a substantial number of victims. The lone wolf trend should be contextualized in the evolution of conflict and strategy in which smaller and smaller entities figure prominently. Elements of the counterinsurgency doctrine can be applied to lone wolf terrorism. A comprehensive counterterrorism strategy must prepare for the prospect of lone wolf terrorism because of the increasing number of small-scale attacks, the large number of soft targets in contemporary society, and the potential damage that individuals can cause with the use of weapons of mass destruction.

Introduction

The face of terrorism has changed considerably in the last decade. For obvious reasons, counterterrorism was catapulted to the top of the public policy agenda after the 9/11 attacks. A massive homeland security apparatus was constructed in the United States. Legislation, such as the USA Patriot Act, which was signed into law on October 26, 2001, empowered law enforcement and intelligence agencies to collect and share more information on citizens. As a result, government investigators have foiled numerous terrorist plots. Still, terrorism persists. According to a May 2010 U.S. Department of Homeland Security report, attempted terrorist attacks against the United States in the previous nine months had surpassed any one-year period in history.[1] Although the U.S. government is concerned with established terrorist organizations, such as al Qaeda, there is a noticeable trend indicating the increasing prevalence of so-called lone wolf attacks by unaffiliated individuals and small cells.[2] To be sure, well-established organizations, such as Hezbollah, Hamas, the FARC

(Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), and al Qaeda, continue to mount operations; however, individuals and much smaller cells, sometimes inspired by the ideologies that inform the more established groups, are able to autonomously mount operations without central direction. Increasingly, these individuals and small groups are responsible for some of the most lethal acts of terrorism.[3]

Lone wolves apply a tactical approach that has been dubbed "leaderless resistance," which suggests that an individual, or a very small cohesive group, engages in terrorism often independently of any official movement, leader, or network of support.[4] In order to be effective, leaderless resistance assumes that multiple individuals and groups hold a common ideology and are willing to act on shared views in a violent or confrontational manner. The increasing frequency of leaderless resistance among such a disparate array of extremist and dissident movements suggests that the concept is gaining popularity as a tactical approach to terrorism and insurgency. The prospect of leaderless resistance is worrisome insofar as all that connects the various individuals and cells is a common ideology, which makes them more difficult to detect and deter.

This essay examines strategies that can be applied to counter lone wolf terrorism. To place leaderless resistance in context, a brief overview of the evolving nature of conflict and strategy is presented and the factors that give rise to the lone wolf trend are identified. Following that, there is discussion on how counterinsurgency methods could be applied to mitigate the problem of lone wolf terrorism. Finally, the conclusion points out some recent trends in lone wolf terrorism and the need for appropriate countermeasures.

The Evolving Nature of Conflict and Strategy

Leaderless resistance should be examined in the context of the evolution of conflict and strategy. Throughout history, modes of warfare and strategy have been influenced by a number of social, political, economic, and technological factors. Four generations of warfare were originally identified back in 1989 in the seminal article written by William Lind et al. entitled "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation."[5] First generation warfare, which reached its apogee in the Napoleonic wars in the early nineteenth century, was characterized by conflicts in which adversaries

sought to amass huge armies that confronted each other on the battlefield in the hope of winning a single decisive victory. Various economic, political, and social trends contributed to this style of warfare, including increasing wealth, which provided more resources for war, and the emergence of nationalism and patriotism, both potent forces that facilitated the mobilization of the entire nation. Second generation warfare, which brought new technology and firepower to bear on the battlefield—*viz.*, the machine gun and heavy artillery—nullified the power of mass mobilization and resulted in stalemate and trench warfare. These tactics exemplified combat operations in World War I. Third generation warfare came into fruition during World War II, when improvements in armor, airpower, and communications allowed for maneuver warfare on an unprecedented scale. As a consequence, firepower combining air and land operations could be synchronized against an enemy. This allowed for a numerically inferior army to prevail over a larger army with greater resources, as evidenced by the *Wehrmacht*'s stunning victory over the French army in the Blitzkrieg of May 1940.

Mao Zedong's peasant-based guerilla strategy is widely considered to be paradigmatic of fourth-generation warfare. His main innovation was adding an ideological component to the guerilla war framework in which a single-party doctrine instilled a sense of revolutionary fervor in insurgents who were led by a unified command structure. Once the insurgency mobilized the peasant population and established a certain critical mass, it was prepared to launch large-scale attacks and seek to overthrow the government.[6] Without a critical mass of support, an insurgency will not get far. At a minimum, the prerequisite for an insurgency is a cause that appeals to both active and passive supporters.[7] Insurgents must demonstrate that they have momentum and will ultimately succeed. By maintaining the military initiative, they can leave the impression that they are gaining the upper hand over the government.[8]

According to Mao's treatise, successful guerilla warfare progresses through three phases. In the first phase, insurgents seek to arouse and organize the people and achieve ideological unification for the resistance. In the second phase, insurgents seek to establish their organization and ideology through small-scale guerilla attacks and acts of terrorism against government targets. Finally, in the third phase insurgents escalate their activities to include larger scale guerilla attacks, increased sabotage and

terrorism, and insurgent control of small, select territories. Support from the populace is critically important as the insurgency passes through each stage. Without it, the insurgency would lose momentum, at which point the counterinsurgency could turn the course of the conflict in its favor and stymie any further violent progression.[9]

As the history of guerilla warfare has demonstrated, one of the most important objectives of an insurgency is to survive. More often than not, guerilla wars are not won militarily; rather insurgents persist in their struggle until they force a political solution to the conflict. Historically, the critical factor that enables an insurgency to persist over a long period of time is support from the populace. New technology, however, allows for smaller and smaller groups to remain viable even without a broad base of support.

Chris Anderson of *Wired* magazine developed the concept of the "long tail" to explain how in the new business environment with platforms such as Amazon, firms can profit by selling previously hard-to-find items to a larger number of customers instead of selling only a smaller variety of popular items in large quantities.[10] Likewise, as Thomas Rid and Marc Hecker observed in their study *War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age*, a similar logic applies to extremist and terrorist groups in the sense that it no longer requires a large popular following to survive over time. A relatively low number of highly motivated, partly self-recruited, and geographically dispersed followers can share a cause without broader popular appeal, thus making niche terrorism possible. As a consequence, the critical mass of people necessary to establish a viable terrorist movement has been drastically lowered.[11]

Various political, social, and technological developments have contributed to the miniaturization of terrorist organizations and the increasing frequency of lone wolf terrorism. Geopolitically, the dissolution of the Soviet Union drastically changed the security environment within which terrorists operate. During the Cold War, several communist states were covert supporters of terrorist groups. At the time, supporting terrorism was viewed as furthering the foreign policy objectives of the Soviet bloc.[12] In her classic study, *The Terror Network*, Claire Sterling maintained that for much of the period from the late 1960s to the early 1980s, the Soviet Union was at the center of a global terrorist apparatus.[13] Although critics dismissed Sterling's thesis when it was first released, subsequent

examinations of the Soviet and East German archives after the collapse of the Red Bloc suggest that she was not far off the mark after all.[14] Initially after the Cold War, terrorism went into steep decline in large part because several leading terrorist groups lost material support from communist states.[15] With the collapse of Soviet Communism, the world entered what Charles Krauthammer referred to as the "unipolar" era in which one sole superpower predominates.[16] In an era of U.S.-dominated globalization, states have more to gain by accommodation with the West rather than confrontation. In many parts of the world, the setting is not conducive to large, clandestine groups insofar as many foreign governments are coordinating their counterterrorism efforts with the U.S. government, as they seek to dismantle terrorist organizations and deny them funding and resources. This trend accelerated after 9/11.[17]

Technology has contributed to the miniaturization of terrorism as well. One the one hand, new surveillance technology has enabled governments to better monitor dissident groups and potential terrorists. On the other hand, the emergence of new technology has the potential to serve as a force multiplier for terrorists. For example, the Internet allows like-minded activists to operate on their own initiative without the direction of a formal organization. Enhanced communication capabilities allow for new flexible models of organization that eschew traditional leadership structures and enable collaboration by disparate parties that are geographically dispersed. Furthermore, the rise of the "new media" has led to a diffusion of soft power around the world that has increased access to groups and individuals who have traditionally not had much influence in the marketplace of ideas. The new media developed concomitant with the Web 2.0, which arose after the Dot-com bubble burst in the year 2000. Out of the rubble, a new crop of new Web-based companies and services emerged that offered interactivity and "user-generated content." The Web 2.0 encompasses an array of interactive communications facilitated by a rapidly expanding set of platforms, including blogs, Web forums, Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube that are linked together in innovative ways.[18] The rise of the new media ushered in a new era of communications, which allowed much greater and broader participation from users, not only in the spheres of commerce and social networking, but in terrorism and insurgency as well.[19]

Today, we are witnessing the age of the "super-empowered individual," who if adequately armed with a weapon of mass destruction (WMD), could

wreak unprecedented havoc.[20] As the leaderless resistance concept gains popularity in terrorist and extremist subcultures and as our infrastructure becomes more and more interconnected, just a few determined lone wolves have the potential to cause greater mayhem. These developments mark a major departure from previous models of terrorism and insurgency.

Thomas X. Hammes elaborated on Lind's framework in the book *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century*, in which he defined fourth generation warfare as an evolved form of insurgency that endeavors to use all available networks—political, social, and military, to convince the enemy's decision makers that their strategic goals are unattainable or not worth the cost.[21] To be effective, strategy must evolve to reflect the current operational environment. Like other previous variants of conflict and warfare that preceded it, the salience of leaderless resistance comes about from a confluence of several political, social, and technological trends. Conceivably, a fifth-generation warfare could take the form of leaderless resistance in which individuals and small cells commit acts of terrorism on their own initiative with no traditional command-and-control hierarchy.

Numerous trends are leading to the miniaturization of terrorism, warfare, and conflict around the world. New Internet platforms allow for faster and more efficient communications of which terrorists can now avail themselves. Greater interconnectedness also makes infrastructure more vulnerable to disruption as a perturbation could precipitate a cascading effect throughout the system. The availability of more lethal weapons and dual use technology could lead to deadlier attacks. Finally, although the historical process of globalization has improved the life opportunities of many people, it can be highly disruptive as it upturns relations among citizens, cultures, economies, societies, and governments.

Several factors make leaderless resistance a potentially effective strategy. Although the state's capacity to monitor is substantial, individuals are still able to operate under the radar screen and commit violence with little predictability. For instance, having no criminal record other than minor offenses, Anders Behrig Breivik was able to procure firearms and fertilizer for making his bomb without raising red flags. His attacks seemed to come out of nowhere.[22] Leaderless resistance can serve as a catalyst spurring others to move from thought to action. The tactic can produce a demonstration effect in that violence spawns copycats.[23] Extraordinary examples of leaderless resistance serve to recruit new members to the

network. Those actions that are unsuccessful are lost or discarded.[24] Lone wolves do not require expensive or sophisticated equipment, as evidenced by the D.C. snipers who used a semi-automatic rifle and a 1990 Chevrolet Caprice to terrorize the area. Leaderless resistance makes the penetration of terrorist movements difficult because lone wolves work alone and they have no information on other activists. Further, the mass media can amplify the exploits of lone wolves. Finally, open societies make leaderless resistance easier to carry out because there are numerous soft targets.[25] Nevertheless, there are measures that can be applied to mitigate the risk of lone wolf terrorism.

Applying Counterinsurgency Methods to Lone Wolf Terrorism

Essentially, counterinsurgency efforts can be conceptualized as a continuum encompassing two disparate approaches. On the one end—the direct approach—is the annihilation of rebel forces. However, a strategy based on attrition can be problematical in counterinsurgency insofar as it runs the risk of producing collateral damage and by doing so, antagonizing the population. On the other end—the indirect approach—is winning the loyalty of the people.[26] The indirect approach seeks to divide the insurgency from the people. Although this approach can take a long time and requires considerable patience, in the long term it is usually more effective.[27] A proven effective method for undermining an insurgency is to split the rank and file away from the leadership through calculated reforms that address the grievances of the people.[28]

Some of these lessons could be applied to lone wolf terrorism. In order to mitigate the risk of lone wolf terrorism, the U.S. government has explored community engagement programs. Back in the late 1990s, the FBI began an outreach program with “Patriot” style militia organizations to allay suspicion on both sides.[29] In August 2011, the White House released a document entitled “Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States.” The report warned that political extremism had the potential to divide the nation. To counter this threat, it called for more community engagement. Rather than blame certain communities, it suggested finding ways for them to help themselves. By forging community partnerships, the threat of terrorism could be reduced.

Information about the threat of radicalization and violence could be provided to a wide range of community groups and organizations. According to the report, the government should be ready to respond to community concerns about government policies and actions. Finally, the report called for more monitoring of the Internet and social network sites to understand their role in advancing violent extremist narratives.[30]

Gaining the trust of the affected communities is vitally important for several reasons, not the least of which is that they can provide intelligence, which is critical in a counterinsurgency program. In fact, information gathered from informants has been the most important factor leading to the arrest of terrorists in the United States.[31] Gaining intelligence on lone wolves, though, can be challenging. With fewer persons involved in a terrorist plot the amount of "chatter"—discussions between conspirators on the phone or the Internet—is reduced.[32] Nevertheless, even lone wolves must conduct planning and preparation for their attacks and as such, are vulnerable to detection as would be a small cell or hierarchical group.[33] And although they act alone or in small groups, lone wolves tend to come out of extremist subcultures. Still, lone wolves often tend to be ideologically idiosyncratic, which often makes them difficult to pigeonhole.[34] Furthermore, though most terrorists are extremists, the vast majority of extremists are not terrorists. Therefore, it is necessary to differentiate persons who express extremist views with those who act upon these ideological impulses. One way to prevent lone wolf attacks is to collect information about people who participate in extremist electronic chat rooms. However, in the United States, this approach has serious civil liberties and civil rights implications due to the country's free speech tradition, which is enshrined in the First Amendment to the Constitution. European nations, by contrast, often subordinate individual liberties for the common good.[35]

Understanding the radicalization process can give investigators clues as to who might be susceptible to the blandishments of terrorist movements.[36] Although lone wolves are solitary actors, they do not live in a vacuum. By cooperating with affected communities, law enforcement authorities can gain insight as to who could be prone to becoming a terrorist. Awareness programs, not unlike those used in schools could be used to engage communities and encourage people to come forward with information on

possible terrorist plots.[37] These programs are not without critics in that there is often little oversight in their implementation.

Disseminating counter narratives in the affected community could quell the tensions that give rise to political violence. Perhaps the most effective approach to countering the threat of lone wolf terrorism would be to use elements of the new media, including YouTube and similar platforms, to post videos and improve public relations. A legal argument has been made that online forums, such as Twitter, could be held culpable for providing "material support of terrorism." Discussion groups that are forums for radical discourse often display notices that indicate that the material displayed on the sites do not necessarily reflect the views of the administrators, thus suggesting a waiver of liability. In as much as users can have multiple identities, fraudulent identities, and shifting identities, they are hard to trace. And site administrators are often slow to act against threats posted online.[38] To counter these online threats, some persons have recommended the use of various material support statutes to hold ISPs responsible for the content of websites. Others, such as Aaron Weisburd who operates the Internet Hagnah, have sought to "shame" those ISPs that host terrorist-related sites so they will sever their connections.[39] One innovative initiative underway to counter online extremism is a software program that would allow the U.S. military to secretly manipulate social media sites by using fake online identities. In March 2012, it was announced that a California company was awarded a contract by the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) to develop an "online persona management service" that would enable one U.S. serviceman to control up to ten identities based around the world. The operators would seek to influence Internet discussions and spread pro-American propaganda.[40]

Despite the Internet, it is unlikely that terrorists will completely self-radicalize. As Burton and Stewart point out, radicalization tends to occur in a group context in which individuals receive ideological education and support with like-minded persons. As such, "[i]t is a rare individual who possesses the requisite combination of will, discipline, adaptability, resourcefulness and technical skill to make the leap from theory to practice and become a successful lone wolf."[41] Terrorist attacks often require careful planning and skills, which few individuals can carry out alone. When lone wolves reach out for assistance, they often come to the attention of law enforcement. Jose Pimental, a convert to Islam, was arrested by the New

York City Police in November 2011 for allegedly making bombs to be used in a terrorist attack. He sought assistance from someone whom he thought was a fellow jihadist, but was actually an undercover informant working for the police.[42] Finally, in order to survive over a period of time, lone wolves require street skills in order to avoid detection. For example, although Eric Rudolph practiced excellent operational security and had good bomb making and wilderness survival skills, he was ultimately captured for his lack of street skills when his suspicious behavior on a street caused a fellow citizen to follow him back to his truck and report the vehicle's license number to the police.[43]

In recent years, the U.S. government has taken notice of the lone wolf trend. In fact, as early as 1998, the FBI publicly announced that small fringe groups could be planning attacks on their own initiative, as the case of Eric Robert Rudolph illustrated.[44] In the summer of 2009, federal authorities announced an effort to detect lone attackers who might be contemplating politically charged assaults. Dubbed the "Lone Wolf Initiative," it began shortly after the inauguration of President Barack Obama in part because of the rising level of hate speech and increasing gun sales.[45]

Policies implemented after 9/11 seek to gather more intelligence on possible lone wolf terrorist plots. For example, the Domestic Security Enhancement Act (DSEA) of 2003 provides law enforcement authorities greater powers beyond those contained in the USA Patriot Act of 2001. Previously, under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), government authorities were required to show probable cause that an individual was acting on behalf of a foreign power, but the DSEA changes this definition to include all individuals involved in suspected terrorism, regardless of whether they are affiliated with a foreign power or terrorist group. Likewise, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 contains a "lone wolf" provision which makes it easier to conduct surveillance on individuals who either act in sympathy with the aims of international terrorist groups, but are not officially affiliated, or whose link with an international terrorist group can be demonstrated.[46] To enhance information sharing, the U.S. Departments of Justice and Homeland Security established the Building Communities of Trust Initiative to foster greater cooperation among police agencies, fusion centers, and communities.[47] Fusion centers bring representatives from various law enforcement agencies to share information on terrorism and related issues.

“Direct” approaches to counterinsurgency can be applied to lone wolves as well. As Marc Sageman noted, the current wave of leaderless Islamist terrorists is inherently self-limiting insofar as when they gather and train, they make themselves vulnerable to monitoring and arrest.[48] As he points out, the shape and the dynamics of the networks affect their survivability, flexibility, and success.[49] A small-world network consists of a hub with many links, which can resist fragmentation because of the denseness of its interconnectivity. Even if a significant fraction of its nodes are removed, it will not have much of an impact on its integrity. At its hub is where the network is most vulnerable. If enough hubs are destroyed, then the network tends to break down into “isolated, noncommunicating islands of nodes.” Thus, the jihadist networks are resilient to the random arrest of their members, but are fragile in terms of attacks on their hubs.[50] In as much as the al Qaeda movement is so dispersed, the leadership could find it increasingly difficult to exert control, beyond offering mere inspiration.[51] Moreover, the movement has become a magnet for the world’s most backward and frustrated radicals, both in the West and the Middle East, which could limit its appeal to the broader masses.[52]

To be sure, government authorities should deal resolutely with lone wolves who commit serious crimes. Blanket repression against extremist and dissident subcultures that hold unpopular beliefs, though, should be avoided. Although state repression can be effective, especially if the targeted group or community has not established deep roots, it can also backfire. Arguably, the 1992 Ruby Ridge[53] and 1993 Waco fiascos were counterproductive. In particular, the siege of the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas, which resulted in the death of 76 persons, was the event that enraged Timothy McVeigh and set him on his course of action, which culminated in the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal building in Oklahoma City—the most horrific act of domestic terrorism prior to 9/11. The resentment resulting from the way in which the government handled these two events did much to fuel the militia movement in the mid-1990s.[54]

Conclusion

Although state-to-state conflicts are declining in number, a great deal of conflict persists at the intrastate level. Often the most serious threats that governments face today are internal to their borders. In a sense, the current incarnation of leaderless resistance is not unlike the approach used by the anarchist movement around the turn of the nineteenth century, whose members used bombs and assassinations to disrupt governments in the West. With new technology, however, it is now possible that terrorist groups could evolve into more resilient entities not unlike transnational criminal syndicates have over the past two decades.[55]

A significant strategic drawback to the leaderless resistance approach is that without direction, it is difficult for the scattered terrorists to coalesce into a political organization that is capable of attaining actual political power.[56] Although it is now easier for insurgents and terrorists to enter the game, it is more difficult for them to evolve into a viable global insurgency because they lack broad-based popular support that is necessary for taking over a state. As modern terrorists groups tend to move away from popular appeal, it becomes less likely that they could consolidate and assume political power. Because of their internal weakness, they cannot reasonably be expected to defeat their conventional and democratic opponents who are much stronger, militarily, economically, culturally, and politically, yet, on the other hand, they probably cannot be completely defeated either.[57]

Despite its limitations, terrorism in the West appears to be moving in the direction of leaderless resistance. Rather than a rigid dichotomy between lone wolves and large, established groups, the trend could be conceptualized as a continuum with more and more terrorist activities committed by those on the lone wolf side of the spectrum.[58] As the frequency of sporadic episodes of lone wolf terrorism in the news headlines suggest, leaderless resistance has become the most common tactical approach of political violence in the West. Concomitant with this trend, as new technology continues to spread the capabilities for developing WMD, just a few angry people now have the potential to inflict unprecedented destruction.

To date, most episodes of leaderless resistance have been ill-planned and haphazard. To be sure, some of the more notable perpetrators of lone wolf violence had histories of mental illness and showed little or no ideological motive. For instance, James Holmes, whose August 20, 2012 mass shooting at a movie theater in Aurora, Colorado, left 12 persons dead, dyed his hair

red before the attack and identified himself to the police as “the Joker”—a popular villain from the Batman comic book series. Although a stellar undergraduate student, in recent months Holmes had experienced some problems in his scholastic and personal life. Likewise, Wade Michael Page, the 40-year-old Army veteran who, just two weeks later, killed six worshipers at a Sikh temple in Wisconsin, had a longstanding drinking problem which ended his military career and cost him his job as a trucker. Nevertheless, even persons who are psychologically impaired can commit acts of violence motivated in part by political ideologies. In fact, they may prove to be some of the most susceptible subjects to the blandishments of extremist exhortations to violence. After all, persons with a stake in the system and who have something to lose may be less likely to carry out terrorism, which often results in death or a very long prison sentence. For about a decade, Wade Michael Page was active in the “white power” music subculture where rhetorical calls such as RAHOWA (racial holy war) have broad currency.

Proponents of the leaderless resistance concept often assume that lone wolves are calculating and devote careful planning for their operations, but so far, these instances have been the exception and not the rule. But as the concept gains currency, it is conceivable that a new breed of more dangerous lone wolves could emerge in the future. The case of Anders Behring Breivik illustrates this danger.

According to his online political manifesto/diary, Breivik spent nine years methodically planning his attacks. A seemingly well-integrated young man in Norwegian society, Breivik was careful not to raise red flags. He maintained no affiliations with hardcore extremists and was not on the authorities’ radar screen. For the first part of his attack, he placed a bomb that exploded at the offices of the prime minister. The second part of his attack was a shooting spree at a summer camp where some leaders of the Norwegian Labour Party sent their children. His attacks were intended to wipe out the leaders of the next generation because he disapproved of the party’s liberal immigration policies. The result was the greatest loss of life in Norway since World War II and the deadliest carnage ever inflicted by a single gunman in that country.[59]

The new media figured prominently in Breivik’s campaign of terror. Shortly before he began his attacks, he uploaded his 1,500-page electronic book—*2083: A European Declaration of Independence*—on the Internet. In

it, he counseled his fellow travelers to emulate his terrorism by acting alone on their own initiative.[60] Whereas Ted Kaczynski, the Unabomber, desperately implored major newspapers to publish his manifesto in order to ensure maximum exposure of his ideas, Breivik was able to take advantage of the Internet and post his manifesto online, thus bypassing the major media outlets. The notoriety stemming from his attack, he predicted, would serve as a "marketing" ad for his manifesto, which would assure substantial interest in its contents.[61]

Despite episodes of sporadic violence, some observers dismiss the notion of "leaderless resistance" as primarily a nuisance in that it poses no existential threat to the nation.[62] Be that as it may, leaderless resistance could be waged as part of a war of a thousand cuts. Not long after the death of Osama bin Laden, some U.S. officials warned that his demise could speed up the trend over the past few years during which al Qaeda has become a more decentralized, and therefore more difficult, entity to stop.[63] Though some observers were quick to declare victory over al Qaeda after the death of bin Laden, the campaign against him and the movement he inspired has come with great costs. Lone wolf terrorism is now part of al Qaeda's war of attrition against America. According to some estimates, the financial cost of fighting bin Laden's network has reached $3 trillion when economic consequences are taken into account.[64] Over time, these financial costs have taken a devastating toll on the American economy and are unsustainable in the long term.[65] Although it is more difficult for terrorists to mount a spectacular attack in the United States today because security measures have been significantly raised, a number of smaller, sporadic attacks persist. Accordingly, a strategy to meet the lone wolf challenge needs to be an integral part of counterterrorism programs.

Notes

1. Jim McKay, "The Face of Terror," *Emergency Management* (January/February 2011): 29.

2. According to a study by the University of Maryland's National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, in the period from 1995 through 2007, 43 out of 131 terrorist incidents (33 percent) were committed by unaffiliated individuals rather than organized groups. Mathew Harwood, "Study Finds Rise in Lone Wolf Terrorist Attacks Since Oklahoma City," *Security Management*, http://www.securitymanagement.com/news/study-finds-rise-lone-wolf-terrorist-attacks-oklahoma-city-007030.

3. In December 2011, Department of Homeland Security Director Janet Napolitano said the threat of lone wolf attacks was rising. "Napolitano Says Lone Wolf Terror Threat Growing,"

Associated Press, December 2, 2011, http://news.yahoo.com/napolitano-says-lone-wolf-terror-threat-growing-175231790.html. Likewise, the U.S. Department of State observed a trend whereby more dispersed, localized, and smaller-scale groups are increasingly active in terrorism, often with lethal effect. U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2005* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005), chapter 2, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65465.pdf.

4. As described in Jeffrey Kaplan, "Leaderless Resistance," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9, no. 3 (1997): 80.

5. William S. Lind, Colonel Keith Nightengale (USA), Captain John F. Schmitt (USMC), Colonel Joseph W. Sutton (USA), and Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson (USMCR), "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation," *Marine Corps Gazette* (October 1989): 22–26.

6. Ibid.

7. Thomas Rid and Marc Hecker, *War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age* (Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger Security International, 2009), 43.

8. Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare* (Dulles, VA: Brassey's, 1990), 74–85.

9. Christopher M. Ford, "Speak No Evil: Targeting a Population's Neutrality to Defeat an Insurgency," *Parameters* (Summer 2005): 51–66.

10. Chris Anderson, "The Long Tail," *Wired*, Issue 12.10 (October 2004), http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/12.10/tail.html.

11. Rid and Hecker, *War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age* (see note 7 above), 219–220.

12. Frank Anderson, "International Terrorism and International Cooperation," in *Countering Suicide Terrorism* (New York: The International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism and the Anti-Defamation League, 2002), 53.

13. Claire Sterling, *The Terror Network* (New York: Berkley Books, 1984).

14. Walter Laqueur, *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction* (New York: Oxford, 1999).

15. There is substantial documentary evidence to suggest that terrorism was an important instrument of Soviet statecraft. Paul R. Pillar, *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2001), 42–51.

16. Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs* 70, no. 1 (1990/91): 23–33; and Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment Revisited," *The National Interest* (Winter 2002–2003): 17.

17. Barak Mendelsohn, *Combating Jihadism: American Hegemony and Interstate Cooperation in the War on Terrorism* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2009).

18. John Curtis Amble, "Combating Terrorism in the New Media Environment," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 35, no. 5 (2012): 339–340.

19. Rid and Hecker, *War 2.0* (see note 7 above), 7.

20. Thomas P. M. Barnett, *Great Powers: America and the World After Bush* (New York: Putnam, 2009), 295. Thomas Friedman first advanced the notion of the "super-empowered individual." See Thomas Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization* (New York: Anchor, 2000).

21. Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century* (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004).

22. "Suspected Norway Gunman/Bomber Reportedly Has Extreme Right-Wing Views, but No Links to Radical Groups," *Associated Press*, July 23, 2011.

23. Jeremy Pressman, "Leaderless Resistance: The Next Threat?" *Current History* 102, no. 668 (December 2003): 422.

24. Simson L. Garfinkel, "Leaderless Resistance Today," *FirstMonday.org*, 2003, http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1040.

25. Pressman, “Leaderless Resistance” (see note 23 above), 424.

26. John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 26.

27. Ibid., 28.

28. O’Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism* (see note 8 above), 138.

29. FBI, “Press Release,” October 20, 1999. The FBI released a guide for law enforcement personnel on how to make contact with militia organizations and cultivate relationships with them. See James E. Duffy and Alan C. Brantley “Militias: Initiating Contact,” *Law Enforcement Bulletin* 66, no. 7 (July 1997): 22–26. As Oliver “Buck” Revell, a former assistant director of the FBI explained, the program sought to establish a dialogue with militia groups in an effort to avoid violent confrontations. Interview with Buck Revell, February 16, 2001.

30. The White House, *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*, August 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/empowering_local_partners.pdf.

31. A study by Christopher Hewitt found that the use of informants was the single most important factor leading to the capture of terrorists. Christopher Hewitt, *Understanding Terrorism in America: From the Klan to Al Qaeda* (London: Routledge, 2003), 89–90.

32. Ahmid S. Hashim, “Terrorism as an Instrument of Cultural Warfare: The Meaning of Anders Breivik,” *CTTA: Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis* 3, no. 8 (August 2011): 4.

33. Scott Stewart, “Cutting Through the Lone-Wolf Hype,” *STRATFOR*, September 22, 2011.

34. Edwin Bakker and Beatrice de Graff, “Preventing Lone Wolf Terrorism: Some CT Approaches Addressed,” *Perspectives on Terrorism* 5, nos. 5–6 (December 2011): 46.

35. For more on the differing approaches in countering right-wing extremism, see George Michael and Michael Minkenberg, “A Continuum for Responding to the Extreme Right: A Comparison between the United States and Germany,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 30, no. 12 (2007): 1109–1123.

36. For an overview of the research on Islamic radicalization, see Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Laura Grossman, *Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K.* (Washington, DC: FDD Press, 2009).

37. Bakker and de Graaf, “Preventing Lone Wolf Terrorism” (see note 34 above), 47–48.

38. Robyn Torok, “‘Make A Bomb in Your Mum’s Kitchen’: Cyber Recruiting and Socialisation of ‘White Moors’ and Home Grown Jihadists,” Paper presented at the 1st Australian Counter Terrorism Conference, Edith Cowan University, Perth Western Australia, November 30, 2010, 58.

39. George S. McNeal, “Cyber Embargo: Countering the Internet Jihad” (Conference Paper), *Case Western Reserve University School of Law* 39, no. 3 (2007–2008): 788–826.

40. “US Spy Operation That Manipulates Social Media,” *The Guardian*, March 17, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/mar/17/us-spy-operation-social-networks.

41. Stewart, “Cutting Through the Lone-Wolf Hype” (see note 33 above).

42. Joseph Goldstein and William K. Rashbaum, “City Bomb Plot Suspect Is Called Fan of Qaeda Cleric,” *The New York Times*, November 20, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/21/nyregion/jose-pimentel-is-charged-in-new-york-city-bomb-plot.html?pagewanted=all.

43. Fred Burton and Scott Stewart, “The ‘Lone Wolf’ Disconnect,” *STRAFTOR*, January 30, 2008, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/lone_wolf_disconnect.

44. Roberto Suro, “A Most Dangerous Profile: The Loner,” *The Washington Post*, July 22, 1998, A01.

45. Kevin Johnson, “Feds Try to Detect ‘Lone Offenders,’” *USA TODAY*, August 12, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2009-08-11-lone-offenders_N.htm. As reported, the lone wolf project is one aspect of a broader strategy to combat domestic terrorism dubbed “Operation Vigilant Eagle.” Gary Fields and Evan Perez, “FBI Seeks to Target Lone Extremists,” *The Wall Street Journal*, June 15, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124501849215613523.html.

46. Instituut voor Veiligheids – En Crisismanagement, *Lone-Wolf Terrorism*, July 6, 2007, 76–77, available at http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/Lone-Wolf%20Terrorism.pdf.

47. The White House, "Empowering Local Partners" (see note 30 above).

48. David Ignatius, "The Fading Jihadists," *The Washington Post*, February 28, 2008, A17.

49. Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), vii.

50. Ibid., 139–141.

51. Rid and Hecker, *War 2.0* (see note 7 above), 217.

52. Ibid.

53. The Ruby Ridge incident occurred in 1992 when federal law enforcement officers ambushed the home of Randy Weaver, a White separatist living in the desolate hills of Idaho. Weaver's young son and wife as well as one Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) agent were killed in what many observers believed was a badly botched operation by the federal government. For more on the siege at Ruby Ridge, see Jess Walter, *Every Knee Shall Bow: The Truth and Tragedy of Ruby Ridge and the Randy Weaver Family* (New York: Regan Books, 1995).

54. The Militia, or Patriot movement, gained much attention in the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing. In the 1990s, the main impetus for the militia movement was gun control laws, such as the Brady Bill, which were perceived to threaten the Second Amendment. In October 1992, a meeting in Estes Park, Colorado that was convoked by a Christian Identity minister, Pete Peters, who exhorted activists to organize at the local level. According to some accounts, this event laid the groundwork for the contemporary militia movement by urging right-wing activists to organize militias at their local levels. Soon after, the Militia of Montana and the Michigan Militia were formed. Amazingly, the idea caught on in large part due to such technology as facsimile machines and the Internet. It was not long before militia-style organizations began appearing around the nation. For more on the militia movement, see Kenneth S. Stern, *A Force Upon the Plain: The American Militia Movement and the Politics of Hate* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996) and David A. Niewert, *In God's Country: The Patriot Movement in the Pacific Northwest* (Pullman, WA: Washington State University, 1999).

55. A notable trend in contemporary international politics is the growing nexus between terrorism and organized crime. Rather than cooperation between the two entities, some terrorist groups are acquiring more of the attributes of organized crime. Thomas M. Sanderson, "Transnational Terror and Organized Crime: Blurring the Lines," *The SAIS Review* 24, no. 1 (Winter–Spring 2004): 49–61. To date, transnational criminal syndicates appear to have adapted better to the changing international system as they thrive on international mobility. Usually, organized crime groups are more effective in maintaining internal discipline. What is more, their financial resources enable them to corrupt officials and avoid prosecution. Finally, insofar as these groups often provide illicit goods and services that are socially acceptable to a substantial portion of the population, they provoke less repression than terrorist groups. These observations are made in John Ross, *Unintended Consequences* (St. Louis, MO: Accurate Press, 1996), 716–717.

56. Marc Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 144.

57. Rid and Hecker, *War 2.0* (see note 7 above), 219–220.

58. For example, using FBI data on terrorism, Smith and Damphousse found that prior to the implementation of the Attorney General's guidelines on investigating dissident and terrorist groups, the average number of members indicted in each right-wing terrorist group was 9.4 persons. In the post-guidelines era (after 1976), that figure had dropped to 5.8 persons. A similar pattern was evident for international terrorist groups operating in the U.S. with a figure of 6 members in the pre-guidelines era and a figure of 3 in the post-guidelines era. Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse, *American Terrorism Study: Patterns of Behavior, Investigation, and Prosecution of American Terrorists* (Rockville, MD: National Institute of Justice, 2002), 6.

59. Hashim, “Terrorism as an Instrument of Cultural Warfare” (see note 32 above): 1.

60. Although characterized as a far rightist, Anders Behring Breivik does not seem to fit the classic profile of that political classification. From his own pronouncements, his ideology consists of nationalism, Christian-Zionist fundamentalism, and freemasonry. He identified Islam as the greatest threat to Europe. Admittedly, his views have some correspondence to the extreme right in Europe in that he was against immigration; however, he eschewed the ZOG (Zionist Occupation Government) rhetoric and was actually very pro-Israel. Though, there is a segment of the extreme right in Europe that sees Islam as the most serious threat; however, philo-Semitism is still usually anathema. Breivik’s freemasonry would also set him apart from the extreme right insofar as freemasons are often implicated as dupes in the conspiracy against the West. For more on Breivik’s worldview, see Ben Hartman, “Norway Attack Suspect Had Anti-Muslim, Pro-Israel Views,” *The Jerusalem Post*, July 24, 2011.

61. Bjørn Amland, “Suspect: Norway Attacks ‘Marketing’ for Manifesto,” *Associated Press*, July 24, 2011.

62. As Thomas P. M. Barnett pointed out, terrorism in the United States tends to be sporadic and unsupported by the population. Domestic terrorists are often disaffected loners, such as Timothy McVeigh and Ted Kaczynski, in short, “someone we see shuffling in orange jump suits and chains, with a burly U.S. marshal on both arms, on their way to a court appearance.” Thomas P. M. Barnett, *Blueprint for Action: A Future Worth Creating* (New York: Berkley Books, 2005), 109–110.

63. Tucker Reals, “What’s Next for al Qaeda?” *CBS News*, May 2, 2011, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-20058796-503543.html.

64. Tim Fernholz and Jim Tankersley, “The Cost of bin Laden: $3 Trillion Over 15 Years,” *National Journal*, May 6, 2011, http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/the-cost-of-bin-laden-3-trillion-over-15-years-20110505?mrefid=site_search&page=1. In 2008, Linda J. Bilmes and the Nobel laureate in economics, Joseph E. Stiglitz, estimated that the invasion of Iraq war would cost an estimated $3 trillion when the economic consequences of the invasion and ancillary costs were taken into account (e.g., treating wounded veterans). Linda J. Bilmes and Joseph E. Stiglitz, *The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2008).

Law Enforcement Tactics and Their Effectiveness in Dealing With American Terrorism: Organizations, Autonomous Cells, and Lone Wolves

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The article examines law-enforcement activities in 20 cases of terrorism and 38 cases of terrorism prevention, using published records. It proposes a seven-fold classification of police actions and examines which tactics were successful in identifying and apprehending perpetrators. Overall, in capturing those responsible for terrorist attacks, the most successful tactics were routine policing, the use of informers, and information provided by the public. Organized terrorism campaigns were most vulnerable to informers and surveillance, while the most effective tactics against lone wolves were witness identification and information from the public. The most successful terrorist preventions involved informers and surveillance.

This article examines how law enforcement agencies investigated 20 cases of terrorism in the United States since 1968, and how successful their different approaches were. The cases fall into two categories of equal size: terrorism by organized groups and terrorism by unaffiliated individuals, whether members of autonomous cells or lone wolves. The cases which will be examined are listed below under each heading with dates. All twenty cases involved terrorism (as defined by the FBI) and the terrorism resulted in at least one death.[1] The cases include virtually all the relevant cases of terrorism during the post-1968 period.[2]

Terrorism by members of organizations includes the following cases. The 1964–68 campaign of the White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan involved over 300 incidents of terrorism against Blacks and civil rights activists and claimed at least nine lives. The Black Liberation Army (1971–82), a faction of the Black Panthers, gunned down at least 13 police officers who they saw

as an army of occupation; Puerto Rican nationalists belonging to the FALN and *Macheteros* were responsible for 120 bombings (1972–78) and 16 deaths. The Death Angels (1973–4) were a group of Black Muslims who, in order to obtain their "wings," received points for killing "White devils." Their victims included at least 16 dead and seven wounded, and it is alleged that another 80 or so unsolved murders in the San Francisco area were by this group. Another Black racist cult, led by Yahweh bin Yahweh, carried out a reign of terror in Miami (1980–1984), killing defectors and dissidents from his group. In addition, his bodyguards were sent out to murder random Whites, bringing back their ears as trophies. Cult members were indicted for 14 murders and two attempted murders. The Symbionese Liberation Army (1973–1975) began their campaign by killing Marcus Foster, the superintendent of the Oakland school district, because he had introduced an ID system for students. Their most notorious act was the kidnapping of Patricia Hearst, daughter of the newspaper magnate. Ms. Hearst later joined the group and was indicted for a bank robbery in which a customer was killed. In 1976, Orlando Letelier, a Chilean political exile, was assassinated in Washington, D.C. when his car was blown up. The explosive device was planted by agents of the Chilean secret police. The armored truck robbery by the M19 Company in 1981 was the culmination of a series of robberies by remnants of the Black Panthers and the Weather Underground. During the robbery, three police officers and security guards were killed. The Order (1982–1985) was an anti-Semitic organization that aimed to inspire a revolution against the "Zionist-controlled" government. In addition to murdering Alan Berg, a Jewish talk show host, they also engaged in several robberies and bombings. The 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center by a group of Islamic extremists resulted in the death of six people and wounded over a thousand.

Unaffiliated terrorists include the Unabomber (Ted Kaczynski), who carried out a series of bombings (1978–1995) inspired by his hatred for modern technological society. The bombs killed three people and injured 23. Joseph Paul Franklin (1977–1980) was a serial racist killer whose sniper attacks against Jews, Blacks, and mixed race couples killed 20 people and wounded six. In 1980, Ali Tabatabai, an Iranian exile and an outspoken critic of the new Islamic regime in Iran, was assassinated by Daoud Salahuddin, a Muslim convert. Roy Moody sent a series of mail bombs to five locations, killing a federal judge and an NAACP official (1989). In

1993, Mir Amal Kansi shot five CIA employees in their cars, while they were waiting to enter CIA headquarters. In 1994, Rashid Baz fired on a van full of Jewish students, killing one and wounding three others. The act was apparently in revenge for a massacre of Palestinians by a Jewish settler a few days previously. Eric Rudolph, a White racist, was responsible for bombing the Olympic Park in Atlanta in 1996 and an abortion clinic and a lesbian bar in 1997. Two people died in the bombings. In 1998, James Kopp in a sniper shooting killed Dr. Barnett Slepian. Kopp allegedly shot another three abortionists in Canada and the U.S. (1998). The bombing of a military research center at the University of Madison at Wisconsin by the New Years Gang in 1970 killed a graduate student and wounded five others. The United Freedom Front (1975–1984) was a leftist group that bombed government and corporate targets. They supported themselves by robbing banks and shot and wounded police officers, killing a New Jersey state trooper in 1985.

In criminal investigations, police gather evidence for three purposes: identifying, apprehending, and convicting those guilty of the crime. Police actions may produce leads or clues, which result in achieving these goals. A preliminary classification of police actions is proposed, and will be used to determine which actions resulted in identifying and capturing terrorists and providing evidence for their conviction at trial. Leads and clues may be a result of seven categories: examination of the crime scene, questioning witnesses, routine policing, surveillance, informers, information from the public, and rewards.[3] In order to illustrate these categories, examples of each—and the resulting leads or clues—are given.

Examination of Crime Scene

On some occasions, evidence from the crime scene led directly to the guilty party. When investigating the World Trade Center bombing site, the ATF agents worked out the source of the blast, then examined the mangled remains of the truck in which the 1500-pound bomb had been placed, and were able to discover the vehicle identification number (VIN). The VIN allowed them to identify the truck as having been owned by a Ryder Truck rental company, and that it had been reported stolen. When the person who had rented the truck showed up to get his deposit back, he was arrested. He

had, to the surprise of the police, given his real name and driver's license when renting the van.[4]

After a federal judge and an NAACP official were killed by mail bombs in 1989, it was determined that these bombs and two others—which were intercepted before exploding—had similar components, and were built the same way. When information about the unusual design of the bombs was presented at the regular monthly meeting of local, state, and federal bomb experts in an Atlanta suburb, an ATF agent recognized that the design of the bombs was similar to one he had investigated seventeen years before. The agent drew from memory a sketch of the 1972 bomb, and named the bomb maker. He said that "he'd never seen another one that had both the end plates and the long bolts in it—until now. And as the senior chemist at the ATF lab in Atlanta, he'd known about every bomb that came through there, more than three thousand of them."[5] This early identification eventually led to the arrest and conviction of Roy Moody.

Questioning Witnesses

Although recent studies have questioned the value of eyewitness identifications, in some cases information provided by eyewitnesses was extraordinarily helpful in identifying those guilty of terrorist attacks. Eric Rudolph, who had already bombed two previous targets, the Olympic park and a gay bar, was spotted after the third incident when he bombed an abortion clinic. A medical student doing laundry saw Rudolph walking away from the blast, while everybody else was running towards the blast site. Thinking this suspicious, the student ran out of the building, got into his car and began to follow Rudolph. After losing him, the student pulled into a McDonald's to call 911. While on the phone, he and a second witness spotted Rudolph again, turning off the sidewalk into a wooded area. The two witnesses got into their cars to continue the pursuit, and separately both saw Rudolph driving away in a gray Nissan van. Not only did they both take down the license plate number, but since they were able to get a close-up look at him, they were able to make a positive identification of Rudolph.[6]

In the murder of Dr. Barnett Slepian by an anti-abortion terrorist, police were similarly fortunate. A neighbor of Slepian had risen the day before, at dawn, to go jogging, and while running noticed a car that she had not seen

before. She saw a man get out of the car, stretch, and then start jogging. Thinking that his behavior was odd, when she got home, she wrote down his license plate number. When the police requested that anyone who had seen anything unusual contact them, she called and gave them the number, which was registered to James Kopp, the killer. This early identification enabled police to gather information on Kopp, and to find out where his mail was being delivered.[7]

Routine Policing by Local Police Agencies

Routine policing frequently resulted in the identification and/or capture of terrorists. Less than a minute after the explosion carried out by the New Year's Gang that destroyed the Army Math building, a police patrol spotted a white Corvair leaving the scene. A few hours later a sheriff's patrol car stopped a white Corvair forty miles outside the town. After questioning the four occupants in the car, they were released since the officers had nothing to hold them on. However, the four were quickly identified as the suspects in the bombing.[8]

Routine policing also led to the capture of several suspects. The first break in the SLA case came when a routine traffic stop of their van resulted in the arrest of two SLA members. A search of their van found "a stack of leaflets emblazoned with the seven-headed cobra symbol of the Symbionese Liberation Army. There was an instant connection between the name and the November killing of Marcus Foster."[9] Foster, the Black superintendent of the Oakland schools, had been shot by the SLA, who had claimed credit for the attack with their first manifesto. A high proportion of Black Liberation Army (BLA) militants were captured or killed after they fired at police; the shootouts were usually provoked by the police stopping their car for something as minor as running a red light. In St. Louis, a routine car license check netted three BLA gunmen, while a pistol recovered after the incident was identified as the gun taken from a slain NYC police officer.[10]

Surveillance

Surveillance is used once police have a suspect. After the FBI identified several of the suspects in a robbery of a Brinks truck by the Order, they

were placed under constant surveillance. The suspects were tailed by spotter planes, which kept in contact with the agents on the ground. “The work consisted mainly of tailing the suspects to see where they would lead.”[11] The surveillance of members of the Order appears to have been continuous until most were arrested at the end of 1984. (Robert Mathews, the leader of the Order, fled to Whidbey Island where he perished in a gun-battle with the FBI). Their phones were wiretapped, their houses searched, and some police actions were of questionable legality.[12]

Since 1981, the FBI had secretly bugged the offices of known sympathizers of the *Macheteros*. These wiretaps eventually led them to the leader of the group, Filiberto Ojeda Rios. “Agents followed the revolutionaries by wiretapping their cars, wiretapping their apartments, wiretapping the public telephones in front of their homes, and even wiretapping people when they made love in the shower …. Agents made no attempt to arrest Ojeda or other members of *Los Macheteros*. In order to find out about the entire network of *Machetero* members, they simply watched, taped, photographed, and waited.”[13]

Informers

Informers played a significant role in several cases. When James Kopp murdered Dr. Barnett Slepian, the FBI had already recruited two paid informers from within the pro-life movement. One was a friend of Loretta Marra and Dennis Malvasi, two anti-abortion activists believed to be in contact with Kopp. Once when Loretta Marra went back to her hotel room, she gave her purse to the informer to hold. He rifled through the purse and found an Irish telephone number, which revealed where Kopp was hiding.

Apart from money, another method for recruiting high-level informers is when they are captured and offered immunity from prosecution. Martinez, a member of the Order, was arrested for passing counterfeit bills, and after his arrest became an FBI informer. In exchange for a suspended sentence, he “told the Secret Service everything he knew. When the astounded agents had finished listening to him unravel the tale, they called the FBI, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, the Internal Revenue Service, and police officials throughout the West.”[14] This was a critical break in the case, since the Secret Service had no idea that Martinez was a member of the Order, or that the Order was behind the murder of Alan Berg. At the

time Martinez became an informer, the Berg murder case had gone cold. He led the FBI to Bob Matthews, the leader of the Order, who had fled to Portland.

Information Provided by the Public

Information provided by members of the general public played a key role in some cases. The first real break that the FBI had in their pursuit of Patti Hearst, Kathy Soliah, and other remnants of the SLA was when the brother of a radical sympathizer who had helped the SLA members contacted the FBI. “He provided the address of the Pennsylvania farmhouse where Hearst and the Harrises had hidden out the previous summer … in what would prove to be a major break, agents found a fingerprint of Wendy Yoshimura, not yet known to be connected to the case.”[15] Yoshimura had been indicted for a bombing and her boyfriend, William Brandt, was serving a prison sentence for the same bombing. An FBI agent checked the prison logbook to see who had visited Brandt, and found that a frequent visitor was Kathy Soliah. This led to the capture of Hearst and the rest of the SLA.[16]

The most spectacular instance of information from the public resolving a case must be that of the Unabomber. This case was finally solved after his manifesto was published in *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times*. This led to David Kaczynski coming forward and suggesting that his brother, Ted, might be the Unabomber. David Kaczynski examined old letters from his brother protesting the abuses of technology, which used very similar phrases to that in the manifesto. He hired an attorney who contacted the FBI and handed over the letters to them.

Rewards

The category of reward overlaps with that of informer. In the case of the shooting of Dr. Barnett Slepian by James Kopp, the informer received a $500,000 reward from the Department of Justice and anticipated receiving another $547,000 reward from Canada. The informer was also given a new identity by the FBI.[17] The capture of Amal Kansi was a result of a million dollar reward.

Discussion

What factors are most crucial in successfully identifying and capturing terrorists and are there any differences between the two types of terrorists as to which actions were successful? Using the typology of factors/police actions suggested above, those factors that led to these successful outcomes for each of the 20 cases were coded and are shown in Table 1.

The distinction between identifying and capturing terrorists is common, although sometimes the same clue can lead to both, in which case it has been double counted. Sometimes multiple factors in combination led to the capture or identification of terrorists, so both factors have been credited. For example, in April 1980, eleven Puerto Rican terrorists were arrested after police spotted a stolen truck and arrested two people when they tried to enter the vehicle. “It looked like a simple car theft until anxious residents told police they had seen a number of other people walking in and out of a van parked in the vicinity. Officers rushed to the scene and arrested nine people dressed in jogging suits.”[18] Since the arrests resulted from both a routine police action and a tip from members of the public, both factors are counted. The murderer of Tabatabai was identified as Daouud Salahuddin by an eyewitness to the shooting, after being shown photographs of 400 extremists, so it is considered to be a result of both an eyewitness identification and surveillance.

Normally lone wolves are captured only once, but Joseph Paul Franklin escaped and therefore his capture is double counted and attributed to two separate factors. In the case of multiple member groups, if their captures or identifications are a result of more than one factor a similar double counting procedure is employed. Ideally, if information on how every individual was caught were available, the arrest data could be weighted to provide a more precise statistic. However, our unit of analysis is the case, not the individual. The aggregate totals suggest what the most important factors involved in these successful outcomes are. Since multiple factors affect the successful resolution of each case, the percentages sum to more than a hundred.

If we consider all twenty cases, the most important factors are routine policing, the use of informers, and information from the public. Comparing the two types, the use of informers and surveillance play a more important role in investigating terrorist organizations than in investigating lone wolf

terrorism. Lone wolves are more vulnerable to witness identification and information from the public.

There is a reason for these differences. Large organized groups like the Klan, the *Macheteros*, or the Black Liberation Army have to be known to more people—and the more people who know something then the more potential informers. This size factor certainly offers advantages to the lone wolves who have no one to betray them. As Thomas Tarrants, a Klan assassin for the White Knights, said of his own terrorist career, "The scary truth is that I would not have gotten caught if I had continued the way I originally started off operating, which was to never tell anybody about anything, to operate only by myself and to strike with an element of surprise. Terrorists who operate that way—if they don't have a previous record where they are under some kind of surveillance or suspicion—are virtually impossible to find."[19] However, lone wolves and small cells have severe problems too. Effective terrorist actions require a mix of skills and other resources, but individuals and small groups are less likely to possess all the necessary skills, so they have to reach out to others who may be informers. Also, lone wolves when on the run lack a network of organized sympathizers, as illustrated by the case of Eric Rudolph.[20]

Table 1. Significant factors in identifying and apprehending terrorists (%)

Factor	Organized	Unaffiliated	Total
Crime scene	30	10	20
Witness	0	40	20
Routine policing	70	40	55
Informers	60	30	45
Surveillance	40	20	30
Tips from public	20	60	40
Reward	20	20	20
(No. of cases)	(10)	(10)	(20)

One important negative finding of the study is that profiling did not provide a clue or lead in any of the 20 cases. Profiling is a technique that has been used extensively in the investigation of serial killers and sex crimes, as well as in a handful of terrorism cases. The assumption of profiling is that by focusing on the evidence left behind by the perpetrators, it is possible to reach conclusions as to the characteristics of the offender.[21] Since terrorists have a political agenda, they often issue manifestos and

make statements, which can be analyzed by profilers. Indeed the first documented case of offender profiling being used to identify an individual responsible for terrorist acts was the New York “Mad Bomber” case. In the 1940s and 1950s, a series of bomb attacks terrified the city, and a psychiatrist, James Brussel, examined the letters sent to the press by the bomber as well as crime scene photographs.[22] Brussel predicted that the bomber would be an Eastern European male aged 40 to 50 years old, living with a maiden aunt or sister. He diagnosed him as a meticulous individual who when arrested would be wearing a buttoned up double-breasted suit. When the perpetrator, George Metesky, was captured several years after Brussel had made his diagnosis, the predictions supposedly turned out to be incredibly accurate, right down to the double-breasted suit! Not surprisingly, this successful example of psychological profiling is cited repeatedly.

In five of the twenty cases examined in our study, profiling was used. In the Death Angel case in which Blacks attacked random Whites—including women and children—with guns and machetes, police contacted a psychiatrist who wisely insisted on remaining anonymous, but told them that the killers were cowardly.[23] Roy Moody was profiled three times. Based on his first letters to the media, he was described as “most likely an intelligent, adult male who would be known for his arrogance. In addition, this individual had likely written to the court system previously.” One analyst suggested that he was Black. A second letter revealed him to be a “high-school-educated, Southern White between thirty-five and fifty years old.” An FBI profiler thought he was a White male, aged between forty-five and fifty, who lived alone or with another adult. The bomber had been to college, was probably not a Klan member, and drove a dark four-door or pickup truck.[24] There were six major profiles on the Unabomber. These showed him to be a typical loner with an obsessive compulsive personality (FBI academy), a college educated White male in his early twenties to mid-thirties, probably raised in the Midwest (Syracuse Research Institute), a meticulous dresser who drove an older car which he kept in perfect running order (FBI, 1991), someone who worked at menial jobs and grew up in the Chicago area (FBI, 1993), well-educated with a background in metal work or carpentry, probably never married (revised FBI profile), in his fifties with an advanced degree in engineering (FBI agent in San Francisco).[25] A psychiatrist provided a profile of Eric Rudolph, based not only on his

actions but also on four letters to the media. The profiler suggested that the bomber was a White male from a blue-collar background, possibly with some military training, but not a drug user. In fact Rudolph was a heavy user of marijuana, who supported himself by growing and selling it! The first profile of the sniper who shot Barnett Slepian developed by the Canadian police suggested that the sniper was Canadian, while the FBI profiler thought he was not a trained marksman, but was secretive.[26]

Overall, these predictions would not seem particularly helpful to law enforcement efforts. Some of them are vague or obvious. What does it mean to say that the Zebra killers were "cowardly"? Often the predictions by different profilers about the same individual are contradictory. Two profiles of the mail bomber guessed that he was White, while one thought that he was Black. He was thirty-five to fifty years old—or maybe he was forty-five to fifty. Most of the correct predictions are so general—for example, knowing that the suspect is probably a White male—that they don't narrow down the list of potential suspects significantly. Interestingly enough, the more specific the predictions the more likely they are to be wrong.[27]

The results of our study have some obvious implications for law enforcement practices and policies. Routine policing by local law enforcement agencies played an unexpectedly significant role in catching terrorists. Therefore it is imperative that local police forces should be given adequate resources (funding, training, and equipment) commensurate with that role.

The importance of the general public as witnesses and otherwise providing information to police is clear, but attempts to encourage even greater public cooperation—"See something, say something"—have problems. Appeals for help in locating or identifying suspects are costly in terms of manpower expended in tracking down false leads. The government and the media typically exaggerate the threat from terrorism. The changing colors published by Homeland Security showing the supposed level of terrorist threat initially increased public fears, and later led to claims that the authorities were crying wolf after so many false alarms had been publicized. The ideal should be a vigilant but not a hysterical citizenry.

One function of policing is preventive, seeking to identify potential criminal or terrorist threats. Generally informants or surveillance are used, not to catch terrorists after they have committed their crimes, but to prevent terrorist attacks from occurring in the first place. However, this raises

significant civil liberties concerns. To what extent is it legitimate to gather intelligence on extremist movements and activists if they have not actually engaged in violence? Intelligence gathering by these means is even more troubling if it involves spying on members of the general public. Since 9/11, it is alleged that police departments have been guilty of placing entire Muslim communities under scrutiny without any evidence of wrongdoing. Indeed in April 2012, the Pulitzer Prize for investigative reporting was awarded to the *Associated Press* for a series of critical articles about the policies of the New York City Police Department's Intelligence Department. The *Associated Press* articles claimed that the NYPD "put American citizens under surveillance and scrutinized where they ate, prayed, and worked, not because of charges of wrongdoing but because of their ethnicity …. The documents describe in extraordinary detail a secret program intended to catalog life inside Muslim neighborhoods." The NYPD was accused of using "mosque crawlers" to monitor sermons, employing undercover officers and confidential informants, and of infiltrating Muslim student groups and monitoring their Internet activities.[28]

Table 2. Factors involved in detection of plots (%)

Factor	%
Undercover agents	42
Informants	39
Surveillance	26
Tips from public	16
Reward	5
Routine policing	3
(No. of cases)	(38)

Note: More than one factor could be involved in the detection of plots; as a result, items sum to more than 100%.

A chronology of terrorist incidents and plots since 9/11 reveals the major role played by undercover agents and informants, as well as the frequency with which electronic surveillance is employed. Of 47 plots, all were carried out by lone wolves or a group of friends, and none were by members of organized groups.[29] Most plots were by Islamist extremists (53%) or right-wing extremists (34%), with the remainder by anarchists, militant Jews, and anti-abortionists. For the 38 plots for which information

is available, Table 2 shows what factors were successful in how they were uncovered.

There are some striking differences between police tactics in dealing with plots and dealing with actual incidents. Obviously since no actual attack had taken place, the absence of clues from the crime scene or witnesses is understandable. Tips from the public or routine policing are much less important, while the role of undercover agents is a major factor. An examination of several of the cases suggests that many of the plots discovered were a result of sting operations, sometimes verging on entrapment.

Overall, the difference between the earlier organized campaigns and the later lone wolf terrorism is evident. The main reason for this transition lies in the repressive powers available to modern states. Extremist groups which threaten violence become the objects of repression. Historically, the decline of the Klan, Black militants, Puerto Rican nationalists, and right-wing extremists was a result of mass arrests and police harassment.[30] Leaderless resistance emerged as a strategy among right-wing militants because of the imprisonment and prosecution of their leaders and activists. Similarly, the jihadist movement resorted to lone wolf actions after the decapitation of al Qaeda and the destruction of most of its leadership. Since both in the United States and Europe there exists large and growing numbers of both angry jihadists and White nationalists, we can expect an increase in lone-wolf terrorism in the future.

Notes

1. The FBI defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.” Since the focus of the paper is on how law enforcement actions identified and captured the terrorists involved, those cases in which the terrorist was killed during the incident or surrendered immediately following the incident are ignored. In distinguishing organized terrorist groups from lone wolves and autonomous cells, several criteria were used. Was there an acknowledged leader of the group? Did different members have defined roles? Was the group divided into multiple units? Was there an organized infrastructure of supporters? Using these criteria, eight of the cases are of lone wolves while the other twelve involve multiple perpetrators. Of these twelve the White Knights, the Black Liberation Army, and FALN/*Macheteros* were terrorist organizations with hundreds of members, while the violence of the two Black Muslim groups, the Death Angels and the Yahweh cult, was carried out on the orders of the leadership of the organizations. The Letelier assassination was an example of state terrorism, organized by members of the Chilean secret police. The 1993 World Trade Center bombing was carried out by local militants,

but it was organized by a foreign jihadist organization. The New Year's Gang and the United Freedom Front were primary groups with no recognized leader in either group.

2. The two most deadly terrorist attacks, the Oklahoma City bombing and the events of 9/11, are not included in this study. The 9/11 terrorists all perished in their attacks while some accounts of the Oklahoma City bombing argue that Timothy McVeigh was part of a wider conspiracy. If we accept the conventional account of how McVeigh was caught, the case would provide further evidence as to the importance of routine policing.

3. These general categories can be further subdivided, so that informers, for example, can be classified into routine police informers, turned members of terrorist organizations, or undercover police officers who infiltrate terrorist or extremist organizations. Similarly, surveillance can be classified according to the technology and mode employed (phone taps, cameras, following suspects, etc.).

4. Jim Dwyer, *Two Seconds Under the World: The Conspiracy Behind the World Trade Center Bombing* (New York: Crown, 1994).

5. Mark Winne, *Priority Mail: The Investigation and Trial of a Mail Bomber Obsessed With Destroying Our Justice System* (New York: Scribner, 1995), 46.

6. For a full account of this amazing pursuit of Rudolph by the two witnesses see Henry Schuster, *Hunting Eric Rudolph* (New York: Berkeley Books, 2005), 69–74.

7. Jon Wells, *Sniper: The True Story of Anti-Abortion Killer James Kopp* (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2008).

8. Tom Bates, *RADS* (New York: Harper Collins, 1992).

9. Marilyn Baker, *Exclusive! The Inside Story of Patricia Hearst and the SLA* (New York: Macmillan, 1974).

10. Robert Tannenbaum and Philip Rosenberg, *Badge of the Assassin* (New York: Fawcett Crest, 1979).

11. Despite this intense surveillance, the agents lost contact with two of them. The plane followed the brown Land Cruiser driven by two suspects into a supermarket parking lot. "The odds were astronomical that there would be two brown Land Cruisers in the lot leaving at the same time. But that was what happened. And when Tate pulled out, the pilot had followed the wrong one." (K. Flynn and G. Gerhardt, *The Silent Brotherhood: Inside America's Racist Underground* (New York: Free Press, 1989), 290–291).

12. Flynn and Gerhardt note that when observing Yarborough, "the agents were bending the Bill of Rights by going onto the property without a warrant." A local policeman was troubled by what he saw, such as a surreptitious nighttime search of a storage locker that "looked like a black bag operation to him" (Ibid., 315, 292).

13. Ronald Fernandez, *Prisoners of Colonialism* (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1994), 245–246.

14. Stephen Singular, *Talked to Death: The Life and Murder of Alan Berg* (New York: Beech Tree Books, 1987), 242.

15. Richard Powers, *Broken: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the FBI* (New York: Free Press, 2004), 332.

16. According to Powers, Ibid., 332, the elder brother, Walter Scott, was angry at his brother Jack for endangering their parents by involving them in helping the SLA fugitives. However, Vin McLellan, *The Voices of Guns* (New York: Putnam, 1977), 435–437 suggests that his motives were a confused mix of "rage, jealousy, and patriotism," that he did not do it for money, and had twice phoned the FBI anonymously with the information. McLellan notes that once Wendy Yoshimura was identified, FBI agents were able to connect several other individuals to the SLA (Ibid., 461–462).

17. Wells, *Sniper* (see note 7 above).

18. In addition to the stolen car and truck, police found weapons, disguises, and false identification papers. Fernandez, *Prisoners of Colonialism* (see note 13 above), 8.

19. Jack Nelson, *Terror in the Night* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), 273.

20. Eric Rudolph was a skillful bomb-maker whose devices became progressively more lethal. He was able to avoid capture for several years, despite a vast manhunt by the FBI. However, despite a degree of tacit sympathy from his neighbors, he was eventually caught by a routine patrol while he was raiding dumpsters for food. As one sympathetic account puts it, his "circle of friends were incapable of providing operational support. He procured his own explosives and materiel. He emplaced his own devices … the best his friends could do for him when he became a fugitive was to turn a blind eye when he raided their chicken coops." See *The Fallacy of Leaderless Resistance*, http://www.resistance.com.

21. FBI profilers point out that "the primary purpose of a profile is to help the investigators narrow the focus of their investigation" (Ressler Hazelwood and Andrew Burgess, eds., *Practical Aspects of Rape Investigation* (London: CRC Press, 1995), 124).

22. J. Jackson and Berkerian, eds., *Offender Profiling: Theory, Research and Practice* (Chichester: Wiley, 1997).

23. Clark Howard, *Zebra* (New York: Marek, 1979), 261–263.

24. Winne, *Priority Mail* (see note 5 above), 68, 71, 86.

25. For discussion of these profiles see Robert Graysmith, *Unabomber: A Desire to Kill* (Washington, DC: Regnery, 1997), 80, 170–174, 468.

26. Wells, *Sniper* (see note 7 above), 103, 112–130.

27. Malcolm Gladwell, in an article on criminal profiling, is skeptical about the whole enterprise. He points out that a statistical analysis by the British Home Office of the effectiveness of profiling in solving 184 crimes found that the profile was accurate in only five cases—a success rate of 2.7 percent. Gladwell notes that—contrary to the conventional account—the legendary Mad Bomber profile by James Brussel was inaccurate in many aspects (Malcolm Gladwell, "Dangerous Minds," *New Yorker*, November 12, 2007).

28. See Mitchell Silber, "Defending the Defenders," *Commentary* (June 2012): 15–23 for a vigorous defense of the NYPD. This section is based on Silber's article and a chronology of terrorist plots in the United States since 9/11. Silber argues that the activities of the NYPD were legitimate under the Handschu guidelines, that they were reasonable efforts to discover hotspots of radicalization, and were successful in thwarting 14 terrorist plots in the New York area.

29. This chronology was compiled by the author using press accounts. Note that Faisal Shahzad, the Times Square bomber, did receive training in bomb-making from a Pakistani jihadist group.

30. See Christopher Hewitt, *Understanding Terrorism in America: From the Klan to al Qaeda* (New York: Routledge, 2003) 84–86, 97–98.

Toward a Profile of Lone Wolf Terrorists: What Moves an Individual From Radical Opinion to Radical Action

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Research has shown that there is no profile of individual characteristics of group-based terrorists, but profiling the characteristics of lone wolf terrorists may yet be possible. In this article, we bring together suggestions about what a lone wolf profile might look like. We describe a two-pyramids model that distinguishes radicalization of opinion from radicalization of action, then use this model to review three case histories of lone wolf terrorists. We also review results comparing two kinds of mostly lone actor violent offenders: assassins and school attackers. Results highlight the gap between radical opinion and radical action, and suggest two profiles of lone wolf terrorists: disconnected-disordered *are individuals with a grievance and weapons experience who are social loners and often show signs of psychological disorder; caring-compelled are individuals who strongly feel the suffering of others and feel a personal responsibility to reduce or avenge this suffering.*

Since 9/11, the success in tracking and disabling al-Qaeda and other major terrorist networks around the world has been accompanied by a new concern about lone wolf terrorism. On November 5, 2009, Major Nidal Malik Hasan opened fire on his fellow soldiers at Fort Hood, leaving 12 dead and 31 wounded. On March 2, 2011, two U.S. soldiers died after a lone gunman, Arif Uka, opened fire on them at Frankfurt airport. On July 22, 2011, Anders Breivik killed 77 in and around Oslo. The threat of lone wolf attacks was voiced by President Obama as follows:

> The risk that we're especially concerned over right now is the lone wolf terrorist, somebody with a single weapon being able to carry out wide-scale massacres of the sort that we saw in Norway recently. You know, when you've got one person who is deranged or driven by a hateful ideology, they can do a lot of damage, and it's a lot harder to trace those lone wolf operators.[1]

In this article, we bring together several different studies to try to identify common characteristics of lone wolf terrorists. We begin by distinguishing radicalization in opinion from radicalization in action, and then consider how opinion-versus-action plays out in several case histories of lone wolf terrorists. We also seek the common characteristics of two kinds of mostly lone actor violent perpetrators: assassins and school attackers. In conclusion, we highlight the importance of means and opportunity in assessing potential for terrorism and suggest two possible profiles of lone wolf terrorists.

Radicalization in Opinion and Action

McCauley and Moskalenko define political radicalization as changes in beliefs, feelings, and actions in the direction of increased support for one side of a political conflict.[2] We have argued that radicalization in opinion (beliefs and feelings) is importantly different from radicalization in action, and we have advanced a two-pyramids model of radicalization.[3] In this section, we describe the two-pyramids model, focusing on examples of opinion and action relating to al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism.

Radicalization in the Opinion Pyramid

The narrative frame of global jihad has four major parts: (1) Islam is under attack by Western crusaders led by the United States; (2) *jihadis*, whom the West refers to as "terrorists," are defending against this attack; (3) the actions they take in defence of Islam are proportional, just, and religiously sanctified; and, therefore (4) it is the duty of good Muslims to support these actions.[4]

This narrative is conveniently represented in terms of a pyramid of opinion radicalization (Figure 1) in which the base includes Muslims who currently do not accept any of the global jihad narrative. A layer above the base consists of those who sympathize with the first step of the jihadist

frame: that the West is waging a war on Islam (opinion pyramid second level). Next higher in the pyramid are Muslims who believe that jihadis are acting in defence of Islam and that their actions are morally and religiously justified (opinion pyramid third level). Highest in the pyramid are Muslims who believe there is an individual duty to participate in defence of Islam (opinion pyramid apex).

There is some complexity here: Islam distinguishes between defence mandated by legitimate authority, a group responsibility, and defence that is an individual obligation of every good Muslim. Osama bin Laden argued that the current threat to Islam justifies an individual obligation to take up arms, an obligation not dependent on having state or religious authorization for jihad. We here identify belief in the individual obligation as the highest, most radicalized level of the opinion pyramid.



Figure 1. Opinion radicalization pyramid.

The implication of a pyramid model of the global jihad narrative is that the lower, less radicalized levels represent more people. Polling data offer some support for this implication.

ICM telephone polls of UK Muslims have asked the following question: *President Bush and Tony Blair have said the war against terrorism is not a war against Islam. Do you agree or disagree?* In November 2004, 80% of a national sample of 500 Muslims disagreed, that is, endorsed the idea that the war on terrorism is a war against Islam. In other words, about 80% of UK Muslims agreed with level (2) of the global jihad narrative.[5]

A July 2005 ICM poll of UK Muslims asked a more extreme question: *Do you think any further attacks by British suicide bombers in the UK are justified or unjustified?* This poll was conducted after the July 7, 2005 bombings in the London underground, and 5% of a national sample of 500 Muslims said that further attacks were justified. In other words, about 5% of UK Muslims agreed with level (3) of the global jihad narrative.[6]

Thus polling research can put numbers on at least the first three levels of the opinion pyramid. Although we have not found any polls asking Muslims about the individual obligation for jihad, level (4), we speculate that the number agreeing would be less than 5%.

It is worth noting that in the case of UK Muslims in 2004–2005, the pyramid model is misshapen. The neutral base of the pyramid, those who do not accept even the first level of the global jihad—that the West is engaged at war against Islam—is smaller than the next higher level. Only 20% of UK Muslims do not see a war on Islam, whereas 80% do see a war on Islam. Descriptively, then, the base of the pyramid in this case is smaller than the first level of opinion radicalization.

The 2007 Pew poll of U.S. Muslims included an item similar to the "suicide bombers" item used by ICM in polling UK Muslims. *Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel that this kind of violence is often justified to defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely justified, or never justified?* In 2007 and again in 2011, about 8% of U.S. Muslims said that this kind of violence is often or sometimes justified.[7]

In general, the opinion pyramid represents the "war of ideas" between terrorists and the government. Polling data from a particular population at a particular time provide a snapshot of how the war is going, as shown in the percentages associated with the different levels of radicalization in the opinion pyramid. Tracking polls, with repeated measurements over time, can provide a trajectory of success or failure in the war of ideas as polling data show shifts in the percentages of poll respondents with more and less radical ideas.[8]

Radicalization in the Action Pyramid

For decades psychologists have studied the relation between beliefs and feelings (cognition and attitude) and action (behavior).[9] There is no simple generalization to be made about this relation. Under some circumstances, beliefs and feelings are good predictors of action (in a voting booth, for instance) and in other circumstances beliefs and feelings are weak predictors of action (when strong social norms run counter to an individual's attitude, for instance). When action consistent with beliefs and feelings is costly (such as committing oneself to terrorism), the gap between belief and action is likely to be large.

The gap between belief and action is evident in the contrast between polling data and security reports in the UK, where 5% of adult Muslims saw reported suicide attacks as justified but only several hundred terrorism-related arrests have been made since 9/11. The 5% of Muslims projects to about 50,000 of the roughly one million adult Muslims in the UK, indicating that only about one in a hundred UK Muslims who justify suicide terrorism have moved to violent action.

A similar ratio appears in the U.S. According to the 2007 and 2011 Pew polls, 8% or about 80,000 of about one million adult U.S. Muslims find suicide attacks justified *often* or *sometimes*. In contrast, only hundreds of terrorism-related arrests have been made in the U.S. since 9/11.

The gap between opinion and action is also evident in case histories of terrorists. McCauley and Moskalenko examined case histories ranging from anti-tsarist Russian terrorists of the late 1800s to anti-Western Muslim terrorists of the late 1900s, and identified twelve mechanisms of radicalization.[10] At least three of these mechanisms do not depend on radical ideas. Some individuals join a terrorist group in order to seek revenge for a personal injury by government or its representatives (*personal grievance*). Some join because a person they care about—friend, relative, romantic partner—is a member of the group and asks for help (*love*). Some join in search of excitement, status, or money (*thrill and status seeking*). These three mechanisms can bring previously apolitical individuals to join a militant group, that is, can bring individuals without radical ideas to radical action.

Thus the gap between radical opinion and radical action has two aspects. The great majority with radical ideas do not take radical action. And some join in radical action without prior radical ideas (though they will likely learn radical ideas after joining).

The gap between radicalization of opinion and radicalization of action indicates the need for another pyramid model, the pyramid of action (Figure 2). Here the base includes all Muslims who are politically inert, whatever their beliefs or feelings. The next higher level represents Muslim activists, engaged in legal and nonviolent political action. Hizb ut-Tahrir members, for instance, are legal activists in both the UK and in the U.S. (Hizb had its first national meeting in the U.S. in Chicago in July 2009), even though Hizb, like al-Qaeda, strives to re-establish a supra-national caliphate. Higher yet are radicals, engaged in illegal political action that may include violence. Finally, at the apex of the action pyramid are the terrorists, radicals who target lethal violence at civilians.



Figure 2. Action radicalization pyramid.

We believe that the borders between the levels of the action pyramid represent the most important transition points of radicalisation in action: from doing nothing to doing something; from legal political action to illegal political action; and from illegal political action to killing civilians. It is important to be clear, however, that the action pyramid is neither a conveyor belt nor a stage theory in which an individual must progress through each succeeding level in a linear fashion to become a terrorist. Most activists never become radicals, and it is not necessary to be an activist to become a radical (e.g., radicalization by personal grievance, love, and thrill and status seeking).

We turn now to drawing out the implications of the two-pyramids model of radicalization for the phenomenon of lone wolf terrorism.

The Puzzle of Lone Wolf Terrorism

Economists have framed the problem of eliciting self-sacrifice in terms of the *free rider problem*.[11] Why should I sacrifice anything for a public good —freedom, justice, equality—that will benefit others? Better I should let others sacrifice and free ride on their efforts than let them free ride on mine.

Perhaps the most salient example of sacrifice for a larger cause is the experience of soldiers in combat. The institutional explanation for military sacrifice is the power of the state, including both rewards for serving and punishments for not serving. Research with U.S. soldiers in World War II, however, found that pay, advancement, medals, and making the world safe for democracy were much less important in combat than "not letting my buddies down."[12] Institutional power may bring soldiers to the battlefield, but love of comrades makes them fight.

In extended form, this same explanation is offered for mobilization in social movements and political parties: the free-rider problem is surmounted and individuals are brought to sacrifice by the rewards and punishments provided by institutions, organizations, and small groups.[13] This perspective turns self-sacrifice into satisficing: putting time, effort, risk, and even life into a cause is the best the individual can do under contingencies the individual cannot escape.[14] But lone wolf terrorists are ready to risk everything in an attack that has neither organizational nor small group support. How is this possible? Moskalenko and McCauley[15] raised this question in the context of two examples, one old and one recent.

Vera Zasulich: The Hand of Justice

Born in Imperial Russia in 1849, Vera Zasulich grew up amidst broad political reforms and social unrest. She came from an impoverished noble family, but received a good education in private boarding schools and earned a teaching degree.[16] Working as a secretary and a bookbinder in St. Petersburg, she made a decent living but gravitated toward student discussion circles and radical rhetoric. For this activism, she was arrested,

sentenced to two years in prison, then exiled to a remote village; she returned to the capital only to get involved with a new activist circle.

In July 1877, a peaceful student demonstration ended with arrest and imprisonment of the participants. Among them was a student, Bogolubov. One day, the prison where he was held was visited by General-Governor Trepov, who crossed the prison courtyard twice. On the first crossing, Bogolubov took his hat off to the governor, but on the second, he failed to do so. The governor screamed at him to take his hat off, and in a fit of rage, ordered that the prisoner be publicly flogged. This caused a revolt by the prisoners.

The newspapers circulated rumors about the incident, as well as about other cruelties perpetrated by the governor. Vera Zasulich, who had never met the student in question, was outraged by the unfairness of the governor, but even more so by the lack of retribution for this arbitrary despotism. Her deep sympathy was not motivated by fear of suffering the same fate as Bogolubov: in Alexander II's Russia, a noble-born woman such as Vera was in no danger of being subjected to corporal punishment. Nor was her outrage limited to Trepov. She planned, with her friend Maria Kolenkina, to assassinate two governmental officials infamous for offences against student activists.

The young women drew lots as to who would kill whom, and Zasulich's target was Trepov. She inquired through her activist connections whether any group, including the terrorist group People's Will, was planning to do anything about the incident, and received no positive answer. After some soul-searching, she decided to take justice into her own hands even if it meant sacrificing her own life. Zasulich went to see the general during his regular "public audience" hours. When she was allowed into his study, Zasulich pulled a gun out of her clothing and shot Trepov in the stomach. She did not attempt to flee the scene, and was arrested and tried.

On the witness stand Zasulich was stoic, calmly explaining her motivation and readiness for the consequences of her actions. She knew she had to do something; she said that she had to act on her conscience. In a cheering courtroom, the eighteen jurors acquitted the defendant of all charges.

Nothing in her history before or after shooting the governor suggests any kind of psychopathology. In character, Vera Zasulich was not oppositional, stubborn, or ideological. She was not generally aggressive and had no

history of physical violence. She had been sentenced to exile for activism that broke tsarist laws; thus, in our action pyramid, she was already a radical before she shot the governor. But her decision to shoot the governor came from a feeling of personal responsibility to take action, placing her at the peak of our opinion pyramid. Shooting the governor moved her also to the peak of our action pyramid when she took up terrorist violence herself after People's Will terrorists brushed her off.

Before Bogolubov's flogging, Zasulich was like many other activists in both opinion and action. But the political became personal in her reaction to the flogging, an emotional reaction that impelled her to action. It seems possible that what distinguished Zasulich from the many who did not act was that she felt more strongly than others. There is some indication of her tender feelings in her later history, when she wrote articles criticizing the Bolsheviks for their profligate use of violence. This is an idea we will return to—that an unusually strong capacity to feel the sufferings of others can move an individual to radicalization and violence.

Clayton Waagner: Criminal Crusader

Clayton Waagner's 2003 book, *Fighting the Great American Holocaust*,[17] spotlights only a few moments of his early life. He was born in North Dakota in 1956; he married early, and with his wife Mary has nine children. His first visit to a bar was when he was 27; his mother took him for a drink after his business failed. He owned and operated a fishing boat out of Kodiak, Alaska. The vessel was 38 feet long and he drove it more times than he could count into 35-foot waves, one time into 70-footers. He had a pilot's license and three times flew into thunderstorms that tossed his small plane around uncontrollably. He never experienced panic; he felt fear only after the danger had passed. He liked the fellowship of small nondenominational Protestant churches. In relaxation, he appreciated a fire, a cigar, and a good bottle of Merlot. He is a big man; when arrested in 1999, he was 6 ft. 1 in. tall and 230 pounds.

Beginning in the 1970s, Waagner was convicted of various acts of theft and burglary, and in 1992 he was sentenced to 4 years for attempted robbery. Released from prison, he was in Pittsburgh in January 1999 when his daughter Emily went into premature labor, producing a granddaughter, Cierra, born dead at 24 weeks. Waagner's commitment to fight abortion

began when be held Cierra, touched her soft skin, and looked at her tiny but perfectly formed face and body. He says that he heard an internal voice, the voice of God: “How can you grieve over one, when you allow millions to be slaughtered every year?”[18]

In September 1999, he was driving with his wife and children in a Winnebago that broke down. Police found stolen firearms in the stolen vehicle, and Waagner admitted that he was planning to use the weapons to kill abortionists. Convicted for theft and firearms violations, he escaped from prison in February 2001. In an Internet posting, he described his escape as a miracle that anointed him as God’s Warrior. While on the run, he posted an Internet threat to kill those who worked for abortion doctors, and claimed to have target information on 42 such employees. In his book, he describes tracking and finding an easy shot at several abortion doctors, but could not bring himself to pull the trigger.[19] He kept moving with auto theft and robbery, and changed his plans: he would use fear instead of bullets.

In October 2001, he sent out 285 letters to abortion clinics across the U.S. Each letter contained a quarter-teaspoon of white flour and an anthrax threat. Coming soon after the still-unsolved anthrax attacks that followed the 9/11 attacks, the letters were taken seriously and seriously disrupted clinic operations. In November 2001, still on the run, he sent out 269 more letters to abortion clinics. Anticipating doubts and accelerated testing after the first hoax, he included in the white powder traces of a substance known to test positive in the most common test for anthrax. Again, he succeeded in shutting down many clinics. Captured in December 2001, he is serving a 30-year jail sentence in the U.S. Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania.

Before holding his dead granddaughter, Waagner was at the second or third level of radicalization in the opinion pyramid: he sympathized with those fighting abortion and may even have seen violence against abortion providers as justified. By his own statement he was doing nothing in the fight against abortion, that is, he was inert in the base layer of the action pyramid. His grief holding his dead granddaughter turned to guilt for doing nothing about the millions of children aborted, and from grief and guilt came radicalization in both the opinion and action pyramids. As with Vera Zasulich, strong emotion made the political personal; he felt suddenly a personal responsibility for action that radicalized him to the apex of the opinion pyramid. He moved also to the apex of the action pyramid

(terrorists) as he stalked abortion providers with the intention of killing them.

Interesting here is the fact that Waagner had targets in his sights but could not pull the trigger. He was forced down the action pyramid to fight abortion with threats of violence that were in fact harmless. With his anthrax letters, he moved from the terrorists apex of the action pyramid to the radicals level of illegal political action without violence. (Terrorist plans, and even terrorist threats, can be prosecuted as terrorism, but here we are concerned with the level of radicalization in the opinions and actions of individuals.)

Waagner worked alone, leaving his family to fend for themselves. His book suggests that, on the run, he knew how to find anti-abortion sympathizers but was careful not to implicate any in his crimes. His grievance is not in doubt: Clayton Waagner began as a petty criminal but ended with what he saw as a God-given mission to make war on those who make war on the unborn. Unlike Vera Zasulich, Waagner was a man of action; his experience with risk-taking, law-breaking, and weapons (robbery) probably eased his radicalization to violent action.

This section began with a puzzle: how can individuals leave self-interest and loved ones behind to take risks and make sacrifices for strangers? The two cases described—the outraged secretary and the tender-hearted man of action—offer several clues. Both were sympathizers with a cause and perhaps justifiers of violence in support of that cause. That is, both were in the middle levels of radicalization in the opinion pyramid. Zasulich had already reached the radicals level of the action pyramid in illegal anti-tsarist activism. Waagner too had broken laws but remained in the inert base of the action pyramid doing nothing to fight abortion. For both, something of great emotional significance occurred—unpunished violation of a student, death of a granddaughter—and the political became personal. In both cases the emotion came from identifying with—caring about—the welfare of others. Both were radicalized to feeling a personal moral obligation—the apex of the opinion pyramid—and both attempted to kill the persecutor of those they cared about—the apex of the action pyramid.

What moved both, while others who shared their convictions did nothing, seems to have been an unusual capacity to care about others. Kaplan’s 1995 study of violent anti-abortion activists noted something very similar: most of these individuals were first moved to action by an emotional experience

of identifying with aborted babies.[20] The capacity for empathy or sympathy is generally seen as quintessentially human and eminently humane. Here we have a hint that there can be a dark side to caring greatly about others. Our next case history extends this hint.

Abu-Mulal Al-Balawi: Internet Warrior

Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi, recruited by Jordanian intelligence as a double agent to gather information on high-profile Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders, blew himself up on December 30, 2009, in Khost province of Afghanistan. He killed seven CIA agents and one Jordanian agent. We distinguish two phases in al-Balawi's trajectory to violence: radicalization of opinion during his life in Jordan working as a physician from 2002 to 2009, and radicalization of action in Pakistan between March and December 2009. In our interpretation, his radicalization in action depended on the means and opportunity offered by Jordanian intelligence and the CIA. This section of the paper draws on a case history by Turcan and McCauley, especially on interviews with al-Balawi's wife Defne Bayrak conducted by Turcan; sources for all the quotations used in this section are detailed in the published paper.[21]

Early life and education. Al-Balawi was born in Kuwait on December 25, 1977 to a middle-class family of ten children. He came from a Bedouin clan from Tabuk (Saudi Arabia), which has branches in Jordan and Palestine. His Palestinian family came to Kuwait in 1948 after the foundation of Israel, and his family lived in Kuwait until Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. After the invasion, the family moved to the city of Zarqa, Jordan; his father, a middle-class professional, still owns two pharmacies in Zarqa. Unlike al-Balawi's family, most Palestinians around Zarqa live in refugee camps with bitter memories of their former properties now controlled by Israel.

Al-Balawi graduated with honors from a high school in Amman. His hope was to go to medical school and become a pediatrician. In 1995, mainly owing to his outstanding grades, al-Balawi was awarded a fellowship from the Jordanian government, and he went to Ankara, the capital city of Turkey, to learn Turkish. After a year of language lessons, he moved to Istanbul in 1996, where he was accepted as a medical student in

the Medical Faculty of Istanbul University. In 2001, in an Internet chat room, he met Defne Bayrak, a Turkish student in the Faculty of Communication in the same university. When they married later the same year, al-Balawi was in his last year of medical school. Their match was for love, rather than arranged by their families, and cut across differences of language and nationality.

After graduating from Istanbul University and becoming a physician in 2002, al-Balawi moved back to Zarqa with his wife. Bayrak says that al-Balawi deeply wanted to go back to his people—to help fellow Palestinians. After moving back to Jordan, he worked in local hospitals run by the Muslim Brotherhood charity, including a clinic in Hittin, a Palestinian refugee camp on the outskirts of Zarqa, where thousands of Palestinians live in an extremely deprived and isolated environment.

Radicalization of opinion in Jordan. Bayrak contends that the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 ignited a transformation of her husband's beliefs. She says that at the end of 2004, for the first time, he began to talk to her about his strong belief in the need for violent jihad against Western occupiers in Muslim lands such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Gaza. However, she explicitly asserts that he had not acted to connect with any jihadist organization or group. "He followed all of them, but from a distance," she says. She insists that "He was constantly reading and writing by himself and had not participated in a radical group activity."[22]

It appears that al-Balawi's jihadist postings on the Internet began with U.S. troops entering Iraq in 2003, but his radicalization accelerated after the Israeli attack on Gaza in late 2008 (*Operation Cast Lead*). Bayrak says that he began spending 3–4 hours on the Internet every day after the Gaza attack, and she adds that his interest in the Internet continued at this level until his departure to Pakistan in March 2009. Al-Balawi posted under the name *Abu Dujana*, a famous Muslim warrior and companion of the Prophet Muhammad. His posts glorified those who fight and those who die in jihad against Western forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The radicalization that began with the invasion of Iraq had an important limitation: al-Balawi did not agree with the version of radical Islam that calls for attacks on civilians. He participated in a version of Salafi Islam that heeded the Quran's injunctions against such attacks. He supported attacks on invaders of Muslim lands—on the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)

in Gaza and the West Bank, and on Western troops in Afghanistan and Iraq—but did not support attacks on European or U.S. civilians. This limitation was to be important when he moved to radicalization in action.

It may have been during the period of the Israeli incursion into Gaza that al-Balawi first attracted the attention of Jordan's General Intelligence Directorate (GID). Ali bin Zaid, a young cousin of King Abdullah, who was to be the Jordanian agent killed by al-Balawi with seven CIA agents in the suicide attack, was among the analysts who kept a close watch on jihadist Internet forums. Jordanian officials said that al-Balawi had been interrogated by officers from the GID in March 2009 because of suspicions about his activities in the online world. He had been released because the inquiry found "nothing relevant." Bayrak says that it was very surprising for her to see her husband three days after his being taken into custody because it took months for others to be released by Jordanian intelligence. She said that when she asked him how he could be released so quickly, he answered, very softly, "by the help of Allah":

> Before the arrest, he had been talking about going back to Turkey or to the USA for medical specialist education. After being released, however, he suddenly changed his mind and started talking about going to Pakistan for surgeon education. I still do not know why he suddenly changed his mind and decided to go to Pakistan. I did not want to let him go and tried to change his mind, but he did not listen to me.[23]

Radicalization of action in Pakistan. In March 2009, al-Balawi flew to Dubai and then to Pakistan, where, maybe for the first time in his life, he could establish face-to-face contacts with hard-core militants. He was in touch with Bayrak by Internet, and called her in late August 2009 (roughly five months after his departure) and asked her to leave Jordan and to go to Turkey with their daughters. He also wired $4,000 to her from Peshawar—a wire delivery unlikely to go through without the knowledge and approval of Jordanian intelligence. At the end of September, Bayrak left Jordan with her daughters and went back to Istanbul. Bayrak says that she communicated with her husband via the Internet for the last time ten days before his attack at Khost on December 30:

> He said he was in Peshawar, working in a local hospital there to help people. He seemed very normal and we talked about everyday things. But he was lamenting the deaths of children from the air attacks of the Americans. At the beginning of December 2009, just three weeks before the attack, he said that he was extremely sorry to see the deaths of hundreds of children caused by the air attacks in the last two months. This was the second

> time I sensed his mood of agony since the Israeli attack on Gaza in the winter of 2008. He said to me that he was extremely affected by the deaths of the children and lamented that he could do nothing to prevent this. The last thing he mentioned to me was his plan to come back to Turkey. He did not mention his plan of an attack, nor did I sense that something abnormal was going on.[24]

Radicalization to violence: Opinion vs. action. Beginning in late 2004, al-Balawi was telling his wife that violent jihad was necessary against Western occupiers in Muslim lands, pointing especially to Afghanistan and Iraq. At this point, in his Internet postings, he was already at the third level of the opinion pyramid (justifiers). In 2008, like other Palestinians, he was outraged by the Israeli attack on Gaza; as Abu Dujana, he expressed his outrage on the Internet in ever more fiery calls for jihad. At this time, according to Bayrak, he also began to talk about going himself to jihad:

> Increasingly, he started to talk about his desire to go to some of the battlefields where jihads were being fought in late 2008. He was very adamant about going to Iraq or Afghanistan and was looking for an opportunity to do this. It was impossible for anybody to go to these states without being monitored by Jordanian intelligence. If he was able to go to Pakistan, I think that it was because he had completely deceived Jordanian intelligence and the CIA and used them as a means to pursue jihad. He may have agreed to work for them and take money, but this was a part of his deception plan. He did not say anything to me about his plans before his departure, but he was very happy to go to Pakistan. His morale was high.[25]

Thus, after four years of radical postings as Abu Dujana, al-Balawi moved to the top of the opinion pyramid: following the Israeli invasion of Gaza in 2008, he began talking of a personal obligation to jihad against Western forces in Muslim lands. And then, it is very important to note, he did nothing. He continued posting his fiery opinions but he did not connect with any militant group and he did not try to go to Iraq or Pakistan to fight. He did not even engage in what small levels of political activism were available in Jordan. He posted and he doctored.

This is an interesting case: someone at the peak of opinion radicalization who did nothing to move toward political violence. Al-Balawi was at the peak of the opinion pyramid for at least four months, while remaining in the inert base of the action pyramid. From late 2008 until March 2009, al-Balawi was talking personal jihad but made no move toward jihad.

These four months underline the importance of distinguishing radicalization in the opinion pyramid from radicalization in the action pyramid. In the cases of Vera Zasulich and Clayton Waagner, the interval

between experiencing a personal moral obligation to take up violence and the beginning of violent action is not clear but appears brief. Looking at these cases, one might think that violent action is the inevitable next step after reaching the peak of opinion radicalization. But al-Balawi's four months of talking jihad while doing nothing shows that there is an important gap between even the most radical idea and radical action. We believe that it was the opportunity, or the pressure, brought by Jordanian intelligence that moved al-Balawi across the gap.

Bayrak asserts that al-Balawi had already decided to conduct an attack when he was in Jordan and had used CIA and Jordanian intelligence to get to Afghanistan to achieve this objective. On the contrary, we suggest that he decided to conduct his attack after he arrived in Afghanistan and Pakistan. When Jordanian intelligence provided him with a free ticket and visa to Pakistan, he could not have been planning an attack because he knew nothing and no one in Pakistan. Without any idea of means or opportunity, he could not, in Jordan, choose to attack anyone or anything in Pakistan or Afghanistan. But Jordanian intelligence offered him the sort of challenge he had said he wanted.

An interview with al-Balawi's father indicates the importance of the opportunity offered by Jordanian intelligence. "Had they left him, he would have stayed behind his computer forever—he would only be expressing his opinion, only talking."

Talking violence is easier than acting violence, especially for a man with a wife and daughters who love him. Especially for a man with no history or experience of violence, not even experience with non-violent activism. But for a man who has been preaching violence to others, there would be something hypocritical about refusing a ticket to the battlefield. The internal pressure toward consistency of words and action—which Zasulich called *conscience* and Waagner called the voice of God—is evident in one of the videos al-Balawi made before his suicide attack at Khost. The title of his post was "When Will My Words Drink My Blood?—I Am Now Fit for Publication":

> Oh, you who write about jihad and urge people to it, beware of falling into the same trap that I fell into. What I fear most is that [when I die] I will meet a man who died as a martyr under the effect of my words, whereas I shall die in bed. This is a nightmare which makes me sleepless and racks my nerves. I'm afraid that on the day of resurrection, standing before a mountain of sins, I shall be asked to account for each and every one of them, and it shall be a long account, and I will be covered with sweat, while they [martyrs] will be

> moving about the halls of paradise in everlasting pleasure. One of them will say to the other: "What do you say about him who used to be called Abu Dajana Al-Khorasani, who used to urge people to go to jihad?" And the other one will answer: "But he died in bed, a contemptible death, having stayed away from jihad. I wish for him that he had benefited by his own words. He was like a candle that burned itself to give light to the others."
>
> I'm afraid to be branded as a liar, and that my words will be the evidence for my conviction. … My words are going to die if I don't save them with my blood, and my emotions will be extinguished if I don't kindle them with my death. My postings will testify against me, if I don't give them the proof of my being free of hypocrisy. … It's either me or them [my postings]. The world cannot have both of us in it. One of us must die, so that the other can continue to live, and I wish it is I who shall die.[26]

One more link with Zasulich and Waagner is al-Balawi's strong identification with those he saw as victims. The medical student who hoped to be a pediatrician became the surgeon who identified with the young victims he worked on. Bayrak reports the special pain al-Balawi felt for the suffering of Palestinian children, and his last communication with his wife expressed the pain he felt for the suffering of the children he saw die in Pakistan. "My husband stated to me that he had personally witnessed the deaths of more than 300 children from April to November 2009 on the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan."[27] To those who killed children, in a camp with no civilians, he carried a bomb he could not have made himself.

Al-Balawi's history highlights the gap between radical opinion and radical action. More than that, it shows that motive for violence is not enough; opportunity and means of violence are required to get across the gap. For al-Balawi, Jordanian intelligence provided the opportunity; the militants he met for the first time in Pakistan provided the means. His move to violent action tests the distinction between lone wolf violence and group violence: he radicalized to the top of the opinion pyramid without group support, but developed violent action by connecting with a violent group. In this trajectory, finding a violent group was like finding a loaded weapon.

The next section moves from case material to statistical reporting of lone attackers to show again the importance of means and opportunity in getting from violent motivation to violent action.

Characteristics of Assassins and School Attackers

Statistical study of lone wolf terrorists has barely begun. In what may be the first such study, Hewitt identified 27 lone actor U.S. terrorists between 1955

and 2001 and suggested that the rate of psychological disturbance was higher (6 of 27) among the loners than among other U.S. terrorists.[28]

Taking a different approach to the problem, McCauley, Moskalenko, and Van Son sought to develop hypotheses about the characteristics of lone wolf terrorists by looking for the common characteristics of two kinds of mostly lone actor violent offenders: assassins and school attackers. Their study used existing U.S. government-sponsored reports to examine these two kinds of offenders.[29]

The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative focused on 37 incidents of targeted school attacks between 1974 and 2000, with a total of 41 attackers.[30] The report coded 30 of the 41 school attackers as having attacked alone (81%). Not counted among the 30, four attackers carried out their violence alone but were reported to have had some kind of assistance planning the attack (*Final Report*, p. 15). *Assassination in the United States* reviewed 74 incidents between 1949 and 1996 in which 83 people had either attacked (46%), or tried to attack (54% intercepted in the vicinity of the target with a weapon), a prominent person in the United States.[31] Of the 83 assassins, 63 (76%) acted alone.

The logic of comparing school attackers with assassins is that these two groups of offenders are like lone wolf terrorists in perpetrating planned violence fueled by grievance (whereas most criminal violence in the U.S. is impulsive or motivated by greed). To the extent that assassins and school attackers share common characteristics, these characteristics may be risk factors for lone wolf terrorism as well. The obvious demographic differences between the two groups (teenagers vs. adults) are actually a strength of the comparison: any commonalities uncovered are the more striking and unlikely to be a reflection of life status or demographic factors.

As a study of lone actor violence, the comparison had an unavoidable limitation: most but not all of the assassins and school attackers were lone actors. Thus the study compared two groups of predominantly lone actors, but the comparison was made coarser by the inclusion of a minority of group actors whose characteristics cannot be separated from the characteristics of lone actors. Four common characteristics of assassins and school attackers were identified: grievance, depression, unfreezing, and weapons use outside the military.

Grievance was coded from perception of *having been persecuted, bullied, threatened, attacked, or injured* (school attackers) and *any*

grievance at the time of the Principal Incident (assassins). The prevalence of *grievance* was high for both school attackers (81%) and assassins (67%). **Depression**, including despair or suicidal ideation, was coded for the great majority of school attackers (78%), and nearly half of assassins (44%) had this history. **Unfreezing** refers not to some kind of character or psychopathology but to a situational crisis of personal disconnection and maladjustment.[32] Unfreezing was coded from report of *experienced or perceived major loss* (school attackers) and *accident/illness, loss of relationship, or failure/loss of status* (assassins). Loss of connection and status leaves an individual with less to lose in radical action, including violence. Almost all school attackers (98%) were coded for unfreezing, and "almost half" (the best summary figure available) of assassins showed unfreezing. Finally, **experience with weapons** was coded for both assassins and school attackers (with experience during military service excluded for assassins). Over half of assassins and school attackers showed a history of weapons use outside the military (71% and 63%).

Taken together, these four characteristics again suggest the importance of means and opportunity. Grievance is a motive for violence, weapons experience provides a means, and depression and unfreezing lower the opportunity cost of violence as the perpetrator has less to lose.

An illustration of these characteristics can be made in the case of Major Nidal Malik Hasan.[33] Major Hasan turned to the Koran after the death of his parents, seems to have had no close relationships after he was transferred to Fort Hood, and was about to be transferred to Afghanistan (*unfreezing*). He saw himself discriminated against as a Muslim (*personal grievance*) and saw the war on terrorism as a war on Islam (*political grievance*). He brought two weapons to his attack, one a sophisticated "cop-killer" pistol for which he purchased a laser sight—indicating *experience with weapons* beyond whatever slight weapons training the U.S. Army provides for physician-psychiatrists. So far as we can ascertain, Major Hasan showed no signs of depression. Thus Major Hasan had three of the four characteristics common to assassins and school attackers: unfreezing, grievance, and weapons experience.

Indeed recent studies of lone wolf terrorists reinforce attention to all four characteristics. Spaaij examined 88 cases of lone wolf terrorists aggregated across fifteen Western countries and found that lone wolves are likely to suffer from some form of psychological disturbance and tend to be loners

with few friends.[34] Gill, Horgan, and Deckert put together an international collection of 119 mostly lone actor terrorists (including also isolated dyads and some individuals with loose group connections); no single profile was identified but many of the lone actors seemed to be socially isolated.[35] In the most methodologically sophisticated study yet conducted, Gruenewald, Chermak, and Freilich compared lethal attacks by lone actor and group actor U.S. far-right extremists.[36] Results indicated that the lone actors were younger and more likely to have a military background, suffer mental illness, and experience disconnection by separation, divorce, or death of a partner.

Taken together, these results indicate a growing consensus that grievance-fueled lone attackers are likely to have weapons experience, depression or other mental disorder, and temporary or chronic social isolation. Future research may discover characteristics that differentiate lone wolf terrorists from assassins and school attackers, or it may be that lone wolf terrorists are part of a larger phenomenon of grievance-motivated lone actor violence.

Conclusion

Research has indicated that the pathways to participating in a terrorist group are many and too varied to admit the possibility of a profile of individual characteristics that can identify potential terrorists.[37] But there remains the possibility that lone wolf terrorists—those who act alone, without group support—may share characteristics that could provide a useful profile of potential for lone-wolf violence.[38]

Results reviewed in this article indicate that there may be at least two profiles for lone wolf terrorists. Statistical studies indicate what may be called a *disconnected-disordered* profile: individuals with a grievance and weapons experience who are socially disconnected and stressed with a psychological disorder. But at least three of our case histories do not fit this description: Zasulich, Waagner, and al-Balawi had social skills, solid social connections, and no sign of mental disorder. Rather these individuals have a *caring-consistency* profile: they felt strongly the suffering of others and a personal responsibility to reduce or revenge this suffering. We suspect that the caring-consistency profile is less common than the disconnected-disordered profile—not least because self-sacrifice for others is less

common than self-interest—but this hypothesis will have to be tested as we learn more about lone actor violence.

Our reviews of both case and statistical results were conducted using a two-pyramids model of radicalization that emphasizes the gap between extreme opinions and violent action. Perhaps our most important suggestion is to emphasize the practical, situational requirements for crossing the gap between radical opinion and radical action. Criminologists give attention to means and opportunity for crime, whereas terrorism researchers tend to focus only on motives. The case of al-Balawi illustrates the importance of giving more attention to situational factors, as Taylor and Currie have recently suggested in their edited book, *Terrorism and Affordance*.[39] Al-Balawi was talking about a personal moral obligation to participate in jihad for months before Jordanian intelligence gave him the means and opportunity to act on his radical opinions.

Surely we should avoid forcing action choices on individuals at the peak of opinion radicalization, but the issue is broader than that. Much has been made of the fact that Major Hasan had emailed with Islamist firebrand al-Awlaki, although apparently the content of these emails did not raise warning flags for U.S. security officers.[40] An emphasis on means and opportunity might have uncovered that Major Hasan, a psychiatrist with no military need for experience with weapons, had recently bought and (presumably) practiced with firearms. This step toward acquiring the means of violence might be more diagnostic than any assessment of perceived grievance.

From our perspective, the most dangerous indicator of potential for lone wolf terrorism is the combination of radical opinion with means and opportunity for radical action. Some individuals with radical opinions may seek out a militant group to acquire means and opportunity for violence, as Vera Zasulich first tried to do in approaching People’s Will. Some with radical opinions may have means and opportunity thrust upon them, as happened to al-Balawi. Some may seek out their own means and opportunity, as Major Hasan did and Zasulich finally did. Given that radical opinions are common and radical action is rare, attention to means and opportunity for radical action may be useful in narrowing the risk pool for lone wolf violence.

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The Pre-1914 Anarchist “Lone Wolf” Terrorist and Governmental Responses

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After discussing the extent to which the period from 1878–1934, with its frequent incidents of anarchist assassinations and bombings, can be considered the classic age of “lone wolf” or leaderless terrorism, this article focuses on four acts of anarchist violence and police and government responses to this violence. The four cases are the 1896 bombing of a Corpus Christi procession in Barcelona, the 1901 assassination of President McKinley, a 1902 bombing in Livorno (Leghorn) Italy, and the 1912 attempted assassination of Italian King Victor Emmanuel III. Confronted by these violent acts, the authorities resorted to two basic policies that might be referred to as “micro” and “macro” approaches. The macro approach was to launch massive crackdowns, arrest hundreds if not thousands of suspects (in some cases torturing them), and pass repressive legislation limiting freedom of the press, freedom of association, and freedom of assembly in order to discover the guilty terrorists and to squelch anarchist propaganda and organized activity. The micro approach was to focus on improving the intelligence capacity of the police by modernizing and expanding it, and creating or professionalizing the protective service for government ministers and heads of state.

This article will focus on four acts of violence committed before World War I by lone anarchists (or apparent lone anarchists) and on police and government responses to this violence. I will explore the motivations of the different anarchists, as far as we know them, and compare and contrast the state’s responses. The four cases are the 1896 bombing of a Corpus Christi procession in Barcelona, the 1901 assassination of President McKinley, a 1902 bombing in Livorno (Leghorn) Italy, and the 1912 attempted assassination of King Victor Emmanuel III. While the different targets and possible motivations of the anarchist terrorists are interesting, even more striking are the sharply differing actions of the authorities. In all these cases the police and government responses were far from flawless, but the ruthless measures of the Spanish provoked violent acts of revenge, whereas the briefly violent and mostly uncoordinated responses of the Americans

led to no further terrorist deeds. The American government was long on anti-anarchist rhetoric but short on concrete acts of repression. This approach produced no martyrs. The Italian approach led to the same result as the American, but was conducted in a more controlled, low-key fashion, and avoided a violent, popular backlash.

The individual cases will make more sense if preceded by a brief discussion of the extent to which the era of anarchist terrorism, 1878–1934, should be considered the classic age of "lone wolf" or leaderless terrorism. Before this period, nineteenth century terrorists and assassins, such as the Italian nationalist Felice Orsini, the Irish Fenians, and the Russian populists, had constructed elaborate, sometimes international, conspiracies to carry out their violent deeds. By contrast, after the late 1870s the anarchists rejected authoritarian, centralized control over acts of planned violence as well as over anything else. Of the total number of violent anarchist incidents, which runs into the hundreds—possibly thousands if we include the quasi civil wars in Russia after the 1905 Revolution and in Barcelona in 1919–23—less than a handful were the product of large-scale conspiracies. All the rest were the deeds of lone individuals or of very small groups without command structures or leaders.

This posed a big problem for governments and law enforcement agencies since they had a difficult time trying to monitor lone potential assassins and bomb throwers who were often unknown and who belonged to no known group. Two contrasting examples illustrate the nature of this problem from the authorities' point of view. In 1874, the great anarchist and Internationalist leader Mikhail Bakunin planned a major revolt in the Romagna, in north central Italy. Police spies, however, were able to infiltrate the anarchist/Internationalist groups planning the revolt. The intelligence they provided led to the preventive arrest of key leaders and the easy subduing of the few insurgents who marched on Bologna in August 1874.[1] By contrast, in 1894 presumed individual anarchists bombed the Italian parliament building and the justice and war ministries, leading to the deaths of two people, but the police were never able to find or identify the perpetrators.[2]

In the face of such difficulties, the authorities resorted to one of two basic policies, which might be referred to as the micro- and the macro-approaches. The macro approach was to launch massive crackdowns, arrest hundreds if not thousands of suspects, and pass repressive legislation

limiting freedom of the press, freedom of association, and freedom of assembly in order to squelch anarchist propaganda and organized activity. Italy, Spain, Portugal, and France adopted this approach at the peak of the anarchist terror during the 1890s.[3] The micro approach was to focus on improving the intelligence capacity of the police by modernizing and expanding it, and creating or professionalizing the protective service for government ministers and heads of state. In the case of Italy and France after 1900, the micro approach was also associated with socially progressive reforms such as allowing greater freedom of press and association, and allowing greater leeway for unions and other labor organizations that were attempting to improve working class conditions. This was important since much of the anger of the anarchists sprang from their bitterness over the "social question," the vast levels of social and economic inequality and injustice existing in society.

Cambios Nuevos Bombing, 1896

The first case of anarchist terrorism I want to discuss in detail was one of the bloodiest. On June 7, 1896, at 8:40 in the evening, a bomb (or bombs) exploded at the intersection of *Cambios Nuevos* (*Camvis Nous* in Catalonian) and *Arenas de Cambio*, narrow streets—one hardly more than an alleyway—near the center of medieval Barcelona. The bombing occurred during a popular religious procession in celebration of the Eucharist (i.e., the festival of Corpus Christi) that was proceeding from the Cathedral to the great medieval church of Santa Maria del Mar.[4] As a result of the explosion, more than 60 people were injured and twelve died.[5] Since it was a civic event of importance, soldiers marched in the religious procession, which was led not only by religious dignitaries, but also by the civil governor, the city mayor, and the captain general, who was the chief military commander in Catalonia. The bomb, however, was not aimed at these leaders but dropped at the rear of the procession where it killed ordinary people, including women and children as young as six years old. The Corpus Christi bombing produced fear and anxiety throughout not only Barcelona but also all of Spain. Newspapers of almost every political persuasion called for the severe repression of the anarchists.[6]

Unfortunately the Spanish police, which the British and others condemned as hopeless, could not find any evidence as to who perpetrated

the crime.[7] Therefore, heeding the popular outcry, the government declared martial law in Barcelona for six months and arrested over 400 anarchists and others suspected of being sympathetic to the anarchists. These included radicals, Catalan republicans, and anti-clericals.[8] Since the jails of Barcelona were filled to overflowing, many of the arrested were imprisoned in the Montjuich fortress overlooking the city. There they were subjected to horrible tortures to extract confessions. The guards beat prisoners repeatedly with rods until their skin ruptured under the blows, or branded them with hot irons. Fingernails and toenails were ripped out and testicles crushed or tied off with guitar string until they atrophied.[9] In a secret trial characterized by many illegalities, a military court condemned five anarchists to death, although it is almost certain that none of them were responsible for the bombing.[10]

Many historians now believe that the real bomber was a French anarchist named Jean Girault who fled to Argentina after the bloody attack.[11] We may never know why he did what he did, but presumably it was because the Catholic Church had become closely identified with the Spanish monarchy and state. For many anarchists, it symbolized repression and persecution; moreover, the inclusion of major civil and military leaders in the religious procession made it doubly provocative.

After the bombing, government repression extended to republican and socialist groups, which were dismantled and their members arrested. The labor movement in Catalonia was also attacked and suffered enormous damage.[12] Since involvement in the labor movement provided one of the chief safety valves for social discontent and anarchist energies, its crippling helped to provoke future terrorist attempts.

While all these repressive measures were intended to destroy anarchism and weaken the opposition movement in Barcelona, they soon backfired. The grossly excessive measures of the police, military, and government were widely publicized and blackened Spain’s reputation both inside Spain and abroad. In the eyes of much of the world, the Spanish anarchists became martyrs cruelly persecuted by a new Spanish Inquisition. Outrage over the sufferings of the innocent anarchists and others now overshadowed that over the original bombing attack. Shocked by these reports and by personally seeing the torture marks on one of the innocent anarchists who had been released, in August 1897 the Italian anarchist Michele Angiolillo

sought revenge. He went to Spain and assassinated the Cánovas del Castillo, the Spanish prime minister, who was unguarded at the time.[13]

After his murder, anarchist terrorism in Spain ended for over five years. This was due not only to police repression but also to the revival of the European and international economy at the end of the 1890s, some Spanish pro-labor legislation, the commutation of the harsh prison sentences received by the anarchists who had not been executed, and the repeal (1902) of the harsh anti-anarchist law of 1896. Nonetheless, this was a short truce, rather than an end to anarchist terrorism in Spain. It began again in January 1903 due to many of the same reasons that lay behind Girault's and Angiolillo's violent attempts: repression of the labor movement, repression of the right to assemble and publish, a lack of inclusion of the lower classes in a Spanish society dominated by a small elite, the sporadic use of torture by the police, and the general lack of legitimacy of the Spanish state.[14]

McKinley's Assassination, 1901

The assassination of President McKinley caused shock and outrage comparable to that from the Corpus Christi bombing. On September 6, 1901, the anarchist Leon Czolgosz waited in line to greet the president during a brief public reception held during McKinley's visit to the Pan-American Exposition in Buffalo, New York. When his turn came, Czolgosz shot the president twice. He died eight days later.

We have much stronger evidence explaining the reasons for Czolgosz's act as opposed to Girault's, although both were protests against what they perceived to be an unjust society impervious to and uninterested in the legitimate economic and social demands and needs of the lower classes. While the Spanish and the Americans liked to blame foreigners for anarchist terrorism, this was untrue in the case of Czolgosz. He was born in 1873 in Detroit, Michigan, the son of German-Polish immigrants. Czolgosz was sensitive, idealistic, intelligent, and a tireless reader. The brutal labor struggles of the 1890s, however, scarred him, marking a turning point in his life. Because of a severe depression in 1893, the owners of the Cleveland wire mill where Czolgosz worked decided to cut wages. Leon and the other workers went out on strike, but the strike was broken. Leon was fired and blacklisted from further employment.[15] He was only able to resume work, at lower pay, by changing his name to "Nieman," which means "nobody" in

German. It was at this time that Czolgosz started to read radical, including anarchist, pamphlets and journals, joined a Socialist Club, and abandoned his Catholic faith. His favorite text, which he studied for years, was Edward Bellamy's *Looking Backward*.[16] This book envisioned a utopian United States in which a government-owned trust worked for the common interest of every citizen, leading to the end of the violent conflicts between capital and labor that characterized so much of the period before World War I. Like several other anarchist assassins, Czolgosz drifted into radical circles and thinking in an attempt to find meaning for a life without much hope.

He also sought in anarchism a way to protest against injustice. A few months before he shot McKinley, Czolgosz told a Cleveland anarchist that "things were getting worse and worse—more strikes and they were getting more brutal against the strikers, and that something must be done."[17] Czolgosz was also upset by the "outrages committed by the American government in the Philippine islands" against a native uprising in favor of independence.[18] Since McKinley was commander in chief of the armed forces, he could be blamed for American actions in the Philippines and, due to his cozy relationship with the leaders of big business, he could also be held partially responsible for the sufferings of American workers.

Questions have been raised about the genuineness of Czolgosz's anarchist beliefs. One anarchist publication claimed that he acted out "of purely personal idiosyncrasy and not of any doctrine or propaganda."[19] Evidence from various witnesses and Czolgosz's repeated statements, however, demonstrate that Czolgosz was indeed an anarchist, but a solitary one with few links to the wider anarchist movement.[20] His assassination of the president was very much the act of a lone wolf since he received no assistance from other anarchists. This was unlike several terrorists of the period who, while acting essentially alone, received some financial help or advice from other anarchists.[21]

Newspaper accounts of Gaetano Bresci's assassination of Italian King Umberto I also exercised an important influence on Czolgosz's actions and demonstrate how media coverage may encourage terrorism. According to his parents, Czolgosz was fascinated by the assassination.[22] In May 1901, he sought out the treasurer of an anarchist association in Cleveland, saying "I hear the Anarchists are plotting something like Breschi [sic]; the man was selected by the comrades to do the deed that was done." When the

anarchist treasurer denied these stories, Czolgosz confessed that he had not read of them in any anarchist publication but “in some capitalist paper.”[23]

Many have claimed that Czolgosz was mentally ill.[24] Leon was secretive, moody, obsessively fastidious, and in his later years showed intermittent signs of depression, such as wanting to sleep all the time. He may have suffered a nervous breakdown in 1897. But the physicians who examined the assassin at the time of his arrest and in prison and the historian Eric Rauchway all conclude that Czolgosz was not insane.[25] Leon was a brooding, alienated loner, not crazy or even “half-mad.”

Besides his alienation from American society and his identification with earlier self-proclaimed “anarchist tyrannicides”, another important factor may have influenced Czolgosz’s decision to murder McKinley. Czolgosz thought that he would soon die of natural causes. This was because Leon seems to have believed that he had advanced syphilis, although his autopsy showed no signs of that disease. Nonetheless, Czolgosz took medication to treat syphilis, and in July of 1901 told his brother Waldeck that he was not going to live long. Since he was going to die soon anyway, why not strike a blow against a system that he found so unjust?[26]

After McKinley’s assassination, a police crackdown was accompanied by a tremendous popular backlash against the anarchists. While the authorities engaged in a vociferous, sporadic, and short-lived persecution of the anarchists, in comparison with the often violent popular reaction that went on for months, their acts were relatively minor. The police temporarily arrested anarchists, raided their homes and clubrooms, and occasionally confiscated their papers and possessions. The police also looked the other way when mobs drove anarchists and their families out of several towns and attacked and wrecked their publishing offices. In Chicago, the authorities arrested over fifty suspected anarchists, including Emma Goldman, and held them without bail for seventeen days on suspicion of involvement with the assassination. After Goldman protested against this injustice, a policeman slugged her, knocking out a tooth. After being released for lack of evidence, Goldman had to adopt a pseudonym since, when she used her own name, she could find neither work nor an apartment. On October 3, Goldman was prevented from giving a lecture on anarchism. But the American police, unlike the Spanish, carried out no widespread or long-lasting effort to persecute or torture the anarchists. Although Czolgosz appeared unharmed at his trial, Rauchway concludes that Czolgosz was

probably tortured on one or two occasions by using light to burn his eyes.[27] Since at the time this use of torture was not conclusively proven or widely reported, it did not inspire other anarchists to avenge Czolgosz's death.

American newspapers, journals, and congressmen called for police control over the anarchists, the declaration, by international agreement, that anarchism was the equivalent of piracy, the deportation of all anarchists to an island, and even "death in some disgraceful form" for those who merely attempted assassinations.[28] But unlike in Spain, none of these extreme measures were enacted.

Theodore Roosevelt, McKinley's presidential successor, understood how to embody and express the outrage felt by the vast majority of Americans regarding the assassination. At the same time he did little or nothing concrete that curbed American liberties or even repressed radicals in or outside the labor movement. Roosevelt's personality and presidential rhetoric, in which he went to bat against the giant corporate trusts and stood up for the average worker, soon captured the American imagination and undercut the appeal of extremist solutions to resolve America's problems. Thus, on the one hand, Roosevelt's first address to Congress in December 1901 was an incendiary condemnation of the anarchists, whom he denounced as depraved criminals akin to highwaymen, wife-beaters, pirates, and slave traders.[29] In response, Congress passed a law in 1903 prohibiting the entrance of anarchists and assassins into the country. Until the Red Scare of 1919, however, the law led to the exclusion or expulsion of only about fifty people.[30]

On the other hand, Roosevelt made it much clearer than McKinley ever had that he was no pawn of Wall Street and that he stood up for labor. In 1902, the president famously rejected the demands of Pennsylvania mine owners who wanted the U.S. military to help crush a coal miners' strike. Later he employed the "bully pulpit" of the presidency to denounce the huge business trusts that increasingly dominated the American economy. Even if Roosevelt had little success in curbing the trusts, he became the darling of the media and gave a strong impression of being progressive. While at the very tail end of his presidency, in 1908, an anarchist scare developed and a scattering of violent anarchist incidents took place, none of them were directed against the president or the federal government.[31]

In terms of combatting terrorism, where the Roosevelt administration made an important change was in protecting the president. Shortly after

McKinley's assassination, presidential protection became more professional and permanent, rather than amateurish and ad hoc. The Secret Service, whose size was increased, took over this task, at first in a de facto manner and then in 1906 with congressional authorization and funding.[32] The police detail from the District of Columbia metropolitan police force assigned to protect the White House was also increased. In 1910, the Justice Department (and therefore the recently formed Bureau of Investigation) was authorized to protect the President.[33] If these reforms, including obliging the president to obey the caveats of his protectors rather than overruling them as the president had done at Buffalo, had been in place earlier, it is very likely that McKinley would not have been assassinated.

Livorno Bombing, 1902

If Roosevelt's anti-anarchist policy could be characterized as speaking loudly but wielding a small stick, that of his Italian contemporary Giovanni Giolitti, who dominated Italian politics between 1901 and 1914, first as interior minister and then as prime minister, could be characterized as just the opposite. In public he tried to downplay or ignore all anarchist incidents while at the same time significantly building up the size of the Italian police and its international intelligence capacity.[34] During his years in power he was confronted by at least three and perhaps four examples of lone wolf terrorism. The first, least known, but bloodiest incident occurred on October 26, 1902. A huge bomb heard throughout the city exploded at the threshold of a seminary near the Bishop's palace in Leghorn (Livorno), Italy killing a twelve-year-old boy and injuring his nine-year-old sister and another boy. Given the death of children and the anti-clerical target, this event seems somewhat similar to the Corpus Christi bombing in Spain. Bishop Gianni of Livorno was an unpopular and notoriously intransigent cleric who had recently called for Rome's return to papal control.[35] As in Spain, the perpetrator of this deed was never conclusively identified.

But the reaction of the Italian authorities was much different than the Spanish. Interior Minister Giolitti was certainly very aware of the seriousness of the event, telegraphing the prefect of Livorno that "the authors [of the bombing] have to be discovered at whatever cost. If necessary promise rewards."[36] The police made some immediate arrests but then soon released those under detention when they provided alibis. Two

days after the explosion, seven were arrested, and amongst these, the injured boy identified Ettore Cateni, a twenty-five-year-old alleged anarchist, as the bomber.[37] But he too proved to have an alibi and multiple witnesses to attest to his innocence.[38] Given this frustrating outcome, Giolitti's admonition to discover the bombers "at whatever cost" might have encouraged the use of torture to extract confessions, but as far as we know, such methods were never used during Giolitti's many years in power. A biographer writing almost fifty years after the event claims that the guilty party *was* identified, but contemporary records fail to confirm this.[39]

Assassination Attempt, Rome, 1912

Another, more extensively documented *attentat* reveals the same restraint by the authorities as in the Livorno bombing. On March 14, 1912, Antonio D'Alba, a self-proclaimed individualist anarchist and recently fired bricklayer, shot at the king while he was riding in his carriage through Rome.[40] D'Alba missed Victor Emmanuel III but severely wounded one of the mounted royal bodyguards as well as a horse, which subsequently died. One of the king's security escorts riding a bicycle subdued the attempted assassin before he was able to fire at the king another time. Victor Emmanuel's safety was therefore at least partially due to the improved security arrangements provided for the monarchy since his father's assassination in 1900, as well as to luck. In a very brief statement to parliament announcing news of the attempted assassination, Giolitti declined to point out D'Alba's anarchist affiliation. Instead he mentioned his criminal record, including several robberies and a conviction for abusing his parents. A confidential police report noted that D'Alba had never been seen at anarchist meetings. D'Alba was given a regular trial before a jury and defended by Enrico Ferri, one of the most famous lawyers in Italy, who made little of D'Alba's political convictions. Instead he depicted him as the product of a wretched family background and corrupted by life in the lower depths of the Roman metropolis. D'Alba received a harsh sentence of thirty years in prison. All this was typical of Giolitti's approach: to severely apply regular law—avoiding any resort to martial law or special legislation—and to downplay assassination attempts as the products of unstable minds. Indeed D'Alba was unstable, since he told his captors that he had been incited to his crime by a specter (*fantasma*) that appeared to him on various

nights. D'Alba became neither a famous anarchist martyr, like Angiolillo or Bresci, nor inspired revenge attacks.[41]

Conclusion

If anarchist terrorism grew from the blood of its martyrs, then the ineffective "macro" anti-anarchist policies of the U.S. government and the effective "micro" policies of the Giolittian government, which both failed to create any martyrs, must be rated a success while the macro policies of Spain, which did, a stunning failure. These experiences suggest that the best way to deal with the "lone wolf" anarchist terrorist was through micro policies such as improving personal protection for heads of state and government and enlarging, modernizing, and professionalizing the police. The legitimacy and popularity of socially progressive governments, when combined with these micro policies, turned out to be the best preventative against anarchist terrorism. In all probability, obscure lone wolf malcontents such as Girault, Czolgosz, D'Alba, and whoever bombed the Livorno seminary could not have been detected ahead of time. But better micro policies might have rendered Czolgosz's deed impossible and prevented Girault's from having a deadly sequel.

Notes

1. Giampietro Berti, "La sovversione anarchica in Italia e la risposta giudizaria dello Stato (1874–1900)," *Quaderni fiorentini per la storia del pensiero giuridico moderno* 38 (2009): 579–600, especially 579–583.

2. *La Tribuna* (Rome), March 10 and June 1, 1894.

3. Eugenio Florian, *Trattato di Diritto Penale*. 2: *Introduzione ai Delitti in Ispecie Delitti Contro La Sicurezza Dello Stato*, 2nd ed (Milan: Vallardi, 1915), 122–162; William Loubat, "De la Législation Contre les Anarchistes au Point de Vue International," *Journal du Droit international Privé* 22 (1895): 1–22; and 23 (1896): 294–320.

4. Temma Kaplan, *Red City, Blue Period: Social Movements in Picasso's Barcelona* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 31–35.

5. Angel Herrerin, "España: La Propaganda por la Represión, 1892–1900," in Juan Avilés Farré and Angel Herrerin, eds., *El Nacimiento del Terrorismo en Occidente* (Madrid: Siglo XXI de España, 2008), 116.

6. Ibid., 117.

7. Sidney Lee, *King Edward VII* (New York: Macmillan, 1927), 2:535.

8. Herrerin, "España: La Propaganda por la Represión, 1892–1900" (see note 5 above), 119; George Richard Esenwein, *Anarchist Ideology and the Working-Class Movement in Spain, 1868–1898* (Berkeley: University of California, 1989), 193; Rafael Núñez Florencio, *El Terrorismo Anarquista (1888–1909)* (Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno, 1983), 57–59.

9. Esenwein, *Anarchist Ideology and the Working-Class Movement in Spain* (see note 8 above), 195.

10. Joaquín Romero Maura, "Terrorism in Barcelona and its Impact on Spanish Politics, 1904–1909," *Past and Present* 41 (1968): 131.

11. Herrerin, "España: La Propaganda por la Represión, 1892–1900" (see note 5 above), 129.

12. Ibid., 121.

13. Ibid., 134; Esenwein, *Anarchist Ideology and the Working-Class Movement in Spain* (see note 8 above), 194–199; Francesco Tamburini, "Michele Angiolillo e l'Assassinio di Cánovas del Castillo," *Spagna Contemporanea* 4, no. 9 (1996): 101–130. Rudolf Rocker, *En la Borrasca* (Buenos Aires: Americalee, 1949), 63, was an eyewitness to Angiolillo's meeting with a torture victim.

14. Núñez Florencio, *El Terrorismo Anarquista (1888–1909)* (see note 8 above), 61–62, 69–70, 72, 102–103.

15. L. Vernon Briggs, *The Manner of Man That Kills* (Boston: Richard G. Badger, 1921), 304; Eric Rauchway, *Murdering McKinley: The Making of Theodore Roosevelt's America* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2003), 166.

16. Briggs, *The Manner of Man That Kills* (see note 15 above), 305, 312.

17. Ibid., 321.

18. Rauchway, *Murdering McKinley* (see note 15 above), 102.

19. *The Free Society*, February 16, 1902, cited by Briggs, *The Manner of Man That Kills* (see note 15 above), 322.

20. Richard Bach Jensen, *The Battle Against Anarchist Terrorism: An International History, 1878–1934* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), chapter seven.

21. For example, Angiolillo received at least some money from radicals and was perhaps influenced by their advice. Tamburini, "Michele Angiolillo e l'Assassinio di Cánovas del Castillo" (see note 13 above), 110–118.

22. Walter Channing, "The Mental Status of Czolgosz, the Assassin of President McKinley," *The American Journal of Insanity* 59, no. 2 (October 1902): 263.

23. Briggs, *The Manner of Man That Kills* (see note 15 above), 317.

24. Both Doctors Channing and Briggs (see note 15 above), 332, concluded that Czolgosz was "insane," although neither had ever met the man.

25. Briggs, *The Manner of Man That Kills* (see note 15 above), 244–249, 289; Rauchway, *Murdering McKinley* (see note 15 above), 39–43, and especially 114–116, 204–206.

26. Briggs, *The Manner of Man That Kills* (see note 15 above), 308; Rauchway, *Murdering McKinley* (see note 15 above), 177–182.

27. Sidney Fine, "Anarchism and the Assassination of McKinley," *American Historical Review* 60 (July 1955): 780–788; Rauchway, *Murdering McKinley* (see note 15 above), 217.

28. Fine, "Anarchism and the Assassination of McKinley" (see note 27 above), 786–789; Jensen, "The United States, International Policing and the War against Anarchist Terrorism, 1900–1914," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 13, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 15–46; "Notes," *American Law Review* (September–October 1901): 744.

29. Congress, Senate, "President Roosevelt's Message to the Senate and House of Representatives, 57th Cong., 1st Sess.," *Congressional Record* XXXV (December 3, 1901): 82.

30. Fine, "Anarchism and the Assassination of McKinley" (see note 27 above), 793; William Preston, *Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903–1933* (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1963), 33.

31. Robert J. Goldstein, "The Anarchist Scare of 1908: A Sign of Tensions in the Progressive Era," *American Studies* 15 (1974): 50–75.

32. "President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy," in *Hearings*, Vol. 25 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), exhibit no. 2550; Frederick Kaiser,

"Origins of Secret Service Protection of the President: Personal, Interagency, and Institutional Conflict," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 18, no. 1 (Winter 1988): 112–113.

33. Richard B. Sherman, "Presidential Protection During the Progressive Era: The Aftermath of the McKinley Assassination," *The Historian* 46, no. 1 (November 1983): 18; Kaiser, "Origins of Secret Service Protection of the President" (see note 32 above), 118.

34. Richard Bach Jensen, "The International Campaign Against Anarchist Terrorism, 1880–1930s," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 21 (January–March 2009): 96–97; and Jensen, *The Battle Against Anarchist Terrorism* (see note 20 above), chapter ten.

35. *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), October 28–29, 1902.

36. Giovanni Giolitti, *Dalle carte di Giovanni Giolitti: Quarant'Anni di Politica Italiana*, ed. Piero d'Angiolini, Giampiero Carocci, and Claudio Pavone (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1962), 2:275.

37. *Corriere della Sera*, October 29–30, 1902.

38. *Corriere della Sera*, November 1–2, 1902. Rumors that the "companions" of the bomb thrower had helped him escape were never confirmed. *L'Osservatore Romano* (Rome), November 4, 1902.

39. Gaetano Natale, *Giolitti e Gli Italiani* (Milan: Garzanti, 1949), 475–476. Another reason for doubting Natale's account is that his dating of the event is a year off.

40. Richard Bach Jensen, "Criminal Anthropology and the Problem of Anarchist Terrorism in Spain and Italy," *Mediterranean Historical Review* 16, no. 2 (December 2001): 31–44.

41. Copy of report including testimonials, Paolo Sessi, Inspector General of Public Security at the Royal Household to Direzione General P.S. (Ministero dell'Interno), Rome, March 14, 1912, Casa reale, Primo Aiutante di Campo, busta 217, Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Rome.

Men in Black: Dynamics, Violence, and Lone Wolf Potential

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Since the turn of the millennium in particular, protest movements have often been characterized by Black Bloc tactics of confrontation and street fighting between anarchist militants and police forces. This article analyses the Black Bloc's philosophy, dynamics, organization, praxis, and goals. After discussing the relationship between the Black Bloc and violence, the article analyses dynamics within militant anarchism that open the way for the formation of autonomous terrorist cells, as well as the potential for lone wolf terrorism in the movement.

I am only an old man whose life is at the mercy of trifling accidents; but may I, before descending into my grave, see the humiliation of the arrogant bourgeois democracies, today shamelessly triumphant. —Georges Sorel[1]

Introduction

It has become almost a truism to assert the importance of anarchist philosophy and tactics that are loosely associated with the alter globalization movement in many transnational protests, especially in counter summits against a myriad of targets ranging from global capitalism, to war, imperialism, poverty, and the destruction of the environment. If at its inception the anti-globalization movement (as it was popularly called) was highly dependent on specific organizations and their calls for action, it has steadily evolved into a fluid and decentralized network of autonomous groups. This has increased the movement's image, reflected by its nature, as being essentially leaderless. This combination of autonomist, horizontal, and anti-hierarchical traits gives the overall movement an anarchist image even if many activists refrain from calling themselves anarchists. This

reinvigoration of anarchism[2] has increased both the visibility of anarchist direct actions, such as the formation of Black Blocs during protests, and the attention paid to anarchism by authorities.

It is unlikely, in today's media-driven reality, even for a simple observer not to have at least a faint image of a Black Bloc: a tactic in which black clad people who are using defensive and sometimes offensive gear, confront and attempt to disrupt police lines that protect a security perimeter.[3] Particularly since 1999's "Battle of Seattle," a much-celebrated event in activist circles, the Black Bloc has become a permanent feature of protests for a world free of oppression in its many forms. The assertion that "the re-born (post Seattle) anarchist movement is always going to be married to the Black Bloc tactic"[4] provides an insight into the importance given by many (though not all) activists to this type of assertive direct action. Similarly, law enforcement agencies have singled out "anarchist extremism" as a threat and potential source of domestic terrorism. In the United States, the Department of Homeland Security defines it as "groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of violence as a means of changing the government and society in support of the belief that all forms of capitalism and corporate globalization should be opposed and that governing institutions are unnecessary and harmful to society."[5] According to the FBI, the Black Bloc is the embodiment of anarchist "violent extremism" and has become synonymous not only with a tactic but also with a group of extremist people.[6] That is why, particularly in the mainstream media, the Black Bloc is often viewed as a collection of individuals. Or, as stated in a news report, "they're not Al Qaeda, but they are a type of home-grown terror group."[7] Before we delve into the organization and *modus operandi* of these "men in black," let us take a look at the philosophy that informs their activities.

The Philosophy of the Black Bloc

Although its roots reach back to the squatting and Autonomist movement in 1980s Germany, the Black Bloc tactic (which owes its designation to the German media and police), only fully blossomed in North America and in Europe at the turn of the century.[8] Black Blocs have now become a feature of protests and riots that extend to the Middle East (in Egypt, particularly in

an anti-Islamic fashion during the “Arab Spring”) and to South America (especially in Brazil). The geography of the formation of Black Blocs is not limited therefore to a specific territory, but it is essentially a geography of struggle. This is the reason why Black Blocs are pervasive in transnational protests, regardless of where they are held, because militants see themselves involved in a war that is global, against forces of global repression. Its existence and validity are rationalized as part of the diversity of tactics that activists must have at their disposal in mass mobilizations and demonstrations. This diversity of tactics approach signifies that protesters should engage in some forms of direct action of which the formation of Black Blocs is a powerful example.

The anarchist collective CrimethInc is at the forefront of the ideological and militant struggle against the rule of “oppressive” and “authoritarian” powers, advocating insurrection in North America and elsewhere. More than a conventional organization, CrimethInc is an umbrella for almost entirely anonymous activity, open to contributions from everywhere. Most of its cultural production is unsigned, heavily translated into several languages, and the use of pseudonyms is widespread.[9] In *A Civilian’s Guide to Direct Action: What It Is, What It’s Good For, How It Works*, it becomes evident the centrality of action—do-it-yourself and unmediated action—for activists. The status quo is outright rejected. But the existence of a tyrannical and all-powerful system that is upheld by an all-seeing police, military, and secret services is not an excuse for passivity. Instead, the *only* morally acceptable answer is to fight back, even against great odds and with the possibility of failure. “Direct action can be dangerous in a repressive political climate, and it is important that those who practice it make every effort not to endanger others,” the manifesto proclaims. “This is not necessarily an objection to it [direct action], however,” it continues, “on the contrary, when it becomes dangerous to act outside established political channels, it becomes all the more important to do so.”[10] It is not terrorism either, because “while terrorism is the domain of a specialized class that seeks power for itself alone, direct action demonstrates tactics others can take up themselves, empowering people to take control of their own lives.”[11] Thus, this type of action results in the empowerment of the individual that wages it; crucially, the action is justified by the political context alone, owing to the fact that “in the face of an insufferable justice it can be more dangerous and irresponsible to leave it uncontested.”[12] The

Black Bloc, by connecting people "committed to assertive direct action,"[13] as stated by a militant, is the result of this self-empowering philosophy of action.

Not surprisingly, practice outweighs ideology in the narratives that emerge from the Black Bloc. It is action, not theory, that transforms anarchists into an insurrectionary army against the powers that be. Hence, activists invest "experience" (of combating, street fighting, destruction, etc.) and the rewarding emotional and psychological benefits that come from it with great importance. Experiencing becomes an instant of taking control of one's life and putting desires, sensations, and lifetime goals into practice. First-hand accounts of street battles reinforce this perspective. The feeling of exhilaration is pervasive. "Changing worlds, we shift from malaise and misery to incredible joy and pleasure: finally, we are at home in our own skin, in our own environment," says a militant about the 2009 Pittsburgh riots against the G20. "Charging down the street together rather than driving down it separately, fighting or outrunning police rather than submissively accepting their authority, we come to life. *No words can do justice to this experience, but it is real*."[14] Or, as stated by another about the Black Bloc strike on May Day 2012, in Chicago, "Here it is, finally, the power to defend a space beyond their control; inside it, all the rage suppressed beneath the veneer of imposed order erupts to the surface … the *excess* of rebellion. It's chaotic, terrifying, exhilarating."[15] Crucially, these feelings commingle with a sense of a newfound empowerment. "I am irreparably transformed," says an activist after participating in a Black Bloc action.[16] Another activist refers to what was gained from the experience by singling out "the feeling of empowerment that participants took home with them [for] hundreds of people [who] now feel in their bodies that, should circumstances require, they can don masks and sweatshirts and become an unstoppable force of defiance."[17] Of course, one cannot underplay the role of bravado in these internal narratives. A more cynical and less sympathetic voice could point out the gap between rhetoric and reality, owing to the many confrontations that saw the overwhelming power of police over militants.

Moreover, the actions of this "force of defiance" are not unanimously welcomed in protests. From the very beginning there have been conflicts (sometimes physical) between militants and nonviolent activists when Black Bloc tactics have been used. If defenders of the Black Bloc postulate

its necessity in the name of diversity of tactics, thereby transforming protest into actual resistance,[18] opponents see its actions as detrimental to the overall cause of the manifestations, whatever they may be. This tension emerged yet again during the Occupy movement. “Cut it out,” wrote a critic, “your tactics divide public opinion and turn it against the majority of those in the movement who don’t believe in violence of any kind, including property destruction.”[19] Whether in physical protests or on the Internet, in blogs, social media, and forums, accusations are thrown back and forth between those who accuse nonviolent protestors of acting often as “peace police” and those who denounce Black Bloc militants as “hooligans,” “thugs,” or “agents provocateurs.” At the same time, the ethic and social composition of the Black Bloc is disparaged as a bunch of mostly male, infantile white kids of privileged and bourgeois backgrounds. Although Black Blocs feature women (sometimes prominently[20]), and also are more diverse than their detractors claim (largely given that many different groups coalesce at times), most members are in fact young (in their twenties, early thirties), white, and male, and these accusations have become sticking points in general criticism of the Black Bloc.[21]

Inside the Black Bloc

Although the action itself may turn out to be chaotic, the preparation and structuring of militant street combat is thought-out and organized. Activist circles circulate manuals that lay out protocols and guidelines that all those interested in participating must follow. *Fashion Tips for the Brave*, for example, gives a full range of precautions that militants must observe when forming a Black Bloc. These are important in order to preserve privacy, especially if Bloc members will be engaging in illegal activity. The goal is anonymity (“to become indistinguishable is to destroy identity, to overcome distinction”).[22] Recommendations include the following:

- “If you’re going to wear a mask, keep it on at all appropriate times;
- Be extremely conscientious about where and when you change into and out of your mask and anonymous clothing … if possible, explore the area in advance to find appropriate spaces for changing.
- Wear different outfits … [and] then another outfit underneath so you can look like a harmless civilian as you exit the area.
- If you have tattoos that are or could be visible, cover them up! … Likewise, if you have visible piercings, take them out.

- Don’t just cover your face! Bandanas are popular and convenient, but they don’t conceal enough.
- If possible cover your eyes. … Contact lenses are not recommended in situations where you may come into contact with chemical weapons.
- Be careful not to leave fingerprints and DNA evidence! Wear cloth gloves—leather and latex can retain fingerprints. … Wipe down tools and other items with alcohol in advance, to clean fingerprints off them—you never know what might get lost in the chaos. Don’t forget about the batteries inside flashlights!
- Do not let any of this give you a false sense of security. … Make sure you know and trust the people you’re working with, especially when it comes to high-risk activities.”[23]

This manual only mentions in passing the most important model of the organization of Black Blocs: affinity groups. Numbering between three and ten persons,[24] or in other accounts five to twenty people,[25] and ideally composed of a tight-knit group of friends, or at least people who know each other’s backgrounds and have relatively high levels of trust, affinity groups are seen as having more chance of holding together in solidarity with each other. A larger Bloc ideally should be made of a cluster of affinity groups. *What is a Bloc good for?* emphasizes the importance of “self-sufficient” affinity groups that are capable of fending for themselves and of making decisions. These cells are supposedly more efficient because they “can make democratic decisions quickly, can split up into equally effective smaller groups, can handle stressful situations without the added stress of herding a flock of confused followers.”[26] Before an action, the affinity group must already plan for “escape routes, legal resources, [and] emergency backup plans,” and should develop “knowledge of the area.” Scouts equipped with hand radios or cell phones are crucial for each action in order to keep track of police whereabouts and establish safe routes when needed. Runners are often employed to communicate new information to other groups.[27] Regardless of all these preparations, however, it could be counter-argued that affinity groups are not really efficient as a combat force because of a lack of centralized leadership and command. The reluctance to obey hierarchical models may constitute, in practice, an obstacle to the efficiency of black blocs as fighting units, especially when on the other side is a well-organized, trained, intimidating, riot police.

The calls for action are publicized in many ways. Flier-ing is common, as is posting announcements in underground and alternative periodicals. E-mail lists and listservs were very popular initially, and mobilizations were posted and reposted in order to reach the greatest number of subscribers. With the development in communications technology, social media,

including Facebook and especially Twitter (feeds are used during actions so that activists can communicate with each other), have become the most effective methods of communication. But the publicity given to calls for action depends on the goals of the action itself. As stated in *What is a Bloc good for?*, "If you're trying to organize a massive but largely symbolic open Bloc, you might choose to circulate meeting times openly [but] if you're preparing an entirely closed Bloc, not only should you only reveal the time and place of the meeting to your companions in the action, but you should also make sure they all know not to mention the existence of the project itself to anyone, and to have alibis ready so their other friends won't wonder what they're up to."[28]

This last preoccupation sheds light on the attention given by anarchist militants to security culture and a perceived need to insulate in order to protect activist cells from state interference, infiltration, and surveillance. *What is Security Culture?* is a how-to guide in this aspect. This document also gives advice not just to Black Bloc preparations but also to *all* actions, including those illegal or at least potentially criminal. Meeting location is crucial in this regard: "You don't want a place that can be monitored (no private residences), you don't want a place where you can be observed all together (not the park across from the site of the next day's actions), you don't want a place where you can be seen entering and leaving or that someone could enter unexpectedly—post scouts, lock the door once things get started, watch out for anything suspicious." The document establishes "security levels" appropriate for each action. Security level 1, for example, rules that "only those who are directly involved in the action know of its existence," while security level 2 states that "trusted support persons also know about the action, but everyone in the group decides together who these will be."

Each security level has a corresponding channel of communication. In the highest level of security there is "no communication about the action except in person, outside the homes of those involved, in surveillance-free environments (e.g., the group goes camping to discuss plans); no discussion of the action except when it is absolutely necessary." Online communication is not allowed below security level 4, at which "communication by encrypted email or on neutral telephone lines is acceptable."[29] Above all, the golden principle is not to make it "too easy for your enemies to figure out what you're up to." Activists "involved in

serious clandestine activities" should be extra careful about their phones (because "federal agents can easily get access to the phone numbers dialed from your phone, and will use such lists to establish connections between individuals"), as well as "email, and the books you check out from libraries, and especially social networking sites." They should take all measures to avoid leaving a trail: "credit card use, gas cards, cell phone calls all leave a record of your motions, purchases, and contacts."

Attention is given to all details, so Bloc members are advised to "be careful about what your trash could reveal about you—dropouts aren't the only ones who go dumpstering!"[30] Activities may affect one's private life: "At the beginning of any relationship in which your private political life may become an issue, emphasize that there are details of your activities that you need to keep to yourself." As with any revolutionary cell, the mission takes precedence over more mundane affairs.

Militants prefer to have the Black Blocs as *part* of larger protests as a way of making its isolation by police more difficult to handle.[31] Even with all the focus on preparation and planning it should be noted that, particularly when the moment for the Black Bloc to act comes, the chaos that is generated and the cat-and-mouse game that plays out between militants and police create such an unpredictable scenario that flexibility and adaptability rather than adherence to preordained schemes make more sense. As an anarchist who participated in street fighting in Barcelona said, "The most fundamental precondition for action isn't having a plan—as plans always fall apart in these situations, the most fundamental need is the ability to push back the police. Those who win a space directly from the police can subsequently do everything."[32]

It is important to note that, in the heat of the action, the dynamics of combat between the Black Bloc and police open space for other individuals and groups to join in. This seems to confirm research that shows that many times Black Blocs are "spaces occupied by a heterogeneous multitude."[33] First-persons accounts confirm that a fusion of groups happens in some of these protests. For example, during the 2001 FTAA meeting in Quebec City, local residents coalesced with the Black Bloc in fighting the police.[34] At the 2012 G20 meeting in Toronto, "while anarchists debated for hours about how to avoid putting regular protestors and those with uncertain citizenship status at risk with confrontational tactics, *it was actually a group of mostly people of color, migrants, and their allies who were the first to charge the*

police (emphasis mine)."[35] Similarly in Barcelona, where "in almost an hour of freedom on a street won by force, hooligans anarchists, and *indepes* [Catalans who want independence from Spain] smashed into and set fire to a Starbucks and a bank … in most instances, hooligans and immigrant youth were at the front, with a handful of anarchists, and their bravery was inspiring. … Those who were most effective in pushing back the police were young people from a mix of socio-economic and ethnic backgrounds with little or no prior street experience."[36] In many Brazilian riots of 2013, much of the street-destruction and fighting of the police was made by a heterogeneous crowd made of Black Blocs *and* youth from the poor suburbs and the favelas. An activist exulted: "This shows that the radical tactics and spirit had spread throughout the multitude, or that the anarchists had dissolved themselves into the multitude."[37] The capacity for "other people"—locals, minorities, immigrants, etc.—to act alongside the Black Bloc varies according to the national context, as well as to the degree of discontent and disaffection with the state of affairs in each city or country. However, these instances of fusion accentuate the dynamics of "leaderless resistance" of these movements of protest. Activists put a high value on this concept and, in some of these protests, even chant, "We are a leaderless resistance."[38] As stated by a participant, "When a march is led by the leaderless, it is unstoppable. Movements without leaders cannot be beheaded; a march with a black bloc is not stopped by one arrest, or ten."[39] The tradition of leaderless resistance[40] against tyranny and oppression is reenacted inside anarchist cells and activities.

Black Blocs and Violence

In the history of anarchism, there has always been an ongoing controversy about the role of violence in the accomplishment of objectives. In the words of a sympathetic writer, "most anarchists have made a distinction between the violence of the oppressor and the violence of the oppressed, and have justified the use of revolutionary violence as a legitimate weapon with which to resist and eventually overthrow the organized violence of the state."[41] In this vein, as a CrimethInc member states, "We reject the idea that any organization could have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force."[42] Ultimately, and this is obvious in current debates in anarchist

circles, the discussion is centered on the *meaning* and *legitimacy* of violence.

Most militants do not see the destruction of property as violence. Both well-known ideologues and anonymous militants share this opinion. “Defensive violence is of course justified. A deeper question is what is meant by violence,” declares “Anarcho-Primativist” John Zerzan. “I think that targeted property destruction is not violence, for example, and is in fact a needed tactic.”[43]As another activist states, “Smashing a window or fucking up a store is not violent. You can’t ‘hurt’ property. It is inanimate.”[44] Moreover, violence is not viewed as pointless or nihilistic. As stated by a Black Bloc communiqué, “Property destruction is not merely macho rabble-rousing … it is strategically and specifically targeted direct action.”[45] “There is a well-considered method to their seeming madness,” writes a Black Bloc supporter, for “black blockers [sic] know whose property they are destroying, and why.”[46] But if this kind of action, regardless of whether it is understood by its perpetrators and their supporters alike as violence, is justified, there is no “consensus,” in the words of a CrimethInc militant, on violence against individuals. However, “I think it’s a bit of a cop-out to draw a sharp line between property destruction and violence to people’s bodies—is the individual simply a physical body, or are one’s interests and desires an essential part of one? If the latter is the case, then by smashing the property from which an executive hopes to profit, you really are hurting him, not just objects.”[47] In any case, tactics of destruction put them at odds with “non violence fetishists.”[48] “Tailoring your tactics to avoid state repression entirely only works if your aims never conflict with the state’s,”[49] says an activist. Ultimately, nonviolence can lead, at best, to cosmetic changes, without constituting a threat to the rule of the elites.

But if the meaning of violence is still a subject of controversy, there is a growing consensus that the use of violence is bound up with the question of legitimacy. “Violence” is not a neutral word but is rather a “tool” used by the state to take the legitimacy out of opponents, making the punishment easier. The manifesto *The Illegitimacy of Violence, The Violence of Legitimacy* states that “defining people or actions as violent is a way of excluding them from legitimate discourse, of silencing and shutting out.”[50] The dichotomy between violence and non-violence creates an opening for

the suppression of those deemed “violent” by official discourses. This has consequences for Black Blocs because it ensures that “when people see a masked crowd that refuses to kowtow to coercive authority, they don’t think, ‘Good for them for standing up for themselves,’ but rather, ‘Oh no—a bunch of terrorist bombers.’”[51] This is the reason why militants aim at establishing “our own criteria for what is legitimate”—which means, in practice, transcending, often by far, the bounds of what is acceptable by contemporary mainstream standards. The rationale for all militant actions should be not whether they are violent or not but rather “on the grounds that they are liberating” and thus advance the cause of freedom against the control and power of the powerful.[52]

A similar discussion applies to the concept of extremism. In political theory anarchism has been ascribed the label “extremism” because it rejects the rules of the game and delegitimizes the constitutional state.[53] The late Joel Olson, an anarchist scholar, welcomed the term because “extremism is the unconventional, extraordinary political mobilization of the refusal to compromise” while recognizing the importance of “zealotry” as a historical political strategy aimed at transforming power relations.[54] But here again there is no unanimity, and CrimethInc views the designation as yet one more “tool used by the powerful to delegitimize rivals,” making repression against “extremists” sound and justified.[55] The deeper question is that, alongside street battles and physical confrontations, the terrain of struggle is also made of a discursive combat, with anarchists reclaiming their own interpretation of concepts and tactics to be more valid than the dominant ones.

The State Versus the Black Bloc

The state and Black Bloc activism uphold two antagonistic narratives about each other’s role in contemporary protest movements. On one hand, the state puts forth a law and order discourse aimed at defending the sanctity of public and private institutions, as well as defending the safety and the right to free speech of all peaceful protesters while keeping violent ones at bay. On the other hand, anarchist militants see the policing of demonstrations and the show of force involved as unadulterated intimidation, provocation, and repression. Between these two narratives (and mindsets) it is impossible to establish bridges.

Particularly regarding large-scale demonstrations on the occasion of international meetings, or political party conventions, states have been able to transform summit sites into inexpugnable fortresses with fences, well-established security perimeters, and a massive presence of police, including undercover agents, that in practice keeps all protesters (violent or not) at the margins. This creation of impenetrable spaces by the police is an adaptation to the heterogeneous, loosely-structured, and direct action-inclined dimensions of contemporary transnational activism.[56] At the same time, months before such events the police launch a public relations campaign that inculcates in public opinion and through the media the possibility of the disruption of public order, perpetrated by "violent anarchists," and its resolve to suppress the threat. This has a "chilling effect" on activists *and* on local communities, afraid to aid or join in the protests.[57] At the same time, and as a way of countering Black Bloc activism, local and national authorities have started to ban masks during protests (Canada, for example, in the fall of 2012, or the Brazilian State of Pernambuco in the summer of 2013[58]), following on a trend already underway in Europe.

The security measures put forth by the state extend beyond the policing of manifestations, however. Law enforcement agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have encouraged "community policing," because, as stated by the DHS lead for countering violent extremism, "community members are best able to identify those individuals or groups residing within their communities exhibiting dangerous behaviors, and intervene, before they commit an act of violence."[59] Security agencies have developed an intense surveillance of groups associated with anarchism and Black Bloc activism. The Brazilian Intelligence Agency, following the riots that rocked the country in 2013, intensified the monitoring of social media such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and WhatsApp in order to identify violent individuals and groups and find criminal evidence.[60] Intelligence-led operations, whose need has been advocated by analysts,[61] have included sting operations and the widespread use of informants, and have resulted in the arrests of some anarchist militants. Although it has been pointed out by analysts that "infiltration into radical revolutionary 'cells' is not" simple,[62] the fact of the matter is that the FBI is one agency that has had some degree of success.

A covert operation in 2012 led to the arrest in Chicago of three individuals who were described in an affidavit as “members of the Black Bloc” group on charges of “Material Support for Terrorism” and “Conspiracy to Commit Terrorism.”[63] At about the same time, five “self-described anarchists” were arrested in Cleveland after undercover work revealed a plot to blow up a bridge; these would-be bombers were also being held on terrorism charges.[64] The harsh position of the state is part of the increased post-9/11 focus on national security (the consolidation of a “securitization frame”[65]) that led to a revamping of anti-terror laws in the United States and in Europe. This included the expansion of the definition of terrorism that now comprises attacks that harm property and commerce.[66] The heavy hand of the state is not lost on militants. To the contrary, as a CrimethInc member states, to a certain extent, it is successful: “surveillance is universal and intense, and probably succeeds in suppressing a great deal of questioning among the general populace as well as specifically disruptive anarchist organizing.”[67]

The fear of informants is particularly acute within activist circles. The arrests in Chicago and Cleveland, for example, were treated as cases of “entrapment” in which undercover agents instigated activists to radicalize their actions. “One thing that should be increasingly clear is that once we begin to live the life of an activist we must be very, very careful,” a writer posted on an anarchist forum. Care is especially necessary because “an agent of the security state could be anyone …. They could be your friend, your mom, your dad, your lover, your sister, your brother, your teacher, your cleaning lady, the mailman—anyone. This is an extremely uncomfortable fact, but it’s one we need to process.”[68] It is significant to note that even the activists arrested in Cleveland, as the affidavits demonstrate, were reluctant to meet with people not vouched for, including the informant that would lead, ultimately, to their arrest.[69] Anarchist manuals, however, warn about the danger of paranoia, emphasizing instead the need to hold fast to strong and reliable security measures: “A good security culture should make it practically irrelevant whether these vermin are active in your community or not.”[70]

After a riotous demonstration, a Black Bloc activist expressed his conviction “that this police state has also bred a tougher breed of anarchist, too, the way that new strains of virus evolve that are immune to existing

vaccines."[71] This is certainly the hope of many militants, even though the "police state" has certainly stepped up its game against its "enemies." Further, it seems that in the strategy of inoculation against the anarchist virus, Intel work has proved to be, in many ways, efficient.

Into the Grey Area: Lone Wolf Terrorism

Terrorist operations conducted by lone wolves are characterized by the inexistence of ties to a formal organization. Nevertheless, the literature points out that underlying the lone wolf solo work is an ideological cause, be that secular or religious. In tracking the development of lone wolf terrorism, scholars have asserted the importance of movements that provide "ideologies of validation"[72] or a "large intellectual movement,"[73] and point out that because "ideas may be more important for solo political action,"[74] they could trigger an individual's self-perception as someone "involved in a global ideological battle … in which they can become quite actively involved in it in a manner that is dangerous to the society in which they are living."[75] Ideologies are thus factors that may be conducive to lone wolf violent actions in the sense that they help shape the self-radicalization of the individual. Therefore self-radicalization does not mean that the lone terrorist was born in a vacuum, "produced solely in the dark vacuum of self,"[76] but gives enough space to the role played by literature or the influence of intellectual role models and like-minded individuals.

As has been shown, the ideology that feeds and shapes Black Bloc activism and related direct action activities is geared toward a cult of action that sees violence, no matter how it is defined, as a weapon for individual transformation[77] and social change. The narrative is far from homogenous, and there is not one single source but rather isolated comments, statements, and manifestos from which one can develop a fuller picture. In *Black Bloc and White Riot* this narrative blossoms.[78] Ecstatic action is exalted, and violence is seen as a necessary step to transform activists into political beings able to change the world: "Violence either writes a new law or preserves the one that exists. For those that feel the weight of the unbearable present, there is only one acceptable decision."[79] "Modern life gives us countless reasons to despair," writes the author, "under conditions like these, we would be well within our right to kill ourselves. But when we

decide not to, when we pass through violence in order to discover the life that lies beyond it, we enter into an agreement in which our actions become the sole measure of our being."[80]

This emancipatory vision of violence, in which violence is *the* solution for individual despair, in one way or another, and not always spelled out this forcefully, pervades the ideology nurturing the actions of the men in black. At the same time, across the literature, the language is many times belligerent, with descriptions of street fighting as "battles," and sometimes the dehumanization of enemies (cops as "pigs," for example). A *Communiqué on Tactics and Organization to the Black Bloc* justifies the "militaristic tone" of the manifesto because "the reality of our militant struggle necessitates the language used in order to most accurately depict our objective circumstances and the methods we must employ in order to come closer to victory."[81] One focus of this document is the need to engage in clandestine operations. "If one of the primary advantages of the force of the State is their mechanized mobility, then we should strike out against these repressive tools by effective, clandestine means," it states. "Separate affinity groups under their own direction should voluntarily coordinate such actions."[82] Sooner or later, the formation of clandestine networks of cells will be unavoidable: "Such an underground force must entail, among other things, access to alternative identification, known and trusted safe houses, friends in strategic positions, access to materials of necessary subsistence, an underground means of communication, ways to pass unseen through international borders and the know-how to continue our militant activities underground." It ends with a call for arms: "We must and will attack the leviathan head on, then from the shadows, and then again face-to-face. The only result can be social revolution. Here we would like to remind you that firearms are still legal, as of print, and easily attainable in the United States."[83] For those who perceive themselves as being in a war, this is a pragmatic and logical scenario. A 2012 opinion piece posted on an anarchist forum written as a show of solidarity with the "Cleveland 5," after praising all inspirational anarchist movements (like the Greek Conspiracy of Cells of Fire [CCF]) that take "violent action" against the state, reiterated the need to endorse "their war against the apparatuses of Control." It also heralded a "new generation of American born anarcho-bombers" who realize "that this life is shit and choose to burn it up. We can't stop these

kids from exploding and burning their enemies (why would we want to?).”[84]

The “cool factor” has been seen as one element that may help direct an individual toward violent radicalization.[85] There is little doubt that a sense of bravado underlies many of the statements about Black Bloc activism and confrontational tactics against the “enemies.” A lingering image that emerges from Black Bloc accounts is of an adventurous and edgy affair, with a thrill and excitement that are at the antipodes of the boring and controlled daily life (which incidentally is one of the reasons why Black Bloc activists reject the Occupy movement).

At the same time there is a tendency to romanticize violence that is not exclusive to openly Black Bloc militants. The popular and trendy anarchist magazine *Adbusters* advocates a revolution against the dominant plutocracy and, although it is as far as a clandestine publication as possible, portrays vandalism, or the destruction of property, glamorously, even publishing citations from the standard bearer of nonviolent resistance, Mahatma Gandhi, approving the necessity of violence under certain circumstances.[86] At the same time “riot porn”—images and videos of riotous actions and confrontations with the police—is a popular concept within anarchist circles and beyond. The argument is that such images appeal to human aesthetical senses. One site, for example, is even named “Black Bloc Fetish” because “resistance is sexy.”[87]

Whether or not violent resistance is “sexy,” the question of whether it is “lethal” and how it can lead to lone wolf terrorism is certainly more complicated. It is not a black-and-white issue, and here we still enter into a grey area. Radicalization (which entails an absolute rejection of the status quo) by itself does not lead to terrorism. It could lead to non-violent radicalization or to violent radicalization,[88] but even in this last case, it should be pointed out, it is not synonymous with lone wolf terrorism. At the same time, empirical studies have shown that the existence of a broader ideological cause is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for lone actions of terrorism. Usually there is a psychological factor at work in the form of a disturbance or traumatic experience that compels one to embark on a lone wolf action or campaign.[89] Self-sacrifice for a cause is rare; maybe high levels of empathy, or emotional commitment to a group, would

help to explain it. In any case, the political becomes personal.[90] These dynamics make prediction a very unreliable affair.

In regard to a correlation between insurrectionary anarchism and lone wolf terrorism, then, the priority should be to establish what is tangible. It is true that other "anarchists of the praxis," such as those belonging to the International Revolutionary Front (IRF), greatly influenced by the Greek CCF, have extended their battle against Power and Capital beyond mass protests and have decisively advanced toward targeting not just property (through sabotage and bombings) but also individuals.[91] In any case, in respect to Black Bloc activism, one needs to emphasize the works of a totalist ideology that gives its members a full understanding of reality and of their role in it, establishes a clear division between friends and enemies, and aims at a complete reconfiguration of human affairs. From the apocalyptic present a new, redeemed future will emerge. As stated by a militant, the goal is "to save the world and society from slipping into the abyss."[92] Militants are true believers; hence, the righteousness and moral certainty that they are on the "right side" of history. This is the justification for their willingness to act, and, in some cases, even to sacrifice their public lives for secretive and underground missions launched against oppression, injustice, and an illegitimate system. Even the authorities that fight against them serve to reinforce group dynamics, making even more real the "under siege" mentality that is diffuse among militant circles. At the same time, state operations heighten the martyrdom mythology of the movement by giving them martyrs, comrades in prison (viewed as "political prisoners"), for the cause.[93] The term comrades is appropriate, for activists see themselves as a band of brothers, united by a political (but mostly existential) cause which is bigger than each one of them on his own. If, to all these dynamics, one adds the purifying role given to violence by many of the activists, the conclusion that we are in the presence of an ideology of validation sounds reasonable—and, it seems reasonable to say, will still be outside the bounds and powers of the realm of prediction.

Notes

1. Georges Sorel, *Reflections on Violence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 293.
2. Cindy Milstein, *Anarchism and Its Aspirations* (Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2010), 75–76; Leonard Williams, "Anarchism Revived," *New Political Science* 29, no. 3 (2007): 297–312; Peter

Marshall, *Demanding the Impossible: A History of Anarchism* (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2010), 697–698.

3. It is important to keep in mind that the tactic of black blocking can also be used in a non-confrontational manner. Other groups have also used it, for example activists dressed in pink, or wearing carnival-esque outfits, known as Pink Blocs. They usually engage in street theatre and dancing in front of the riot police.

4. *Black Bloc Papers*, edited and compiled by David Van Deusen and Xavier Massot of the Green Mountain Anarchist Collective (Shawnee Mission, KS: Breaking Glass Press, 2010), 154.

5. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), *Statement for the Record of Principal Deputy Counterterrorism Coordinator and Senior Advisor to the Secretary John Cohen for a House Committee on Homeland Security hearing titled 'The American Muslim response to Hearings on Radicalization within their Community* (Washington, DC: Author, June 20, 2012); Department of Homeland Security (DHS), *Leftwing Extremists Likely to Increase Use of Cyber Attacks over the Coming Decade* (Washington, DC: Office of Intelligence and Analysis, January 26, 2009), http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/leftwing.pdf.

6. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), *Domestic Extremism—Anarchist Extremism: A Primer* (Washington, DC: Author, November 16, 2010). Already in the summer of 2001, Jurgen Storbeck, at the time director of Europol, the European Law Enforcement Agency, called Black Bloc anarchists "terrorists or proto-terrorists." See Jean-Pierre Masse and Nathalie Bayon, "L'altermondialisme au Prisme de L'exceptionnalisme: Les Effets du 11 Septembre 2001 Sur le Mouvement Social Européen," *Cultures and Conflicts*, October 6, 2004, 10, http://conflits.revues.org/1069.

7. "Men in Black With a Violent Agenda," *FOX 13 News*, Tampa Bay, May 23, 2012.

8. For an inside account of the German Autonomist movement and its use of Black Bloc tactics see Geronimo, *Fire and Flames: A History of the German Autonomist Movement* (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2012). In North America, the first relevant example of Black Blocs happened during the protests against the Gulf War in 1991, in Washington D.C. But it is the "Battle of Seattle" (1999) that would witness the emergence of Black Blocs as a pervasive force in protests.

9. For an activist account of CrimethInc see Sandra Jeppesen, "The DIY Post-Punk Situationist Politics of CrimethInc," *Anarchist Studies* 19, no. 1 (2011): 23–55.

10. *A Civilian's Guide to Direct Action: What It Is, What It's Good For, How it Works,* http://crimethinc.com/tools/downloads/pdfs/direct_action_guide.pdf.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. *Black Bloc Papers* (see note 4 above), 86.

14. "Breaking News From The Pittsburgh G-20 Protests," *CrimethInc. Ex-Worker's Collective,* 2009, http://crimethinc.com/texts/recentfeatures/g20.php.

15. "May Day: A Strike Is a Blow," *CrimethInc. Ex-Worker's Collective,* 2012, http://www.crimethinc.com/blog/2012/05/10/may-day-a-strike-is-a-blow/.

16. "God Only Knows What Devils We Are," *The Institute for Experimental Freedom*, February 20, 2012, http://www.politicsisnotabanana.com/2012/02/god-only-knows-what-devils-we-are.html.

17. "G20 Mobilization: Preliminary Assessment," *CrimethInc. Ex-Worker's Collective,* 2009, http://crimethinc.com/texts/atoz/g202.php.

18. *Black Bloc Papers* (see note 4 above), 88.

19. Carl Gibson, "Cut It Out: An Open Letter to Black Bloc Anarchists," *Reader Supported News*, May 22, 2012.

20. For instance, the cover of the mainstream Brazilian weekly magazine *Veja* issue dedicated to the Black Blocs featured a woman activist (Emma), under the headline "the gang of the masked people." See *Veja*, no. 34 (August 21, 2013). The title of this article does not want to reinforce a gender stereotype about Black Blocs. Therefore, the role of women must be acknowledged, even if the majority of activists are still young men.

21. See José Pedro Zúquete, "'Hell Yes, We're Fighting!': Revolutionary Anarchism's Call for Destruction and Creation," in George Michael, ed., *Extremism in the United States: An Overview* (Gainesville, FL: Florida University Press, 2013).

22. "On the Black Bloc," *Anarchist news dot org*, April 4, 2012, https://anti-politics.net/content/black-bloc.

23. "Fashion Tips for the Brave," *CrimethInc. Ex-Workers' Collective*, October 11, 2008, http://www.crimethinc.com/blog/2008/10/11/fashion-tips-for-the-brave/.

24. *Black Bloc Papers* (see note 4 above), 350.

25. Luis A. Fernandez, *Policing Dissent: Social Control and the Anti-Globalization Movement* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2008), 55.

26. CrimetInc. Workers' Collective, *Recipes for Disaster: An Anarchist Cookbook* (Olympia, WA, 2004), 136, https://we.riseup.net/assets/35370/crimethinc.recipes.for.disaster.an.anarchist.cookbook.pdf.

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28. Ibid.

29. "What is Security Culture?," *CrimethInc. Ex-Workers' Collective*, n.d., http://www.crimethinc.com/texts/atoz/security.php.

30. Ibid.

31. For example, *Black Bloc Papers* (see note 4 above), 139.

32. "The Rose of Fire Has Returned," *CrimethInc. Ex-Workers' Collective*, April 2012,http://crimethinc.com/texts/recentfeatures/rosefire.php.

33. Francis Dupuis-Déri, "The Black Blocs Ten Years after Seattle," *Journal for the Study of Radicalism* 4, no. 2 (2010): 50–51.

34. *Black Bloc Papers* (see note 4 above), 138.

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40. See Jeffrey Kaplan, "Leaderless Resistance," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9, no. 3 (Autumn 1997): 80–95.

41. Marshall, *Demanding the Impossible: A History of Anarchism* (see note 2 above), 658.

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43. Interview with John Zerzan, July 31, 2010.

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57. Fernandez, *Policing Dissent: Social Control and the Anti-Globalization Movement* (see note 25 above), 161.

58. “Em Recife, Protestos Agora Só de Cara Limpa,” *O Globo*, August 23, 2013, 9.

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62. Ibid.

63. *The People of the State of Illinois—vs.—Defendants*, May 19, 2012.

64. *The United States of America vs. Douglas L. Wright*, April 30, 2012, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/USCOURTS-ohnd-1_12-cr-00238/USCOURTS-ohnd-1_12-cr-00238-1/content-detail.html. Three of them, after pleading guilty to all charges, were subsequently sentenced as “domestic terrorists” to prison terms ranging from 8 to 11 years. See “Jury in Bridge-Bombing Conspiracy Case Begins Deliberations; Defendant Denies Guilt,” *Cleveland.com*, June 13, 2013, http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2013/06/jury_in_bridge-bombing_conspir.html.

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68. “Agent Provocateurs & Informants,” *Infoshop News*, May 21, 2012,http://news.infoshop.org/article.php?story=2012052119495540.

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70. “What is Security Culture?” (see note 29 above).

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75. Raffaello Pantucci, “What Have We Learned about Lone Wolves from Anders Behring Breivik,” *Perspectives on Terrorism* 5, nos. 5–6 (2011): 40.

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87. See *Black Bloc Fetish*, http://blackblocfetish.tumblr.com.
88. Bartlett and Miller, "The Edge of Violence" (see note 85 above), 2.
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91. For the IRF network see José Pedro Zúquete, "World War Ⓐ," in Michael Fredholm, ed., *Lone Wolf Terrorism: Past Experience, Future Outlook, and Response Strategies*, forthcoming (2014).
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93. On the relationship between radicalization and martyrdom see McCauley and Moskalenko, "Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism" (see note 73 above), 425–426, 428.

Lone Wolf Islamic Terrorism: Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad (Carlos Bledsoe) Case Study

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This article is a detailed case study examining Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad (born Carlos Bledsoe), a lone wolf jihadist who carried out a fatal shooting at a joint Army-Navy recruiting center in Little Rock, Arkansas, on June 1, 2009. The article explores his early life, including involvement in violent and criminal activities that caused Muhammad to get into trouble with authorities, after which he decided to explore religion as an alternative that could keep him out of trouble. Muhammad found that he was attracted to the Islamic faith, and converted at the age of nineteen. The article explores Muhammad's subsequent turn toward Salafism*, and chronicles his increasing extremism with reference to academic debates about the concept of radicalization and the role of religious ideas. Finally, the article explains Muhammad's attack on the recruiting center, and the manner in which he was able to continue his jihad even while imprisoned.*

June 1, 2009 was a Monday. Shortly after 10:00 a.m. that morning, Private William Long, 24, and Private Quinton Ezeagwula, 18, stood outside the joint Army-Navy recruiting center in northwestern Little Rock, Arkansas, taking a smoke break. The two young men, who were working at their hometown recruiting center before moving on to their first duty station, spoke of where that first assignment would take them. Long mentioned that he would be leaving for Korea the following Monday; Ezeagwula was bound for Hawaii a day earlier, on Sunday.[1] As they made conversation, a black Ford Sport Trac sport utility vehicle pulled around from the commercial parking lot adjacent to the recruiting station.

The SUV's window rolled down. Ezeagwula thought he heard the driver say something, so he turned and looked toward the driver, a black male in his mid-twenties. Almost immediately, the driver—Abdulhakim Mujahid

Muhammad, formerly known as Carlos Bledsoe—began firing at both of them with a SKS semi-automatic rifle. Long was hit, and collapsed immediately. He would be declared dead upon arrival at the hospital. Ezeagwula was hit in the back and torso, and dropped to his knees. He began to crawl back toward the recruiting station, trying to find shelter from the gunfire.[2] Muhammad continued firing through the recruiting station's window, hoping to hit the fifteen Army and civilian personnel who remained inside.[3] The SUV then drove off.

Figure 1. Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad at the time of his arrest (color figure available online).

Though this initially appeared to be a routine drive-by shooting, Muhammad made his motivations clear after his apprehension by Little Rock police. In his initial discussion with detectives in the homicide interview room, Muhammad said that he was a practicing Muslim, and was motivated to carry out the shooting by the injustices of U.S. foreign policy. It soon became obvious that the shooting had been an act of lone wolf Islamic terrorism, one of only two fatal lone wolf attacks inspired by Salafi-

jihadi ideology since 9/11 (that term will be defined subsequently, just as evidence of his Salafi-jihadi beliefs will be provided later in this article).[4] The U.S. has also seen other fatal attacks that might be described as lone wolf Islamic terrorism—Hesham Mohamed Hadayet's 2002 attack on the El Al ticket counter at the Los Angeles International Airport and Naveed Haq's 2006 shooting at the Seattle Jewish Federation—but the attackers in these other cases do not appear to have been motivated by Salafi-jihadi ideology.

The Muhammad case, which this article examines in detail, illustrates a number of pertinent points about lone wolf Islamic terrorism. The first is the role of religious ideology in individuals' radicalization. Though some scholars argue that religious belief is not a significant factor in radicalizing people toward jihadi violence,[5] certain behavioral patterns suggestive of religious motivation have emerged in a broad cross-section of jihadi homegrown terrorism cases, and Muhammad's radicalization fits into this pattern. However, there is a question of whether this new ideology played a causal role in his eventual turn to violence, or whether Muhammad brought violent tendencies with him when he converted to Islam.

Second, while this is not necessarily typical of incarcerated terrorists in general, Muhammad illustrates the ability of a lone wolf terrorist to continue his war even while imprisoned. The amount of damage he did while in jail—including stabbing one guard and threatening another, stabbing an inmate, and constantly defacing his cell—was noteworthy by any measure for the facility in which he was held. In addition, he was even able to win a convert to his cause while imprisoned.

Third, this incident illustrates how difficult it is to protect against lone wolf terrorist attacks in an open and free society such as the United States. The lone wolf attacker simply enjoys too many targets of opportunity for them all to be secured. Further, because of robust constitutional protections —something we as a society do not want to change—it is difficult (though not impossible) to take preventive action against a potential attacker like Muhammad even if authorities have strong information that he has been radicalized and poses a danger of undertaking violence. In this case, Muhammad had already come across the FBI's radar, yet if they had moved to arrest him earlier, federal authorities likely would have lacked a compelling criminal case.

Finally, though it is difficult to prevent attacks like this, the Muhammad case shows why lone wolf Islamic terrorist attacks have had an extremely limited impact. Al Qaeda's propaganda has frequently encouraged Muslims living in the West to carry out attacks on their own,[6] and al Qaeda can legitimately boast one lone wolf attacker who both did significant damage and also captured the nation's attention (Fort Hood shooter Nidal Hasan). But thus far, lone wolf terrorists have not been the asset that al Qaeda and other jihadis would like them to be.

I conducted field research in Little Rock, Arkansas, for this article. Before traveling there, I read all available court documents and media reporting related to Muhammad's attack, making special note of figures who seemingly had special insight into him and the attack in order to interview them during the field research, and interviewed Muhammad's father (Melvin Bledsoe) by telephone. In Little Rock, the people I interviewed included prosecutor Larry Jegley; Lt. Carl Minden of the Pulaski County detention facility where Muhammad was held; guards at that facility who worked there during Muhammad's incarceration; and Jim Hensley, an attorney who was part of the defense team. I also visited the detention facility itself, where I was provided access to the administrative segregation wing where Muhammad had been held, and was able to gain access to the files that the prosecution used in this case.

Muhammad's Early Life and Conversion

Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad was born as Carlos Bledsoe on July 9, 1985, and grew up in Memphis, Tennessee.[7] His family operated a tour company, Twin City Tours, and Muhammad began to assist the family business when he was eight years old. He would interact enthusiastically with customers. Muhammad's father, Melvin Bledsoe, explained that the company was a big part of Muhammad's upbringing. "He grew up in the business," Bledsoe told me. "He came to work in the summers, after school was out."[8]

Bledsoe described his son as a "fun kid" while growing up. Bledsoe explained, "He loved to have fun, he was a practical joker, he loved high fashion clothes, rap music, girls. Typical young boy." The family had a couple of dogs as pets during Muhammad's youth: it had an American Eskimo up until he was twelve, but after it was killed by a neighbor's dog,

the family bought a golden retriever. The American Eskimo was one of the memories that neighbor Curnelia Crutchfield emphasized after news of Muhammad's shooting became public, recalling that he "seemed like he was a good kid. He was a happy-go-lucky kid. I remember he had a white dog and they were the best of friends."[9]

Muhammad graduated from high school in 2003 and went to college at Tennessee State University in Nashville. Given his involvement in the family business, he wanted to get a degree in business administration, and eventually run the tour company. Melvin Bledsoe and his wife hoped that their son could thus give them an early retirement.[10]

Muhammad's recollections of his childhood are less positive than those of his father and the neighbors who described him to the media. Speaking to a psychologist with the Arkansas Department of Human Services before his trial, Muhammad recalled that he was suspended from school several times for fighting, and characterized himself as having been "a gang member."[11] (The psychologist's conclusions will be discussed later in this article.) Some of the people I interviewed in the course of my research were dismissive of the claim that he had been in a gang while growing up. However, records from the Shelby County, Tennessee Sheriff's Office suggest that Muhammad's claim may be more than simply an exaggerated view of his pre-Islamic past. A police report from February 2002 describes an incident in which Muhammad was punched in the face by a man named Derrick Moore, who claimed that Muhammad had threatened him. The report concludes by noting that Muhammad and Moore had in the past been "affiliated" with a gang called the Vice Lords.[12]

Muhammad was involved in a couple of other violent incidents before leaving for college. In August 2002, he entered a barbershop and told a man named Derrick Cathey to "step outside so that they could fight."[13] Cathey refused, and barbershop employees told Muhammad to leave. He later returned with two other men, and a knife was pulled during the course of the ensuing altercation. And in May 2003, Muhammad's car was struck by another driver. Muhammad jumped out of his car, ran to the other driver's vehicle, and started hitting the rear passenger window with chrome-plated brass knuckles. Muhammad yelled, "Bitch I'm gonna kill you, get out, I'm going to kill you when I get your address."[14] Officers who arrived on the scene found the brass knuckles in Muhammad's left rear pocket during a pat-down.

This involvement with violence as a teenager does not, of course, mean that Muhammad would inevitably have committed murder absent his encounters with Islamic extremism. His defense lawyer, Jim Hensley, told me that if Muhammad hadn't been captured by this fringe ideology, "I don't think he ever would have murdered anybody."[15] (Muhammad fired Hensley from the case before trial, but Hensley continued to serve as an informal consultant to Muhammad's father even after being forced out.) On the other hand, prosecutor Larry Jegley, who has tried a large number of murder cases, thought that Muhammad might have ended up a killer even without drifting into Islamic radicalism. "It's possible," Jegley said, that he might not have killed absent becoming radicalized. But on the other hand, "he also could have hooked up with the Crips or the Bloods."[16] Jegley did note, however, that Muhammad had every opportunity to not go down the wrong path, in that he was blessed with a father who had "pulled himself up by his bootstraps, worked hard, took chances, and was part of the American dream. His family members all wanted desperately for him to share in that."[17] Thus, Jegley said, "I'm not going to argue with anybody who says the radical Muslim stuff he was exposed to could have been an influence."[18]

So Muhammad had early brushes with the law. But one criminal incident, occurring in Knoxville, Tennessee, in early 2004, would indelibly change Muhammad's life. Around 9:00 p.m. on the evening of February 21, Knoxville police officer Michael Harper pulled over a blue Mazda.[19] A man who had been sitting in the car's front seat fled, and the officer found Muhammad in the back seat. There were weapons in the car, including a SKS assault rifle and a single-shot shotgun, which Muhammad told the officer he had been trying to sell to the man who fled for $100. A search accompanying the arrest turned up a bag of marijuana in Muhammad's front left pants pocket, and he was charged with unlawful possession of a weapon and drug possession.

Muhammad could have faced up to fourteen years of imprisonment for this offense, which "spooked" him.[20] The family hired a lawyer, who argued that he was just a college student who was experimenting.[21] The prosecutors gave Muhammad a plea deal that included a year's probation, but one condition was that if he got into further criminal trouble, he would have to serve the full fourteen-year sentence.

The experience frightened Muhammad, seemingly instilling in him the idea that he had to show he could do better. He became interested in religion, and would later provide an account of this exploration to journalist Kristina Goetz of Memphis's largest daily newspaper, *The Commercial Appeal*, to whom he wrote from jail.[22] Muhammad told her that he first looked into Christianity, the faith in which he had been raised, but no longer believed in it. He found the doctrine of the Trinity "not comprehensible," telling Goetz: "1 + 1 + 1 = 1. That's wasn't clicking to me."[23] (This article retains Muhammad's original spelling and grammar, which is idiosyncratic, when quoting from his writings.)

Thereafter, Muhammad decided to study Judaism, saying that he "was attracted to the belief of monotheism."[24] However, he claimed that he was turned away from a couple of orthodox synagogues because he was black. Muhammad wrote of Judaism: "That religion seem to me like too much of racial pride and not for other people. It seem to be all about 'the Jews' or 'Children of Israel.'"[25]

Then Muhammad began to explore Islam, having known Muslims while growing up. He visited a mosque in Nashville, and reported being "drawn and amazed" by *salah*, the congregational prayer in which about 75 people participated. He attempted to join in the prayer, but it was obvious to the others that Muhammad was unfamiliar with the sequence of standing, bowing, and prostration. So after *salah* was done, one of the congregants asked Muhammad how long he had been Muslim, and he said that he wasn't—that he was just interested in the faith.

Muhammad reported that the congregation responded enthusiastically, with shouts of *Allahu Akbar!* permeating the room. The congregants, he wrote, "embraced me like I was a long loss brother."[26] The congregant who had asked Muhammad how long he had been Muslim spoke to him about the fundamentals of the faith, and Muhammad felt attracted to its "pure monotheism, no 1 + 1 + 1 = 1."[27] Muhammad was given a translation of the Qur'an, and other books. "I believed in it wholeheartedly," Muhammad wrote, "and decided to become a Muslim."[28]

Muhammad took his *shahadah*, or declaration of faith, at a mosque in Memphis in 2004, at the age of nineteen.

Muhammad's Radicalization

By his own explanation, Muhammad ascribed to an interpretation of Islam at the time of the shooting that is best labeled *Salafi-jihadi*. By *Salafi*, I mean that he adhered to an austere religious methodology that seeks to re-create Islam as it was supposedly practiced by the Prophet Muhammad and the first three generations of Muslims. The term *jihadi* refers to the belief that violence should be undertaken in purifying Islam in this manner. Although the term *jihadi* is controversial among terrorism researchers, in large part because it is derived from the religious term *jihad*, it has the benefit of being an organic term, the way those within the movement refer to themselves. Moreover, as the noted academic Jarret Brachman writes, this label has "been validated as the least worst option across the Arabic-speaking world," including being used in Arabic-language print and broadcast media.[29]

As previously mentioned, the concept of *radicalization* is hotly debated amongst researchers, especially with respect to the role of religious ideas. It should be clear at the outset that saying religion played a role in an individual's radicalization or turn to violence is not an indictment of the Islamic faith as a whole. One may hold, for example, that an interpretation of Christianity strongly influenced the Inquisitors from the fifteenth to nineteenth centuries—as it surely did—without implying that the Inquisitions represent the totality of Christianity, or its truest interpretation.[30] Similarly, Salafi-jihadism is one interpretation of Islam. Many other interpretations also exist, including those that reject religiously inspired violence. Journalist Bruce Livesey has said that less than one percent of the world's Muslims are Salafi-jihadis, though it is difficult to create a precise estimate.[31] (A precise estimate is difficult because participation in violence is not the only indicator of Salafi-jihadi beliefs: some will provide "soft" support for jihadism, while others will share its outlook but lack the opportunity to participate in or support violence. Indeed, the explosive growth of Salafism after the Arab uprisings, "sometimes at the ballot box, sometimes at the point of a gun," suggests that many observers underestimated the strength of this strand of belief before the uprisings began.)[32]

As I mentioned, some scholars argue that religion is relatively unimportant to jihadi terrorism, full stop. One study that argues to the contrary, written by Mitchell Silber and Arvin Bhatt (both then of the New York City Police Department, which published their report), is entitled

Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat.[33] In it, using a comparative case study method, Silber and Bhatt identify four phases through which they believe homegrown jihadi terrorists progress on their way to undertaking violence.

The first phase is *Pre-radicalization*, the period before individuals begin the terrorists' journey to extremism. This phase is generally marked by apparent normalcy. The second phase is *Self-identification*, where individuals begin exploring Salafi Islam "while slowly migrating away from their former identity—an identity that now is re-defined by Salafi philosophy, ideology, and values."[34] Frequently a cognitive event—such as the loss of a job, alienation or discrimination, or death in the family—produces an identity crisis that shakes previously held beliefs, and readies individuals to accept a new identity and new beliefs based on Salafism. (If we examine whether Muhammad aligns with this model, that cognitive event could be his arrest and prosecution in Knoxville, which produced his subsequent religious exploration.) The third phase is *Indoctrination*, where the individuals' newly adopted Salafi beliefs intensify. A person going through this stage "wholly adopts jihadi-Salafi ideology and concludes, without question, that the conditions and circumstances exist where action is required to support and further the Salafist cause. That action is militant jihad."[35] The fourth and final phase is *Jihadization*, where individuals "accept their individual duty to participate in jihad and self-designate themselves as holy warriors or mujahideen." Ultimately, they "will begin operational planning for the jihad or a terrorist attack."[36]

One legitimate criticism of the NYPD's study is that it takes too determinative a perspective on radicalization, making ideology the central factor. A wide variety of individuals who have come to support terrorism in service of radical Islamic causes were primarily motivated by something other than ideology: for example, political grievance or sense of adventure.[37] But though there are other radicalization trajectories that the NYPD's report does not account for, it does illustrate one trajectory—that of ideological radicalization—that can be observed in a wide variety of Islamist terrorism cases.[38] It appears that Muhammad falls into this category. Following his conversion, he began to identify with Salafism, his religious practice became progressively more rigid, and finally he decided to undertake violence during time he spent in Yemen. Indeed, after carrying

out his shooting, he explained his actions by reference to religious obligation.

Turning to the specifics of Muhammad's religious evolution, soon after his conversion to Islam he began to embrace a highly legalistic practice of the faith consistent with Salafism. A legalistic religious practice does not make one radical (many Muslims who fall into this category are just religious conservatives), but many of those who went on to become involved in Islamist terrorism first adopted a highly legalistic religious practice.[39] One hypothesis for why religious legalism is often found in those who go on to support jihadi terrorism is that a legalistic understanding of faith can subsume an individual's own moral agency. If a believer thinks that he cannot make up his own mind about such matters as whether he needs to grow a beard, or whether it is permissible to own a dog as a pet, can he have any agency on larger issues, such as violence in service of the faith? Further, for those who support jihadi causes, legalistic religious practice may be linked to a utopian outlook that can justify religious violence: many believe that if Islamic law (*sharia*) could be implemented fully, a perfectly just society would emerge. Mass movements that believe their ideas can usher in a new utopia have often found it easy to justify violence in service of a perfect future.

Muhammad's family glimpsed his transformation during his trips back home to Memphis following his conversion. They actually learned that he had become Muslim after Muhammad "took down all the pictures from the walls in the bedroom where he slept," including a picture of Martin Luther King, Jr. that held particular emotional resonance for the family.[40] When his family asked why he had done this, Muhammad replied that he had "converted to Islam and that everything he does from now on will be to honor Allah."[41] Muhammad's decision to take down the pictures in his room is consonant with certain Islamic rulings holding that pictures depicting anything with a soul are religiously impermissible (although Muhammad was almost certainly motivated by what other Muslims had told him to do, rather than his own scholarly exegesis of the Qur'an and *sunnah*).[42]

Another aspect of Muhammad's newfound legalism can be glimpsed in what he did with a dog that he had bought as a pet while in college. As previously explained, Muhammad had grown up with a couple of dogs, and was viewed as inseparable from one of them, so it was natural that he

bought a puppy—a Rottweiler—while in college. But a popular interpretation of Islam holds that dogs are religiously impermissible pets. In one *hadith*, for example, the Prophet Muhammad states that "Angels (of Mercy) do not enter a house wherein there is a dog or a picture of a living creature."[43] So Muhammad took his Rottweiler into the wilderness, and simply let it go. It was only a year and a half old when he did so.[44] Muhammad was likely unaware of other *hadith* that counsel kindness to dogs,[45] although on balance more *hadith* are critical of them.

Muhammad adopted a number of other legalistic practices and trappings of the faith that were consistent with a Salafi practice. His father told me that Muhammad tried to grow out a beard, but "it wouldn't grow right. It would always be thin and ragged, and we would make fun of him about it. He'd be an old man before he would grow a beard, but he kept trying, because he was told that's what he should do."[46] Muhammad rolled his pants legs up above the ankles, another behavioral change often associated with Salafism. He began chewing a *miswak*, a stick used for cleaning one's teeth that the Prophet Muhammad had reportedly used. In this way, there was external evidence of Abdulhakim Muhammad exploring Salafism, allowing it to define his new identity while moving away from who he was before. Further showing his rejection of his old identity, he legally changed his name from Carlos Bledsoe to Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad on March 29, 2006.[47] His father told me, "Carlos and Abdulhakim Muhammad are two different people."[48]

Most significantly, Muhammad began to distance himself from his own family due to their refusal to become Muslim when he tried to push his new faith on them. As Melvin Bledsoe said in congressional testimony, "It had gotten to the point where he had no interest in coming home, even for the holidays."[49]

Muhammad's writings from jail provide further evidence supporting Bledsoe's interpretation of his son's transformation—both the notion that Carlos Bledsoe and Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad were "different people," and also the way he distanced himself from his family. (This article often quotes from Muhammad's own account of his personal history, provided after he carried out the Little Rock shooting. A convicted terrorist's narrative about his own life is often unreliable: as Marc Sageman has noted, there is a "tendency to distort the past to make it consistent with

one's present self-concept."[50] Thus, I find his personal history credible where it is supported by external evidence, and note areas where his account seems dubious.)

In one of his several letters to Kristina Goetz, Muhammad flatly stated, "I'm not Carlos. I'm Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad—a new man, changed man." He continued by substantiating his post-conversion distance from his family. He analogized his situation to that of the prophet Abraham (who is considered a prophet by Jews, Christians, and Muslims). Muhammad wrote: "Abraham was a friend of Allah but his relatives and people especially his father were enemies of Allah and that's the situation with me and them. I love Allah, and His Messenger, they hate them. So we are on different sides."[51]

In September 2007, Muhammad left the United States for Yemen. At the time, the imam of Masjid Furooq in Nashville wrote a letter to the Yemen Al Khair Institute on Muhammad's behalf. The letter explains that Muhammad wanted to go to Yemen because he "seeks knowledge" of Islam. It goes on to describe his religious practice as Salafi: "He follows the Quran and Sunnah according to the understanding of the Salafis Salih. He is Salafi and seeks to increase his knowledge of Quran and Sunnah, and the Arabic Language."[52] (Beyond this letter, it is unclear what influence the imam had on Muhammad's faith and decision to go to Yemen.)

Muhammad's Time in Yemen

Muhammad arrived in Yemen on September 11, 2007. One unfortunate aspect of his time there, from a research perspective, is that we only have his own account for much of what occurred.

It is clear that by the time he left the U.S., Muhammad self-identified as Salafi, and had adopted the mores, customs, and rules of that practice of the faith. Seemingly, however, it was not until his time in Yemen that he came to embrace the need to undertake religious violence. He told Kristina Goetz, "I've loved Jihad ever since I became Muslim. But here in America you have *hypocrites* and *hypocritical sects* preaching against Jihad and the Mujahideen so I fell victim to their false knowledge and cowardly ways."[53] The most reasonable interpretation of this statement is that, when he left for Yemen, Muhammad had not yet come to see undertaking violence in the

name of his faith as a religious obligation because of the relative moderation of the American Muslim community.

If we assess Muhammad based on the NYPD's radicalization model, during his time in Yemen he progressed from self-identification with Salafism into the stage of Indoctrination. In this phase, the radicalizing individual wholly adopts the Salafi-jihadi worldview and concludes that it is necessary to undertake violence.

Because what happened during Muhammad's time in Yemen is somewhat obscure, this article offers only a bare outline. He had gone there primarily to learn about Islam and to learn Arabic. Muhammad taught English at two different schools, but that was by no means his primary interest.[54] In fact, he felt guilty and uncomfortable teaching English because, as he related, "it's the English and others that are the enemies to the Muslims."[55] Thus, Muhammad "felt uncomfortable teaching the Language of the Enemy to my brothers and sisters."[56]

Muhammad would later express the new worldview that he adopted while in Yemen, and explain how it led him to embrace the need for violent action. As has been the case for many homegrown Islamist terrorists, Muhammad put political rage at the center of his explanation, but fused that political rage with a sense of religious obligation:

> What lead to the attack on the Recruiting Center was this. America and it's allies are waging an all out war on Islam and Muslims. Even before 9/11 it was involved in a war against Islam. The US Foreign Policy regarding occupied Palestine was the sole purpose of 9/11. In Islam there's a call to duty—Jihad—and it's of different types but the one I'm mentioning is a defensive struggle or fight with weapons against those who attack, kill, maim the Muslims. And this is apart of Islam …
>
> "Like I said" there's an all out war against Islam and Muslims in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Waziristan, Chechnya, Somalia, Palestine, Phillipines, Yemen etc. And Muslims have to fight back. Like I said before in a past interview we believe in an eye for eye not turn the other cheek. Now it's a all out war on America and I'm on the other side. The side of the Muslims Yes! The side of Al-Qāeda Yes! Taliban Yes! Al-Shabaab Yes! We are all brothers under the same banner. Fighting for the same cause which is to rid the Islamic world of Infidel and Apostate Hypocritic regimes and Crusader Invaders and re-establish the Caliphate, the Islamic Empire and Islamic Law as was ended officially in 1924 by the fall of the Ottomans.[57]

This is an important passage that tells a great deal about Muhammad's thinking. He starts out by speaking of his anger over U.S. foreign policy, something he elaborated upon in other letters and statements to authorities. This backdrop, the "war against Islam," gives rise to what he describes as a

religious obligation to undertake violence. He explains that "there's a call to duty—Jihad." Muhammad specifically references the need for a *defensive jihad*: in contrast to an *offensive jihad*, expansionist warfare designed to enlarge the abode of Islam, a defensive jihad may be called when Muslim lands are attacked. When this situation exists, each Muslim has an individual obligation to join the battle. In Islamic jurisprudence, this concept is known as *fard ayn*.

However, Muhammad does not limit the scope of the battle he believes like-minded Muslims should engage in to defending Muslim lands and expelling alleged Western aggressors. Rather, he states that the ultimate goal of his fight is to "re-establish the Caliphate, the Islamic Empire and Islamic Law as was ended officially in 1924 by the fall of the Ottomans." This indicates the manner in which Muhammad's political and religious thinking intertwine. His understanding of contemporary foreign policy aimed at the Muslim world gave rise to his belief that aggressions against Muslims have triggered an individual duty to undertake jihad in defense of the *ummah* (worldwide community of believers). But by the end of his explanation, he declared that the fight would not stop until the re-establishment of the caliphate—a far broader goal, and one that has long been shared by al Qaeda and a host of jihadi thinkers.

Muhammad told Little Rock police that he got married while in Yemen, to a Yemeni woman who was a student at one of the schools where he taught.[58] He said, though, that they divorced before he returned to the U.S. A marriage document issued by Yemen in September 2008 provides verification for his claim of marriage.[59]

It is unclear at what point during his time in Yemen Muhammad came to accept the need to undertake violence, but his writings reveal that he did not receive military training when abroad. He noted that he had wanted to travel to Somalia, but was unable to do so. Muhammad boasted that if he had received this training, the attack he carried out would have been far more successful. As he wrote in grandiose tones, "My drive-by would have been a *drive-in*, with noone [sic] escaping the aftermath!!"[60] But before Muhammad could go to Somalia, Yemeni authorities arrested him in October 2008. There is some dispute in open source reporting over why he was arrested (some sources claim he had overstayed his visa), but the likeliest explanation is that Yemeni officials suspected him of being a militant, especially because he possessed a fraudulent Somali passport at

the time of arrest.[61] Muhammad later said that the reason he had the passport was to go to Somalia and receive militant training.[62]

Muhammad was likely on the FBI's radar even before his arrest in Yemen. As a senior counterterrorism official in the U.S. government told me, "Carlos Bledsoe was interviewed by an FBI agent from Nashville in Yemen. What was the agent doing in Yemen? He wasn't there on a TDY [temporary duty assignment]. The embassy didn't even know he was there."[63] Muhammad corroborated this account, describing his interview with an FBI agent in his public correspondence.

After carrying out his attack in Little Rock, Muhammad would claim that he was associated with al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the jihadi organization's Yemeni affiliate. In assessing al Qaeda's organizational structure for *Foreign Affairs*, analyst Leah Farrall noted AQAP's closeness to al Qaeda's core leadership, in that it "was created by, and continues to operate under, the leadership of core al Qaeda members."[64] Muhammad's claim that he was a part of AQAP is both vague and circuitous. He told Kristina Goetz that he would not say much about AQAP, but "yes, I'm affiliated with them." He wrote, "Our goal is to rid the Islamic world of Idols and Idolators, Paganism and Pagans, Infidelity and Infidels, hypocrisy and hypocrites, apostasy and apostates, democracy and democrats and *relaunch* the Islamic caliphate, the Islamic Khalifah and to establish the Islamic Law (Shari'ah)—Allah's Law on Earth and anyone who strives for this is affiliated with the movement. So yes I'm Al Qāeda and proud to be."[65] The most noteworthy aspect of Muhammad's claim to be affiliated with al Qaeda is that he explains it based on shared values: based on his desire to purge the Islamic world of paganism and infidels, and to re-establish the caliphate. He does not claim any sort of formal affiliation, such as having taken an oath of *bayat* (a formal oath of allegiance) to the jihadi group.

I spoke with Gregory Johnsen, a former Fulbright Fellow in Yemen and Ph.D. candidate in Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, who is a noted AQAP specialist. He told me that "it would have been pretty easy" for Muhammad to come into contact with people who at least believed many of the same things that AQAP did, perhaps even during his time in prison. Muhammad may even have come in contact with actual AQAP members, but "what's even more likely is that he came into contact with people who held anti-American or extremist views." But this contact is

different than becoming a formal member of AQAP or swearing *bayat*, which Johnsen doubts Muhammad did—and I agree with him. Among the more persuasive reasons that Muhammad was unlikely to have been a formal member, Johnsen notes that the group did not release propaganda taking credit for his attack. "If they considered him a member," Johnsen said, "they may have taken more credit for this."[66]

Muhammad's time in Yemen gives rise to questions about his social relationships. Many studies on radicalization—including those of McCauley and Moskalenko, and Sageman—highlight the importance of social dynamics. Indeed, often lone wolf terrorists are only alone in carrying out their attacks, and are actively influenced by others in every step leading up to undertaking violence. There are ample hints that this may be the case with Muhammad—that group influences may have played an important role in his turn toward Salafism even before traveling to Yemen, and that his social networks may have further compelled him to embrace violence when he lived in that country. Unfortunately, we don't have much more than hints about these dynamics—but suffice it to say that ideological and social explanations for radicalization may be mutually reinforcing rather than in competition with one another.

The Little Rock Attack

Muhammad was deported back to the United States in January 2009. He lived with his family for about three months in Memphis before moving to Little Rock. His family wanted to help straighten him out, and gave him a job with Twin City Tours in Little Rock as the company expanded to that location.[67]

Even before he returned to the U.S.—during his incarceration in Yemen—Muhammad had formulated the intention to carry out an attack in America. Upon his move to Little Rock, he began developing a specific plan of action, targeting both recruiting centers and Jewish organizations. He looked at possible locations for attack that included "Little Rock, Memphis, Nashville, Florence, Kentucky, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and D.C."[68]

In preparation for an attack, Muhammad bought guns and a great deal of ammunition. Continuing his legalistic practice of Islam, Muhammad refused to use credit cards to buy these supplies because "Muslims don't

believe in interest."[69] At one point, he purchased a .22 rifle at a Walmart to see if the FBI would put a hold on the purchase, or if he would be questioned. No such hold or questioning came. He recalled walking out of the store with the new gun, thinking to himself, "It's on."[70]

But Muhammad's initial journey to try to carry out an attack resembled a farce more than anything else. He first drove to the house of a rabbi in Nashville. He lit the fuse of a Molotov cocktail and threw it at the house, but it bounced off a window. Muhammad quickly left the scene, driving toward the next target he had preselected, an army recruiting center in Florence, Kentucky that he had found on the Internet. However, the recruiting office was closed when he arrived.

Muhammad felt dejected. Gas cost around $4 a gallon at the time, and he felt that he had spent a lot of money on this unsuccessful expedition. But when Muhammad returned to Little Rock, driving down Rodney Parham Road on June 1, 2009, he saw two soldiers standing in front of the joint Army-Navy recruiting center smoking, and he recognized his opportunity. Muhammad, who had been heading east on Rodney Parham Road, drove through a parking lot adjacent to the recruiting center, approaching them from around a corner so that the two soldiers would be less aware of his approach.

Muhammad's black Ford Sport Trac SUV pulled up next to William Long and Quinton Ezeagwula shortly after 10:00 a.m., and he shot at them with a SKS semi-automatic rifle. Long collapsed immediately, and was pronounced dead upon arrival at the hospital less than an hour later, at 10:56 a.m.[71] Tragically, his mother, Janet Long, was sitting nearby, in her car, when Muhammad shot her son. She saw his sudden execution first-hand. As Ezeagwula, who was injured in the shooting, crawled back into the recruiting station, Muhammad continued firing through the window until his ten-round clip was empty.[72] He then drove away.

Another driver, Woody Mulkey, heard the shooting from his truck, which was at the nearby stoplight at the corner of Reservoir and Rodney Parham.[73] He looked over and saw Muhammad's truck, with a gun sticking out the window, and briefly pursued it. However, Mulkey incorrectly anticipated the direction that Muhammad would take in his retreat, and lost sight of him.

Figure 2. Photograph of the Army-Navy recruiting center taken in August 2012 (color figure available online).

But Muhammad's shooting was sloppily executed if he had any intention of escape: he had left his truck's tailgate down, thus making it easier to spot as he fled. Police logs show that officers pursuing Muhammad were told about the tailgate.[74] An officer caught up with Muhammad as he drove east on I-630.

The arrest itself was uneventful. The officer activated his blue lights and Muhammad pulled toward the right shoulder but didn't stop, then pulled across I-630 to the left lane, and continued onto the I-30 East on-ramp. Muhammad then stopped about halfway up the ramp. The arresting officer drew his service weapon, and made Muhammad keep his hands outside the window of his car. When two other officers arrived, Muhammad was instructed to turn his car off and throw the keys out the window, after which he was arrested.[75]

When Muhammad was brought in for questioning after his arrest, he waived his Miranda rights. In a recorded conversation, he told Detective

Matt Nelson and Detective Tommy Hudson that he was a practicing Muslim, and shot the two soldiers because he was angry at the U.S. military. Muhammad also said that "if there would have been more out there I probably would have shot them too."[76]

Muhammad also claimed that the night before he carried out the shooting, he had watched the video *Fitna Exposed*, which was a response to Dutch parliamentarian Geert Wilders's anti-Islam movie *Fitna*. Muhammad explained that this was the sole and unexpected trigger for his shooting: "I started seeing more pictures of just women being raped you know, gang raped and you know it's one woman named Fatima, she's in a (inaudible) prison so she got raped more than nine times on one—one day and uh she was wanting to kill herself and you know it was just—it was a point of insanity, I—I think is what happened and I just like blacked out you know. And—and I just kind of went insane all of a sudden."[77]

That statement suggests that Muhammad's attack was not premeditated, but rather an emotional response to watching an inflammatory film that made him go "insane." Yet thereafter Muhammad's story changed to what is outlined above: that he formulated the intention to carry out an attack while in Yemen, and sought out other targets (in Nashville and Florence, Kentucky) before driving past the Little Rock recruiting station and realizing that the two soldiers out front would be relatively easy targets. The explanation involving premeditation is more credible. Not only did Muhammad stick to this story thereafter, but also it is the most consistent with external evidence, such as his purchase of large quantities of ammunition, and of a rifle at Walmart to make sure authorities were not tailing him.

Muhammad's Detention and Trial

While awaiting trial, Muhammad was detained at the Pulaski County Regional Detention Facility in Little Rock. It is the largest county jail in Arkansas, holding 1,130 inmates (with construction underway to add another 240 cells). There, Muhammad realized that he could continue "waging jihad" even while incarcerated.[78] He remains notorious among the guards and administrators at the facility.

Muhammad was involved in several violent incidents. The first occurred on October 24, 2009. Another inmate, George McFee, had been pouring

juice into Muhammad's cup when Muhammad cut his left hand and wrist with a makeshift knife that he had made from his glasses.[79] Muhammad explained in a letter from jail that he did this because McFee was "a blasphemer who got mad because I told him to calm down so I could hear the news on TV and he responded by cursing me, my mother, and The Almighty Allah."[80] He said that because McFee had "blasphemed the Creator," stabbing him was "a just reward."[81]

Muhammad also stabbed a guard, Deputy Grunerwald, whom he said was an Iraq war veteran. Again he made a shank from his glasses. Guards at the Pulaski County Regional Detention Facility have rather large duty belts (see Figure 3), and Grunerwald reported that he was stabbed in the duty belt. Muhammad did not believe this, saying in a clinical evaluation, "He lied and said I stabbed his belt. I stabbed his stomach, that bastard."[82] In explaining why he had stabbed Grunerwald, Muhammad claimed that he was "a Crusader in the Crusader Army and was combat medic just back from Iraq. He bragged and boasted of having killed 'sand niggers' and Muslims in front of me so I shanked him as a reward."[83]

It is unlikely that Grunerwald actually bragged about having killed Muslims in front of Muhammad. Several of Muhammad's stories have a fictionalized quality, in which his foes take on the characteristics of movie villains, cartoonish and stereotyped. Jim Hensley, Muhammad's attorney, did not believe that account of the altercation when I told him of it. "I don't think that happened," Hensley said. "Soldiers don't talk about things like that. I was in the Marine Corps and I was a cop, and I don't talk about either. The one thing a true warrior who loves his country doesn't want to do is go to war. Shame on Carlos for saying that."[84] It is of course possible that Grunerwald bragged about killing Muslims and "sand niggers" just as Muhammad claimed, but his account does not come across as credible.

In April 2010, Muhammad went on to threaten another of the prison personnel, Deputy Huff, saying, "You're done, you redneck ass motherfucker. I'm gonna kill your bitch ass, I'm gonna find something better than a piece of motherfucking glasses, you punk ass white boy. I'm gonna stab you in the motherfucking heart. You bitch, I'm gonna kill you. I'm gonna get you better than I got Grunerwald. I'm gonna stab you in the motherfucking heart."[85]

Even though he was placed in administrative segregation, Muhammad was able to persuade another inmate to splash urine on a guard whom he considered his enemy. Additionally, Muhammad was able to convert another inmate to his cause, as shown by a letter that Mu'min Abdulaziz (formerly known as Frank Askew, Jr.) wrote to the judge in Muhammad's case. In it, Abdulaziz described Muhammad as "my brother in Islam and the individual who has awakened me."[86] Muhammad also assaulted another guard, Lieutenant Martin, in October 2010. In that incident, Muhammad was being moved from his cell to the shower when he charged Martin, hitting him in the back of the head when Martin turned to avoid being hit in the face.[87]

Figure 3. Duty belt worn at Little Rock's Pulaski County regional detention facility. Deputy Grunerwald claims that Muhammad stabbed his belt, while Muhammad insists that he actually stabbed Deputy Grunerwald's stomach (color figure available online).

Lieutenant Carl Minden, who handles media relations and training for the Pulaski County Sheriff's Office, told me that Muhammad "was renowned

for making all sorts of problems for the staff."[88] This included not only assaults and threats against guards and other inmates, but also vandalizing cells where he was kept. For that reason, Muhammad would only be kept in a cell for a few days at a time before authorities had to move him. Both Minden and also several other guards and officials at the jail whom I was able to interview said that Muhammad was easily in the top percentile of offenders that the jail had seen, in terms of one inmate doing so much damage. The reason for this was not just Muhammad's resolution to wage jihad against guards and others, but also the sheer length of time that he was kept there, 784 days in total. The jail is a pre-trial facility, but given the nature of Muhammad's case, there were multiple delays.

One may question, given Muhammad's history of violence, whether the idea that he was "waging jihad" is a bit too pat of an explanation. Certainly he seems to have had trouble controlling his anger, so not everything he did while in prison can be taken as a calculated response. However, Muhammad's explanation that he was continuing jihad seems credible, particularly given that he was able to provide a religious justification for his human targeting, and was able to convert one of his fellow inmates.

Ultimately, Muhammad was tried by local rather than federal prosecutors. There are various theories about why federal prosecutors did not take the case away from the local Office of the Prosecuting Attorney. Muhammad's explanation was thoroughly egotistical: "I outsmarted them and they know it that's why they don't want to pick these charges up and are leaving me in State Court to be hung. But it's OK people still see pass the smoke and mirrors."[89] Part of this is clearly hubris: the U.S. is an open society, in which it is impossible to assure that all possible terrorist targets are protected. And further, *intent* to carry out an attack is not in itself a crime, even if federal investigators suspected Muhammad (which they clearly did). Muhammad thus didn't outsmart anybody; and yet he may have a point, that the federal government was hesitant to reveal information about how he had crossed its radar, and the extent of its surveillance.

A senior counterterrorism official in the U.S. government surmised that federal prosecutors may not have taken the case because of hesitation to describe it as terrorism. "Ask yourself why the feds didn't prosecute that case," he said. "The explanations from my friends in the federal government never added up. The federal government taking the case wouldn't do President Obama any good with his liberal base, his

conservative critics, or the conspiracy theorists who think he is a secret Muslim."[90] On the other hand, prosecutor Larry Jegley thinks the explanation may be easier: his office, sadly, has a lot of experience prosecuting murders, as there are anywhere from forty to 100 killings a year in his jurisdiction. Federal authorities may have decided it was best for experienced local prosecutors to handle the case.[91]

Ultimately, the Muhammad case went to trial, where the specifics of Muhammad's worldview, motivations, and process of radicalization were not presented to the jury. "We looked at it, but only to see if anything jumped out as an aggravating factor if we got to the sentencing phase," Jegley told me. "But it wasn't part of our case in chief, because motive isn't something we had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt."[92] The case was treated like so many other murders that Little Rock experiences in any given year: terrorism and Islamic extremism played no role in the prosecution's case.

However, Muhammad's beliefs did figure in the defense's case. Though the state psychologist found Muhammad fit to proceed with trial, the defense argued that he was not guilty by reason of mental defect. Psychiatrist Bhushan Agharkar testified that Muhammad had a delusional disorder by virtue of his "fixed, false beliefs."[93] Though brainwashing is not a recognized defense in Arkansas, this was a brainwashing defense by another name.

But we were never able to learn whether this defense would have succeeded. Muhammad unexpectedly took a plea bargain more than a week into the trial, before the case went to the jury.[94] Muhammad's lawyers explained to the local press that they had offered a plea because they believed the prosecution was willing to accept one in exchange for taking the death penalty off the table. Muhammad was sentenced on July 25, 2011 to "life without parole, 11 additional life sentences plus 180 years."[95] Immediately after the plea bargain, Muhammad was moved from the Pulaski County Regional Detention Facility to a larger state prison, but he left an impression that officials at the regional detention facility won't soon forget.

Conclusion

As highlighted earlier, the Muhammad case demonstrates several aspects of lone wolf Islamic terrorism. I have outlined the role of ideology in his radicalization—how observable behavior indicated Muhammad's adoption of a new identity, a hardening Salafi practice, and finally a move toward acceptance of violence. Second, this case also shows how Muhammad was able to continue his jihad from jail, targeting guards and fellow prisoners alike. This imposed costs on the society that he wanted to harm even after he was caught. Third, we can see the overarching difficulty of protecting against lone wolf terrorist attacks in an open and free society. While Muhammad swore that he "outsmarted" federal authorities, in reality his shooting illustrates the advantages that lone wolf actors have in carrying out attacks.

But the shooting also demonstrates the limits of what a lone wolf terrorist might be able to accomplish. At the end of the day Muhammad, not the most gifted operative, shot two people, killing one. The shooting was tragic, but so too are all of the various murders that regularly occur in Little Rock and other cities. When I asked Jegley, he said he thought the incident's effect on the community was "about the same" as so many other murders. "I think that there was more of an outrage factor than there would be for a street killing down at 15th and Oak between a couple of drug dealers because here it was a man in uniform," he told me. "But no, I don't think anybody here was terrorized. You want to see a terrorized community, let's go back to 1993–1994, when the gangs were tearing this place up. That really terrorized the community."[96]

Notes

1. *Statement of Quinton Ezeagwula,* Incident No. 09–61198 (Little Rock: Little Rock Police Department, June 1, 2009.)

2. *Information Sheet 2009–61198* (Little Rock: Little Rock Police Department, June 1, 2009) (statement of eyewitness Woody Mulkey); K. P. Baer, *Officer's Report*, Incident No. 09–61198 (Little Rock: Little Rock Police Department, June 1, 2009.)

3. Det. Matt Nelson, *Case Report*, Incident No. 09–61198 (Little Rock: Little Rock Police Department, no date.).

4. This article employs the definition of *lone wolf terrorism* provided by Ramón Spaaij, who holds that the three key features of the lone wolf terrorist are that he a) operates individually, b) does not belong to an organized terrorist group or network, and c) has a modus operandi conceived without direct outside command. Ramón Spaaij, *Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism: Global Patterns, Motivations and Prevention* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012), 16.

5. Scholars taking this view include Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, *Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Robert A. Pape

and James K. Feldman, *Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010), especially p. 20; John Mueller, *Terrorism Since 9/11: The American Cases* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University, June 2012), 11; Jessica Stern, "5 Myths About Who Becomes a Terrorist," *Washington Post*, January 10, 2010.

6. See, for example, Adam Gadahn, *A Call to Arms* [videotape] (Al-Sahab Institute for Media Production, March 7, 2010.)

7. Melvin Bledsoe, "The Extent of Radicalization in the American Muslim Community and That Community's Response," testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security, March 10, 2011.

8. Telephone interview with Melvin Bledsoe, August 1 and 9, 2012.

9. Dana Rebik, "Neighbors Shocked 'Boy Next Door' Arrested for Little Rock Soldier Shootings," *Eyewitness News Memphis*, June 2, 2009.

10. Telephone interview with Bledsoe (see note 8 above).

11. R. Clint Gray, *Forensic Report: Abdulhakim Muhammad* (Little Rock: Arkansas Department of Human Services, July 19, 2010), 4.

12. Shelby County (Tenn.) Sheriff's Office, M.P.D. Visions, Case No. 0202002806ME, February 8, 2002.

13. Shelby County (Tenn.) Sheriff's Office, M.P.D. Visions, Case No. 0208045660ME, August 17, 2002.

14. Shelby County (Tenn.) Sheriff's Office, M.P.D. Visions, Case No. 0305006491ME, May 14, 2003.

15. Interview with Jim Hensley, North Little Rock, Ark., August 10, 2012.

16. Interview with Larry Jegley, Little Rock, Ark., August 10, 2012.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Michael Harper, Knoxville (Tenn.) Police Department Crime Report, Case No. 04–007777, February 21, 2004.

20. Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad, letter to Kristina Goetz, May 18, 2010, 2.

21. Telephone interview with Bledsoe (see note 8 above).

22. Muhammad letter to Goetz, May 18, 2010.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Jarret M. Brachman, *Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice* (London: Routledge, 2009), 5.

30. See Brian Moynahan, *The Faith: A History of Christianity* (New York: Image, 2002), 440–441; Edward Peters, *Inquisition* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).

31. Bruce Livesey, "The Salafist Movement," *Frontline* (PBS), January 25, 2005.

32. See, for example, William Booth, Karin Brulliard, and Abigail Hauslohner, "Salafists Urge Ultraconservative Islam on Post-Arab Spring Governments," *Washington Post*, October 6, 2012.

33. Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat* (New York: NYPD Intelligence Division, 2007).

34. Ibid., 30.

35. Ibid., 36.

36. Ibid., 43.

37. McCauley and Moskalenko's *Friction*, discussed earlier (see note 5 above), does a good job of illustrating the multiple pathways to support of terrorist violence.

38. For my own study examining evidence of religious/ideological radicalization in 117 individuals in the U.S. and U.K. who have been involved in the illegal support of Islamic militancy, see Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Laura Grossman, *Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K.: An Empirical Examination of the Radicalization Process* (Washington, DC: FDD Press, 2009).

39. See ibid., 35–40.

40. Bledsoe, "The Extent of Radicalization in the American Muslim Community" (see note 7 above), 2.

41. Ibid.

42. For *hadith* on the impermissibility of pictures depicting anything with a soul, see Bukhari 3:428, 4:47, 4:448, 5:338.

43. Bukhari 3:515.

44. Telephone interview with Bledsoe (see note 8 above).

45. See, for example, Bukhari 1:174, 3:551, 3:646, 4:538.

46. Telephone interview with Bledsoe (see note 8 above).

47. Order of Name Change, Seventh Circuit Court for Davidson County, Tenn., March 29, 2006.

48. Telephone interview with Bledsoe (see note 8 above).

49. Bledsoe, "The Extent of Radicalization in the American Muslim Community and That Community's Response" (see note 7 above), 2.

50. Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 65.

51. Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad, letter to Kristina Goetz, September 1, 2010, 8.

52. Imam AbdulAziz, Masjid Furooq, letter to Yemen Al Khair Institute, no date.

53. Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad, letter to Kristina Goetz, September 30, 2010, 8.

54. Statement of Abdulhakim Muhammad, Incident No. 09–61198, June 1, 2009, 4.

55. Muhammad letter to Goetz, September 1, 2010, 1.

56. Ibid.

57. Muhammad letter to Goetz, May 18, 2010, 7–8.

58. Statement of Abdulhakim Muhammad, 19.

59. *Legal Marriage Document* (Sana'a: Republic of Yemen, Ministry of Justice, September 19, 2008).

60. Muhammad letter to Goetz, September 1, 2010, 3.

61. James Dao and David Johnston, "Suspect in Soldier Attack Was Once Detained in Yemen," *New York Times*, June 4, 2009.

62. Muhammad letter to Goetz, May 18, 2010, 7.

63. Telephone interview with senior U.S. government counterterrorism official, August 15, 2012.

64. Leah Farrall, "How al Qaeda Works," *Foreign Affairs* 90, no. 2 (March/April 2011): 128–138.

65. Muhammad letter to Goetz, September 1, 2010, 6.

66. Telephone interview with Gregory Johnsen, August 13, 2012.

67. *The Little Rock, Arkansas Recruiting Station Shooting* (Charleston, SC: NEFA Foundation, June 2009), 7.

68. My information on Muhammad's targeting and travels before carrying out the successful Little Rock attack is taken from Gray, "Forensic Report: Abdulhakim Muhammad" (see note 11 above).

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

71. Det. Matt Nelson, Case Report, 1.

72. Statement of Abdulhakim Muhammad, 12.

73. Statement of Woody Mulkey, Incident No. 09-61198, June 1, 2009.

74. Event Display Record, Event No. 0906010128, June 1, 2009.

75. Sgt. Blair, Officer's Report, Subject 09-61198, June 1, 2009.
76. Statement of Abdulhakim Muhammad, 12.
77. Ibid., 5–6.
78. Muhammad letter to Goetz, September 1, 2010, 9.
79. Pulaski County Sheriff's Office, Incident No. 2010007680 (Battery 2nd), no date.
80. Muhammad letter to Goetz, September 1, 2010, 8.
81. Ibid.
82. Gray, "Forensic Report: Abdulhakim Muhammad" (see note 11 above), 9.
83. Muhammad letter to Goetz, September 1, 2010, 8.
84. Interview with Hensley (see note 15 above).
85. Deputy Huff, Disposition Report, Offense No. 10–7531, no date.
86. Mu'min Abdulaziz, letter to Judge Herbert Wright, received June 13, 2011.
87. Pulaski County Sheriff's Office, Incident No. 10-23225, October 25, 2010.
88. Interview with Carl Minden, Little Rock, Ark., August 9, 2012.
89. Muhammad letter to Goetz, September 1, 2010, 4.
90. Telephone interview with senior U.S. government counterterrorism official, August 15, 2012.
91. Interview with Jegley (see note 16 above).
92. Ibid.
93. Kristina Goetz, "Muhammad Day 5," *Commercial Appeal* blog, July 22, 2011.
94. Kristina Goetz, "Former Memphian Abdulhakim Muhammad Gets Life Without Parole in Recruiting-Center Shooting," *Commercial Appeal* (Memphis), July 25, 2011.
95. Ibid.
96. Interview with Jegley (see note 16 above).

Crusader Dreams: Oslo 22/7, Islamophobia, and the Quest for a Monocultural Europe

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The synchronized terror attacks on July 22, 2011 was the worst politically motivated assault in post-WW2 Norway. To the perpetrator, Anders Behring Breivik, 22/7 was a "marketing operation," designed to draw attention to his compendium, 2083: A European Declaration of Independence. *While Breivik acted alone, his political philosophy is far from unique. Through a detailed analysis of the compendium's content, identifying the original authors whose texts Breivik used but did not always acknowledge, this essay discusses the political traditions that informed the assailant's worldview: Islamophobia (anti-Muslim racism), cultural conservative nationalism, antifeminism, and selected elements of White Power thought, far Right evangelical theology, and the Knights Templar tradition, all permeated by romantic male warrior ideals. The stunning violence of July 22 was a hyper-masculine performative act aimed at producing a heroic* avant-garde *of nationalist warriors who will rise to purge Europe from the corrupting influence of its internal enemies and defeat its external enemies. Through the cleansing fire of the civil war, he believes that a reborn Europe will arise to reclaim its ordained position of glory as the world's leading civilization. In the final analysis, Breivik's political philosophy may thus be recognized as a 21st-century articulation of the fascist legacy.*

Friday afternoon July 22, 2011, a homemade bomb made with fertilizers, fuel, and chemicals detonated in the complex of buildings housing the Norwegian government in downtown Oslo. Placed in a rental truck parked outside the office of prime minister Jens Stoltenberg, head of the Social Democratic Labour party, the bomb devastated the first floor and blew out the windows of adjacent government buildings. Had the assailant not been delayed that morning, the bomb would have detonated before most people left the office for the weekend. Yet, eight people died and 11 more were critically injured by the blast and flying debris. The assailant then took the ferry to Utøya, a small island a short drive from Oslo annually hosting the summer camp of the Labour Party's Youth League. Having shot the camp guard, the killer, who wore a police uniform, entered the camp centre.

Pretending to bring news about the terror attack in Oslo, he summoned the youth, and opened fire. For more than an hour, he calmly circulated the island; systematically executing the youngsters he found hiding or trying to escape by swimming away from the island. At Utøya, he murdered 69 people and wounded 41, including 18 hospitalized in critical conditions. When finally an armed unit from the national counterterrorism task force arrived, the killer laid down his arms, raised his hands, saying "I'm done here."[1]

Lethal political violence in Norway has almost exclusively been perpetrated by far-right extremists.[2] Yet, terrorism experts, media, and politicians instantly blamed Islamic terrorists. "Most likely al-Qaida is behind it," Magnus Ranstorp at the Swedish National Defence College stated, referring to Norway's military engagement in Afghanistan and Libya, and the Muhammad Cartoons published by the Danish daily *Jyllands-Posten* as the probable cause.[3] "It's only natural to conclude that this is linked to the conflict between the West and radical Islam," his Norwegian colleague Helge Lurås filled in, "though it need not be an organized group with an international agenda. It might also be a local group of [Muslim] immigrants hostile to Norwegian society."[4] Reporters voiced similar opinions. "Al-Qaeda Massacre. Norway's 9/11," the *Sun* shouted. "Who is responsible for these attacks? Well, Norway has been grappling with home-grown terror plots linked to al-Qaeda," MSNBC asserted. "This is probably Middle Eastern in its origin," *Fox News* explained. "It appears, once again, to be the works of Muslim extremists." "This is a sobering reminder for those who think it's too expensive to wage a war against jihadists," wrote *The Washington Post*'s Jennifer Rubin. "[A]s the attack in Oslo reminds us, there are plenty of al-Qaeda allies still operating."[5] Politicians stood up against the Islamic threat. "The entire international community has a stake in preventing this kind of terror from occurring," Barack Obama said. "And so we have to work cooperatively together both on intelligence and in terms of prevention of these kinds of horrible attacks."[6] "These attacks are a stark reminder of the threat we all face from terrorism," UK Prime Minister David Cameron solemnly added. "We will work with Norway to hunt the murderers who did this and prevent any more innocent deaths. We can overcome this evil, and we will."[7] NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen assured the people of Norway

and everyone else that all the "NATO countries stand united in the battle against these acts of violence."[8] During the first few hours, Muslims in Norway and Sweden, who knew no more than any other citizen about the massacre, were attacked or harassed, and Linus Bylund, party secretary of the anti-Muslim and ultranationalist Sweden Democrats[9] warned, "Next bastard whining about taking pity with all the good Muslims when Norwegians lay bleeding on the streets will be taken care of."[10]

When it became clear that the terrorist was not a Muslim but a Norwegian Christian, a remarkable shift of attitude occurred. No one urged Christian Scandinavians to take exception to their religion and culture, Cameron stopped talking about hunting down the murderers to overcome evil, and NATO rethought the wisdom of responding to the attack by military intervention. When the Sweden Democrats realized that the killer, Anders Behring Breivik, had extensive contacts with party activists and justified his assault in a text with notable similarities to their own publications, the Sweden Democrat's leadership suddenly found the idea of politicizing the attacks to be reprehensible.

In contemporary public discourse, the phrase "terror attack" seems dependent on the adjective "Islamic" to such an extent that it seems hard to think the one without the other. Without a Muslim perpetrator, columnists and pundits suddenly were less confident about labeling the act terrorism or even politically motivated. Mainstream media overnight replaced their Islamic terrorism experts with psychiatrists to explain the attacks now thought of as the insane acts of a mentally deranged individual. "Right-wing or left-wing extremism is unimportant," forensic psychiatrist Ulf Åsgård said,[11] suggesting that Breivik suffered from "assorted personality disorders: psychopathy, narcissism, borderline, as well as obsessive–compulsive disorder."[12] Sten Levander, professor emeritus of forensic psychiatry, asserted that Breivik "suffered from delusional disorder of the grandiose type,"[13] while psychiatrist Lars Bohman claimed that it was "incorrect to label [Breivik] a racist or even xenophobic. It was government buildings he blew up—not a mosque." Bohman found the compendium's political contents irrelevant, highlighting instead Breivik's supposedly "suppressed" sexuality.[14]

Based on the notion that forensic psychiatry is a precise if not absolute science, forensic psychiatry has had an elevated status in the Norwegian

legal system. This status was undermined during the ten-week long Breivik trial, as the two court-assigned teams to assess the defendant's mental state reached conflicting conclusions. Psychiatrists Torgeir Husby and Synne Sørheim found Breivik to be paranoid schizophrenic and hence not criminally responsible for his acts.[15] Their evaluation was challenged by psychiatrists Agnar Aspaas and Terje Tørrissen, who determined that the defendant was a dissocial narcissist, but not psychotic and hence criminally sane.[16] In addition, no less than eleven alternative diagnoses—ranging from Asperger to Tourette syndrome—were suggested by other experts during the trial, none of whom deemed the defendant criminally insane.[17]

Husby and Sørheim based their conclusion that Breivik suffered from paranoid schizophrenia on two main findings: his grandiose delusions and his use of what they mistook for neologisms (e.g., cultural Marxist, suicidal humanist, national Darwinist). Of course, grandiose delusions are hardly new to Western politics, as evidenced by the doctrine of the superiority of the white race, the delusion of a Jewish world-conspiracy, and, more recently, the idea of civilization's war against evil. Certainly, the notion of "Islam" and "Europe" as two essentially distinct and incompatible entities engaged in a 1,300-year war of extermination is a delusion, but it was not concocted by Breivik. Had Husby and Sørheim looked at the political milieus that Breivik referred to in their conversations and his writings, they would have realized that his worldview and key concepts were not his own fabrications, but produced by others and widely circulated in the cultural conservative and anti-Muslim milieu.

How then are we to understand Breivik's political philosophy?

Breivik's Compendium

To Breivik, July 22 was a "marketing operation" to draw attention to his 1516-page compendium, *2083: A European Declaration of Independence*, which he, hours prior to the attack, mailed to one thousand selected recipients active in the anti-Muslim and right-wing networks,[18] asking the "patriots" to translate and distribute the work.[19] Soon, the compendium appeared in Dutch, Finnish, French, German, Polish, Russian, Serbian, and Spanish and was circulated by hundreds of anti-Muslim websites and individuals. The title *2083* refers to the year by which Breivik imagines that his ultimate goal should have been achieved: a monocultural, patriarchal

Christian Europe without Muslims, Marxists, multiculturalists, or feminists. The subtitle is taken from an essay by the Norwegian blogger *Fjordman* (Peder Nøstvold Jensen), who is a main source of inspiration to Breivik and the wider anti-Muslim milieu. In his Declaration of Independence, Fjordman claims that European politicians had betrayed their constituencies by establishing the EU and opening Europe to hostile Muslim immigration with the secret aim of merging Europe with the Arab world to become "Eurabia," the land of the un-free. "Europe is being targeted for deliberate colonization by Muslim states, and with coordinated efforts aimed at our Islamization and the elimination of our freedoms. We are being subject to a foreign invasion, and aiding and abetting a foreign invasion in any way constitutes treason."[20]

2083 is not a manifesto but a compendium, i.e., a compilation of texts, the majority of which Breivik has not himself written. Many essays are included in their entirety, such as Fjordman's *A European Declaration of Independence*; others are copied in selected parts. In some texts, Breivik modified the wording to fit the context, such as when replacing "American" with "European" in a cultural conservative piece that decries the alleged feminization of the white American male. Breivik may or may not refer to the original authors of the essays compiled. When analyzing the compendium, I have used search engines to identify the original authors whom Breivik did not acknowledge. Hence, Breivik's sources and main influences have been established. Thereby, it is also possible to ascertain what the compendium *is not*. Besides wild speculations that 22/7 was a Mossad and/or Freemason operation,[21] two incorrect allegations do merit comment as they continue to float around in the debate. The day after the attacks, Hans Rustad—editor of the Norwegian anti-Muslim forum *document.no* where Breivik had been a frequent participant—revealed that "large parts" of *2083* were plagiarized from the *Unabomber Manifesto*, published in 1995 by anti-modernist and technology critic Ted Kaczynski, who carried out a series of 16 bomb attacks against universities and airline companies. Johan Lundberg, then editor-in-chief of the cultural conservative magazine and news hub *Axess*, inflated the claim by alleging that the Unabomber provided the "ideological kernel" of Breivik's ideology.[22] As Lundberg's "exposure" was cabled around in mediascape, the parliamentary wing of the anti-Muslim scene let out a sigh of relief.[23] Is the claim correct? Well, not really. Three of 1516 pages are taken from the

Unabomber Manifesto, from a section in which Kaczynski decries the left (substituted for multiculturalists by Breivik). The remaining 1513 pages come from elsewhere. The second misrepresentation alleges that Breivik is an al-Qaeda copycat. Interviewed by *Time*, Magnus Ranstorp characterized Breivik's work as "a complete mirroring of al-Qaeda, a cut-and-paste image of a jihadist manifesto."[24] The fact that Ranstorp did not substantiate his argument by identifying which sections of Breivik's compendium were compiled from which jihadist manifesto is hardly surprising, as Breivik found his material elsewhere, including at Ranstorp's research centre from which he lifted a 25-page text in its entirety.[25]

Examining the ideological contents of the *2083* compendium, Breivik's worldview is found to be mainly influenced by the Islamophobic tradition, cultural conservative nationalism, and antifeminism, combined with substantial elements from White Power thought, selected aspects of right-wing evangelical theology, and material from the Knights Templar tradition, all imbued with romantic male warrior ideals with its call for heroism, bravery, and sacrifice. Breivik firmly stands in the fascist tradition, in accordance with Roger Griffin's definition of fascism "as a revolutionary form of nationalism, one which sets out to be a political, social, and ethical revolution, welding the 'people' into a dynamic national community under new elites infused with new heroic values. The core myth which inspires this project is that only a populist, trans-class movement of purifying, cathartic national rebirth (palingenesis) can stem the tide of decadence."[26] In Breivik's version, this project is centered on the vision of a reborn Europe that, purged from internal enemies (cultural Marxists and feminists), will rise out of the ashes of humiliating multiculturalism to defeat its external enemy (Islam and Muslims) and retake its position of glory as the world's leading civilization.

Islamophobia

Islamophobia is not a "phobia" in terms of clinical psychology; it does not denote an individual anxiety disorder or an irrational fear disproportional to the actual danger posed by the object of fear.[27] As in the concepts "xenophobia" and "homophobia," the suffix "phobia" is used in a transferred sense to connote socially, culturally, and politically produced prejudice, aversions, and discrimination against specific categories of

humans, in this case Muslims. Islamophobia proceeds from an essentialist understanding of "religion" and "culture" that views religion and culture as distinct monolithic entities bestowed with certain inherent qualities that determine how those associated with a specific religion and culture think and act; that define their *being*. According to this logic, it is legitimate to talk about "how Muslims are." Narratives about "how Muslims are" (e.g., Muslims are violent, Muslims are terrorists, Muslims are oppressive to women, Muslims are a threat against freedom of expression) appear to have been normalized to such an extent that their racist premise seems obscured. How would we react to narratives about "how Jews are" or "how Blacks are"? While Muslims, of course, do not constitute a "race," Islamophobia *operates* as racism, as evidenced by discrimination in the labor market, hate crimes, police profiling, et cetera.

In Islamophobic discourse, "how Muslims are" is said to be determined by "Islam," perceived of as a living being, bestowed with specific features and an agency of its own. In Islamopbobic literature, we encounter an "Islam" that walks, talks, commands, oppresses, hates, deceives, conspires, wages war, expands, and retracts. Moreover, this "Islam" seems to be the source of an inborn essence of eerie "Muslimness" that prevents a Muslim living in the West, in Sweden for instance, from becoming a Westerner; he or she remains "Muslim" and not a "Swede" even if born in Sweden by parents born in Sweden. In "moderate" Islamophobic discourse, one frequently encounters a distinction between "good" and "bad" Muslims, what Stephen Schwartz termed the "two faces of Islam," in which good Muslims are like us, and bad Muslims hate us.[28] Hence, the closest a "Muslim" may come to the speaking "us" is to be "like us," where the inserted "like" maintains the critical separation between "them" and "us." A two-faced being, of course, is a beast, and less moderate Islamophobic discourse informs us that seemingly good-hearted, law-abiding, and likable Muslims conceal their true evil nature in an effort to fool gullible Westerners into letting down their guard. This, we are told, is the principle of *taqqiya* (dissimulation)—a concept developed in Shiite jurisprudence during the 8th century to protect Shiite minorities from persecution, but which Islamophobic discourse recasts to connote an all-Muslim feature: they lie to deceive non-Muslims as a service to their (false or evil) God.

To Breivik, Muslims are the archenemies of Europe. On this subject, Breivik is heavily influenced by a host of anti-Muslim ideologues and

militant movements, predominantly, but not exclusively involved with the Counter Jihad scene that arose in the early 2000s to combat what they saw as "Islam's" effort to colonize and eventually subdue the Western world. In Europe, the Counter Jihad milieu consists of anti-Muslim populist parties, street fighting "Defence Leagues" (modeled on the English Defence League whom Breivik admired),[29] "Stop Islamisation" national groups (modeled on Stop Islamisation of Denmark, SIAD), and individual champions, and in the U.S. of well-financed ideologues, lobby groups, think tanks, preachers, radio/television hosts, and grass-root evangelicals. In 2007, the Norwegian blogger Fjordman, Anders Gravers Pedersen of SIAD, and Baron Bodissey (Edward S. May), American editor of anti-Muslim blogs *Gates of Vienna* and *Brussels Journal*, summoned the first transatlantic Counter-Jihad meeting in Copenhagen. Since then, yearly Counter Jihad Summits, attracting a rising number of anti-Muslim celebrities and ultranationalist party leaders, have been organized in Brussels in 2007, Vienna in 2008, Copenhagen in 2009, Zurich in 2010, Strasbourg in 2011, and Brussels in 2012. These conventions, May emphasizes, do not aim at uniting all anti-Muslim ideologues and movements into a single organization. "No, we are a network of networks," without a "chain of command." "No party line. No one in control of what happens. Our unity in mission arises from a common goal: to resist the Jihad in all its forms. Anything else is details." "We need to be prepared for the rough times ahead. Parts of Europe will descend into civil war in the relatively near future, and the way that we have lived for the past sixty years will be gone."[30]

Counter-Jihadis have been particularly active on the Internet, where Breivik came across their message at interconnected anti-Muslim online journals, news-hubs, and blogs, primarily *Gates of Vienna*, *Brussels Journal*, *Jihad Watch*, and *Front Page Magazine*. Breivik was especially impressed by Robert Spencer, Pamela Geller, Andrew Bostom, Bruce Bawer, Serge Trifkovic, and Baron Bodissey from the U.S., and Geert Wilders, Bat Ye'or, and "Fjordman" (Peder Nøstvold Jensen) from Europe.

Robert Spencer and Pamela Geller have become millionaires from the anti-Muslim industry.[31] They are co-founders of Stop Islamization of America (SIOA), Stop Islamization of Nations (SION), and American Defense Initiative, and run the prominent anti-Muslim blogs *Jihad Watch* (Spencer) and *Atlas Shrugs* (Geller)—all named anti-Muslim "hate groups" by the Southern Poverty Law Center[32]—and are both prolific writers, with

books such as *The Politically Incorrect Guide to Islam* (Spencer, 2005), *Stop Islamization of America: A Practical Guide to the Resistance* (Geller, 2011), and *The Post-American Presidency: The Obama Administration's War on America* (Spencer and Geller, 2010). Andrew Bostom is a medical doctor who pursues exegetical studies of the Koran and Hadith collections to prove that wars of aggression and Jew-hatred is inherent in Muslim nature.[33] Bruce Bawer, an American living in Norway, authored the alarmist *While Europe Slept* (2006) and published *The New Quislings* (2012) after 22/7, in which he labels the Norwegian media and political leadership Quislings (i.e., traitors), and complains about having been vilified only because Breivik cites his works. Serge Trifkovic, author of *Defeating Jihad* (2006), is the foreign affairs editor of the conservative magazine *Chronicles*, and was advisor to war criminal Biljana Plavšić, then president of Republika Srebska, during the Bosnian Civil War.[34]

Flamboyant Dutch politician Geert Wilders, leader of the anti-Muslim *Partij voor de Vrijheid* (Party for Freedom) ranks as a hero among Counter Jihadists for his efforts to ban the Koran, mosques, and Muslim immigration and for proposing to put all antisocial (Muslim) criminals in "scum camps" (*tuigdorp*). British conspiracy theorist Bat Ye'or (Gisèle Littman) popularized the Eurabia concept in bestselling books claiming to expose the alleged Islamic world-conspiracy, including *Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis* (2005) and *Europe, Globalization, and the Coming of the Universal Caliphate* (2011). Her disciple Fjordman regularly contributes to *Gates of Vienna*, *Brussels Journal*, and other Counter Jihadist websites with his inflammatory essays, 39 of which Breivik included in full, and is arguably Breivik's single most important influence.

By utilizing the works of these anti-Muslim authors, Breivik evokes a Manichean struggle between the forces of Light and Darkness, alleging that the Western world is locked in an apocalyptic conflict with "Islam," depicted as a sinister Being who tirelessly seeks the eradication of Christian Europe. Muslims are construed as an imagined collective, by "nature" bestowed with inherent, timeless, and malevolent features said to derive from "Islam," which sets them apart from universal man. The racist logic underlying the figure of the Eternal Muslim is integral to the theory of an Islamic world conspiracy that Breivik promotes, and allows Breivik to link Muslims "here" with the perceived threat from Muslims "there," which, as noted by Arjun Appadurai, simultaneously appeals to the aversion to small

numbers—the hatred of minorities—and the fear of the masses.[35] We are told that two previous attempts of the Muslim hordes to overrun Europe were halted at the last minute, at Poitiers in 732 and at the gates of Vienna in 1683, respectively.

Now, the third and final effort is well underway. Citing Fjordman, Breivik writes:

> Our ancestors, better men and women than we are, held the line against Islam for more than one thousand years, sacrificing their blood for the continent. By doing so, they not only preserved the European heartland and thus Western civilisation itself, but quite possibly the world in general from unchallenged Islamic dominance. The stakes involved now are no less than they were then, possibly even greater.[36]

This time, the cunning Muslims have enlisted traitors within the Western political and intellectual elite who have allowed the enemy to establish breeding colonies on European soil. Muslim reproduction in Europe, Breivik asserts, constitutes a demographic warfare that will be militarized as soon as Muslims become sufficiently numerous. Hence, Breivik claims, again by using Fjordman, "the EU is formally surrendering an entire continent to Islam while destroying established national cultures, and is prepared to harass those who disagree with this policy. This constitutes the greatest organized betrayal in Western history, perhaps in human history."[37]

Fortunately for those erecting barricades to stop the Islamisation of Europe, the sinister scheme has been exposed by dedicated anti-Muslim investigators who have found the masterminds' secret minutes. Borrowing from Anti-Semitic tales of a Jewish world-conspiracy, anti-Muslim conspiracy theory comes complete with its own version of the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. Breivik includes two versions of the Muslim world-conspiracy. From Bat Ye'or, Breivik derives the allegation that the occult conspiracy utilizes vehicles of transnational cooperation such as the European-Arab Dialogue, the Barcelona Process (the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership), and the Alliance of Civilizations (whose initiator the Spanish prime minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, we are told, was appointed by al-Qaeda) to establish Eurabia and reduce all decent white European Christians to humiliating servitude.[38] Breivik goes on to mobilize the work of Swiss-French conspiracy theorist Sylvain Besson,[39] who claims to have uncovered "*The Project*," codename of an alleged Muslim Brotherhood scheme to infiltrate and subdue the West; a plan exposed when an untitled

protocol was found in a Swiss mansion belonging to an Egyptian-born businessman.[40]

The conspiracy is close to fruition. “This is the third major Jihad, the third Islamic attempt to subdue the heartland of the West,” Breivik (through Fjordman) dramatically suggests. He continues:

> There will be no fourth Jihad. Either Muslims will win this time, or Islam itself will be handed a defeat and a blow so powerful that it may never recover from it. This is perhaps the longest, continuous war in human history. And it’s about to be decided within the coming decades. I’m not sure how all of this will play out. What I do know is that it could all be decided on my watch, and I don’t want to be the weak link in something my ancestors kept intact for 1300 years.[41]

Cultural Conservative Nationalism

Breivik positions himself at the vanguard of a “national resistance” that seeks to purge his country and Europe from cultural Others and the enemies within, cultural Marxists, multiculturalists, and feminists, who are charged with seeking to deconstruct the “natural” hegemony of the white Christian heterosexual male in favor of a social revolution based on what Breivik sees as the contra-natural idea of human equality. Of course, to Breivik, cultural Marxism and feminism are intertwined. Yet, gender issues and antifeminism remain keys to his project, and will be discussed separately.

For more than a decade, the cry that “multiculturalism has failed” has been recited by a host of mainly conservative politicians, columnists, and populist parties. Yet, what exactly its critics mean by the term remains elusive. What multiculturalism is seems less important than to be against it. Despite, or maybe thanks to, its notorious vagueness, multiculturalism may be blamed for a wide range of social ills and has become a privileged rhetorical tool to rephrase racist and xenophobic opinions.[42] More than a descriptive term to acknowledge human diversity and the fact that a variety of cultures coexist in any given society, multiculturalism is by definition an *–ism*, typically cast as a sinister ideology threatening to undermine the value or even the existence of *the* culture the critics of multiculturalism construe as the organic, benign, natural, native, original culture of the nation.

Besides calling for a nationalist revolution to “re-establish” monocultural Europe, Breivik contributes by providing a theory of who the agents of

multiculturalism supposedly are and how their scheme operates. In addition to building on Fjordman, Breivik here compiles—typically without proper references—texts by a variety of predominantly American conservative writers, including William S. Lind, director of the Center of Cultural Conservatism; T. Kenneth Cribb Jr., president of the conservative Intercollegiate Studies Institute and once presidential advisor of Ronald Reagan; Gerald L. Atkinson, retired commander of the U.S. Naval Academy and editor of *Eternal Vigilance* and *New Totalitarianism*, Raymond V. Raehn, founder of the World Anti-Communist League-linked Global Security Council and member of the white nationalist Council of Conservative Citizens; Daniel L. Adams, co-founder of Stop Islamization of America and contributor to conservative online magazines, including *New England Review, American Thinker*, and *Family Security Matters*, and Koenraad Elst, a Flemish traditionalist/radical conservative nationalist and freelancing Orientalist scholar sympathetic to the right-wing Hindutva (Hindu nationalist) movement.

Through utilizing texts by these authors, Breivik builds his case that the West—counterfactual as it may seem—*lost* the cold war because its leaders did not persecute the Marxists in their countries. "If we had executed each and every Marxist and banned Marxist doctrines," including internationalism, feminism, and egalitarianism, "we would not be in the current situation. Instead, our traitorous and weak minded post-WW2 leaders allowed the Marxists to gradually infiltrate many aspects of society after WW2, especially our universities and the media."[43]

Voicing the concerns of anti-intellectual right-wing populism, Breivik decries the supposed hegemony of postmodernism, postcolonial theory, critical theory, gender studies, and post-Structuralism at European universities, and deprecates the works of a series of seminal thinkers, including Sigmund Freud, Karl Marx, Antonio Gramsci, Theodor Adorno, Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse, Wilhelm Reich, Georg Lukács, Michel Foucault, Edward Said, and Jacques Derrida. To Breivik, and those whose works he cites, there are absolute Truths, a real reality, built on the facts of nature and approachable by the common sense of the common man, which has been obscured by the "intellectual systems" of the philosophers that are built on "ideology," and "all ideologies are wrong."[44]

To protect their distorted theories and privileged positions, the intellectuals need to ban the truths of real reality, e.g., that cultures by

nature are unequal, that the gendered roles of men and women reflect their essentially distinct natures, and that homosexuality is morally wrong. The primary tool developed to repress real reality is “political correctness,” an alleged disciplinary instrument by which “the intellectuals” are said to have secured that everyone who aspires to a position at the universities or in the media understands that they must suppress that which is factually correct in favor of only stating that which confirms to “ideology,” i.e., that which is politically correct.

According to Breivik, it all began with the effort of the Frankfurt School to challenge traditional order in a quest for social justice and equality. He states:

> As a grand scheme intended to deny the intrinsic worth of native Christian European, heterosexual males, the Critical Theorists of the Frankfurt School opened the door to the racial and sexual antagonisms of the Trotskyites. Many believed that oppressed Muslims, non-European minorities and others like Feminists and Homosexuals could be the vanguard of a communist revolution in Europe.[45]

The proponents of egalitarianism altered the curriculum at the universities to relativize Western tradition, allowing students to study Marxist revolutionaries from Latin America or Chinese philosophy as easily as they could study Plato, Shakespeare, and Newton.[46] With their hegemony at the universities secured, the cultural Marxists allegedly proceeded by systematically ridiculing, silencing, and persecuting conservative scholars who dared insist on the value of traditional learning, absolute truths, the Western literary canon, and Eurocentric history. The quiet revolution of cultural relativism with its celebration of human diversity and tolerance paved the way for the ideology of multiculturalism. However, “multiculturalism has never been about tolerance,”[47] but a “hate ideology which was created to destroy our European cultures, national cohesion and Christendom (in other words Western civilisation itself).”[48] Multiculturalism devalues European achievements, e.g., by denying the benefits of the colonial expansion, and, conversely, glorifies the achievements of cultural others while blaming the West for their shortcomings. According to Breivik and those he quotes, Islam has long enjoyed an especially protected status. “Europe has its own full-fledged brand of Negationism: a movement to deny the large-scale and long-term crimes against humanity committed by Islam. This movement is led by

Islamic apologists and Marxist academics and followed by all the politicians, journalists and intellectuals."[49] Multiculturalism thus became the "soiled garden" in which Islam grew. In fact, "multiculturalism is the tool by which Islam gains access to our countries for the purpose of the destruction of the host culture."[50]

Cultural Marxism, with its "evil twin sisters" liberalism and multiculturalism, "works by creating 'victim groups' who are used to destroy Western society by inverting morality and demanding more and more from society to compensate for their unjust oppression." Inferior people are led to believe they are "victims," whose experiences of "'injustice' and 'unequal status' is morally wrong and that the strong oppressors—the white race—must be made to pay for their immoral, unfair superiority."[51]

By installing in Europeans a sense of self-hatred and shame of their own culture, cultural Marxism has undermined their collective will to self-perseverance. "Multiculturalism and uncontrolled mass-immigration destroy the internal cohesion of the decadent West, which will slowly fall apart as it has lost the will to defend itself and the belief in its own culture."[52] To Breivik, the main reason for the alleged lack of European self-esteem and cultural pride "is the absence of nationalism/nationalist monocultural political doctrines" in postwar Europe.[53] Since Hitler's defeat, Breivik claims, antinationalist campaigns have branded every nationalist doctrine as bigoted intolerance. However, "defending your nation from cultural and literal annihilation is not 'intolerance' it is the height of patriotism and rationality."[54] Failing to reignite a movement of national resistance will, Breivik asserts, be fatal as we are now entering the "fourth" world war.[55]

To achieve a nationalist revolution by democratic means only is futile. Democracy "worked to some extent as long as there was a sense of being a demos, a people with a shared identity and common interest," Breivik writes, citing Fjordman.[56] With a multicultural constituency, democracy will be detrimental. Even the citizens who still identify with their nation "keep electing people who betray their trust." Obviously to Breivik (and Fjordman, whom he quotes), democracy "functions so poorly that it threatens our very survival. Perhaps in order to ensure our continued

existence, we need to supplement democracy with other tools in our toolkit."[57] Of course, to Breivik, one of these tools is lethal force:

> If we had executed let's say, 100,000 Marxist intellectuals in Western Europe after WW2 and banned all form of Marxist doctrine we could have prevented the creation of the anti-European hate ideology known as multiculturalism. It's absolutely essential that we, the cultural conservative patriots of Europe do not repeat this mistake again. All our efforts must be to target and execute the multiculturalists wherever we find them.[58]

Antifeminism

Antifeminism is an ideology, theory, or perspective whose proponents rally against certain perspectives, theories, or ideologies they define as "feminist." In line with most anti-isms, (e.g., antiracism, and anticapitalism), antifeminists attack an ideology or social order they consider oppressive, which allows the supporters of the anti-ism to position themselves as emancipatory. Antifeminists must therefore elevate the feminist enemy to a hegemonic position, and either present themselves as the champions of true freedom and equality (which is difficult, but typical to the so-called "equalists" in Scandinavia, a men's empowerment movement claiming that men are oppressed by women) or adopt a conservative position by asserting to be the voice of Nature and Tradition. Antifeminism proceeds from an essentialist notion of gender, according to which the sexes are products of God and/or Nature, i.e., that men and women are *ontologically* distinct: men "are" in certain ways, women in other predetermined manners. The gendered order of nature is held to be complementary, and social harmony is assumed to rest on the maintenance of the equilibrium given by God or biology. In theory, the gendered order need not be hierarchical, although social systems based on the principle of "separate but equal" tend to be unequal in practice.

Antifeminism is historically rooted in the reactionary response to the early feminist movement's struggle for universal suffrage. Although antisuffragettes could also be found among socialists and anarchists—who did not oppose women's suffrage on the grounds that women were not equal to it, but because fundamental change required revolution—antisuffragettes were generally associated with a conservative perspective, portraying suffragettes as rabid man-haters who made everyone miserable by feminizing men and masculinizing women and confusing children.

Essentialized gender was fundamental to the fascist projects of the 1900s, with its idealization of male virility and female fertility as a prerequisite for national rebirth, though we also find a tension between a more bourgeois law-and-order Nazism stressing the hardworking yeoman, his caring wife and orderly children, and a more berserker oriented Nazism with its homo-social cult of the male warrior band—a tension that would resurface in Breivik's worldview.

To Breivik, feminism plays the lead character in a dystopian tract about the demise of the West.[59] It all began with the suffragette movement, with its agenda of social reform and women's emancipation, which initiated a process of decline: the fatal feminization of European culture. The seeds of corruption were cleansed in the fires of the two world wars, and the immediate postwar period saw a return to traditional patriarchal order.

Born in 1979, Breivik nostalgically envisioned an imaginary world of the 1950s, when men were men, women were housewives, children were well behaved, and when there was neither criminality nor Muslims in Western countries. He writes:

> Our homes were safe, to the point where many people did not bother to lock their doors. … Most men treated women like ladies, and most ladies devoted their time and effort to making good homes, rearing their children well and helping their communities through volunteer work. Children grew up in two-parent households, and the mother was there to meet the child when he came home from school.[60]

This pastoral idyll was ruined by the second surge of feminism, which in the 1960s and 1970s arose to invert everything normal. "The patriarchal social structure would be replaced with matriarchy; the belief that men and women are different and properly have different roles would be replaced with androgyny; and the belief that heterosexuality is normal would be replaced with the belief that homosexuality is equally 'normal.'"[61] In effect, feminists turned society against nature. "Nature has evolved the sexes for different tasks that ensure human survival just as nature does with all species. All men are not equal, all women are not equal and the sexes are not and never can be equal."[62]

Feminists, Breivik argues, caused European women to neglect their reproductive and domestic duties to the point that the "indigenous people" now stand at the brink of extinction. Feminists favor multiculturalism, care for refugees, the poor and disabled, and have feminized Western men who

know how to change diapers but have lost their ability to fight. “The ‘man of today’ is expected to be a touchy-feely subspecies who bows to the radical feminist agenda,” Breivik claims, warning that “the feminisation of European culture is nearly completed. And the last bastion of male domination, the police force and the military, is under assault.”[63]

This greatly facilitates the Muslim effort to Islamize Europe.[64] “What are liberal feminists going to do when faced with aggressive gangs of Muslim youngsters? Burn their bras and throw the pocket edition of the Vagina Monologues at them? Perhaps women can succeed in turning their men into doormats, but it will be at the cost of doing so to their nation and to their civilisation as well.”[65] Without their protectors, Western women will be easy prey to the warring Muslim hordes. Then, they will learn the difference between real and imagined oppression. Maybe, Breivik muses through the writings of Danish anti-Muslim author Lars Hedegaard, this is what women really want as they by nature feel attracted to subservience, subjugation, and submission.[66] Or, could it, Breivik continues, be that feminists are simply “testing men to find out which men are strong enough to stand up to their demands, and thus which men can stand up to other men on their behalf?”[67]

Breivik sees himself as a heroic knight, but is distressed with the fact that so few women want to be rescued. “Approximately 70% of European males support our cause while only 30% of European women do. As a consequence, when this is all over we must significantly reduce these women’s influence on political issues,” Breivik argues. “This is perhaps the most important lesson we must learn, the betrayal by so many of our own women. It is not really a betrayal as a majority of our women only thinks and acts in accordance with how nature created them—in a suicidal compassionate manner.” Breivik acknowledges that he might sound sexist, “but nature itself is sexist and you cannot defy primary natural laws.”[68] The laws of nature are grim, and so are the laws of war. “Every female traitor or system protector out there is someone’s daughter, someone’s sister or mother,” Breivik observes. But as “approximately 60–70% of all cultural Marxists or suicidal humanists are female,” we “must embrace … the concept of killing women, even very attractive women.”[69]

When the cultural conservative nationalists eventually have secured military and political control and executed or expelled all traitors and cultural others, patriarchy will be restored as the cornerstone of the New

Order. “As soon as women once again will be conditioned through just institutions and are raised in a strong and unified nuclear family lead by a confident patriarch she will know her place in society and further regulations will be unnecessary.”[70] To achieve this end, a few strategic laws need to be implemented: the father will be guaranteed custody of the child, no-fault divorce will be banned, and disciplinary violence legalized. This will allow the return to traditional family values, in which,

> [m]ales learn to be assertive, aggressive, and dominant while females learn to be docile, gentle, and passive. They learn that men are expected to be tough, courageous, and rational while women are expected to be tender, timid, and emotional. They learn that men are the power holders while women are expected to be submissive, that men make the decisions while women are expected to comply.[71]

White Power Thought

Basically formed by a merger of two race-centred ideologies that lost their hegemonic aspirations, (American) white supremacy and (European) National Socialism, the White Power milieu took shape in the U.S. during the 1970s and 1980s to become a transatlantic scene during the 1990s, not least due to the rise of White Noise, i.e., the White Power music industry (known through, but not limited to racist Skinhead culture), and the Internet revolution of communication and information.[72] At its heart, invoking the concept of White Power involves a notion of powerlessness, of whites having been deprived of their exalted position conceived of as their birthright privileges, and a determination to engage the “traitors” that are said to occupy the governments in the “once white world” in a white racist war of resistance to secure the survival of the white race and, eventually, to either regain White Power in the countries believed to be “theirs” or establish an independent white racial homeland of their own.

Breivik is well versed in White Power literature, its history, music, and heroes. He addressed the milieu’s internal factions and schisms, communicated with White Power activists, and joined White Power forums (e.g., *Stormfront*) under various online pseudonyms, including Sigurd Jorsalfare.[73] He enjoyed William Pierce’s race war novels *Turner Diaries* and *Hunter*, and listed *Saga*, the Swedish white pride singer, as his favourite musician. He recounted the accomplishments and setbacks of the legendary Aryan guerrilla group *Brüders Schweigen* (the Order), subscribed

to the Leaderless Resistance tactics of the Aryan underground, and made repeated efforts to reconcile the differences between racist pagans (whom he calls Odinists as White Power activists would) and racist Christians. Yet, Breivik is at pains to conform to the Counter Jihadist standard of taking (at least publicly) exception to (biological) racism, National Socialism, and Anti-Semitism. However, Breivik's compendium and court testimony reveals that he remains heavily influenced by White Power thought.

Racism

On the race issue, Breivik is ambivalent. Suggesting that six decades of multiculturalist propaganda have made most Europeans inclined to reject racist doctrine as scientifically flawed and morally wrong, Breivik urges his fellow patriots to "avoid talking about race." The war against Islam "is a cultural war, not a race war! If you do believe it is a race war, then keep it to yourself as it is un-doubtfully counterproductive to flag those views."[74] Yet, Breivik found the fine line hard to follow. "At first, I hesitated to include anything including the word race, white or ethnicity as I convinced myself originally that I was first and foremost against Islam." Hence, "I attempted to replace the term [race] with more compromising expressions: the words culture, native European or ethnic group." However, he found that in many cases, it was "simply impossible to replace the term with less 'offensive' words." Besides, he had grown "tired of ideological censorship" and therefore decided to include long excerpts from the British National Party publication *From Titans to Lemmings: The Suicide of the White Race* that sees inequalities between the races, cultures, and sexes as a reflection of the natural order.[75]

Key to White Power thought is the conviction that there is a conspiracy to exterminate the White race. Adjusting the theory to fit his Scandinavian context by focusing on the traitors' alleged effort to wipe out the Nordic race, Breivik says that he first hesitated to bring up eugenics because of its disrepute since the fall of National Socialist Germany. However, as "the Nordic genotypes will be extinct completely within 200 years," he urges his readers to "get over this taboo."[76] Referring to Madison Grant's classic *The Passing of the Great Race*, Breivik claims that the "Germanic/Nordic race … will be diluted or annihilated to such a degree that there will be no one left with Nordic physical characteristics; blond hair, blue eyes, high

forehead, sturdy cheekbones." Hence, "the Nordic tribes will become extinct if we do not resist and seize political and military control of our countries."[77] To prevent the "ongoing genocide" of the Nordic folk, Breivik suggests three possible programs: a) "negative eugenics programs combined with ethnic segregation somewhat similar to some policies of the Third Reich"[78]; b) "repro-genetics programs" working with "indigenous genotypes from pure sources (non-diluted Nordic genotypes) found in Northern Sweden and other areas where this is available"[79]; 3) "large scale surrogacy facilities" where the "eggs and sperm will exclusively carry the Nordic genotypes."[80] Most importantly, immigration and interracial marriage must be banned. To secure Europe's economy and a comfortable living standard for its white Christian citizens, Breivik finds it "logical to use cheap foreign labour," especially within construction and agriculture, and to create a "servant class" of cleaners, gardeners, and drivers. These guest-workers will be given short-term contracts of 6–12 months, they should work 12 hours a day, be offered competitive wages (compared to their country of origin), and live in segregated communities in predefined areas of each major city. This, Breivik reasons, will allow for a flexibility to accommodate the booms and recessions of the markets. "It will allow us to become the economical powerhouse of the world and the beacon of light for all humanity".[81]

National Socialism and Anti-Semitism

On these issues, Breivik's break with White Power thought is at first glance more definite, as he seeks to distance himself from National Socialism and Anti-Semitism, and claims to be devoutly pro-(rightwing) Israeli. However, the underlying rationale is clearly pragmatic and his worldview reveals strong Anti-Semitic dimensions. Addressing the National Socialist current within the White Power scene, Breivik urges its stalwarts to realize that "National Socialism was designed for Germany after WW1 and addressed the concerns and needs of the time."[82] However, today "there is no Jewish problem in Western Europe (with the exception of the UK and France) as we only have 1 million in Western Europe, whereas 800 000 out of these 1 million live in France and the UK. The US on the other hand, with more than 6 million Jews (600% more than Europe) actually has a considerable Jewish problem."[83] Compared with 25 million Muslims in Europe, Breivik

finds the Jewish presence miniscule, which is why he advises white power activists to put their dated Jew-hatred to the side and join the new Crusade against Muslims. After all, the new anti-Muslim and the old National Socialist far right "share the same anti-EU, -UN and -immigration/multiculturalism (Muslim immigration at least) sentiments and the goal of preserving European traditions." Addressing the remnants of Nazi groups out there, Breivik urges them to "conform and join our armed struggle against the European cultural Marxists/multiculturalists (the enablers of the Islamisation of Europe), or continue to be sidelined and marginalized." "The cultural conservatives of Western Europe will seize power by 2080, if you want to be a part of this you will have no choice but to compromise."[84]

Breivik holds the Israeli right wing a natural ally in the struggle against Islam, and offers the assistance of the new Crusaders in deporting all Muslims from the Holy Land, demolishing the al-Aqsa mosque and Dome of the Rock, and rebuilding the Temple of Solomon, after which Jerusalem "once again" will be jointly administrated by Christians and Jews. However, Breivik's professed sympathy with the Jewish people comes with exacting qualifications. Recognizing that many cultural Marxists and feminists are Jewish—all of whom will be executed in due time—Breivik holds it imperative for the European Jewish community to join the far right's anti-Muslim effort. "Neutrality on this issue is not an option."[85] Thus, Breivik is pro-Jewish on the condition that Jews abide with his political agenda and abstain from being liberal, socialist, or apolitical. Similarly, he is pro-Israeli on the condition that Israeli Jews behave in accord with his plans for ethnic cleansing and military confrontation. Now, conditional support for Jewish people may easily transform into Anti-Semitism should Jews refuse to behave according to the manuscript of their gentile supporters as, for instance, when the pro-Zionist British-Israelite movement transformed into the virulent Anti-Semitic Christian Identity milieu.[86] Good Jews, Breivik holds, should ideally be in Israel and engage in Israel's expansion at the expense of Palestinian Muslims. Jews who insist on remaining in Europe may be accepted to the extent that they support the anti-Muslim crusade. When the new *reconquista* is eventually completed, there really is no excuse for Jews to loiter around in what will be a strictly monocultural Europe, in which Christianity will be the only religion permitted.

Leaderless Resistance

Breivik's call for a decentralized armed "resistance" rests on his adoption of two groundbreaking conclusions drawn by activists in the U.S. White Power milieu. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, American white racist champions Louis Beam, David Lane, Robert Matthews, Joseph Tommassi, Robert Miles, Ben Klassen, and William Pierce began to realize that the battle for constitutional power was lost. In their view, a cabal of racial enemies, often—though not exclusively—thought of as ZOG [Zionist Occupation Government], clandestinely had secured control of Capitol Hill to deprive white Americans of their birthright privileges.[87] Confronting an enemy in control of federal resources, white resistance could not only rely on member-based organizations that would be infiltrated and monitored. Instead, the strategy of "leaderless resistance" developed, with a propaganda-oriented public branch that remained within the legal framework, and an armed underground of autonomous cells and lone wolf assassins who acted on their own.[88] In his influential 1992 essay *Leaderless Resistance*, Beam argues that the traditional pyramid organizational structure is "not only useless, but extremely dangerous for the participants when it is utilized in a resistance movement," as they are "easy prey for government infiltration, entrapment and destruction." Instead, Beam detailed a "phantom cell" mode of organization in which "all individuals and groups operate independently of each other, and never report to a central headquarters or a single leader for direction and instruction." Substituting unity of organization for unity of purpose, participant revolutionaries should acquire appropriate military skills and take action when needed. Overt organs of information should keep participants informed of events, enabling them to act without receiving orders. Such tactics, Beam laid down, would pose "an intelligence nightmare."[89] By the end of the decade, the FBI assessed that the "overwhelming majority of [right-wing] extremist groups" had "adopted a fragmented, leaderless structure where individuals or small groups act with autonomy," which meant that they were "extremely difficult to identify."[90]

By then, the U.S. had seen a series of right-wing assaults against individuals, banks, government facilities, abortion clinics, and infrastructure, perpetuated by autonomous cells of self-proclaimed patriots or lone wolf assassins, including the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing that

Breivik sought to emulate. In 2009, the Department of Homeland Security assessed that "lone wolves and small terrorist cells embracing violent right-wing extremist ideology" remained "the most dangerous domestic terrorism threat."[91]

In the 1990s, the leaderless resistance strategy crossed the Atlantic to inform the European white racist scene, where it inspired (among others) the Laser Man (John Ausonius), the racist serial killer and bank robber who haunted Stockholm in the early 1990s, his admirer Laser Man 2 (Peter Mangs), who in 2012 stood trial for a series of three murders and fifteen shootings of mainly Muslim immigrants in Malmoe between 2003 and 2010, and the *Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund*, an autonomous cell of three who murdered a series of nine, mainly Turkish immigrants and a policewoman between 2000 and 2006, and wounded 22 in a bomb attack against a Turkish business district in Cologne—all of whom Breivik would refer to in court as "national heroes" and "perfect Knights" who "sacrificed their lives" for the "conservative, anti-communist and anti-Islamic revolution. To secure national rebirth, Europe needs more great heroes such as these."[92]

In his compendium, Breivik embraces the leaderless resistance strategy. He warns his readers away from repeating the mistake of the *Brüders Schweigen* that rapidly expanded to encompass some hundred members who remained connected—which left it vulnerable and possible to round up—when ideally they should have divided into 50–100 cells that cut contact with each other.[93] A decentralized structure of autonomous cells is "virtually immune to detection, penetration and decapitation." It should not be organized as a fixed and thereby fragile hierarchy but as "an extremely distributed movement, a resilient network made up of small, autonomous groups or cells," each group "lead by a cell commander, often working solo." Autonomous solo cells "allow the individual to stay hidden until he is ready to activate himself." Even then, Breivik adds with reference to the police practice of racial profiling, he would likely "escape the scrutiny often reserved for young men of Arab descent." Breivik emphasizes that resistance fighters should abstain from being affiliated with extremist networks or right-wing movements, in order to escape the intelligence radar and to avoid endangering public right-wing leaders,[94] which is why he left the populist Norwegian Progress Party when he decided to go underground.

Breivik's Knights Templar is not an organization in conventional terms but a "decentralised platform with self-organising features."[95] "Any individual who decides he wants to choose the road of the [Knights Templar], a road of strength and honour, courage and martyrdom, should leave any other organisation for practical reasons (first and foremost in order to protect them). He will then spend a predefined time preparing himself mentally … as well as for planning the actual operation (planning, financing and eventually execution of the plan)."[96]

In Breivik's imagination, the Lone Knight becomes,

> … part of an indestructible network of cells, spread all around Europe that functions without a central command. No dormant cell can remain inactive waiting for orders from above. Your obligation as a Justiciar Knight/a cell commander is to act on your own initiative. Any single patriot who wants to establish a cell and begin action can do so, and thus becomes a part of the organisation.[97]

Breivik informs his readers that "brutal and breathtaking operations," ideally using "weapons of mass destruction," need to be employed.[98] Spectacular attacks against traitors and Muslim communities will increase polarization and eventually escalate to an all-consuming civil war from which purified New Europe will rise in all its glory. "Innocent people will die, in the thousands,"[99] but "the needs of the many will always surpass the needs of the few."[100] To assist the volunteer crusaders he hopes to inspire, Breivik provides practical advice on how to get arms, produce chemical weapons, and build bombs downloaded from various Do-it-yourself sites at the Internet, such as *Douchermann's Chemistry Page*,[101] and forwards notes on physical training from *Bodybuilding.com* and similar forums.[102]

Right-Wing Christian Theology

Breivik claims to be "100% Christian," while not "excessively religious,"[103] and put more emphasis on Europe's Christian heritage than a personal relation with God. A Lutheran by birth, Breivik decries the Protestant Church of Norway as part of the problem, a leftist abomination that "defends and encourages the ordination of women, divorce, abortion, the mass scale distribution of contraceptive pills and contributes to glorify homosexuality (including the ordination of homosexuals),"[104] "ignoring chastity, ignoring people's duties in relation to procreation, [supporting]

mass-Muslim immigration and even the inter-religious dialogue with the Muslim community."[105]

Searching for an alternative, Breivik looked across the Atlantic to American right-wing preachers Michael Bradley, founder of the evangelical Bible-Knowledge Ministries, and Joseph Francis Farah, author of the *Tea Party Manifesto*, and editor-in-chief of the conspiracy peddling *World Daily Net* that Breivik frequented, both of whom are popular among Militia members, the Patriot movement, and Tea Party activists. "God is telling you that He does not want you to be a wimp," Breivik states, "and He is expecting each and every one of us to learn how to war against any enemy or challenge that could come our way operating under His authority, power and anointing to be able to do so. This is why we are all called to be soldiers of Jesus Christ."[106] Citing Biblical battle verses compiled by Bradley and Farah, Breivik urges his readers to obey the command in Luke 22:36 to arm themselves for battle: "And the one who has no sword must sell his cloak and buy one." "Clearly," Breivik writes, citing Farah, "this is not a pacifist God we serve. It's God who teaches our hands to war and our fingers to fight."[107] Eventually, each Christian needs to reach a decision. "You can either choose to learn how to rise up in the power of your Lord and Saviour and learn how to become a true warrior in the Lord, or you can continue to keep your head in the sand and oppressor after oppressor keep beating you down. The choice is yours."[108]

Breivik urges the protestant nations of Europe to revert to their Catholic roots. Ideally, Europe should have a united Church under the stern leadership of a "Crusader Pope" capable of restoring Christian Tradition, and commanding the political and military leaders to embark on a crusade to rid Europe from the enemies of God.[109] Built on the Rock of Christian tradition, the new Europe will be one hundred percent Christian, but "embracing Christendom will be voluntary (under normal circumstances). People who chose to be atheists will enjoy the same rights," provided that they are atheists in the right way, i.e., culturally Christian. When victory is secured, a Christian Congress will summon Europe's military, political, and Church leaders to establish the constitution of Christian Europe. The Church will be granted "public monopoly" to ensure that schools and government policies will propagate cultural conservative values, "much like European policies 40–60 years ago," and Christianity will be the only legally recognized religion in Europe.[110]

The Knights Templar Tradition

"Go forth confidently then, you knights, and repel the foes of the cross of Christ with a stalwart heart," Breivik summons his readers, using the words of St. Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153), the French Cistercian abbot who secured the Church's public confirmation of the Knights Templar at the Council of Troyes around 1129. "What a glory to return in victory from such a battle! How blessed to die there as a martyr!"[111] Breivik claims to be part of a restored order of the Knights Templar. The cover of *2083* sports the red Templar Cross and the inscription *A Laude Novae Militiae. Pauperes Commilitones Christi Templique Solomonici*. The first sentence (In Praise of the New Knighthood) refers to the title of St. Bernard of Clairvaux's exhortation of the Knights Templar, and the latter is the full name of the historical order: the Poor Fellow-Soldiers of Christ and of the Temple of Solomon. Breivik is not the first to talk about restoring the Knights Templar. The mysteries of the chivalric order and the quest for the Holy Grail has been an important element of the Western esoteric tradition since the late 17th and early18th century, and with Sir Walter Scott's epic *Ivanhoe* the Knights Templar rode into popular imagination. The early 19th century saw the emergence of a series of "revived" Templar orders, typically as part of the temperance movement and frequently Masonic in orientation.[112] Knights Templar Orders of today tend to be populated by distinguished gentlemen, many of whom were appalled when Breivik committed his terrorist attacks in their name. "Breivik is not and has never been a member of the Knights Templar," declared Robert C. Disney, Grand Commander of *Ordo Supremus Militaris Templi Hierosolymitani* (OSMTH).[113] "We are not modern day 'Crusaders.' We express our Christian faith through our good works," OSMTH announced in an open message, "in partnership with and for the benefit of all peoples regardless of faith, creed or ethnic background."[114]

Beyond the confines of the bourgeois literati, the Knights Templar has long caught the imagination of white supremacists and esoteric national socialists. National romantic Anglo-Saxon notions spun around the Knights Templar inspired the Christian knights of the Ku Klux Klan, and the German *Völkish*-milieu saw the emergence of esoteric Aryan secret societies, such as *Ordo Novi Templi*, founded in 1907 by Jörg Lanz von Liebenfels, whose Ariosophy (the Gnosis of Aryan divinity) would be

carried forth in the Third Reich through SS-Reichführer Heinrich Himmler whose SS was modeled in part on the (imagined Aryan) Knights Templar.[115] That romanticized notions of the medieval Knights Templar heroic adventures would feed the warrior dreams of today's anti-Muslim Christian soldiers is hardly surprising. Predating Breivik's compendium, the propaganda videos, web pages, and posters produced by the English Defence League made ample use of Knights Templar and Crusader imagery. *2083* is dotted with illustrations of knights in shining armour, swords in hand, riding, fighting, bursting forth, humbly kneeling, martyring.

Breivik gives detailed information about his Knights Templar: its ranks, titles, military mission, oaths, initiation rites, ceremonies, heraldry, uniforms, insignia, ornamental cords, medallions, badges, weaponry, military training, burial ceremonies, and honorary tombstones of the fallen martyrs.[116] Adorned with a sculpture of a knight's armour, the tombstone will be decorated with the words, *Born into Marxist slavery on [date]. Died as a martyr fighting for the freedom of his people and the sovereignty of his fatherland [date]. Never Surrender! In Hoc Signo Vinces*.[117] The military motto of the first Christian Roman Emperor Constantine, the phrase *In Hoc Signo Vinces* (In this sign you will conquer) was used by the original Knights Templar, King Felipe III of Spain (who expelled the Moriscos from the Peninsula), and John III Sobieski, the Polish king who defeated the Ottomans at the gates of Vienna in 1683. Today, the motto is popular among Masons and Templars, as well as among fascist and National Socialist movements. *In Hoc Signo Vinces* was the title of George Lincoln Rockwell's most important essay,[118] it features in White Noise music, on NS Skinhead tattoos, and is the motto of the English Defence League and the Norwegian Defence League, that greatly inspired Breivik.

Much like the Ancient Order of the Templar Knights, an anti-Muslim and anti-communist order led by Paul Ray[119]—one of the original founders of English Defence League who lost the internal power struggle to EDL's *éminence grise* Alan Lake and frontman Tommy Robinson (Stephen Yaxley-Lennon) and went into exile in Malta—Breivik's Knights Templar is not an organization but an *idea*; a vision that mobilizes Knights Templar symbolism and iconography to create the mood, setting, and direction desired. For the same reason, the compendium frequently refers to Charles Martel, the Frankish Prince who defeated the Iberian Moors at the battle of Poitiers in 732, and John III Sobieski.

The message is clear: once again, Christian Europe faces its transhistorical arch-enemy and desperately needs to rekindle the dormant warrior instincts inherent in the white Christian male to produce heroes of the same caliber in order to defeat the Muslim invasion. One of the military medals a distinguished Knights Templar engaged in liberating Europe from Marxists and Muslims may be awarded is the Legacy of Charles Martel & John III Sobieski Medal—that Breivik sported on one of the promo-photos at the end of the compendium. During the trial against Breivik, the prosecution frequently sought to "expose" the fictional character of Breivik's Knights Templar. Similarly, forensic psychiatrists Husby and Sørheim interpreted the fact that Breivik claimed to be a commander of an order that did not exist as evidence of his mental insanity. Both parties missed the point completely. Breivik's account of the Knights Templar should not be seen as a description of a preexisting military organization but as a *performative* narrative,[120] a proposition designed *to create that which it refers to*: a vanguard of heroic crusaders paving the way for a nationalist revolution.

Concluding Remarks

Breivik grew up with his mother in Skøyen, an upscale district in Oslo West. His father was a diplomat stationed in London and Paris, and his stepfather a military officer. Breivik went to the same primary school as did the royal children, continued to a prestigious undergraduate school of economics, and claims to have made a fortune on the stock market. As a white, Christian, heterosexual, middleclass male, Breivik claims that his birthright privileges are threatened by the multiculturalist regime that favors all sorts of minorities, an allegation exemplified in his court testimony by recalling petty squabbles with immigrant youths and a story about a family of asylum seekers that acquired an apartment in the building where he lived through public assistance. That made him angry.

In the echo chambers of the xenophobic, anti-Muslim, and far-right Internet forums, Breivik encountered other angry voices who vetted their frustrations with the general decay of the declining Western world and the betrayal of the political and economical elites. To Breivik, the primary foe is the inner enemy—the cultural Marxists, multiculturalists, and feminists—who seek to deconstruct the nation, patriarchy, and Western civilization in

support of the politically correct doctrine of equality that will destroy Christian Europe and open the continent to Muslim colonization. The "Islamisation of Europe," Breivik emphasizes, is merely a "secondary infection." Thanks to the inner enemy's effort to de-Christianize Europe and feminize the Western male, "Western Europe has grown weak and decadent and will be completely annihilated culturally unless we succeed to implement a second European renaissance and reverse the damage done."[121]

The idea of a rapidly approaching civil war that will engulf the Western world permeates Breivik's compendium. "Given the European Union's borderless nature," Breivik writes citing Fjordman, "it is unlikely that war will be limited to one nation only. This will create a domino effect, and Muslims will be expelled from Europe yet again, after major bloodshed and millions of dead across the continent."[122] The desire is obvious: through the cleansing fire of devastating war, a New Europe will be born. Breivik, again citing Fjordman: "By quite literally putting a dagger at Europe's throat, the Islamic world will force Europeans to renew themselves or die. Europe will go through a turbulent period of painful, but necessary revival, and will arrive chastened on the other side."[123]

The yearning for a national rebirth is at the heart of Breivik's vision. Spirited by romantic warrior ideals of heroism, bravery, honor, and glory, he desires a revolutionary nationalist showdown with the idea of equality in favor of a social order built on what he thinks of as nature's eternal principle of hierarchy, in which the strong rules the weak, white rules black, male rules female, and rich rules poor. He seeks the restoration of a monocultural, moral conservative, and patriarchal Europe that, cleansed from the corrupting influence of its internal and external enemies, will rise anew to reclaim its (by God and Nature) given position as the world's leading civilization.

Obviously, this vision did not originate with Breivik, but represents a 21st-century reflection of the fascist legacy, a fact he emphasized by founding a Fascist Party behind bars,[124] throwing right-wing salutes in court and by inscribing himself in the history of violent right-wing "resistance" in postwar Norway. "Right-wing activists have systematically used violence," Breivik said. "There have been so many cases. I would like to recount some of these, as many seemed surprised to learn that it was not Islamists who carried out 22/7." Breivik proceeded by listing a series of

forty attacks, including seven murders, fifteen arsons, and five bomb attacks against Blitz (an Antifa collective), a May first rally, a leftist bookstore, a mosque, an Islamic center, a Kurdish family home, assassinations of an African, a Somali, a Moroccan, an Indian. “Should I have included death threats and assaults, it would be more than a thousand incidents,” Breivik said. “Although some of these attacks have been pathetic or modest in scale, I regard the assailants as heroes. They have sacrificed their lives [for the Cause]” and bear witness of an unbroken right-wing “tradition to use violence to change the system,” actions that “motivate people to carry on the fight.”[125] To Breivik, July 22 was meant to be “inspirational,” an effort to set a new precedent for others to follow: “I have committed the most sophisticated, spectacular, and brutal political assault perpetuated by a militant nationalist in Europe since the end of the Second World War.”[126] Yet, to Breivik the carnage was not enough. “Had I known that the Labour Party would not change its ideology after 22/7, I would have detonated a poor-man’s atom-bomb,” i.e., a gas truck with propane. “Had I detonated it at the May 1 rally … up to 10,000 Marxists would have died, i.e., a huge part of the multiculturalist elite in Norway. Unfortunately, I was naïve in thinking a small action would do, a mistake that all militant nationalists should learn from.”[127]

Notes

1. Pelle Tagesson and Andreas Victorzon, “Terrordåden i Norge. Nära bli Skjuten” [The Terror Attacks in Norway. Nearly Shot], *Aftonbladet*, July 28, 2011.

2. The one exception is the 1973 murder of a Moroccan immigrant whom Israeli agents mistook for a Palestinian militant who had been involved with the Black September (*Muna amat Aylūl al-aswad*) group that was responsible for the massacre of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics in Munich. Max Webster, *Inside Israel’s Mossad: The Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks* (New York: Rosen Publishing Group, 2003), 50.

3. Ranstorp, quoted in Siv Sandvik and Oddvin Aune, “Terrorekspert Tror Al-Qaida Står Bak” [Terrorist Expert Thinks al-Qaida Did It], *NRK*, July 23, 2011, http://www.nrk.no/nyheter/norge/1.7723020.

4. Lurås, in Sandvik and Aune (see note 3 above).

5. Jennifer Rubin, “Norway Bombing,” *Washington Post*, July 22, 2011.

6. Barack Obama, “Our Hearts Go Out to the People of Norway,” *President’s Statement*, July 22, 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/07/22/president-obama-our-hearts-go-out-people-norway.

7. “Oslo: Island shooting death toll over 80 as David Cameron expresses outrage at Norway attacks,” *Mirror.co.uk*, July 23, 2011, http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/top-stories/2011/07/23/oslo-island-shooting-death-toll-over-80-as-david-cameron-expresses-outrage-at-norway-attacks-115875-23290846/.

8. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, "Statement by NATO Secretary-General," *BBC*, July 22, 2011.

9. Founded in 1988 by neo-Nazi activists from Nordiska Rikspartiet [Nordic Reich Party], Bevara Sverige Svenskt [Keep Sweden Swedish], and Sverigepartiet [Sweden Party], the ultranationalist Sweden Democrats has over the years sought to remake its image into a social conservative, EU-sceptic nationalist party by (not always that successfully) distancing itself from National Socialism and Anti-Semitism, focusing more on "culture" than biological "race," and criticising "multiculturalism," "political correctness," "mass immigration," Islam, and Muslims as detrimental to society. In 2010, the Sweden Democrats became the first "brown" party ever elected to Sweden's parliament with 5.7 percent of the vote.

10. Niklas Svensson, "SD Gjorde Bort Sig på Twitter om Terrorspekulationer," *Expressen*, July 23, 2011, http://www.expressen.se/nyheter/1.2507610/sd-gjorde-bort-sig-pa-twitter-om-terrorspekulationer.

11. Ulf Åsgård, "En Person Med en Störning" [A Deranged Person], *Aftonbladet*, July 24, 2011.

12. Ulf Åsgård, "Breivik Lider Med Stor Sannolikhet av en Rad Personlighetsstörningar [Breivik Suffers From Personality Disorder]," *SvT Rapport*, July 27, 2011; cf. Ulf Åsgård, "Han Är Störd [He's Deranged]," *Aftonbladet*, July 28, 2011.

13. Sten Levander, "Delade Meningar om Breiviks Psykiska Tillstånd [Different Opinions on Breivik's Mental Condition]," *Dagens Eko*, July 26, 2011.

14. Lars Bohman, "Breivik Schizofren?" *Ordinationer*, July 27, 2011, http://ordinationer.wordpress.com/2011/07/27/breivik-schizofren/#comment-993.

15. Torgeir Husby and Synne Sørheim, *Rettspsykiatrisk Erklæring Breivik, Anders Behring f 130279*, Saksnr 11-12099ENE-OTIR08 (2012). Husby and Sørheim had worked as a team in more than fifty court assessments, and had arrived at a larger percentage paranoid schizophrenia diagnoses than any of their colleagues (Sindre Bagstad, "Norway – One Year After: An Open Wound," *OpenDemocracy*, July 20, 2012, http://www.opendemocracy.net/sindre-bangstad/norway-one-year-after-open-wound).

16. Terje Tøirrissen and Agnar Aspaas, *Rettspsykiatrisk Erklæring Til Oslo Tingrett*, Sak nr. 11-188627MED-OTIR/05 (2012).

17. For a day-to-day, verbatim account from the trial, see *Rettsaken Mot Anders Behring Breivik* [The Trial Against Anders Behring Breivik], http://www.nrk.no/227/.

18. Breivik aimed at sending the compendium to roughly 8000 recipients, but his mail program had a limit of one thousand a day. Struggling with this problem delayed Breivik, which probably saved many lives that day.

19. Anders Behring Breivik, *2083: A European Declaration of Independence* (self-published, 2011), 16, 14.

20. Peter Nøstvold "Fjordman" Jensen, "Native Revolt: A European Declaration of Independence," *Brussels Journal*, March 16, 2007, http://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/1980.

21. Wayne Madsen, "Link Between Breivik and Israeli Mossad," *Wayne Madsen Report*, July 24, 2011, http://www.prisonplanet.com/wayne-madsen-link-between-breivik-and-israeli-mossad.html; Ofer Aderet, "Pioneer of Global Peace Studies Hints at Link Between Norway Massacre and Mossad," *Haaretz*, April 30, 2012, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/pioneer-of-global-peace-studies-hints-at-link-between-norway-massacre-and-mossad-1.427385.

22. Johan Lundberg,"Bjurwald Blandar Ihop Högerkorten [Bjurwald Mix Up Rightwing Cards]," *Expressen*, July 25, 2011, http://www.expressen.se/debatt/1.2509234/bjurwald-blandar-ihop-hogerkorten.

23. See, for instance, Ted Ekeroth, "'Blame Game' Gone Wrong," *Ted Ekeroth. Stoppa Islamiseringen*, July 25, 2011, http://tedekeroth.se/2011/07/25/blame-game-gone-wrong/.

24. William Boston, "Killer's Manifesto: The Politics Behind the Norway Slaughter," *Time*, July 24, 2011, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2084901,00.html.

25. Evan F. Kohlmann, *The Afghan-Bosnian Mujahideen Network in Europe*, Swedish National Defence College, 2006, http://www.aina.org/reports/tabmnie.pdf, cf. Breivik, *2083* (see note 19 above), 264–282. Kohlmann has previously worked with Steven Emerson (who wrote the alarmist *The Terrorist Among Us: Jihad in America*) and at the American Enterprise Institute.

26. Roger Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), xi.

27. For a critical analysis of the concept, see Mattias Gardell, *Islamfobi* (Stockholm: Leopard, 2010); Christopher Allen, *Islamophobia* (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2010); S. Sayyid and AbdoolKarim Vakil, *Thinking Through Islamophobia: Global Perspectives* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

28. Stephen Schwartz, *The Two Faces of Islam* (New York: Anchor Books, 2003).

29. Founded by multimillionaire Alan Lake in 2009, the EDL seeks to take its anti-Muslim battle to the streets by mobilizing Casuals (football hooligan firms), skinheads, nationalist youth, and veterans from the Ulster Freedom Fighters in aggressive rallies through neighbourhoods with Muslim inhabitants in ritual demonstrations of power. EDL claims to keep Nazis at arms' length, but undercover reporters and antiracist researchers revealed extensive cooperation with BNP and National Front organizers. Defence Leagues that despite their nationalist pathos go by English names have since been established in Australia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russia, and Sweden, so far without matching the success of their English model. Fjordman greeted the EDL with enthusiasm. Breivik counted 600 EDL members among his Facebook friends, participated in EDL events, and sent his compendium to 250 British recipients, most of whom were part of the EDL or the British National Party (Matthew Taylor, Guy Grandjean, Teresa Smith, and Jason Parkinson, *The English Defence League Uncovered* [documentary] (London: The Guardian, 2010); Paul Jackson, *The EDL: Britain's "New Far Right" Social Movement* (Northampton: RNM Publications, University of Northampton, 2011); Fjordman, "The Noted Blogger Fjordman Discusses the English Defence," *EDL News*, July 19, 2011, http://englishdefenceleague.org/the-noted-blogger-fjordman-discusses-the-english-defence-league-2/.

30. Edward S. May, "The UK and Scandinavia Counterjihad Summit," *Gates of Vienna*, April 14, 2007, http://gatesofvienna.blogspot.se/2007/04/uk-and-scandinavia-counterjihad-summit.html.

31. Wajahat Ali, Eli Clifton, Matthew Duss, Lee Fang, Scott Keyes, and Faiz Shakir, *Fear, Inc. The Roots of the Islamophobia Network in America* (Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, 2011).

32. Robert Steinback, "The Anti-Muslim Inner Circle," *Intelligence Report* (Southern Poverty Law Center), 142 (Summer 2011), http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2011/summer/the-anti-muslim-inner-circle; Southern Poverty Law Center, "Hate Map," http://splcenter.org/get-informed/hate-map; "Pamela Geller," *SPLC Intelligence Files*, http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-files/profiles/pamela-geller; "Active Anti-Muslim Groups," *SPLC Intelligence Files*, http://www.splcenter.org/node/3502/activegroups. Spencer alleged that the SPLC was a Jihadist front involved in a leftist/Islamic conspiracy, and Geller suggested that SPLC wage a "Jihad against America" and should be named the "Sharia Promoting Law Center": Robert Spencer, "SPLC Fronts for the Jihad, Smears Freedom Fighters," *Jihad Watch*, June 22, 2011, http://www.jihadwatch.org/2011/06/splc-fronts-for-the-jihad-smears-freedom-fighters.html; David Horowitz and Robert Spencer, *Islamophobia: Thought Crime of the Totalitarian Future* (Sherman Oaks, CA: David Horowitz Freedom Center, 2011); Pamela Geller, "SPLC's Jihad Against America," *Atlas Shrugs*, June 22, 2011; Pamela Geller, "Southern Poverty Law Center: Wellspring of Manufactured Hate," *Atlas Shrugs*, September 28, 2012, http://atlasshrugs2000.typepad.com/atlas_shrugs/2012/09/southern-poverty-law-center-wellspring-of-manufactured-hate.html.

33. Andrew Bostom, *The Legacy of Jihad: Islamic Holy War and the Fate of Non-Muslims* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2005); Andrew Bostom, *The Legacy of Islamic Antisemitism*

(Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2008); Andrew Bostom, *Sharia versus Freedom: The Legacy of Islamic Totalitarianism* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2012).

34. *International Criminal trial for the Former Yugoslavia, Case Number IT-05-88-T*, The Prosecutor versus Vujadin Popovic, et al., Transcript of hearing on September 4, 2008.

35. Arjun Appadurai, *Fear of Small Numbers: An Essay on the Geography of Anger* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006).

36. Breivik, *2083* (see note 19 above), 716. The section is taken from Fjordman, "Suggestions for the Future," *Fjordman Report*, September 29, 2008, published at *Gates of Vienna*, http://gatesofvienna.blogspot.com/2008/09/suggestions-for-future.html#c8772512582428522002.

37. Breivik, *2083* (see note 19 above), 319. This section is copied from Fjordman, "The Eurabia Code–2008 Updates," *The Brussels Journal*, October 13, 2008, http://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/3590.

38. Breivik, *2083* (see note 19 above), 49ff; 258ff; 792ff.

39. Breivik, *2083* (see note 19 above), 300ff; 563ff.

40. "Included in the documents seized was a 14-page plan written in Arabic and dated 1 December 1982, which outlined a 12-point strategy to 'establish an Islamic government on earth' – identified as The Project," that has "served for more than two decades as the Muslim Brotherhood 'master plan' for conquest" (Breivik, *2083* [see note 19 above], 300). This is taken from Fjordman's post "The Eurabia Code, Part 2, A Planned Sell-Out by the EU," originally posted at *The Brussels Journal*, October 5, 2006, http://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/1462. Fjordman here builds on Patrick Poole, "The Muslim Brotherhood 'Project' (Continued)," *FrontPage Magazine*, May 11, 2006, http://archive.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=4475, who in his turn builds on Sylvain Besson, *La Conquête de l'Occident, Le Projet Secret des Islamistes* (Paris: Le Seuil, 2005).

41. Breivik, *2083* (see note 19 above), 350. This bravado too, is cut and pasted from Fjordman, "Waiting for Churchill or Godot?" *FrontPage Magazine*, May 29, 2007, http://archive.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=26756.

42. Alana Lentin and Gavan Titley, *The Crisis of Multiculturalism: Racism in a Neoliberal Age* (London: Zed 2011).

43. Breivik, *2083* (see note 19 above), 743.

44. Ibid., 19. Section taken from William S. Lind, "What is 'Political Correctness?,'" in William S. Lind, ed., "*Political Correctness": A Short History of an Ideology* (Washington, DC: Free Congress Foundation, 2004), 1–8.

45. Breivik, *2083* (see note 19 above), 25. Section taken from Raymond Raehn, "The Historical Roots of "Political Correctness," in Lind, "*Political Correctness"* (see note 44 above), 10–18.

46. Breivik, *2083* (see note 19 above), 32. Here, Breivik incorporates T. Kenneth Cribb, Jr.'s "Political Correctness in Higher Education," in Lind, "*Political Correctness"* (see note 44 above), 19–25.

47. Breivik, *2083* (see note 19 above), 733. Cited from Fjordman 2006, *A Declaration of European Independence*.

48. Breivik, *2083* (see note 19 above), 372.

49. Ibid., 52. Plagiarized from Elst Koenraad, *Negationism in India–Concealing the Record of Islam* (New Delhi: Voice of India, 1992), published online at http://koenraadelst.voiceofdharma.com/books/negaind/index.htm.

50. Breivik, *2083* (see note 19 above), 409. Cited from Daniel L. Adams, "Ignorance and Multiculturalism Must be Destroyed," *ACT! Nashville*, August 8, 2008, http://actwestnashville.com/?p=880.

51. Breivik, *2083* (see note 19 above), 409. Cited in Reconquista, *From Titans to Lemmings, The Suicide Of The White Race* (The Green Arrow, 2009), based on a series of eight essays first published on the BNP supporting website, The Green Arrow, http://www.thegreenarrow.co.uk.

52. Breivik, *2083* (see note 19 above), 738. Cited from Fjordman, "The Fall of France and the Multicultural World War," April 18, 2008, http://gatesofvienna.blogspot.se/2006/04/fall-of-france-and-multicultural-world.html.

53. Breivik, *2083* (see note 19 above), 744.

54. Ibid., 408. Taken from Adams, "Ignorance and Multiculturalism" (see note 50 above).

55. To Breivik and his cohorts, the Cold War was the third world war.

56. Breivik, *2083* (see note 19 above), 706f. Essay by Fjordman, "Democracy Not Working—Essay by Fjordman," *Democracy Reform Blogspot*, September 11, 2008, http://democracyreform.blogspot.se/2008/09/democracy-not-working-essay-by-fjordman.html.

57. Breivik, *2083* (see note 19 above), 706f. Essay by Fjordman, "Democracy Not Working" (see note 56 above).

58. Breivik, *2083* (see note 19 above), 743f.

59. In his critique of feminism, Breivik returns to the writing of Fjordman and the circle of American conservatives referred to above, and refers to female conservative writers, including Christina Hoff Summers at the American Enterprise Institute, who wrote *Who Stole Feminism? How Women Have Betrayed Women* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995) and *The War Against Boys: How Misguided Feminism Is Harming Our Young Men* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001); U.S. psychologist Phyllis Chesler, a frequent contributor to Front Page Magazine who in *The Death of Feminism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) charges the feminist movement for having become proponents of multiculturalism and neglecting the threat of Islam; Oriana Fallaci, the Italian journalist who by the end of her career turned vociferous contributor to the Eurabia literature and wrote that "the sons of Allah breed like rats"; and Malanie Philips, an English journalist who turned from left to right with attacks against the "gay lobby's" effort to "destroy normal sexual behaviour," and bestselling conspiracy tale *Londonistan* (New York: Encounter Books, 2006) in which she holds the political elite responsible for the alleged transformation of Britain into an Islamist Terror State.

60. Breivik, *2083* (see note 19 above), 20. This is taken verbatim from William S. Lind, *Political Correctness* (see note 44 above).

61. Breivik, *2083* (see note 19 above), 24. Here, Breivik cut and pasted from Raymond V. Raehn, "The Historical Roots of 'Political Correctness" (see note 45 above).

62. Breivik, *2083* (see note 19 above), 400. This is copied from Reconquista, *From Titans to Lemmings* (see note 51 above).

63. Breivik, *2083* (see note 19 above), 37. Here, Breivik plagiarizes Gerald L. Atkinson, "Radical Feminism and Political Correctness," in Lind, ed., "*Political Correctness"* (see note 44 above), 32–41.

64. Breivik, *2083* (see note 19 above), 353, 369, 371, 376–378.

65. Ibid., 355.

66. Ibid., 355. Cited in Fjordman, "How Feminists' "War Against Boys" Paved Way for the Islam," *The Brussels Journal*, September 4, 2006, http://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/1300.

67. Breivik, *2083* (see note 19 above), 356. Cited from Fjordman, "How Feminists'" (see note 66 above).

68. Ibid., 1358.

69. Ibid., 942.

70. Ibid., 1148.

71. Ibid., 1151.

72. The concept White Power was coined in 1966 by George Lincoln Rockwell, founder of the American Nazi Party and chairman of the now defunct World Union of National Socialists, as a response to Black Nationalist calls for Black Power. None of Rockwell's organizational efforts met with any degree of success, and his importance lies rather in the legacy he bequeathed the white racist scene for which the concept of White Power became a unifying tool in the decades to come. See Mattias Gardell, *Gods of the Blood: White Separatism and the Pagan Revival* (Durham, NC:

Duke University Press, 2003); Mattias Gardell, "White Racist Religions in the United States: From Christian Identity to Wolf Age Pagans," in James R. Lewis, ed., *Controversial New Religions* (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 2005), 387–421; Jeffrey Kaplan, *Encyclopedia of White Power: A Sourcebook on the Radical Racist Right* (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2000), Frederick J. Simonelli, *American Führer: George Lincoln Rockwell and the American Nazi Party* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1999).

73. Breivik also used Andreas Borg, Andrew Berwick, Dudley Veron, Axel Downing, and Sigurd Magnusson. For a study of his e-correspondence, see Ketil Stormark, *Massemorderens Private E-Poster* [The mass-murderer's private e-mail] (Oslo: Spartacus, 2012).

74. Breivik, *2083* (see note 19 above), 680.

75. Reconquista, *From Titans to Lemmings* (see note 51 above); Breivik, *2083* (see note 19 above), 398–407.

76. Breivik, *2083* (see note 19 above), 1193.

77. Ibid., 1157.

78. Ibid., 1193.

79. Ibid., 1157.

80. Ibid., 1195.

81. Ibid., 1199, 1200.

82. Ibid., 1368.

83. Ibid., 1167.

84. Ibid., 1376.

85. Ibid., 1374.

86. British-Israelism was a lay school of theology that identified the peoples of northern Europe with the lost tribes of Israel. Introduced in the United States in the late 19th century, British-Israelism found resonance with the Puritan legacy that identified America as the New Israel. Substituting analogy with biology, British-Israelism insisted on a *genealogical* identity with the Chosen People. Longing to be reunited with the House of Juda, British-Israelites were generally sympathetic to the early Zionist movement. However, when Israel was established and Jewish people failed to embrace the Anglo-Saxon-Nordics as fellow people of the covenant, Jews became denounced as impostors, a demonic race, that sought to fool the world that they, and not the Aryans, were the Chosen race. In the U.S., British Israelism transformed into Christian Identity, which entered pro-National Socialist groups and Ku Klux Klan organizations. Christian Identity families may name their children Seth, Elisheba, Levi, and Rebekah, Melchizedek or Sarai and change to Israeli surnames, such as Weisman or Neuman. Many observe Sabbath, celebrate Passover and Purim, follow the dietary laws of Deuteronomy and Leviticus, and practice male circumcision. Given the Anti-Semitic attitude typical to the White Power scene, this may be a source of confusion. Not every Aryan warrior appreciates the activities of a Mission to Israel or an Army of Israel (Michael Barkun, *Religion and the Racist Right: The Origins of the Christian Identity Movement* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, rev. ed. 1997); Mattias Gardell, "White Racist Religions" (see note 72 above).

87. Jeffrey Kaplan, "Leaderless Resistance," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9, no. 3 (1997): 80–95.

88. Seminal to this development were Louis Beam, former Grand Dragon of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan and "Ambassador" of the Aryan Nations, William Pierce, leader of National Alliance and author of white race war novels *Turner Diaries* and *Hunter*, and Odinist David Lane of Wotansvolk and Brüders Schweigen (Silent Brotherhood), popularly known as the Order, an armed Aryan guerrilla operating in the Northwest in the early 1980s.

89. Louis Beam, "Leaderless Resistance," *The Seditionist* (1992). Beam's essay and a number of key documents of the time are included in Kaplan, ed., *Encyclopedia of White Power* (see note 72 above), 503–511.

90. FBI, *Project Megiddo* (1999), 4. The full text of Project Megiddo may be found in Jeffrey Kaplan, ed., *Millennial Violence: Past, Present and Future* (London and Portland: Routledge, 2002), 27–52, also published as a special issue of *Terrorism and Political Violence* 14, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 27–52. Cf. in the same volume Michael Barkun, "Project Megiddo, the FBI and the Academic Community," 97–108.

91. Department of Homeland Security: *Rightwing Extremism, Current Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment* (Washington, D.C.: DHS, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Extremism and Radicalization Branch, Homeland Environment Threat Analysis Division, 2009).

92. Anders Behring Breivik, Testimony in Court, 17 April 2012; Anders Behring Breivik, Manuscript, Court Speech, Oslo Tingrett, i sak TOSLO-2011-118627-24 (2012).

93. Breivik, *2083* (see note 19 above), 845.

94. Ibid., 840.

95. Ibid., 828.

96. Ibid., 832.

97. Ibid., 837.

98. Ibid., 834.

99. Ibid., 1361.

100. Ibid., 847. In these quotes, Breivik's inspiration from the *Turner Diaries* is obvious.

101. *Douchermann's Chemistry and Pyrotechnics Tutorials and other information*, http://williestop.tripod.com/, http://www.survivalblog.com. In addition, Breivik includes material from National Research Council, *Containing the Threat from Illegal Bombings, An Integrated National Strategy for Marking, Tagging, Rendering Inert, and Licensing Explosives and Their Precursors* (1998); and data from Department of Homeland Security programs, such as Denver's Metropolitan Medical Response System.

102. For example, Bodybuilding.com forums, http://forum.bodybuilding.com/archive/index.php/s=82ea9de149c5d5ae2352dddc39377ad9&api=1.

103. Breivik, *2083* (see note 19 above), 1404.

104. Ibid., 1138.

105. Ibid., 1222.

106. Ibid., 1332. Joseph Francis Farah, "The Bible and Self-Defense," *WorldNetDaily*, November 26, 2001, http://www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=25442; Carol Sopring-Baker, "Battle Verses of the Bible, parts I-IV, *inchristnetwork*, http://inchristnetwork.com/blogs/29/1788/battle-verses-of-the-bible-part#axzz1cDQUNdxP; Mike Bradley, "Battle Verses of the Bible," *Bible-knowledge.com*, http://www.bible-knowledge.com/battle-verses-of-the-bible/.

107. Breivik, *2083* (see note 19 above), 1329. Cited from Farah, "The Bible and Self-Defense" (see note 106 above).

108. Breivik, *2083* (see note 19 above), 1331. Cited from Bradley, "Battle Verses of the Bible" (see note 106 above).

109. Breivik, *2083* (see note 19 above), 1138, 1404.

110. Ibid., 1140.

111. Ibid., 1337.

112. Michael Haag, *The Templars: The History and the Myth: From Solomon's Temple to the Free*masons (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 2009); Caren Ralls, ed., *Knights Templar Encyclopedia* (Franklin Lake, NJ: Career Press, 2007); Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The Crusades, Christianity, and Islam* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011); Henrik Bogdan, *Western Esotericism and Rituals of Initiation* (New York: SUNY, 2007).

113. Robert Disney, cited in Anders Park Framstad and Gjermund Glesnes, "Tempelridderne Fortviler, - Breivik Er Ikke En Av Oss! [Knights Templar Despair: Breivik Not One of Us]" *Verdens*

Gang, July 28, 2011, http://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/oslobomben/artikkel.php?artid=10080916.

114. "International Templar Order Deplores Senseless Acts in Norway: An Open Message Following the Killings in Utøya, Norway," *OSMTH*, July 24, 2011, http://www.osmth.org/.

115. Nicolas Goodrick-Clarke, *The Occult Roots of Nazism* (London: I.B. Taurus, 1992).

116. Breivik, *2083* (see note 19 above), 842–918; 926–976; 1074–1123. Breivik claims that the crusading order of the Knights Templar was re-founded at a secret meeting in London in 2002 by representatives from eight European countries, that its ranks of Justiciar Knights in Western Europe was estimated to be 15–80 initiates, and hoped that it would attract some of his estimated potential of 407,120 battle-ready patriots across the continent. (Breivik [see note 19 above], 827, 842, 1258).

117. Breivik, *2083* (see note 19 above), 1102.

118. Full text free at http://www.americannaziparty.com/rockwell/materials/articles/vinces.php. Or you can pay actual money for it from Amazon.com, http://www.amazon.com/Signo-Vinces-George-Lincoln-Rockwell/dp/B0006Y0FCS.

119. Ray denies having met or been in contact with Breivik, but admits that "it's really pointing at us. All these things he's been talking about are linked to us": "a lot of the things that we're involved in and promoting are in there." "Who else is there called 'Lionheart' who's writing about anti-jihad, Muslims and Templar iconography? It blatantly looks like it's me! He also talks about diamonds in Liberia and whatever. Meanwhile, Nick [Greger] is supporting Charles Taylor …. It looks like he's pointing the finger at us! It's like he's copied us" (Simon Haydon, "AP Exclusive, 'Knights Templar' says no Norway tie," Associated Press, *TimesUnion*, July 28, 2011, http://www.timesunion.com/news/article/AP-Exclusive-Knights-Templar-says-no-Norway-tie-1612882.php; [Downloaded July 30, link no longer active. Cf http://news.yahoo.com/ap-exclusive-knights-templar-says-no-norway-tie-223243535.html]; Ray, cited in Jamie Armstrong, "I am not Breivik's British Mentor," *Viceland* (2011), http://www.vice.com/en_uk/read/the-ancient-order-of-the-templar-knights-anders-breivik-paul-ray-edl-british-mentor-lionheart.

120. Magnus Ullén, "Utøya 2083, Terror, Performatives, and the Rhetorical Situation," in Karen Knutsen et al., ed., *Narratives of Risk* (Münster: Waxmann Verlag, 2013), 339–362.

121. Breivik, *2083* (see note 19 above), 1354.

122. Fjordman, "The Second Fall of Rome," *Fjordman*, November 21, 2005, http://fjordman.blogspot.se/2005/11/second-fall-of-rome.html, included in Breivik, *2083* (see note 19 above), 741.

123. Fjordman, "The Fall of France and the Multicultural World War," *Gates of Vienna*, April 18, 2006, http://gatesofvienna.blogspot.se/2006/04/fall-of-france-and-multicultural-world.html, cited in Breivik, *2083* (see note 19 above), 742.

124. The application to register The Norwegian Fascist Party and Nordic League was declined by Norwegian authorities, but the announcement resounded on far-right websites, including Nordfront, Stormfront, and the Commander Breivik Report ("Anders Behring Breivik vil Starte Norsk Fascistparti," *Aftenposten*, May 10, 2013; Rebecca Haimi, "Breivik Vill Starta Fascistparti," *Dagens Nyheter*, May 10, 2013; "Breivik Vill Starta Parti," *Nordfront*, May 12, 2013, http://www.nordfront.se/breivik-vill-starta-parti.smr; "Breivik Establish Norwegian Fascist Party," *Stormfront*, May 14, 2013, http://www.stormfront.org/forum/t966657/; "The Norwegian Fascist Party and the Nordic League," *The Commander Breivik Report*, May 19, 2013, http://breivikreport.wordpress.com/2013/05/19/the-norwegian-fascist-party-and-the-nordic-league/.

125. Anders Behring Breivik, Testimony in court, trial date 30, June 4, 2013. Tape recorded. Oslo Tingrett, i sak TOSLO-2011-118627-24.

126. Anders Behring Breivik, Testimony in court, trial date 2, April 17, 2013. Tape recorded/Original manuscript. Oslo Tingrett, i sak TOSLO-2011-118627-24.

127. Ibid.

Hatred of the System: Menacing Loners and Autonomous Cells in the Netherlands

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In this article, the violent threat emerging from "menacing loners" and autonomous cells in The Netherlands is being historicized and contextualized by providing quantitative and qualitative insight into this threat and illuminating some of the most dramatic incidents. Although beyond the core purpose of this mainly empirical article, some tentative remarks will be presented as possible explanation for both continuity and change. We argue that the shift from political violence originating from groups and networks to political violence perpetrated by individuals, and the shift from ideologically motivated violence to performative violence, are both shifts within a continuum, not radical breaks with the past. It is a difference in degree. Further, we argue that these gradual shifts in types of violence can only be understood as dependent on parallel manifestations of counter-policies, technological developments, and broader trends within society, rather than as attributable to indigenous terrorist developments as such. We postulate a shift from ideologically motivated to performative violence, resulting to a large extent from the possibilities offered by the Internet and social media, and from a broader cultural trend defined as the emergence of the "casting society."

Whereas the relatively calm and non-violent character of the Dutch political system and its radical opponents for years has been symbolized by Dutch politicians peddling on their bikes through the city of The Hague without any visible security detail, nowadays The Royal and Diplomatic Protection Department (DKDB) is working overtime in order to protect a range of politicians and other public figures. Responsible for this shift in protection regime are not only the deadly attacks against politician Pim Fortuyn (2002) and opinion maker Theo van Gogh (2004), but also a wave of death threats against national and local politicians. In this article, we will historicize and contextualize the violent threat emerging from "menacing loners" and autonomous cells in The Netherlands by providing quantitative and qualitative insight into this threat and illuminating some of the most dramatic incidents.[1] In this article, we argue that the assumed double change

in current manifestations of political violence—from groups and networks to individuals, and from ideologically motivated violence to performative violence—in fact should be understood as gradual shifts within a continuum. Both tightly organized terrorist groups and supposedly "lone wolves" should be seen as ideal types, as poles on a scale on which political violence manifests itself. Ideologically motivated violence and performative violence also should be understood as ideal type categorizations, demarcating a continuum on which different kinds of violence might erupt and conflate.

Further, we argue that these gradual shifts in types of violence can only be understood as dependent on parallel manifestations of counter-policies, technological developments, and broader trends within society. The shift from organized groups or networks to more individual actions should also be considered the result of counterterrorist operations, new legislative definitions, and Internet possibilities rather than attributable to indigenous terrorist developments as such. We postulate a shift from ideologically motivated to performative violence, resulting to a large extent from the possibilities offered by the Internet and social media, and from a broader cultural trend defined as the emergence of the "casting society."

Our research draws extensively on figures and analyses provided by Dutch intelligence services and law enforcement. This of course runs the risk of biased analysis. Whether radical groups would agree with the characteristics the Dutch intelligence service assigned to them of course can be doubted. However, this approach makes it possible to elucidate both continuity and change in the authorities' threat perception of violent political actors. The figures we present should also be treated carefully and with reservation. Due to changing definitions, concepts, and registration regimes, it is impossible to give an exhaustive and comparable quantitative insight into violent political incidents. The figures presented therefore should be considered as no more than a sketch in broad outlines.

Political Violence in the 1960s and 1970s

The Dutch radical decade started with spontaneous incidents of "ludicrous" happenings in Amsterdam in the mid-1960s. After 1966, the more militant Rode Jeugd (*Red Youth*) organizations took over, starting in 1967 in Amsterdam, but spreading out to other cities, such as Eindhoven, where the Philips industrial plant was located. The adherents of the Rode Jeugd were,

according to Malkki,[2] radicalized by the Vietnam War and believed that the world was on the brink of revolution and that their struggle fit within the worldwide fight against imperialism and capitalism. The history of the group can be divided into two periods: the protest phase of the years 1966–1970 and the period of resistance with the initiatives for armed struggle in 1970–1973.[3] The first years of the Rode Jeugd were characterized by "spontaneity and by a very loose type of organization."[4] Whereas most local branches restrained their action to mostly peaceful acts, the Eindhoven branch was characterized by more provocative and sometimes violent confrontations with the authorities and especially with the police.[5] Due to a de-radicalising action environment, quarrels about political ideology and the use of violence, the Rode Jeugd split in November 1971. The "moderates" established a short-lived organization called the Rode Jeugd (ML).[6] The remaining "radicals" of the Rode Jeugd adopted more serious and radical ways of action, including the creation of an organization with legal and illegal branches.[7] In the course of 1971–1972, the illegal branches were responsible for minor arson attacks—for instance against the car of the police commissioner in Eindhoven—some unsuccessful bomb attacks, and a few small bomb attacks against the multinational Philips that succeeded. The attacks were claimed under different names, like the Philips Griekenland Aktiegroep (Philips Greece Actiongroup) and the Revolutionair Volksverzet Nederland (RVN, the Revolutionary People's Resistance of The Netherlands), but were in fact action names of the Rode Jeugd that were used for illegal actions.[8]

Due to arrests by police, fear of infiltrators, and problems inhibiting the establishment of a serious and well-disciplined resistance organisation, Rode Jeugd was formally disbanded in 1974.[9] However, their key members went on as before with their own network of people and activities. The following years (1974–1976 in particular) were characterized by a search for ways to "contribute to the world-wide revolutionary struggle."[10] Although plans for an urban guerrilla struggle in The Netherlands never completely disappeared from the agenda, the focus was mostly on supporting other groups that had already started the armed struggle, like the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) in Germany. Several people from the old cadre of the Rode Jeugd joined an organization called the Rode Hulp (*Red Help*), established in 1973 to organize solidarity with progressive activists in trouble, and took it over as a legal cover to continue their efforts towards starting an urban guerrilla

movement.[11] In the summer of 1976, a new opportunity presented itself for the radicals around the Rode Hulp as they had the chance to join a training camp of the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) in South Yemen. Their intention of again starting up a serious urban guerrilla campaign upon returning to The Netherlands fell apart as it became apparent that the Dutch Security Agency BVD was way too well informed about what they were up to, and after two members were apprehended while on an intelligence mission for the PFLP. On December 31, 1976, the disbandment of the Rode Hulp was announced.[12]

However, after the disbandment of the Rode Hulp, a new organization called Rood Verzetsfront RVF (Red Resistance Front) was established.[13] The purpose of the RVF was to support those who opposed the "fascist system" by publicizing the resistance against the system and by helping activists who were in trouble.[14] According to Malkki, in analogy with the Rode Jeugd and Rode Hulp earlier, there seems to also have been initiatives for armed struggle behind the façade of Rood Verzetsfront, but this never really took off. The Rood Verzetsfront continued its existence in the form of a publishing enterprise until the late 1980s.[15]

The Maoist-inspired sabotage acts were flanked by anticolonial outbursts organized by South Moluccan youngsters. The disenfranchised second-generation South Moluccans were children of Moluccan colonial soldiers who had fought for The Netherlands in the Dutch Indies, and because their lives were endangered by the postcolonial republican regime in Indonesia after Independence, had been transported to The Netherlands in 1950, without any prospect of returning or reintegrating into Dutch society.[16] Their children, raised in secluded Moluccan barrack camps in some centralized areas throughout the country, were not willing to accept the Dutch neglect of their plight any longer and carried out a number of violent actions, including hijacking trains, occupying a primary school, and raiding government buildings. Frustrated by the refusal of authorities to take their feelings of injustice seriously, and inspired by perceived successes of groups like the Black Panthers in the U.S., a growing number of second-generation Moluccan youths became convinced that only a show of force would bring attention to their cause.[17] Without establishing a formal organization, but as a series of consecutive actions of loose social groups (consisting of close friends or relatives), they carried out a number of attacks. Nine hostages lost their lives in these actions that took place between 1970 and 1978. Eight

Moluccan activists died during the raids by special forces in order to end the occupations and hijackings. After 1978, violent political activism by Moluccans declined, although the BVD registered rumours that violent actions were still considered possible in the years thereafter.[18] The fact that the authorities never framed the Moluccan violence as a homogenous public threat,[19] and responded to the grievances with social services, welfare, dialogue, and integration programmes contributed to the de-escalation of the conflict. Unlike the situation in West Germany, where the second-generation RAF terrorists continued their actions for several years, in The Netherlands the violent political campaigns of the 1970s ended relatively quickly and did not lead to such prolonged campaigns and confrontation as in West Germany.

The Movements of the 1980s

In the aftermath of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, new political and social movements entered the Dutch scene, especially the anti-militarist movement. The squatters' movement and the anti-imperialist movement were at the forefront of what was referred to as "The Movement": a conglomerate of action groups engaged in squatting, radical anti-militarism, anti-nuclear energy protests, anti-Apartheid actions, anti-racism and fascism, and radical feminist groupings. Individuals and networks that were part of the movement were engaged in innovative, radical, and sometimes violent political actions. The anti-militarist group "Onkruit" (started in 1974) attracted the most attention with spectacular actions, ranging from occupations of military buildings, disturbances at military parades, breaking into and destroying military bunkers, and breaking into different military buildings in order to steal and afterwards publish secret documents. An important dimension of Onkruit's struggle entailed the break-in at military barracks in order to steal and expose secret military plans in which the army prepared itself for actions against targeted individuals and groups within society in times of crises.[20] From January 1977 till January 1982, about 200 actions were carried out under the name of Onkruit. According to Dutch intelligence, some 500 persons were involved in different actions. Dutch intelligence described Onkruit as "not an action group but rather a group of actions." Further, Dutch intelligence defined it as "a phenomenon that from an organisational viewpoint was hard to describe."[21] Remarkably, actions

were not accompanied by any clear demand towards the authorities. According to Onkruit publications, expressing distaste for current society was more important than an alternative perspective of the future.

The same period gave rise to the squatters' movement. Grounded in concrete actions for affordable housing, the squatters' movement developed itself not only as the centre of a radical counter culture but also created the physical infrastructure for an autonomous life independent from authorities. Major squatted buildings not only had an important symbolic value but also accommodated autonomous printing offices, broadcast stations, restaurants, pubs, music stages, and small businesses. Street confrontations with authorities during evictions from buildings frequently ended in massive and violent street fights. Dutch intelligence described the movement as an "unstructured phenomenon" in which a "colourful collection of different groups and individuals are connected not as much by common goals and strategies, as by a life-style characterized by autonomy and individualism."[22] Several thousand activists were believed to be part of the movement. The movement was further characterized by a strong negative orientation towards established leftist political parties, civil organisations, and trade unions. Living a life full of action, pleasure, autonomy, and subversion was more important than aspiring to some kind of formal political goal or waiting for the "right class conditions" to arrive. Instrumental violence (the rational use of violence in order to achieve a goal) was mixed with expressive violence: violence intended to shed light on perceived injustices but not targeted at mobilizing popular support. This type of violence could be motivated by anger and indignation about concrete abuses, but also considered as a necessary discharge of tensions, or as an expression of emotional awareness of being in confrontation with the state.[23] Although the threat to public order was perceived limited by the secret services, the "impertinence and professionalism as well as the frequency of actions" did have a "strong impact on general feelings of insecurity" and therefore intelligence kept a close watch on the movement.[24] See Table 1.

Table 1. Violent political incidents from "The Movement," 1980–1989[25]

Motive	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	Total
Anti-imperialism	1	0	2	2	1	4	2	2	–	–	14
Anti-apartheid	–	–	–	–	1	19	19	5	48	47	139
Anti-militarism	2	1	–	2	2	2	4	3	2	5	23
Housing	–	2	4	1	1	4	–	1	1	–	14
Transport	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	1	–	–	2
Nuclear energy	–	–	1	–	–	4	1	–	–	–	6
Bio/gen technology	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	1
Animal rights	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	6	7
Not clear	2	–	2	4	1	8	10	5	3	–	35
Total	5	3	9	10	6	41	36	18	54	59	241

Note: Buijs, *Overtuiging en Geweld. Vreedame en Gewelddadige Acties Tegen de Apartheid* (see note 23 below), 173; BVD, *Kwartaaloverzicht BVD 1985, 4e Kwartaal 1985* (Den Haag: Author, 1985); BVD, *Kwartaaloverzicht BVD 1987, 1e Kwartaal 1987 Nr. 2048.927* (Den Haag: Author, 1987); BVD, *Kwartaaloverzicht BVD 1987, 4e Kwartaal 1987 Nr. 2070.330* (Den Haag: Author, 1987); BVD, *Kwartaaloverzicht BVD 1988, 4e Hwartaal 1988 Nr. 2094.467* (Den Haag: Author, 1988); Klerks, *Terreurbestrijding in Nederland, 1970–1988* (see note 9 below).

Fragmentation and the Rise of Anti-Imperialist Struggle

From within the movement, an anti-imperialist orientation developed during the mid-1980s aimed at uniting the by then fragmentized and isolated remnants of the activist networks from the 1970s. These efforts, however, were strongly criticized and rejected by most of the remaining activists. According to Dutch intelligence, the average activist was too autonomous to follow an all-embracing theory as a guiding principle for future activism. Emotional activism based on individual engagement was deemed more important.[26] Although the movement was averse to presumed ideological leadership or dogmatism, some general ideas surfaced. Central to anti-imperialist ideology was the idea that the capitalist world order is fundamentally unjust, and that this injustice manifests itself in fundamental contradictions between capital and labour, patriarchal exploitation and racist exploitation of Southern countries by Western business and migrant workers in the "Heart of the Beast." The primary targets in the struggle against these injustices were new technologies (genetic technology, biotechnology),

population policies, flexible labour policies, city planning, immigration and asylum policies, and European integration ("Europe of Capitalism").

Although anti-imperialism conflicted with the spontaneous and autonomous character of the movement, during the 1980s the anti-imperialist tendency gained strength. This was due to some spectacular and successful actions of the anti-imperialist inspired group *RaRa* (Revolutionary Anti-Racist Action). With a series of arson attacks, the multinational Makro was forced to divest themselves of their activities in South Africa. When RaRa repositioned its actions towards Shell, a wave of smaller actions against Shell gas stations and other Shell affiliates were carried out independently by a plethora of ad hoc groups and individuals. The anti-imperialist tendency was further strengthened when police arrested eight RaRa suspects in 1988.[27] A wave of solidarity passed through the remainder of the movement. Some action groups launched actions against biotechnology,[28] city planning, and European integration efforts. After the apartheid regime collapsed, RaRa redirected its actions against Dutch asylum and immigration policies with bomb attacks against the military police in 1990 (responsible for the deportation of illegal aliens and rejected asylum seekers), the Ministry of Justice, the residence of Dutch politician Kosto (responsible for asylum policies in 1991), and the Ministry of Social Welfare and Employment in 1993 (responsible for retrieving illegal migrants). The tactical and strategic goals of their actions were defined by RaRa as a) a contribution to the political awareness of exploitation and oppression, b) showing by the "Propaganda of the Deed" that radical resistance was possible, c) blocking or sabotaging governmental policies or business operations, and d) contributing to the formation of a radical counter force able to resist and change policies.[29]

Dutch Intelligence believed that by 1997 RaRa had ceased to exist. Some 100 persons were thought to form the hard core of the anti-imperialist scene. Some 20 persons within this scene were believed to be core members or close supporters of RaRa. Although especially the bomb attack on Kosto's place could have been lethal, RaRa never aimed at wounding or murdering individuals, as was acknowledged by Dutch intelligence. After the bomb attack against the house of Kosto, it was debated whether politicians should be better protected. The conclusion, however, was that as a matter of principle, public authorities in The Netherlands should not be surrounded by bodyguards and should stay accessible to the public.[30] Furthermore, the

attacks by RaRa were not referred to as terrorism, but were consciously defined as violent political activism (in the same way as earlier the 1970s campaigns by Red Youth and the Moluccans were never publically labelled as terrorism). See Table 2.

At the end of the 1980s, what was left of the once active and lively movement of the 1980s crumbled further down into some small action groups and initiatives. From the start of the 1990s, Dutch intelligence concluded that the threat from the movement had almost disappeared.[32] Dejection, lethargy, fragmentation, and decline were the keywords used about the remnants of the autonomous left movement. Combined with international developments like the fall of the apartheid regime, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the neoliberal ideologies and policies that triumphed in the 1990s, and the beginnings of the new millennium, the movement of the 1980s and its violent exponents seemed to have reached the end of their life cycle.

Table 2. Attacks by RaRa, 1985–1993[31]

Year	Place	Motive	Target	Method
1984	Amsterdam	Colonialism	Van Heutz Monument	Bomb attack
1985	Groesbeek	Apartheid	Transworld Oil	Arson attack
1985	Duivendrecht	Apartheid	Makro	Arson attack
1986	Amstelveen	Apartheid	Makro	Arson attack
1986	Amstelveen	Apartheid	Van Leer	Arson attack
1986	Duiven	Apartheid	Makro	Arson attack
1986	Duivendrecht	Apartheid	Makro	Arson attack
1987	Nuth	Apartheid	Makro	Arson attack
1987	Zaandam	Apartheid	Makro	Arson attack
1987	Alphen	Apartheid	Shell	Arson attack
1988	Schiedam	Repression	Elba	Arson attack
1989	Hilversum	Apartheid	Shell	Arson attack
1990	Arnhem/Oldenzaal	Asylum	KMAR	Bomb attack
1990	The Hague	Asylum	Ministry Justice	Bomb attack
1991	Grootschermer	Asylum	House of Under Secretary	Bomb attack
1991	The Hague	Asylum	Ministry of Home Affairs	Bomb attack
1993	The Hague	Asylum	Ministry of Social Welfare and Employment	Bomb attack

Note: BVD, *Kwartaaloverzicht 4e Kwartaal 1989, Nr. 2115986* (Den Haag: Author, 1989); BVD, *Kwartaaloverzicht BVD 1989, 2e Kwartaal 1989 Nr. 2105.321* (Den Haag: Author, 1989); BVD, *Revolutionaire Anti Racistiese Aktie. De Anti-Imperialistische Stroming in Nederland. No. 2197054-88* (Den Haag: Min BZK, 1993).

Revival of Activism

At the beginning of the new millennium, authorities detected a resurrection of autonomous actions against racist and fascist organisations and asylum policies, and actions in favour of environmental protection and animal rights.[33] As activists were believed to work together on these different themes, Dutch Intelligence and Security Agency AIVD[34] introduced the term "anarcho-extremism."[35] Anarcho-extremists want to change society and are prepared to engage in violent acts to further this goal. Authorities were most worried about radical environmental and animal rights activists. Businesses engaged in the production of meat, mink-breeders, and companies using laboratory animals were the objects of arson attacks. The tendency to pay "house-visits" to intimidate employees of these companies and institutions was seen as a sign of violent radicalisation. According to the AIVD, animal rights activism is both diverse and diffuse, inspired by various motives and perceptions. The majority of the animal rights activists are not inspired by any political ideology, however, but by a great emotional attachment to the well-being of animals. The activists are believed to be mostly apolitical persons with a wide range of backgrounds. The purpose of their campaigns is to influence political decision-making on animal rights. It is a movement that according to the AIVD therefore cannot easily be placed under a particular political category.[36]

Compared to the animal rights activists of the 1980s, the "new activists" were less organized and without leadership. They formed rather "a conglomerate of ideas and principles" from which everyone who fights against animal suffering can pick what suits him best. Rather than "follow the leader," the idea is to "follow the doctrine."[37] A small minority of activists—probably no more than a few dozen—was prepared to go to extremes for the benefit of animals. By the mid-1990s, for instance, The Netherlands was confronted with a series of arson attacks throughout the country, committed by two activist organizations operating under the name Right Animal Treatment/Animal Justice Front (RAT/AJF). Dutch intelligence also pointed at so-called individual "amateur activists"; they lead a normal life as an employee, family man, housewife, or student, but after working hours or on weekends, they occasionally—seemingly out of the blue—take part in fierce campaigns, only to disappear into anonymity again afterwards.[38] So far, however, even this category of activists has kept

to the principle that inflicting (serious) material damage is acceptable, but that physical harm to people should be prevented at all times.

The Dutch intelligence agency AIVD further predicted an increase in hard actions against Dutch immigration and asylum policies. This is reflected in an increasing number of arson attacks and so-called “house visits,” as well as the “naming and shaming” of policymakers and officials held responsible for the more restrictive asylum policies by publishing their names, addresses, and other details. Extremist actions are believed to be the work of a handful of people operating in tight cells with an ever-changing structure. Targets selected are those responsible for formulating and implementing asylum policy in both public (Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND), military police, Repatriation and Departure Service of the IND) and private sectors (building contractors and financial institutions involved in construction or renovation work at detention and deportation centres, suppliers and service providers, airlines and private security companies). Three intimidating house visits were registered in 2011, in which paint bombs were thrown, windows were smashed, and cars vandalized.[39] See Table 3.

Rude Awakening: The Murder of Fortuyn

The seemingly calm and relatively peaceful political situation in The Netherlands during the 1990s and beginnings of the new millennium was brutally shaken when Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn was murdered in 2002 by Volkert van der Graaf. It was the first political murder seemingly since time immemorial. Fortuyn was an unconventional populist politician with a strong anti-Islam and anti-establishment orientation. He was expected to achieve an unprecedented electoral victory in the coming general elections. His provocative behaviour and sweeping statements against Islam and the “Leftish Church” exposed smouldering dissatisfaction in society with multiculturalism. Further, Fortuyn’s critique of the “depoliticized” 1990s—in which the social-democratic party Partij van de Arbeid PvdA (Labour Party), “freed” of its ideological tenets, formed coalitions with the conservative liberal VVD (People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy) and implemented neoliberal policies based on New Public Management—was also shared by parts of the population that felt that the seemingly “autistic” political-administrative complex had lost contact with parts of population.

The emotional debates between Fortuyn and the political establishment were saturated with accusations of racism and discrimination. Fortuyn, for instance, spoke of Islam as a "fifth column," called for a Cold War against Islam and pledged the abolition of the anti-discrimination article in the Dutch Constitution. His political competitors compared Fortuyn with Mussolini, Hitler, and Le Pen. After Fortuyn was murdered, his supporters and political successors accused leftist politicians of having created the climate in which the political murder became almost inevitable. Fortuyn was said to be "demonized" by his political opponents, who compared Fortuyn's positions with racist and fascist ideologies; so "the bullet came from the Left." To this day, the reproach of "demonizing" political opponents has a strong connotation and effect in the heavily polarized Dutch political debate on immigration, integration, Islam, freedom of speech, and the role of the "leftist" establishment.[41]

Table 3. Illegal actions of animal rights activists, Right-wing extremism, Left-wing extremism, 2009[40]

Item	Animal rights activism and extremism	Right-wing activism and extremism[a]	Left-wing activism and extremism
Illegal demonstrations	0	0	6
Threats	9	8	4
Arson attacks	0	2	1
Unlawful entry	9	3	48
Assault	1	4	0
Public violence	2	10	8
Vandalism	23	133	17
Of which house visits	1	–	2
Of which liberation of animals	3	–	–
Possession of weapons	0	2	0
Miscellaneous	1	2	4
Total	45	163	88

[a]See paragraph "Anti-Islam Actions by the Extreme Right" for an appreciation of right-wing extremism.

Note: Minister of Home Affairs, *Contra Terrorism. 29754 Nr. 189, April 13th 2010* (The Hague: Author, 2010).

Fortuyn's murderer Van der Graaf was heavily engaged in environmentalism and worked for an organisation that mainly employed judicial tactics in order to force farmers to comply with environmental and animal rights legislation. After his arrest, several newspapers accused Van der Graaf of involvement in the 1996 murder of an environmental civil servant. Police investigation, however, found no evidence for this accusation. Material suited for making explosives was found in Van der Graaf's house, which fed rumours that he was involved in arson attacks against mink breeders. This accusation, however, also could not be proved by police. What exactly his motivations were for murdering Fortuyn never became clear. In his sparse comments on his decision to murder Fortuyn, Van der Graaf pointed at the heavily polarized debate in The Netherlands when he declared that he saw Fortuyn as a "danger to society," especially for the vulnerable parts of the population like asylum seekers, Muslims, and people entitled to social security. Van der Graaf stated that his attack was not unpremeditated. He didn't see any other way to stop Fortuyn.[42] Although police investigations concluded that Van der Graaf acted on his own (an assessment the AIVD endorsed), a general feeling in the society was that leftist politicians, environmental activists, and anti-racist activists were more or less responsible for Fortuyn's death.

Rise of Jihadism in the 1990s

From the late 1990s, the AIVD for the first time identified the threat emerging from so-called jihadist "transnational networks" composed of immigrated jihadist mujahedeen that engaged in transnational support for the international jihad. Around 1999/2000, Dutch intelligence further identified "internationally-orientated local networks" resulting from the successful radicalisation and recruitment through the transnational networks of mostly Muslim migrants raised and/or born in the West. Thirdly, the AIVD recognized "local-autonomous networks" made up entirely of radicalized young Muslim immigrants.[43] These jihadists still viewed their activities as part of international jihad, but directed them against their country of residence and operated outside existing jihadist structures. The command structures of the groups that were formed in this stage were spontaneous and very local. Some radicalized youngsters were recruited into the jihad by recruiters with a mujahedeen background that had participated in the jihadist

war. The recruitment was defined as an expression of a violent, radical Islamistic movement that has crept into Dutch society. According to the AIVD, this phenomenon should be partly understood as the rise of an Islamic youth subculture in which Islamic dress, symbols, and extreme statements foremost reflect a desire to be part of a group and the expression of an Islamic social identity.[44]

Beginning in 2002, Dutch intelligence monitored closely a group of homegrown jihadi radicals, a network the service internally dubbed as the "Hofstad Group."[45] Apart from Mohammed Bouyeri, the murderer of the journalist Theo van Gogh, whose case is discussed later, its core members were under surveillance as was the radical Salafist El Tawheed mosque in Amsterdam.[46] The members of the Hofstad Group met in and around this mosque and gathered around their mentor Redouan al-Issar (also named "Abu Khaled" or "the Sheikh") who had ties to radical Muslims in Spain and Belgium.[47] He inspired, amongst others, 17-year-old high school student Samir Azzouzz, who came to the notice of the AIVD in January 2003, when he took the train to Berlin, bound for Chechnya, to join local jihadists in their fight against the Russian forces, but was stopped and arrested at the Ukrainian border and put back on a train to Western Europe.[48] After his return, Azzouzz's status rose inside local jihadist circles. Together with Ismaïl Aknikh, he established contacts with Barcelona-based Abdeladim Akoudad, suspected by Moroccan security services of being involved in the Casablanca terror attacks of March 16, 2003. On the basis of intercepted telephone conversations, both Spanish and Dutch authorities believed Azzouzz, Aknikh, and Akoudad were preparing for terrorist attacks. On October 17, 2003, arrests were made in several Dutch cities and apartments raided.[49] However, as the allegation of terrorism could not be substantiated, the Hofstad members were released after 11 days. It is believed that from 2004 onwards, members of the Hofstad network began to conspire against Dutch targets.[50] The Hofstad Group illuminates what Dutch intelligence called autonomous radicalization, "a spontaneous, interactive and largely autonomous process" through which young men (and, to a lesser degree, young women) embrace radical Islam on their own, with no support from the outside.[51]

The Murder of Theo Van Gogh

In the early morning of November 2, 2004, Mohammed Bouyeri, a 26-year-old Dutch-Moroccan, born and raised in Amsterdam, awaited moviemaker and opinion maker Theo van Gogh in an Amsterdam street, shot him off his bicycle and slaughtered him with a knife in the middle of the street in front of many witnesses. Bouyeri's action had taken the security services by surprise as he was not considered a main actor in The Netherlands jihadi scene and was not on the list of approximately 150 jihadi radicals the AIVD had identified as a risk to security.[52] Bouyeri's radical texts calling for violent jihad, disseminated under the name "Abu Zubair," were only taken notice of after the police and AIVD stepped up their investigation into the Hofstad Group after the murder of Van Gogh.[53] It then turned out that Bouyeri had taken over Abu Khaled's role as spiritual leader and ideologue of the Hofstad Group. Bouyeri slowly radicalized into Islamic militancy from 1999 onwards. The death of his mother in 2001 had a profound impact on this development.[54] In his testimony, he declared that this bereavement had changed him, leading to a search for truth. His father's re-marriage in the fall of 2003 turned Mohammed Bouyeri further toward radicalism and one can assume that the American invasion of Iraq also contributed to his Islamic militancy. Mohammed Bouyeri started to live according to strict Islamic rules. He grew a beard and began to wear traditional Islamic clothes. He refused to shake hands with women and refused to serve alcohol in the youth centre where he was working as a volunteer. Incidents with police and youth workers and failed attempts by Bouyeri to establish a youth club contributed to this life change.[55] In Amsterdam Al-Tawheed Mosque, where he began to pray regularly, Bouyeri came to know other Islamic militants like Samir Azzouzz. In his digital statements, he legitimized violence against anyone who offended the Prophet as a religious duty for every Muslim. He also legitimized violence against the Dutch population at large. As Dutch citizens had elected a government that supports the U.S. and Israel, he considered them responsible for the acts of their government. As the Dutch population therefore is at war with Islam, it becomes a legitimate target. At his trial, Bouyeri stated he didn't murder out of hate, but that it was his religious duty. During another trial against Hofstad members, in which Bouyeri was questioned as a witness, he stated in a long but tangled speech that the only possibility of deserving a place in heaven is by killing disbelievers.[56]

Dutch authorities believed that Bouyeri conceived his attacks by himself. Although perhaps some other members of the group were aware of his intentions, his action was a one-man mission.[57] Bouyeri carefully planned the attack on Van Gogh. Van Gogh was known, among other things, for his anti-Islamist doings and produced the provocative documentary *Submission* together with the Somali-born Member of Parliament Ayaan Hirsi Ali. Hirsi Ali was protected by Dutch security agencies at that time, but Van Gogh, who had rejected protection, seemed a good alternative for Bouyeri. That Hirsi Ali, however, was the real object of the attack was shown by the "Open letter to Hirsi Ali" Bouyeri stuck with a knife in Van Gogh's chest.[58] Bouyeri tried to kill the police officers who pursued him, planning to be killed himself in the process and become a martyr, but he was shot in the leg and overpowered. After the arrest of Bouyeri, Dutch authorities launched actions against other members of the Hofstad Group, resulting in the arrest of twelve suspects, all charged with membership in a terrorist organisation. However, Azzouzz, who was in jail for his alleged participation in the murder of Van Gogh, and Nourriddin el Fatmi, who had fled the country, continued to plan with others for possible terrorist actions. It took intelligence and law enforcement several more investigations before Azzouzz, El Fatmi, and five others were also prosecuted and convicted for terrorist acts.[59]

Since the turbulence of 2005 and 2006, Dutch intelligence has noticed a drop in the threat of homegrown jihadism.[60] The threat is believed to be diminished as a result of interventions by law enforcement, intelligence and the administration, internal divisions inside the networks, and the absence of people with leadership appeal. However, some examples of what are referred to as "*zelfontbranders*" (self-radicalized individuals who go through the entire process of radicalization) occurred during these years.[61] Bilal L., for instance, was sentenced in 2005 to ten months of prison for publishing video messages in which people were encouraged to decapitate Geert Wilders. There were also rumours that he had planned a bomb attack against the Amsterdam Red Light District. Just a few weeks after his release, he was arrested again on charges of terrorist conspiracy and recruitment for the jihad during his time in prison. He told inmates that he was willing to blow himself up in a public place, was recruiting for jihad, and asked for help in getting ahold of weapons and explosives. Another example is Yehya K., arrested in 2004 because he had threatened Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Geert

Wilders with death on the Internet. As the “AIVD-killer,” he repeatedly published threatening texts on the Internet and his chat sessions showed that he was making preparations for a bombing. At his home, information on a detonator and booster charge, maps of the city centre of The Hague, information on ammonium nitrate, and addresses of foreign embassies were seized. The court decided that Yehya was in a state of diminished responsibility at the time of his deeds. On February 14, he was sentenced to four months’ imprisonment. On November 11, 2008, police arrested a self-radicalized citizen of The Hague. Weapons, ammunition, and a silencer were seized. Although the suspect was convicted for the illegal possession of weaponry, no hard evidence of engagement in terrorist activities could be proven.[62] During the years 2002–2010, 255 suspects were arrested on terrorist charges; 65 of the suspects were immediately released, 100 suspects were held longer in custody but were never convicted, 33 suspects were expelled, seven suspects were convicted on terrorist charges, and 14 suspects were convicted on other charges.[63]

Anti-Islam Actions by the Extreme Right

The van Gogh murder was followed by a wave of violent actions against both churches and mosques. “These actions show manifestations of hate and intolerance inside the Dutch society that until recently were not imaginable,” AIVD stated.[64] 174 actions were counted during November 2004; 106 of them were directed against Muslim targets and three against churches. Actions varied from plastering swastikas on walls (16%), threats (24%), bomb alerts (6%), street confrontations (10%), vandalism (13%), arson attacks (21%) and assaults (7%) to bomb attacks (2%). According to the researchers, the wave of violence was reminiscent of the wave of violence following the 9/11 attacks, when 190 violent acts were documented within the two months following the attacks.[65]

Whether or not right-wing extremist organisations are responsible for these violent acts is unclear. Right-wing extremism, in its fascist or neo-Nazi manifestation, is traditionally weak in The Netherlands. In the 1980s, for instance, one or two hundred people were believed to be part of organized right extremist networks. A few dozen of these activists were said to be politically active in organisations.[66] Besides the strong resistance in Dutch society against right-wing extremist organisations, they were traditionally

burdened with internal fights and divisions, lack of appealing leaders, and sometimes violent counter activities of anti-fascists. Most organisations only dealt with propaganda and small demonstrations. Most violent incidents with a right-wing extremist character were the responsibility of individual members who were part of an unorganized subculture and not directed by organisations of their leadership. Dutch intelligence used in the beginning of the 1990s the term “unstructured right-extremism” to express the absence of visible planning, coordination, organisation, or the involvement of known right-wing extremist leaders.[67] During that period, however, an increase in violence directed at “foreigners” was noticed. These violent acts, however, also were not really political or ideologically inspired but based on incoherent, individually determined motives, and interpreted as an expression of a growing societal aversion against multiculturalism.[68]

Although the right-wing extremist scene is known for its obsession with weapons and several members have been arrested for illegal weaponry, this seems more of a cultural fetish than intended for political attacks against political opponents. So far, there are according to the AIVD no indications of a development towards right-wing extremist inspired or motivated terrorism. This does not mean that the possibility of “lone wolves” using violence based on right-wing extremist inspirations or motives can be ruled out.[69] The broader following seems to be characterized by a certain lack of interest in politics and society, and by a sheer distrust of the current political system. Its recruitment power has decreased over the years as some of their viewpoints have been put on the national political agenda by mainstream political parties. In the integration and Islam debate initiated after the attacks of 9/11, many extreme right-wing viewpoints have been addressed and become mainstreamed. An example is the alleged bankruptcy of the multicultural society.[70] See Table 4.

Right-wing extremists tried to take advantage of the political success of the strong anti-immigration agendas of Fortuyn and later Wilders. However, besides some isolated incidents in which right-wing extremists succeeded in getting access to the Lijst Pim Fortyn LPF (List Pim Fortuyn) and Partij Voor de Vrijheid PVV (Freedom Party), the right-populist political parties strongly distanced themselves from anything resembling traditional right-wing extremism. According to Dutch intelligence, the most serious threat to democratic order in the beginning of the new decade was a broad societal frustration with multiculturalism from both native and immigrant

communities, which could lead to inter-ethnic confrontations.[72] Right-wing extremist symbols and discourse are used by dissatisfied Dutch youngsters (especially the "Londsdale" youngsters[73]) in order to emphasize their identity and in provoking confrontation with migrant youth. Some of these Lonsdale youngsters were believed to be behind recent anti-Islam actions.[74] Feelings of frustration about multiculturalism could pave the way for further societal polarization. Further, the AIVD stated that the risk that within these groupings of individuals, some can be radicalized into militancy or terrorism cannot be excluded.[75] However, in 2010 AIVD stated that the Lonsdale subculture had almost disappeared.[76] After the attacks by Anders Behring Breivik, AIVD investigated possible connections between Breivik, his thoughts, and right-wing extremism, but no connections could be established. A group of right extremists were arrested in 2011 for the illegal possession of arms, but the weaponry seemingly was not meant to be used for political targets, but instead for illegal trade.[77]

Table 4. Right-wing extremist violent incidents, 1980–1994[71]

Year	No. of incidents
1980	22
1981	13
1982	23
1983	57
1984	62
1985	37
1986	43
1987	13
1988	5
1989	30
1990	37
1991	40
1992	270
1993	352
1994	1000

Besides more or less spontaneous violent confrontations or actions from unorganized individuals from "both" sides, the polarized sphere is foremost represented on the Internet and other new social media. Websites devoted to right-wing extremist or right-populist politics were full of hate messages. In

the forum of *Polinco*—a "politically incorrect forum for people who think"—the tone was set by moderator "Brama":

> Nothing will change as long as the spirit and politics of the cowardly left-wing social-democratic lackeys that is everywhere in our society has free rein. There lies the responsibility for the politics of tolerance and gagging that has been preached and imposed for decades! THAT's what is responsible for rewarding the "loonies," for protecting murderers and rapists, for accommodating criminals and thugs, for stimulating moral decay, for destroying the standardisation of prevailing ethical values that have grown for centuries.[78]

The Internet became, in the words of Benschop, a "crucial battlefield" in which political controversies were fought out.[79] In this, the sharply opposing parties did not restrict themselves to expressing their visions and arguments on their own sites. They also fought each other on neutral sites and entered the sites of the opponent. Right-wing extremists in particular penetrated the web forums of Moroccan sites on a large scale. This gave, according to Benschop, rise to a "virtual civil war."[80] But as much as the digital "bigmouths" from extreme right, left, and jihadist affiliations called for civil war, bomb attacks, murder, and revolution, the overwhelming majority of them turned out to be no more than keyboard warriors.

From 2010 onwards, Dutch intelligence introduced the new category "Anti-Islamism" as a referent for actions emanating from anti-Islam or anti-jihadist circles that turn both against multiculturalism and the Left. The Breivik attacks were the reason for this new interest, as they showed that attacks by radicalized individuals were not perpetrated only by jihadist terrorists. Anti-Islamism in The Netherlands is, however, perceived to be foremost a digital discourse without any real practical consequences. One of the few activities actually carried out was by the short-lived *Dutch Defence League*, an organisation consisting of one active person.[81]

Death Threats Against Politicians

One special manifestation of the political and social turbulence since the murder of Fortuyn was the strong increase in threatening messages—mostly digital—towards a range of politicians, administrators, and other public officials. An inventory by the department of Home Affairs showed that more than one thousand death threats (letters containing bullets, threats by telephone, and hate mail) against politicians were made during the period

May 6, 2004 to May 28, 2004.[82] Research into the past conducted by Frank Bovenkerk in 2005, however, revealed that threats against politicians were not as new as it seemed; public authorities have been the object of aggression for decades. Respondents came up with examples of death threats from twenty or thirty years ago.[83] Bovenkerk argued that there is however a difference in the way public authorities reacted to threats and political violence. Authorities were traditionally inclined to ignore the involved individuals as harmless quarrel mongers and choose deliberately not to give any public attention to the threats in order not to give other "lunatics" the inspiration to come up with the same idea.[84] Further, threats and actions against politicians and other public figures used to be "instrumental": motivated by concrete political or societal grievances and aimed at changing policies. Nowadays, threats seem to be more "expressive": symbolic actions in which perpetrators just want to work off their resentment or anger aroused by politicians and administrators.[85]

A special police squad (Team Threatened Politicians (TBP)) was installed in 2004 in order to investigate and prosecute the perpetrators. See Table 5.

Based on in-depth research of 351 cases in which the perpetrators (167) were traced by police, researchers drew up a typology. See Table 6.

According to the researchers, none of the suspects intended to execute their threats. The majority of the "street language" threats are directed at PVV-leader Geert Wilders and originate from young, mostly Moroccan-Dutch youth, motivated by frustration, anger, or just acting tough. Intervention by police is almost always sufficient to stop the threats. The category "confused-frustrated" seemed to pose the biggest risk. Their frustration, coupled with social and economic problems, alcoholism or drug abuse, trauma or other psychological problems, and diminished anger control are all considered to be high risk factors that can lead to violent behaviour.[88] Sometimes these individuals are motivated by conspiracy theories. Lately, the number of threats is diminishing, partly because of the closing of the Hyves-pages of Geert Wilders. 253 threats were reported in 2011, of which 107 were considered to be liable to punishment.[89]

Table 5. Reporting of threats against politicians, 2005–2010[86]

Year	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Total
Number	96	249	245	257	186	201	1234

Note: NCTB, *Individuele bedreigers van publieke personen in Nederland. Fenomeenanalyse en een beleidsverkenning* (Den Haag: Author, 2010), 51.

Table 6. Typology of menacing individuals[87]

Type of menacing individual	Number of suspects	Number of threats
Street language threats	103 (60%)	122 (35%)
Confused	13 (9%)	125 (36%)
Confused-frustrated	16 (10%)	26 (7%)
Frustrated	15 (9%)	18 (5%)
Joke/miscellaneous	7 (4%)	7 (2%)
Denial of guilt	5 (3%)	5 (1%)
Dismissal	4 (2%)	4 (1%)
Radical	2 (1%)	41 (12%)
Blackmailer	1 (1%)	2 (1%)
Sparking fear	1 (1%)	1 (0%)
Total	167 (100%)	351 (100%)

Note: NCTB, *Individuele bedreigers van publieke personen in Nederland. Fenomeenanalyse en een beleidsverkenning* (Den Haag: Author, 2010), 74–75.

Menacing Loners

The threat emerging from radicalized individuals, however, only entered the political and public stage in full magnitude in April 2009. Queens Day 2009 changed from the usual celebratory happening into a disaster when a car broke through the police cordons and crashed into a monument just before hitting the bus that carried the Royal Family. The death-defying ride cost the lives of seven spectators; nine others were seriously injured. The incident was broadcasted live on national television. The driver, Karst Tates, was fatally injured and died on his way to the hospital. Police officers at the scene were able to ask Karst Tates some questions before he lost consciousness. According to the officers, Karst Tates admitted that he was deliberately trying to hit the Royal Family. He stated that he hated the monarchy and that Prince Willem Alexander was a racist and fascist. Main media outlets stated that “The Netherlands had lost its innocence.”[90] “First

there was the murder of Pim Fortuyn, then the murder of Theo van Gogh. And now an attack on the Royal Family can be added to this. The first millennium of the new century couldn't have started worse," another daily newspaper wrote.[91] A popular television program, "Rondom 10" [Around 10], that focuses on pressing social problems broadcasted a special program on the events. The program gave room for the stories of people who felt hurt, offended, and frustrated for reasons of sickness, handicaps, personal losses, unemployment, financial problems, and quarrels with official institutions. The program makers concluded: "Our program proved to be an outlet for Dutch citizens who feel dejected and who identified themselves with the despair of Karst Tates."[92]

The government launched several investigations into the events. The government labelled the events formally as an "attack on the Royal Family that has left deep marks in society."[93] Although the responsible authorities had made an inventory of all intelligence and information on "potential disturbers, be it known criticasters of monarchy or fixated and disturbed persons," no information was available on Karst Tates. The investigation into Karst Tates led to the conclusion that he acted alone and that it was "unlikely" that Tates was informed by any ideology or philosophy. He seemed to be "against everything," had some possible affinity with right-wing extremist ideas and old Nordic cultures and rituals, but no clear political engagement. Police concluded that it "was the individual act of a disturbed person, not inspired by any ideology and done without any significant preparations."[94] The Dutch Parliament discussed the findings in January 2010. The Minister of Justice, Hirsch Ballin, declared that government would invest in knowledge development concerning "radicalized individuals." With help from the British government, police and investigation techniques would be developed in which police, intelligence, prosecutors, and mental health care organisations would collaborate in detecting and monitoring "disturbed individuals" with a fixation on "persons, society or the government."[95]

During Remembrance Day 2010, with Queen Beatrix and other members of the Royal Family, the prime minister, and the acting mayor of Amsterdam in attendance, another incident occurred. Just before two minutes of silence came to an end, a man dressed up as an orthodox Jew started mumbling and then shouting. Police officers in plain clothes immediately arrested the man and removed him from the place. A person in the public, however, shouted

“bomb, bomb, run for your life.” This caused a huge panic amongst the public. A person lost his briefcase, resulting in even more panic. Mounted police removed the suspect briefcase from the square (later it turned out the briefcase was totally harmless). People tried to escape the square, but got caught in the enclosures. Sixty-three persons were wounded. The Queen and the other public figures were immediately brought to a safe place, but returned within minutes to the square to carry on with the ceremonies.[96] The perpetrator turned out to be a man with a history of drunkenness, drug addiction, and mental health problems. He declared he had shouted because he was angry that he couldn’t reach his favourite pub at the other end of the square. When the authorities invented some judicial novelties to keep the man—who by then was publicly known as the “Dam-shouter”—as long as possible in custody, criticism arose from the side of judicial experts. They rejected the claim of the authorities that the man should be prosecuted for an attempt to “attack the Queen” and suggested this was just done as a deterrent and some kind of a “public revenge” for the incident at Queens Day 2009. Later, the “Dam-shouter” was convicted to eight months of prison; he also was banned from attending Remembrance Day for a period of five years.

Another incident took place at *Prinsjesdag*, September 2011. On *Prinsjesdag*, the parliamentary year is opened with a joint session of the two houses. On this occasion, the Queen addresses the joint States in a speech in which she sets forth the outlines for the government’s policies for the coming year. The Queen travels from her palace to the parliament in a Golden Coach. Every year, tens of thousands of spectators witness the procession of the Golden Coach. A 29-year-old man, Erwin Lensink, threw an object (a tea light candle) at the Golden Coach while shouting “swindlers, thieves, Nazis, fascists, and traitors.” The object hit the Coach, but nobody was wounded. The man was immediately arrested by police officers on the suspicion of an attempt to inflict severe personal injury. It turned out the man had a history of mental health problems. Police had known the man before, because he testified after the attack of Karst Tates that he was responsible for that attack. Erwin Lensink was held in custody month after month. The public prosecutor wanted Lensink certified as insane and filed a petition for detention under a hospital order. Lensink stated in court and open letters that he contested the birth rights of the Orange Family. Therefore, he wanted a court order to investigate the DNA structure of the remains of King Willem III (who died in 1702). Further, he accused the monarchy of undemocratic

and authoritarian behaviour and engaging in conspiracies with international banking and financial institutions, planning for the New World Order.

Shooting Spree in Alphen Aan Den Rijn

On April 9, 2011, The Netherlands was shocked by the first shooting spree in its history. A 24-year-old man, Tristan van der Vlis, opened fire at the local mall in the small village of Alphen Aan den Rijn, killing six random bystanders and wounding another sixteen. After the shootings, Van der Vlis killed himself. According to a police reconstruction of the incident,[97] Van der Vlis suffered from depression and schizophrenia. Raised as a Christian, Van der Vlis started to hear the voice of God and claimed to be "touched" by God. He developed an interest in the paranormal and occult and bought special recording equipment (electronic voice recording devices) in order to be able to speak with ghosts. Van der Vlis developed a strong antipathy against God, whom he held responsible for both the psychological pain he suffered in his life as well as misery around the world. "I've prayed many times but none of my prayers were answered. Therefore I lost my faith," Van der Vlis declared to friends.[98] Van der Vlis even wrote a "counter Bible." Further, Van der Vlis was fascinated by weapons and shooting sprees, especially the Columbine High School shootings. He was a frequent visitor to websites devoted to shooting sprees abroad. As a legitimate member of a gun club, he was able to acquire weapons and ammunition. In September 2006, his parents found a farewell letter from their son. They warned the mental health authorities, leading to a short hospitalization of Van der Vlis. After 2006, Van der Vlis tried on two occasions to kill himself. Police hypothesized that two trigger events were of importance. Van der Vlis lost his job during 2011 and also lost his electronic voice recorder. Further, he suffered from chronic insomnia. There is some evidence that Van der Vlis prepared his act carefully. According to the Public Attorney, Van der Vlis became more angry with God and the world during 2011 and saw no other solution than taking his own life after "punishing God" by making innocent bystanders suffer. As Van der Vlis understood people to be "God's children," he believed he could hurt God by killing people.[99]

"Hatred Against the System"—A New Typology

During the course of 2009–2011, policies and measures concerning the phenomenon of radicalized individuals were being discussed and implemented by the authorities. The incidents on Queen's Day, Remembrance Day, and *Prinsjesdag* by now functioned as signifiers for the problem of radicalized and confused individuals. The alleged disturbed state of mind of these perpetrators was being emphasized in policy documents and paved the way for an approach in which police and justice work closely together with mental health agencies. The "National Counterterrorism strategy 2011–2015"[100] defined "menacing loners" as "people who (without any cooperation from others) constitute a threat through deed or word, as a consequence of individually completed processes towards violence." Within this group, a distinction is made between "radicalized individuals" or "lone wolves" (defined as individuals who are inspired, motivated, and sometimes directed by (virtual) networks of a more or less known ideology or religion) and "fixated persons" (who have no clear ideological motivation for their deeds). Within the "fixated persons" group, a differentiation was made between "confused persons" and individuals who are driven by "hatred of the system" and presumed conspiracy theories. The authorities pointed to the fact that in public discourse some doubt about the "intellectual capacities" of these perpetrators existed and consequently there was a tendency to dismiss their acts as isolated incidents. The Dutch government, however, underlined that the targets of these menaces often had an actual or symbolic function as representatives of a social system the menaces despised.

With the newly introduced concept "hatred of the system," the Dutch government hinted at a "general tendency" in the Dutch society to hold the government or politicians responsible for any form of setback in individual life. According to the authorities, some "unfortunate individuals" could believe that this would justify their decision to take the law into their own hands. An attack is therefore not only a form of retribution, but also a form of self-realisation. This is the case when a loner intends to carry out an ultimate deed in the presence of a large audience and thereby reveal himself to be someone who has the power to make life and death decisions. Due to the motivation, the symbolism of the selected target, and the corresponding effects, an act of violence like this against the political and social system has "all the characteristics of a terrorist act," Dutch authorities stated. Further, the government stated that it is often impossible to make a distinction in advance between radicalized individuals and confused or fixated people.

“Often it is important to filter the confused people out of this group where possible, and to neutralize the (potential) danger they represent as much as possible.”[101]

In order to detect “fixated persons” before they can do any harm, different approaches were implemented. The first was increased surveillance of the Internet, in order to signal and detect potential “fixated persons.” The second approach was called “personalized isolation”: in cooperation with a range of “front-line workers” (police officers, community workers, teachers, sport instructors, youth workers, and family doctors), police and justice authorities are trying to get a grip on the phenomenon of fixated persons in order to steer these persons towards a (mental) health care route. When local or national ceremonies are being held that could attract the attention of these fixated persons, police and health organisations actively try to get these persons off the streets for that day. On the national level, around 175 people are monitored by a special national police unit; 15 of them are closely monitored. In the Rotterdam-Rijnmond region for instance, the regional police force is monitoring around 50 persons. Local networks established in earlier days to signal and counter radicalisation processes of individuals are now being employed to spot the “fixated” individuals.[102] The policy papers in which this approach was announced pointed specifically at Karst Tates, the “Dam-shouter,” and Erwin Lensink. “Individuals who threaten members of the Royal Family or politicians are a new priority in the light of the societal unrest their acts provoke.”[103]

Dutch intelligence’s analysis stated that the digitalisation of society had lowered the threshold for threatening politicians and other public figures.[104] Dutch intelligence also indicated that most menacing individuals have psychological problems or are young adults who want to work off their anger or frustration. The threat represented by these menacing individuals is believed to be low.[105] Although the threat emerging from jihadist activists against national politicians is also believed to be low, sometimes the combination with mental health problems can pose a real risk. “The fusion of mental health problems, Jihadist body of thought and a fascination for violence can make these persons a potential threat for national security. As sometimes it is unclear what for these persons count as reality and what not, it is extremely difficult to judge how threatening they are.”[106]

Conclusion: Continuity and Change

In this article, we have sketched the origins, development, and primary characteristics of political violence stemming from individuals and autonomous cells in The Netherlands since World War II. Some striking continuities can be found. *First*, political violence in The Netherlands has always been the product of loosely knit networks, small cells, or individuals rather than perpetrated by fairly organized and hierarchical groups. Intelligence labelled these phenomena as “hard to describe from an organisational viewpoint,” “a group of actions rather than an action group” (the movements of the 1980s), “a conglomerate of ideas and principles,” “tight cells with an ever-changing structure” (animal right activists), “spontaneous aggregated grass-roots networks in which every member is free to act on his own” (homegrown jihadism) or as “unstructured extremism” and “individuals that are part of an unorganized subculture not directed by organisations or leadership” (right-wing extremism). *Second*, the number of individuals belonging to these “communities of belief”[107] that are willing to engage in violent acts was and is very low. *Third*, the underlying ideological motivations are not always clear and strategic goals are mostly absent. Dutch intelligence described the movements of the 1980s as “not connected by common goals and strategies, but by a life-style characterized by autonomy and individualism,” or “the essence was living a life full of action, subversion, pleasure and autonomy,” “a mixture of instrumental and expressive violence”; animal rights extremism is depicted as “both diverse and diffuse,” “mostly not inspired by any political ideology”; homegrown jihadists are said “not to be driven by strategic tactical considerations” or “expressing its own social identity in its subculture by the use of Islamic dress, symbols and extreme statements”; right extremists are “not really politically or ideologically inspired but based on incoherent, individual determined motives.” The exception to the rule seems to be the anti-imperialist group *RaRa*, which was inspired by a detailed ideological analysis and program that also informed their tactical and strategic targets. *RaRa* also turned out to be professional in its operations, able to escape police and intelligence, and successful in its attacks insofar as it forced the mother company of the Makro to close its South African interests. *Fourth*, threats to politicians and public figures have not just entered the scene in the last decade. Although it is not possible to present clear figures, research found that in the 1980s and 1990s those threats were also common.

Changes can also be noted. *First*, even the anti-imperialist *RaRa* was believed to have made the deliberate choice not to target individuals in order to wound or kill them. The murders of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh therefore count as an earthquake in Dutch political violence. Remarkably, the perpetrators Van der Graaf and Bouyeri were never labelled as "lone wolves," although they surely qualified as such. *Second*, Holland witnessed its first shooting spree. *Third*, the attack by Karst Tates on the Royal Family was inexplicable in terms of motivation, choice of target, and background of the perpetrator, which was interpreted by Dutch policy makers as a sign of a possible new form of emerging violence that could not be understood by existing concepts and analyses. *Fourth*, violence committed by individuals or small ad hoc cells was long interpreted as a mitigating condition. As long as violence was not directed by organisations and leadership, the threat to democratic order was deemed to be low. Nowadays, the fact that violence originates from individuals is interpreted as an aggravating condition. *Fifth*, in the past a supposed disturbed state of mind was never used in order to characterize violent activists. Nowadays, a "psychiatric turn" seems to have taken place in which an important part or even the majority of menacing loners is depicted as fixated individuals mostly in need of psychiatric treatment and counseling. At the same time, a "securitization turn" can be noticed in which people with well-documented histories of mental health problems are posited as risks to national security. One should bear in mind that labeling someone as "disturbed" or not is partly a social construction. Both Volkert van der Graaf and Mohammed Bouyeri could have been labeled as "lone lunatics," but this never happened. One could argue that this is the result of the prevailing societal and political context. Before Pim Fortuyn was murdered, his political opponents were already accused of "demonizing" Fortuyn. Critical questions were raised concerning his security and a lack of protection and the political elite were thus held responsible for anything that might happen to Fortuyn. When he was indeed murdered, the popular interpretation of the act that it was not the work of a disturbed loner was already prevalent. In this view, the bullet came from the Left. This scenario was subsequently instrumentalized for political purposes. The murder of Theo van Gogh occurred in the societal context of fear of jihadist terrorism. When Van Gogh was murdered, the scenario of interpreting the act as proof of the serious risk The Netherlands was facing, instead of as the act of a disturbed individual, was already written.

Although beyond the main purpose of this mainly empirical paper, some tentative remarks will be presented as possible explanation for both continuity and change. We argue, based on our empirical observations, that the shift from political violence originating from groups and networks to political violence perpetrated by individuals, and the shift from ideologically motivated violence to performative violence are both shifts within a continuum, not radical breaks with the past. It is a difference in degree. Further, some factors can be assigned as explanations for these shifts. A first important factor can be situated in counter-terrorist policies, legislation and the operational success of intelligence services, law enforcement, and government. These policies have reduced the possibilities of establishing radical groups or networks. As soon as there is any form of organisation and communication, radicals are vulnerable to detection and pro-active disruption of their activities by intelligence services and law enforcement.

Second, the emergence of the Internet and social media enabled the emergence of digital "communities of belief." These digital communities of belief can be considered to be substitute networks or communities that have partly replaced the old face-to-face contacts. So what we witness is not so much the lone individual operating completely isolated from society, but a change in the meaning and perception of what constitutes a community or network.[108] These digital communities can produce and provide ideological frameworks, knowledge concerning tactics, equipment and targets, but of greatest importance, inspiration and the idea that one is part of a vivid, supporting community and *not* alone.

Comparable remarks can be made for the shift towards performative violence. The rise of Internet and social media enable individuals to assemble their own copy-and-paste ideologies that give meaning to their worlds. In an age in which traditional ideologies have lost most of their appeal, alternative signifying frames are attractive for people looking for sense and meaning in a sometimes confusing and complex world. Discomfort, dissatisfaction, rage, or alienation will, compared to earlier days, manifest themselves less as collective political ideologies and institutions and more as personalized ideologies and identities.

Broader cultural shifts are also of importance. Modern times seem to put a premium on self-exhibition. The importance of individual responsibility, authenticity, wealth, celebrity status, and self-expression, the "casting society" or the "personal branding society," paves the way to understanding

oneself and presenting oneself to the outside world as a brand ("the brand Me"). The essence of this personal branding is to recommend oneself constantly or to "expose" the self to the outer world. This exposition of the self asks for a reaction, for confirmation by others. Staging a spectacular action allows an individual to attract the attention of the world. Performative violence therefore foremost refers to itself. It is the construction of identity or position through active expression. Performative violence is not directed so much against the world, but clamours for attention from audiences, demands audiences to look intently at the actor/perpetrator, and by doing so recognizing and acknowledging the actor/perpetrator in its very existence and uniqueness.[109]

Finally, the societal and political framing of acts of political violence matters and has changed. As de Graaf has stated for the 1970s[110] and Bakker for the 1980s,[111] The Netherlands were a much more violent place to live regarding politically motivated arson and bomb attacks by autonomous cells then than now. However, back then authorities deliberately avoided labeling these violent acts as "terrorism." Violent incidents were not linked together to a homogeneous threat discourse of global terrorism. The "terror network" discourse did not make inroads in Dutch politics. No apocalyptic scenarios were invoked, no political witch hunts instigated. On the contrary, thwarted terrorist actions were kept secret and measures were, as far as possible, only discussed in advisory committees of senior prosecutors, police, and the Ministry of Justice. Nowadays, terrorism has become more or less a standard term in the security discourse. In particular, the murder of Theo van Gogh and the emergence of homegrown jihadi activists tremendously affected governmental counter-terrorism efforts. Threat perception therefore is not just a matter of objective figures but is also informed by broader political-cultural changes in society, shocking events, and the meanings attached to them.

The first important societal change is the increasing sensitivity toward everything that is connected with insecurity and risk. Modern societies are dominated by fear, risk, and insecurity and "security" has become a governmental technique to produce meaning and order in society. The loss of social connections, identities, and public morality has put the issue of meaning and significance in the foreground and has created a permanent feeling of existential insecurity in the capillaries of society.[112] Incidents not only emerge faster and more often into the public consciousness, the

political and societal reactions they provoke are also harsher. A second important change is the rise of new technologies leading to changes in visibility, accessibility, and speed. The current public and political attention to menacing individuals can partly be explained by the *visibility* of the threats. We speculate that in earlier days a segment of Dutch society was frustrated and resentful of "politics," and insults and death threats were the order of the day. However, this resentment was hardly noticeable either to the public at large or to authorities, as it was enacted in the private places of home, pub, and barbecue parties. Nowadays, every digital threatening message is visible to anyone with an Internet connection. The *accessibility* of the Internet also functions to magnify threats. It is easy to find the email addresses or personal Internet pages of politicians and other public figures. But it is also easy to be informed and inspired by the rich discourse of hate that circulates on the Internet. Finally, the *speed* of the Internet sets a premium on impulsive behaviour. In the past, anyone who wanted to express their anger with politics or who wanted to threaten a politician had first to find a writing paper and a pencil, write down their grievances, buy a stamp, and find out where to send the letter. Nowadays an impulsive and emotional outburst of hate can be made public within seconds with a few mouse clicks.

Shocking events have a profound impact on society's threat perception and the way authorities react to it. The murders of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh shocked Dutch society to its very foundations. Not only was the fact that politically motivated murders occurred in Holland shocking, but also the idea that this could happen to anyone who spoke out fiercely against multiculturalism or Islam. Further, the 9-11 attacks and the Madrid 2004 and London 2005 bombings deepened a general feeling of risk. As Bakker[113] stated, in the 1980s no one had to be fearful of becoming a target for activists as long as you did not invest in apartheid, speculate in real estate, or decide to evict a house occupied by squatters. As jihadists turned towards attacking *soft targets*, every train or metro traveller was felt to be a potential target. In the digitally interconnected world, incidents abroad form part of ordinary people's perceptions. Although twenty years ago Dutch people also were informed for instance of ETA bomb attacks in Spain, it was not believed to impact their own situations. As jihadists target Western society at large, every jihadist attack abroad can deepen the feeling that this could happen to you tomorrow.

Finally, the understandable societal fear of political violence and terrorism can be partly influenced by the meaning authorities attach to incidents. The performative power of counter terrorism policies[114] influences, for instance, whether attacks or threats by menacing loners or autonomous cells are signified as tragic incidents or as manifestations of a broader threat that society is facing. From an historical perspective, the threat of political violence that The Netherlands is currently facing is quite low. The vast majority of small violent incidents can—as before—be attributed to loose networks, cells, and individuals from different affiliations. Homegrown jihadism has lost most of its threatening capabilities. The death threats that regularly infect the Internet are perhaps reprehensible, but they have never led to concrete preparations for an attack. The recent warning by AIVD[115] against overestimating the threat of jihadists based on their outspoken appearance on the Internet therefore could be applicable in general to digital bigmouths. Hatred of the system, according to Dutch authorities, is a new tendency within Dutch society, and can also be found widely on the Internet. However, only Karst Tates probably qualifies as an individual who was informed by a diffuse disgust of society, politics, and its main institutions and so took the law into his own hands and executed an attack not only as a form of retribution, but also as a form of self-realisation. Karst Tates has achieved notoriety and will be remembered. Whether he will be portrayed in history books as a sad loser or as a representative of a broader violent tendency within Dutch society will of course be decided by history.

Hypothesizing that the radicalisation process remains a social process, more research is needed in order to find out whether autonomous cells, lone wolves, fixated individuals, and individuals informed by “hatred of the system” nowadays are influenced by comparable social processes. For instance, in The Netherlands not only politicians and public authorities receive digital death threats, but almost anyone who speaks publicly about whatever issue, no matter if they are artists, football trainers, soap opera stars, opinion makers, or singer/songwriters, receives such threats. Therefore the question is whether political or ideological anger is an important explanation for the wave of death threats, or that death threats have become a “normalized” repertoire of contention in society and therefore *also* affect the political domain. Along the same line of reasoning, one can wonder if Karst Tates really hated monarchy so much that he decided to execute an attack against it, or that he was longing for notoriety (“dying in a blaze of

glory" in order to be converted from a nobody into a somebody[116]) and rightfully estimating that hitting monarchy was the best and fastest way of realizing this. Looking for both continuity and change in (political) violence and carefully contextualizing and historicizing apparently "new" developments therefore seems to be of utmost importance in order to fully understand current manifestations of the violence that society is facing. For scientists and intelligence or law enforcement officials alike, it seems therefore to be of the utmost importance to analyse as factually and precisely as possible whether the current threat of menacing individuals and small autonomous cells is as new or as threatening as it sometimes appears in political and public discourse, and to decide which counter measures are best suited for an approach that is effective, efficient, and in proportion to the real threat level.

Notes

1. We will not look into violent action committed by foreign organisations on Dutch territory, like the 1971 attack on an oil terminal by El Fatah, the hostage taking of the French ambassador by the Japanese Red Army in 1974, or the 1979 attack by the IRA on the British ambassador. Nor will we pay attention to violence in the course of mass demonstrations, evictions of occupied buildings, and so forth.
2. Leena Malkki, *How Terrorist Campaigns End: The Campaigns of the Rode Jeugd in The Netherlands and the Symbionese Liberation Army in the United States* (Helsinki: University of Helsinki, 2010), 35.
3. Ibid., 35.
4. Ibid., 37.
5. Ibid., 39.
6. Ibid., 45.
7. Ibid., 47.
8. Ibid., 48; BVD, *Maandoverzicht* [Monthly Review], nr. 4-1979, Nr. 1324.696 (Den Haag: Author, 1977); BVD, *Maandoverzicht* [Monthly Review], nr. 6-1977, Nr. 1342.580 (Den Haag: Author, 1977); BVD, *Kwartaaloverzicht 1e kwartaal 1981* [Quarterly Review, 1st Quarter], Nr. 1538.691 (Den Haag: Author, 1981); Siem Eikelenboom, *Niet Bang Om Te Sterven. Dertig Jaar Terrorisme in Nederland* [Afraid to Die. Thirty Year of Terrorism in the Netherlands] (Amsterdam: Nieuw Amsterdam, 2007), 141–170; Beatrice de Graaf and Leena Malkki, "Killing it Softly? Explaining the Early Demise of Left-Wing Terrorism in The Netherlands," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22, no. 4 (2010): 623–640; Paul Moussault and Jan Lust, *Rood Verzetsfront. Aanzetten tot Stadsguerrilla in Nederland. Een Reconstructie* [Red Resistance Front. Initiatives towards Urban Guerrilla in The Netherlands] (Breda: Papieren Tijger, 2009).
9. See Peter Klerks, *Terreurbestrijding in Nederland, 1970–1988* [Counterterrorism in the Netherlands, 1970–1988] (Amsterdam: Ravijn, 1989), 217–218; Eikelenboom, *Niet bang om te sterven* (see note 8 above), 141–148.
10. Malkki, *How Terrorist Campaigns End* (see note 2 above), 56.
11. Ibid., 57, 59.

12. Ibid., 61. See also Jacco Pekelder, *Sympathie voor de RAF. De Rote Armee Fraktion in Nederland, 1970–1980* [Sympathy for the RAF. The RAF in the Netherlands, 1970–1980] (Amsterdam: Mets & Schilt, 2007), 81–101, 317–319.

13. Malkki, *How Terrorist Campaigns End* (note 2 above), 65.

14. Ibid., 65.

15. Ibid., 65–66.

16. Martijn Rasser, "The Dutch Response to Moluccan Terrorism, 1970–1978," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 28, no. 6 (2005): 483.

17. Ibid., 483.

18. Eikelenboom, *Niet bang om te sterven* (see note 8 above), 110–140; Martijn Rasser, "The Dutch Response to Moluccan Terrorism, 1970–1978," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 28, no. 6 (2005): 481–492; BVD, *Maandoverzicht nr. 5, Nr. 1339.855* (Den Haag: Author, 1977); BVD, *Maandoverzicht nr. 6, Nr. 1342.580* (Den Haag: Author, 1977); BVD, *Maandoverzicht nr. 7/8, Nr. 1350.205* (Den Haag: Author, 1977); BVD, *Kwartaaloverzicht 4e kwartaal, Nr. 1410.798* (Den Haag: Author, 1978); AIVD, *Jaarverslag 2000* (Den Haag: Author, 2000).

19. See *Notulen Van de Vergadering van Procureurs-Generaal, Fgd. Directeuren van Politie Met het Hoofd van de Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst in het Ministerie van Justitie op 23 September 1971* [Notes of the Meeting of the Procuratory-General and Directors of Police With the Head of the Security Service], RA 1972/001 (The Hague: Archive Ministry of Justice, 1971).

20. BVD, *Kwartaaloverzicht 2e Kwartaal 1983, Nr. 1679.711* (Den Haag: Author, 1983).

21. BVD, *Kwartaaloverzicht Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst 1e Kwartaal 1982, Nr. 1598.854* (Den Haag: Author, 1982).

22. BVD, *Kwartaalbericht BVD 1987, 2e Kwartaal 1987 Nr. 2056.843* (Den Haag: Author, 1987); BVD, *Kwartaaloverzicht BVD 1980, 2e Kwartaal 1980 – Nr. 1495.359* (Den Haag: Author, 1980).

23. Frank J. Buijs, *Overtuiging en Geweld. Vreedame en Gewelddadige Acties Tegen de Apartheid* [Persuasion and Violence. Peaceful and Violent Actions Against Apartheid] (Amsterdam: Babylon/De Geus, 1995), 69.

24. BVD, *Kwartaaloverzicht BVD 1985, 2e Kwartaal 1985* (Den Haag: Author, 1985).

25. Buijs, *Overtuiging en Geweld* (see note 23 above), 173; BVD, *Kwartaaloverzicht BVD 1985, 4e Kwartaal 1985* (Den Haag: Author, 1985); BVD, *Kwartaaloverzicht BVD 1987, 1e Kwartaal 1987 Nr. 2048.927* (Den Haag: Author, 1987); BVD, *Kwartaaloverzicht BVD 1987, 4e Kwartaal 1987 Nr. 2070.330* (Den Haag: Author, 1987); BVD, *Kwartaaloverzicht BVD 1988, 4e Kwartaal 1988 Nr. 2094.467* (Den Haag: Author, 1988); Klerks, *Terreurbestrijding in Nederland, 1970–1988* (see note 9 above).

26. BVD, *Kwartaaloverzicht BVD 1988, 3e Kwartaal 1988 Nr. 2088.557* (Den Haag: Author, 1988); BVD, *Kwartaaloverzicht BVD 1988, 4e Kwartaal 1988 Nr. 2094.467* (Den Haag: Author, 1988).

27. Only one of the arrested suspects was convicted. Due to procedural faults, his original conviction of 6 years was changed in appeal to a conviction of one year. To this very day it is unclear who exactly belonged to RaRa.

28. BVD, *Kwartaaloverzicht 3e Kwartaal 1989, Nr. 2110.419* (Den Haag: Author, 1989).

29. Buijs, *Overtuiging en Geweld* (see note 23 above), 251.

30. Erwin R. Muller, *Terrorisme en Politieke Verantwoordelijkheid. Gijzelingen, Aanslagen en Ontvoeringen in Nederland* [Terrorism and Political Responsibility. Hostages, Attacks and Kidnappings in the Netherlands] (Arnhem: Gouda Quint, 1994), 378–380.

31. BVD, *Kwartaaloverzicht 4e Kwartaal 1989, Nr. 2115986* (Den Haag: Author, 1989); BVD, *Kwartaaloverzicht BVD 1989, 2e Kwartaal 1989 Nr. 2105.321* (Den Haag: Author, 1989); BVD, *Revolutionaire Anti Racistiese Aktie. De Anti-imperialistische Stroming in Nederland. No. 2197054-88* (Den Haag: Min BZK, 1993).

32. BVD, *Jaarverslag 1991* (Den Haag: Author, 1991); BVD, *2e Kwartaalbericht 1990* (Den Haag: Author, 1990).

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Political Elements in Post-Columbine School Shootings in Europe and North America

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School shootings have traditionally been interpreted as non-political acts. Empirical evidence, however, suggests that not all shootings are necessarily so different from political violence, at least in the shooter's own opinion. The article analyses 28 school rampage shootings in Europe, the U.S., and Canada from 1999–2011 to determine common and prevalent political elements in the shootings. The shootings are divided into three categories: shootings with overtly political communication (four cases), shootings with references to previous school rampage shootings (13 cases), and isolated incidents (11 cases). While it is possible to question whether the shootings were genuinely politically motivated, it is clear that the majority of school shooters link their deed to the agenda and beliefs presented by the Columbine shooters, which has created a sense of tradition, continuity, and imagined community among the shooters and their admirers, not unlike in cases of terrorism and political violence that are referred to as leaderless resistance.

Introduction

On November 7, 2007, 18-year-old Pekka-Eric Auvinen entered the Jokela high school in Tuusula, Finland and started shooting his fellow students and teachers, killing eight and shooting himself in the end. Before leaving to go to the school, he had uploaded an extensive media kit to the Internet, including photos and videos of himself as well as documents in which he explained his deed and philosophy. In a document called "Attack information," he wrote:

> Attack Type: Mass murder, political terrorism (although I choosed [*sic*] the school as target, my motives for the attack are political and much much deeper and therefore I don't want this to be called only as "school shooting").[1]

This description sounds peculiar considering that school rampage shootings like this have traditionally been interpreted as non-political acts. Explanations for why they happen have focused heavily on the personal

history of the shooter, the social dynamics in the school and surrounding community, and the wider cultural context that provides narratives glorifying rage and portraying violence as a solution to one's problems.[2] The majority of contributions come from the fields of sociology, education, youth studies, and (social) psychology. In the public debate, the discussion has typically revolved around questions of youth, delinquency, mental health, and gun control.[3] As for terrorism studies, the school rampage shootings have received very little attention. In those rare cases in which they are mentioned, it is to highlight that they are not a form of terrorism.[4]

While Auvinen is, to my knowledge, the only school shooter who has explicitly called his act terrorism, he is not the only one who has used political vocabulary to explain his deed. Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, who committed the notorious shooting in the Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado on April 20, 1999 said in their video recordings that they wanted to kick-start a revolution with their act. Harris and Klebold have been referred to by other school shooters as martyrs or heroes. The word *terrorism* appears in the context of several school shootings, for example as a text in a T-shirt, a rhetorical device used in the manifestos, or as a shooter's strong interest in terrorism and violent crime.

These examples suggest that the school rampage shootings may not always be as far apart from political violence as the previous literature suggests—or that at least the shooters themselves do not think they have nothing at all to do with terrorism. Can it be that the political elements in the shootings have been downplayed and ignored in the aftermath of the shootings? Maybe the strong focus on the mental health and peer relation issues has overshadowed other aspects of this phenomenon?

These questions are important, especially for the ongoing debate on lone wolf terrorism. One of the key issues in this debate is how to draw the line between politically motivated lone wolf terrorism and mass murderers acting primarily motivated by personal grievances or mental health problems and how lone wolf terrorism differs from other forms of lone operator violence. This question has been debated, e.g., with relation to the cases of Anders Behring Breivik, who committed a bomb attack and killing spree in Norway in July 2012, and Nidal Malik Hasan, who opened fire at the Fort Hood military base in the U.S. in November 2009.

The purpose of the article is to take another look at the school rampage shootings and focus specifically on their political elements. This analysis is

conducted in order to see how prevalent and common they have been in the context of school shootings. This, in turn, will hopefully contribute to the discussion on the relationship between lone wolf terrorism and other forms of lone operator violence.

School Rampage Shootings

Many kinds of shooting incidents have taken place at educational institutions, ranging from shootings performed by government agents (e.g., the Kent State shootings in 1970) to full-blown terrorist hostage incidents (e.g., the Beslan hostage crisis in 2004). Many shootings related to personal feuds or gang disputes have also taken place on school premises.[5]

It is, however, one specific type of incident in particular that the researchers usually have in mind when they talk about school shootings. This type is usually called "school rampage shooting" in the literature. These acts are defined as (at least partly) indiscriminate shootings perpetrated by former or current students[6] of that school. They are "attacks on whole institutions—schools, teenage pecking orders, or communities."[7]

School rampage shootings are essentially symbolic violence, committed with the intention of sending a message to a wider audience than the immediate victims. In some cases, this message is embedded in the act itself, but it has also been typical that the perpetrator leaves behind writings or videos that provide explanation for his act. This indiscriminate and communicative nature of the school rampage shootings separates them from targeted killings.

This article focuses on these school rampage shootings. This does *not* mean that there might not be any other kinds of school shootings that would merit further investigation with regard to their relationship to lone wolf terrorism. There are several incidents that do not fall into the category of school rampage shootings in which the shooter has given political meaning or reason for his act. One well-known example of such an attack is the École Polytechnique shooting in Montreal in 1989. The shooter, Marc Lépine (25 years old, not a student of the school) killed fourteen women and four men, injured ten more women, and finally shot himself. He had a note in his pocket in which he wrote that he had committed the act for political reasons and that he hated feminists.[8]

Besides the obvious need to limit the scope of this study for practical purposes, there are specific reasons why I have chosen to focus on the school rampage shootings. The first reason is that they have some things in common with terrorist attacks: both involve symbolic violence with a clear intent to communicate a message to a wider audience than its immediate victims and witnesses.

Secondly, the nature of school rampage shootings appears to have changed during the last decade in ways that makes the phenomenon of particular interest to the lone wolf terrorism and leaderless resistance debates. At the beginning of the article, I gave some examples about the use of political language by school shooters. All the examples that I gave are from school shootings after 1999. The Columbine shooting in 1999 has been a watershed event that has arguably changed both the anatomy of school rampage shootings and public perceptions of them in important ways. A prominent school shooting researcher Ralph W. Larkin has claimed that during the 2000s, "[r]ampage shootings were no longer the provenance of isolated, loner students who were psychologically deranged. Columbine raised rampage shootings in the public consciousness from mere revenge to a political act."[9]

Research Design and Methods

While Larkin's aforementioned statement has been an inspiration for this article, he actually does not really elaborate on what exactly makes these attacks political beyond the Columbine shooters' statement that they wanted to kick-start a revolution. The main point of his article is to demonstrate how the Columbine shooting has influenced these subsequent school rampage shootings. When it comes to the political meanings, his attention is more directed at the public debate than at the characteristics of the shootings as such.

The focus of this article is in the acts themselves, and the intent and communication of the shooters in particular. How have the perpetrators explained their actions? Do they make any reference to political thinkers, activists, ideologies or use political terminology in their communication? Have they a history of interest or involvement in politics? Do they mention previous school shootings or terrorist attacks? Do they place their act in a wider political and social context?

To analyse these questions, I have compiled a list of post-Columbine school rampage shootings from April 1999 to December 2011. I have limited the scope of the article to Europe, the U.S., and Canada. The other continents are excluded because it would have been very difficult to put together a representative list of cases fitting the definition of school rampage shooting based on the source material that was within the reach of this study.

To identify potential cases for this study, I have used several chronologies of school shootings.[10] One of them was the chronology of post-Columbine shootings presented by Ralph W. Larkin in his aforementioned article. I have adopted the same definition that he used, which defines school rampage shootings as indiscriminate, non-targeted attacks perpetrated by current or former students against a school institution. Larkin also set additional criteria for cases that were included. The same criteria were used in the case selection for this article. These criteria are: The student has brought the gun to the school with the intention of shooting somebody (not just to show off), at least one person (other than the shooter) has to be injured by a bullet, and that "the shooter attempts to shoot more than one person, at least one of whom was not specifically targeted."[11] There are, however, differences between my list and his chronology. Larkin's study includes 12 cases in the U.S. and 11 cases outside the U.S., starting from April 1999 (but excluding the Columbine shooting) and ending in November 2007. The time span of my list starts from the Columbine shooting and ends in 2011. Two of the cases in Larkin's list are from countries not included in this study (one from Australia and one from Argentina) so they are excluded from this study. I have also excluded two cases that are on Larkin's list because a closer examination revealed that they do not meet the definition of a school rampage shooting.[12]

Besides the writings, videos, and photos by the shooter, I have also collected information on the perpetrator's background, including their family background, mental health record, peer relations and school situation, criminal record and history of violent behaviour. In particular, I focused on evidence suggesting interest in politics or political participation. The source material that has been used in this analysis includes publicly available communication by the perpetrators (manifestos, letters, videos, photos, diaries, etc.), official reports and police investigation documents on the incidents, media reports as well as previous research on the incidents. The availability of information varies considerably among the cases.

I should also point out that at this stage of the study, the goal was not to decide what the "real" motive of the shooting was. In other words, the question asked here was how the school shooters explained their deed, not what made them commit the shooting. As it has been brought up in the recent discussion on lone wolf terrorism, "perpetrators' true motivations are rarely fully accessible or accurate."[13] I will return to this question at the end of the article.

Overview of Post-Columbine Rampage Shootings

The dataset of rampage school shootings that was put together for this study consists of 28 cases (the cases are listed later in the article). Rampage shootings represent only a small minority of all school shootings, let alone school violence in that period.[14] When compared to the documented cases of lone wolf terrorism, the number of school rampage shootings is quite similar, as far as the available statistics allow such comparison. For example, Spaaij's chronology of lone wolf attacks includes 33 cases for the years 1999–2010. However, his study does not include all European countries, so the numbers are not entirely comparable.[15]



Figure 1. Post-Columbine school rampage shootings per year (*N* = 28).

The majority (17) of the shootings took place in the U.S. Five of them happened in Germany, two in Finland, and one in Canada, Bosnia, Greece, and Hungary. It is perhaps good to mention in this context that plans for

similar school rampage shootings have been revealed in several other countries too. Therefore, even though I was able to identify actual school rampage shootings in only seven countries, the phenomenon is not completely restricted to these countries only.

The number of incidents per year varies from zero to five. The small number of cases makes it difficult to make any conclusions about trends. What is worth mentioning is that I was not able to find any single incident conforming to the definition between November 2009 and December 2011. This is the longest time period without documented school rampage shootings since 1999. There are, however, such cases again in 2012.[16]

In terms of gender, age, and race of the perpetrator, the cases in this study conform largely with the image that emerges from the previous literature. All but one of the perpetrators were males, most of them white. Their age varies from 13 to 62, but an overwhelming majority of the perpetrators (21) were between 13 and 19 years of age. Only two shooters were over 27 years old. The Columbine shooting was the only one that involved two active perpetrators.



Figure 2. Age of the post-Columbine school rampage shooters (*N* = 29).

There is a notable difference in terms of the age of the perpetrator among countries. All incidents in which the shooter was 13–15 years old took place in the U.S. (5 cases) or Canada (one case). Likewise, all shootings in which the shooter was over 23 years old happened in the U.S. (three cases). In

other words, in all European school rampage shootings, the perpetrator was 16–23 years old.

Political Involvement and Interest

In order to assess the political elements in these shootings, this study analysed the communication of the perpetrators as well as looked for information on their background to see whether there is any evidence on political interest or involvement. In none of the examined cases was I able to find evidence that the perpetrator had been involved in any form of political action or tried to join a political organisation. In two cases, the perpetrator is known to have been in correspondence with politically minded organisations or people. Pekka-Eric Auvinen (perpetrator of the Jokela school shooting [Finland] in 2007) was in contact with the Finland-Korea Association (he was interested in North Korea at that time) and Jeffrey Weise (perpetrator of the Red Lake school shooting [MN, U.S.] in 2005) wrote a few messages to a neo-Nazi Internet forum.

Information indicating that the perpetrator had some degree of interest in politics was more common. Such evidence was found in 8 cases. It is good to keep in mind here that interest in political issues is not among the questions that have usually been asked in the aftermath of school shootings. Therefore, it is possible that there are more cases in which the perpetrator had an interest in politics, but that was not considered relevant enough to mention in the newspaper articles or investigation reports.

The nature and depth of the interest varies from case to case. On one end, there are cases in which the perpetrator has voiced his admiration for Hitler, but there is no conclusive evidence indicating deeper familiarity and interest in political thinking. On the other end, there are cases such as that of Pekka-Eric Auvinen, who had studied and supported several forms of radical political ideologies for years, ranging from far left to far right.

In 11 cases, the perpetrator had left behind communication that deals explicitly with the shooting. In four cases, this explanation included political elements. In the rest of the cases, the message was merely personal or ambiguous in nature. Dimitris Patmanidis, the perpetrator of the Athens school shooting (Greece) in 2009, for example, wrote in the note which was written in Greek: “I have no reason to continue living. But, unluckily for you, I’m too selfish to leave and let you keep living … ” He also said that he

had been rejected by someone whom he was in love with and complained that he had experienced “nothing but rejection and contempt from those around me.”[17]

To give an example of an ambiguous message, T. J. Solomon (the perpetrator of the 1999 Heritage School shooting in Conyers, GA in the U.S.), left behind a message “for the sake of my brothers and sisters related to the Trench Coat Mafia, those answers will have to remain out of the public eye.” While the reference to the Trench Coat Mafia connects the act to the Columbine High School shooting and evokes the impression that he sees himself as a representative of a larger entity, he does not provide a political meaning or explanation for his deed.

The strong influence of the Columbine shooting on subsequent school shootings is very evident in the case studies. In a majority of the cases (16 of 27), there is evidence that the perpetrator was influenced by Columbine. In the remaining 11 incidents, there was no evidence of Columbine influence. It is not impossible that the perpetrator was familiar with the Columbine shooting also in these cases, but there was no evidence available that s/he had made indirect or direct reference to that shooting.

It is also noteworthy that there was only one case in which there was evidence that the perpetrator had been interested in politics but there was *no* evidence of Columbine influence. I will briefly discuss this case later in the article.

Typology

Based on these observations, the school rampage shootings in the list can be loosely divided into three categories in terms of their political and communicative elements:

1. *Shootings with overtly political communication* (four cases). In these cases, the perpetrator has left behind a message in which he explains his deed. This explanation includes clear political content —references to political thinkers, movements or actors, use of political terminology and/or a political goal for the act.
2. *Shootings with references to the Columbine shooting* (13 cases). In these cases, the perpetrator may have left behind some written or visual communication, but it does not include an elaborated politically coloured explanation (beyond short and simple statements like “I blame the society”). However, either the communication and/or the way the shooting was conducted include clear references to the Columbine shootings. I have singled out these attacks as a separate category, because such references may mean that the perpetrator wanted his deed to be seen as part of a larger phenomenon.

3. *Isolated incidents* (11 cases). This category includes incidents in which the perpetrator has not left behind any politically coloured explanation for his/her deed and there is no evidence of explicit references to the Columbine shooting.

Shootings With Overtly Political Communication

The shootings in this category were accompanied by visual or textual communication in which the perpetrator explained his deed (all perpetrators in this category were male). The explanation provided in the communication had references to wider political or social processes beyond his personal situation. Furthermore, the shooter claims to be part of a larger category of people whom he hopes to inspire with his act.

There are four such cases within the time range of this study. Two of them have taken place in the U.S., two in European countries (Germany and Finland). Again, the small number of cases makes it difficult to draw any definite conclusions, but it may still be noteworthy that European cases are overrepresented in this category (25 percent of all cases in Europe fall into this category, compared to only 12 percent of the U.S. cases). In terms of timing, there is an interesting pattern: even though the Columbine shooting has been the major model for all three subsequent shootings in this category, these all happened over six years after the incident and within a time period of 13 months. The category is also more homogeneous in terms of the age of the perpetrator than school rampage shootings in general: one perpetrator was 17, three 18 years old, and one 23 years old.

Table 1. Shootings with overtly political communication*

Date	Name(s)	Gender	Age	Location	Country	School	Killed/ wounded	Suicide
April 20, 1999	Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold	Male	18 and 17	Littleton, CO	U.S.	Columbine High School	13/21	Yes
October 13, 2006	Sebastian Bosse	Male	18	Emsdetten, Germany	Germany	Geschwister Scholl	1/21	Yes
April 16, 2007	Cho Seung-Hui	Male	23	Blacksburg, VA	U.S.	Virginia Tech University	32/23	Yes
November 7, 2007	Pekka-Eric Auvinen	Male	18	Tuusula	Finland	Jokela High School	9/12	Yes

*There is conflicting information on the number of injured in several cases. The numbers included in the table are the most reliable estimate that I was able to find from the data used for this study. The same applies for Tables 2 and 3.

These four cases are the most interesting ones for the present discussion, so I will go through these cases in detail and then conclude this section with some general observations.

Columbine High School Shooting in Littleton (U.S., 1999)

In the history of school shootings, the most influential incident has without any doubt been the Columbine shooting. Two students, Eric Harris (18) and Dylan Klebold (17), entered their school and opened fire on the students and teachers. Thirteen people were killed, over 20 were injured, and the shooters ended their shooting spree with suicide.

In the weeks preceding the shooting, Harris and Klebold made several videos, popularly known as the basement tapes, in which they talked about their plans. Most of the basement tapes have never been made public, but reports by journalists who have seen the tapes give a rather good overview of their content.[18] Harris and Klebold also wrote diaries that they quite clearly intended to be found.[19] These diaries and some other writings have been made publicly available over the years after the incident.

The tapes and diaries indicate that Harris and Klebold conducted the attack clearly out of contempt, rage, and desire for revenge against their peers and teachers at school. “Isn’t it fun to get the respect we’re going to deserve?” They complained about the way they had been treated:

> Harris recalls how he moved around so much with his military family and always had to start over, “at the bottom of the ladder.” People continually made fun of him—“my face, my hair, my shirts.” As for Klebold, “If you could see all the anger I’ve stored over the past four f___ing years … ” he says. His brother Byron was popular and athletic and constantly “ripped” on him, as did the brother’s friends. Except for his parents, Klebold says, his extended family treated him like the runt of the litter. “You made me what I am,” he said. “You added to the rage.” As far back as the Foothills Day Care center, he hated the “stuck-up” kids he felt hated him. “Being shy didn’t help,” he admits. “I’m going to kill you all. You’ve been giving us s___ for years.”[20]

However, the school and their peers were not their only target. As Larkin writes, “their primary target was the peer structure, the secondary target was the community at large, and the tertiary target was American society.”[21] In fact, the Columbine incident was not supposed to be a “school shooting” at all.[22] Instead, Harris and Klebold laughed at previous school shootings in their tapes. What they had in mind was rather a mass-casualty bomb attack that would outdo all violent incidents in U.S. history, specifically mentioning

the Oklahoma City bombing among others. They had placed a series of bombs inside the school and in their vehicles parked in front of it. The bombs in the school cafeteria were meant to go off first, then they would shoot people escaping from the building, and the bombs in their cars would explode when the rescue workers arrived. The way their "judgment day" played out was mostly improvisation. When the bombs in the cafeteria (as all other bombs) failed to detonate, Harris and Klebold decided to enter the school and start the shooting spree that ended with their suicide.

In his diary, Harris writes that he does not think the human race is worth fighting for anymore. He views most people as brainless followers who act like robots and do not think for themselves anymore—and it is partly the school that makes them that way:

> WWII was the last war worth fighting and was the last time human life and human brains did any good any [sic] made us proud [sic]. Now, with the government having scandals and conspiracies all over the fucking place and lying to everyone all the time and with worthless pointless mindless discraceful [sic] TV shows on [scratched out] and with everyone ub-fucking-sessed [sic] with hollywood [sic] and beauty and fame and glamour and politics and anything famous, people are just not worth saving. Society may not realize what is happening but I have; you go to school, to get used to studying and learning how youre [sic] "supposed to" so that drains or filters out a little bit of human nature.[23]

What separates Harris and Klebold, in Harris' mind, from others is their self-awareness. He and Klebold can see through the situation and realize the real state of the world. "I feel like GOD and I wish I was, having everyone being OFFICIALLY lower than me. I already know that I am higher than almost anyone in the fucking welt [sic] in terms of universal intelligence and where we stand in the universe compared to the rest of the UNIV."

Harris and Klebold completely expected the attack to make them notorious—in the basement tapes, they famously discuss how they want someone to make a movie about them and who would direct it (Steven Spielberg or Quentin Tarantino). Besides fame, they also expected to have followers. With their act, they said they wanted to start a revolution of the dispossessed.

The diary and school assignments, in particular those of Eric Harris, indicate that he was interested in politics, history, and philosophy to some degree. In particular, Harris expressed his admiration of Adolf Hitler. In his diary, he also mentions philosopher Nietzsche in passing. Researchers have argued that his texts indicate that he may have been influenced also by Thomas Hobbes.[24]

During the last couple of years before the attack, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold had become inseparable friends. The personal background of Harris and Klebold has been a subject of intense debate. The researchers still disagree on various matters. One of these issues is bullying. There are studies that claim that Harris and Klebold were outcasts who were systematically bullied at school and their act was at least partly a revenge on the school community for how they had been treated. As a close friend of Eric Harris, Brooks Brown, stated in a radio interview five years after the incident, “Eric and Dylan were crazy, but it was Columbine that made them that way.”[25] Others deny that bullying would be important for understanding the attack. David Cullen, for example, points out that the writings of Harris “are not the rantings of an angry young man, picked on by jocks until he’s not going to take it anymore. These are the rantings of someone with a messianic-grade superiority complex, out to punish the entire human race for its appalling inferiority.”[26]

There is also disagreement about the mental health of the perpetrators. It is less so for Dylan Klebold, who has been commonly seen as a confused, depressed follower. When it comes to Eric Harris, while there is dispute about the correct diagnosis, it is beyond dispute that by the time of the attack, he was mentally unstable and out of control.[27] This was not evident to everyone—most adults and many of his fellow students thought he was nice and well-mannered. He was a bright student who did well at school and rarely caused any trouble. His writings, online activities, and nightly endeavours, however, reveal another “dramatic, passive-aggressive, vindictive”[28] side of him. He spent a lot of time on his computer and is well known for having been a heavy user of the violent computer game Doom. When Harris had posted a death threat against his schoolmate on his website about one year before the attack, his mother arranged a meeting for him with a psychologist. He told the psychologist that he was feeling angry, depressed, and had suicidal thoughts. A doctor prescribed him SSRI type medication.[29]

Geschwister School Shooting in Emsdetten (Germany, 2006)

On the morning of November 20, 2006, 18-year-old Sebastian Bosse entered his former school in Emsdetten, Germany. He was armed with guns, explosives, and smoke bombs, and wore a suicide-bomber style explosive

belt, a long black coat, and a gas mask. Over 30 people were hurt by gunshots or suffered from asphyxiation. After the shooting, Bosse committed suicide on the school premises.

Before the attack, Bosse (who used the nickname ResistantX online) had uploaded videos and writings to the Internet. Part of this material is in English ("Sometimes I write s**t in English because I want everybody to understand what the hell I am talking about!").[30] All the material has clear visual and textual references to the Columbine shootings.

In his messages, he expresses his deep dissatisfaction with his life and the way the society works. He explicitly states that there are two main reasons for why he committed the massacre: school and politics.[31] These two are clearly interlinked in his communication as he sees the school as part of the larger social system that he opposes.

He tells that his life was good until he went to school at the age of six:

> The only thing that I was taught intensively in school was that I am a loser. For my first years at the GSS,[32] this is even true, I was captivated by consumer lust, I tried hard to make friends, people who do not regard you as a person, but as a status symbol. But then I woke up! I realized that the world as it seemed to me does not exist, that it was an illusion which is essentially produced by the media. More and more I noticed in what kind of world I was. A world in which money rules everything, even in school everything revolved around it. You must have the newest cellphone, the newest clothes and the right "friends." If you do not have one of those, you are not worthy of being noticed. And those people are called jocks. Jocks are all those who think that because of expensive clothes or beautiful girls by their side they outrank others. I hate those people, no, I hate people.
>
> I have experienced in those 18 years of my life that you can become happy only if you bow to the majority, adjust to society. But I could not and did not want to do so. I am free! Nobody is allowed to intervene in my life, and if he does anyway, he has to bear the consequences![33]

This protest against limits and regulations links directly to his personal situation. What seemed to function as the triggering event was that he was scheduled to appear in court because of illegal possession of weapons one day after the incident. Bosse makes direct reference to this in his farewell letter ("No politician has the right to enact legislation that prohibits me to do something. No cop has the right to take my gun away from me, certainly not while carrying his own on his belt.")

Bosse explains himself that he committed the shooting foremost as revenge against all those who had made his life miserable and meaningless. He calls the "normal" life course S.A.A.R.T. (German acronym for school, education, work, retirement, death) and constructs his act as a protest against

this whole system. For him, the current political system is not a democracy or government by the people but a fascist system, and the school is an integral part of this system (elsewhere he draws a parallel between the Hitler youth and school[34]):

> The child sets off on its personal route of socialization, and in the subsequent years, it will be forced to adjust to the general public, the majority. If it refuses, teachers, parents and not least the police will intervene. Compulsory school attendance is whitewashing for coercive education, because you are forced to attend school. If you are forced to do something, you lose part of your freedom. You are forced to pay taxes, you are forced to obey speed limits, you are forced to do this, you are forced to do that. Ergo: No freedom! And this is called popular government. If the people would rule, it would be anarchy![35]

What he wants instead is anarchy, a complete freedom. Immediately after the previous passage, he calls others to action ("WAKE UP AT LAST – TAKE TO THE STREETS – IT HAS WORKED IN GERMANY ONCE BEFORE!"). He also states that he wants to contribute to the revolution of the outcast. In his diary, he wrote that "I hope that other outcasts will be treated better after GSS! And I hope that some of 'em will be like Reb, Vod and Me! A FUCKING HERO!"[36] Committing the rampage shooting was his way to find meaning in his life (he states this explicitly in his farewell letter).

When it comes to the personal background of Sebastian Bosse, we know that his family background is unremarkable. He had some trouble at school and had to retake two classes, but managed to graduate with good grades some months prior to the attack. He had a strong interest in weapons and all things military. He liked to play violent computer games. His peers considered him a somewhat strange loner. There is also some evidence that his parents and relatives were concerned about him to some extent, worrying that there was something wrong with him. He displayed behavioral problems since grade 3 and teachers had recommended that his parents consult with a school psychologist. In June 2004, he sought help in a professional psychological counseling forum, where he wrote about his fear of being bullied and his anger, mentioning also the possibility of a rampage shooting.[37]

Virginia Tech University Shooting in Blacksburg (U.S., 2007)

The shooting at Virginia Tech University on April 16, 2007 has been the bloodiest school rampage shooting so far as it left 32 people dead. The

perpetrator was Seung Hui Cho, a son of a South Korean immigrant family and a current student of the university. From the perpetrators of the shootings in this category, he has the longest and most severe history of documented mental health problems. He was extremely introverted, quiet, suffered from extreme social anxiety and had been treated for depression and suicidal thoughts. He was involuntarily committed to mental health treatment a few months prior to the shooting because he was considered to present an imminent danger to himself and others.[38]

While his mental health problems undoubtedly play a significant role in why he committed his attack, it is equally clear that he wanted to make a statement with his act. On the morning of his attacks, he sent a package to NBC News including pictures of himself, video clips, and a 1,800-word text, described as a "multimedia manifesto."[39] His message is commonly viewed as mostly incomprehensible "rambling diatribe."[40] It is more idiosyncratic than the other manifestos, but it does include an explanation for his act that goes beyond his own situation and has a distinctively political (and religious) flavour to it.[41]

The text is full of resentment and anger. He blames others for "raping his soul" and ruining his life and forcing him to act:

> You had a hundred billion chances and ways to have avoided today, but you decided to spill my blood. You forced me into a corner and gave me only one option. The decision was yours. Now you have blood on your hands that will never wash off, you Apostles of Sin.[42]

He does not consider his suffering as an isolated case, but part of a larger problem. He portrays himself as one of the many weak and defenceless people in society who are abused by a dominating class of sadist hedonists whose desire for more money, profit, and commodities is insatiable and who have never experienced pain. He calls these people lovers of terrorism, Christian Nazis, and many other degrading terms.

He presents himself as one of the weak and defenceless people, an anti-terrorist, who dies "like Jesus Christ, to inspire generations of the Weak and Defenseless people—my Brothers, Sisters, and Children—that you fuck":

> By destroying we create. We create the feelings in you of what it is like to be the victim, what it is like to be fucked and destroyed. Because of your annihilations, we create and raise new breeds of Children who will show you fuckers what you have done to us. Like Easter, it will be a day of rebirth, it will be a start of a revolution of the Children that you fucked. You have never felt a single ounce of pain your whole life, thus, by destroying you, by giving you pain, we attempt to show you responsibilities and meanings of other people's lives.[43]

He explicitly links his act to the Columbine shootings, stating that "[g]eneration after generation, we martyrs, like Eric and Dylan, will sacrifice our lives to fuck you thousand folds for what you Apostles of Sin have done to us."

Jokela High School Shooting in Tuusula (Finland, 2007)

The most elaborate political explanation for a school rampage shooting has been provided by Pekka-Eric Auvinen, the perpetrator of the Jokela High School shooting in 2007. As mentioned at the beginning of this article, he explicitly called his attack a mass murder and political terrorism. He further specified that the target of his attack was "Jokelan Lukio (High School Of Jokela), students and faculty, society, humanity, human race."[44]

To explain his deed, he uploaded a "media kit" to the Internet before his attack. It included several documents, as well as videos and photos bearing close resemblance to the Columbine shooting visual communications. All writings were included both in Finnish and in English.

One of the documents is a three-page Natural Selector's Manifesto in which he explained his view on what was wrong in the world. He picks up many of the themes that are present in the communication of the previous shooters discussed in this section, but he discusses them much more elaborately. He also makes a lot fewer references to his personal situation than the other shooters, making the content of his manifesto in that sense more akin to the manifestos and communiqués of terrorist groups or lone wolf terrorists.

In his view, the process of natural selection had reversed and the human race was devolving. The large majority of people had fallen under the spell of collective de-individualization and are not thinking for themselves. He is one of the few who have woken up and can see through that:

> Majority of people in society are weak-minded and ignorant retards, masses that act like programmed robots and accept voluntarily slavery. But not me! I am self-aware and realize what is going on in society! I have a free mind! And I choose to be free rather than live like a robot or slave. You can say I have a "god complex," sure … then you have a "group complex"! Compared to you retarded masses, I am actually godlike.[45]

Auvinen hoped that his act would inspire others to fight for the revolution and describes his own act as dying for a cause:

> Long live the revolution … revolution against the system, which enslaves not only the majority of weak-minded masses but also the small minority of strong-minded and intelligent individuals! If we want to live in a different world, we must act. We must rise against the enslaving, corrupted and totalitarian regimes and overthrow the tyrants, gangsters and the rule of idiocracy. I can't alone change much but hopefully my actions will inspire all the intelligent people of the world and start some sort of revolution against the current systems. […]
>
> I am ready to die for a cause I know is right, just and true … even if I would lose or the battle would be only remembered as evil. … I will rather fight and die than live a long and unhappy life.[46]

The content of the manifesto demonstrates that Auvinen was familiar with philosophy and political ideology. It is clear that he had read at least Plato and Nietzsche. It is also known that he was interested in Ted "the Unabomber" Kaczynski. Coincidence or not, the day he had chosen to carry out his plan was the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution.

In terms of his personal background, Pekka-Eric Auvinen was in many ways a typical school shooter as depicted in the research literature: he lived in a small town, he had been bullied for years at school, did not have many friends, and suffered from panic attacks and fear of social situations. But unlike other school shooters, Pekka-Eric Auvinen's personal history shows a strong interest in radical politics.

It was well known to people around Auvinen that he had been interested in politics for years. His interest in politics dates back at least to the age of 12 and it went through several phases. According to his mother, he was initially mainly interested in mainstream politics, but around 14–15 years of age, he started to become fascinated with more radical politics and fringe parties (e.g., the Finnish communist party). He considered joining its youth organisation, but did not find the courage to do that. After that, he became interested in North Korea and was in contact with the Finland-Korea association. The North Korea phase was followed by fascination with Nazism. During the year 2007, Auvinen reportedly started to be critical of Hitler and his choice to go after the Jews because he thought they were not the right target. Around this time, he started to talk about violence as a legitimate means of political action. These developments were well known to his fellow students and friends, who became increasingly worried about him.

The evidence suggests that Auvinen started to plan his act in early 2007. Eight months prior to the act, he wrote in his diary that he was "going to

initiate an operation against humanity with the purpose of killing as many people as possible and causing havoc and mayhem around him."[47] He also wrote in his diary that he wanted to make a lasting impact on the world and believed that others would follow his example. He began writing his manifesto six months before the attack. His computer also included photos and information on several terrorist attacks. In a video called "Mass of murders" that he made, several terrorists are mentioned, including Theodore Kaczynski, Eric Rudolph, Franz Fuchs, and Timothy McVeigh, as well as earlier school shooters (Eric Harris, Dylan Klebold, Jeff Weise, Robert Steinhäuser, Seung-Hui Cho, all included in this study).[48]

Around early 2007, Auvinen started to contribute actively on Internet discussions dedicated to the Columbine shootings. He had produced several videos on American school shootings, Hitler, and Finnish radical ecologist Pertti Linkola and made them available on YouTube. His admiration for the American school shootings comes out very clearly also from his diary.

His interest and familiarity with "Columbine" is evident from his act. During the shooting and in many of the photos, he wore a t-shirt with a text "humanity is overrated," quoting the Columbine shooter Eric Harris and imitating Harris and his fellow shooter Dylan Klebold, who had worn shirts with a short written statement during their attack. His videos are stylistically similar to the shooting videos of Harris and Klebold. Included in his media kit is a document listing things that he liked and hated, much like Eric Harris had done in his writings, and he mentioned many of the same bands as Harris and Klebold are known to have admired. Many ideas included in his manifesto are present in some form also in the writings of Harris.

Interim Summary: Emerging Narrative of the Political School Rampage Shootings

Despite their differences, the manifestos and writings of these school shooters share many commonalities. All the latter three overtly political rampage school shootings in 2006–2007 very clearly follow the tradition of the first of them, the Columbine shootings. This goes both for the content of the perpetrators' writings, their visual material as well as the way their attack was conducted. Reading the writings side by side, one can see that they are in essence variations of the same narrative. Their analyses of the prevailing political and social situation and their role in it are in many ways very

similar to each other, all mixing personal and political grievances, which in the perpetrators' mind are closely related to each other.[49]

The perpetrators express angrily their resentment of the way they have been treated, arguing that they were pushed to their act of vengeance ("I did not start this war"). From the description of the personal situation emerges an image of a failed joiner,[50] who tried to fit in but was bullied, teased, and rejected.

At some point, they understood that they did not even want to fit into the majority and live in a world like that. They blame the majority of people for being brainless sheep, following the others without thinking for themselves. They see the media, school, and democratic politics as systems that create and maintain this state of affairs. What they think differentiates themselves from the others is their self-awareness. They understand what is going on and they have developed one step ahead. As a solution for this situation, they demand anarchy and/or that the law of natural selection would be left to take its natural course, allowing the survival of the fittest. They strongly protest against any limitations to their freedom, claiming that they only have the right to decide on their own life.

The shooters stress emphatically that they alone are responsible for their act ("this is my war"), portraying themselves as lone heroes fighting a war against their enemy. Even if they act alone, there is an "us" for them, the outcast, which they hope to inspire with their actions to do something similar and in that way to start a revolution against the majority.

These observations, together with numerous textual, visual, and behavioural references to previous school rampage shootings suggest that indeed while they acted alone, perpetrators of these rampage shootings saw their attack as part of a wider struggle. For them, it was not only about their personal situation, but also about dying for a cause that they felt had wider significance.

Finally, what is noteworthy here is that the ideas and images expressed by these school shooters bear a lot of similarities with the cultural narratives of the U.S. paramilitary culture of the 1980s and 1990s: a lone hyper-masculine hero, starting up the fight against the system.[51]

Columbine-Influenced Shootings

The second category includes shootings that have been clearly influenced by the Columbine shooting. Some of these perpetrators have also left behind visual or textual communication directly related to the shooting, but none of these communications are such politically and socially coloured elaborate explanations as is the case with the shootings in the first category.

This category includes 13 school rampage shootings, spreading over the entire period. Eight of these shootings happened in the U.S., two in Germany, and one in Canada, Finland, and Greece. The perpetrators were 14–27 years old. Five of the perpetrators were 14 or 15 years old. The category thus includes all but two cases in which the perpetrator was 15 years old or younger.

The Columbine influence is evident in these cases in various ways. Several of the perpetrators have participated in the school shooting discussion groups online or collected photos, videos, and writings dealing with the Columbine shooting. They have quoted previous school shootings in their discussions prior to the attack or during the attack (such as “Humanity is overrated,” “Do you believe in God?”). They have imitated the clothing of Harris and Klebold during the shooting by wearing black trench coats or t-shirts with a message. Some of them have left behind photos and videos that bear strong resemblances to those produced by Harris and Klebold. Another common way to connect their act to the Columbine shootings has been to list things that they hate and love in the same style as Harris did in his writings. In these lists, the same cultural products appear over and over again.[52]

A good example of cases included in this category is the Kauhajoki school shooting perpetrated by Matti Saari in 2008. Saari did not leave behind any writings beyond Internet profiles, but he uploaded several videos and photos that are very similar to those of the Columbine shooters and Pekka-Eric Auvinen, who had committed Finland’s first school rampage shooting ten months earlier. He also reportedly expressed his admiration of previous school shooters to his friends. During the last months before the incident, there were also concerns about his mental state among his friends and family.[53]

In some other cases in this category, the perpetrator has had an extensive history of mental health problems. One case in point is Steven Kazmierczak, the perpetrator of the Northern Illinois University shooting in 2008. He had had considerable mental health problems since the age of 16, including

several suicide attempts and hospitalizations. He was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder. In 2002, he started his sociology studies at the university and was a remarkably successful high performance student for a long time. In autumn 2007, his condition started to deteriorate again after a series of losses and changes. Throughout these years, Kazmierczak showed strong interest in mass murders and violent crime, including previous school shootings (such as the Columbine and Virginia Tech shootings) and National Socialism. He did not, however, leave any explanation for his deed, but on the contrary evidently destroyed his computer hard drive completely. On the other hand, during the shooting he did wear a black T-shirt with the word "Terrorist" written on the chest over a picture of an assault rifle.[54]

Besides Columbine, these perpetrators occasionally referred to other school shootings as well. In Kazmierczak's case, he referred at least to the Virginia Tech shooting. The German school shooters have often referred to the Erfurt school shooting in 2002, which was the first post-Columbine school rampage shooting in the country. It is noteworthy that the subsequent school shootings after Columbine do not feature even nearly as prevalently in their case histories or communication as Columbine does. This highlights the role of this particular school shooting as an exemplary action among the school shooters.

In four cases of this category, we have evidence that the perpetrator had at least some level of interest in politics. Robert Steinhäuser, who committed the Erfurt school shooting, showed interest in terrorism.[55] The same goes for another German school shooter, Tim Kretschmer (The Winnenden school shooting in 2009), who had regularly researched the 9/11 attacks.[56] Jeffrey Weise, the perpetrator of the Red Lake school shooting in 2005, was known for his interest in Nazi ideology and Hitler. He wrote some messages to an Internet forum dedicated to these issues one year before the incident. Weise's shooting is also one of the few cases in which the political orientation of the shooters made headlines.[57]

Table 2. Columbine-influenced shootings

Date	Name	Gender	Age	Location	Country	School	Killed/ wounded	Suicide
April 28, 1999	Todd Cameron Smith	Male	14	Taber, Alberta	Canada	W. R. Myers High School	1/1	No
May 20, 1999	T. J. Solomon	Male	15	Conyers, GA	U.S.	Heritage School	0/6	No
December 6, 1999	Seth Trickey	Male	13	Ft. Gibson, OK	U.S.	Fort Gibson Middle School	0/4	No
March 5, 2001	Charles Andrew Williams	Male	15	Santee, CA	U.S.	Santana High School	2/13	No
April 26, 2002	Robert Steinhäuser	Male	19	Erfurt	Germany	Johann Gutenberg High School	16/7	Yes
February 9, 2004	Jon William Romano	Male	16	East Greenbush, NY	U.S.	Columbia High School	0/1	No
March 21, 2005	Jeffrey Weise	Male	16	Red Lake, MN	U.S.	Red Lake Senior High School	9/7	Yes
March 14, 2006	James Scott Newman	Male	14	Reno, NV	U.S.	Pine Middle School	0/2	No
August 30, 2006	Alvaro Rafael Castillo	Male	18	Hillsborough, NC	U.S.	Orange High School	0/2	No
February 14, 2008	Stephen P. Kazmierczak	Male	27	DeKalb, IL	U.S.	Northern Illinois University	5/18	Yes
September 23, 2008	Matti Saari	Male	22	Kauhajoki	Finland	Kauhajoki Polytechnic School	10/1	Yes
April 10, 2009	Dimitris Patmanidis	Male	19	Athens	Greece	OAED Vocational College	0/3	Yes
March 11, 2009	Tim Kretschmer	Male	17	Winnenden	Germany	Albertville-Realschule	15/11	Yes

Table 3. Isolated shootings

Date	Name	Gender	Age	Location	Country	School	Killed/ wounded	Suicide
November 19, 1999	Victor Cordova Jr.	Male	13	Deming, NM	U.S.	Deming Middle School	0/1	No
March 22, 2001	Jason Hoffman	Male	18	El Cajon, CA	U.S.	Granite Hills High School	0/5	No
January 16, 2002	Peter Odighizuwa	Male	46	Grundy, VA	U.S.	Appalachian School of Law	3/3	No
February 19, 2002	Adam Labus	Male	22	Freising	Germany	Economics School	3/1	Yes
April 29, 2002	Dragoslav Petkovic	Male	17	Vlasenica	Bosnia	Vlasenica High School	1/1	Yes
May 9, 2003	Biswanath Halder	Male	62	Cleveland, OH	U.S.	Case Western Reserve University	1/2	No
July 2, 2003	Florian K.	Male	16	Coburg	Germany	Realschule II	0/1	Yes
October 10, 2007	Asa H. Coon	Male	14	Cleveland, OH	U.S.	Success Academy	0/4	Yes
February 8, 2008	Latina Williams	Female	23	Baton Rouge, LA	U.S.	Louisiana Technical College	2/0	Yes
April 26, 2009	Odane Greg Maye	Male	18	Hampton, VA	U.S.	Hampton University	0/2	No
November 26, 2009	Ákos Gere	Male	23	Pécs	Hungary	University of Pécs	1/3	No

Isolated Shootings

This last category includes cases that meet the definition of a school rampage shooting but do not include any references to the Columbine shooting and are not accompanied by an extensive political explanation. I have named the category as “isolated shootings” because there are no similar links to previous school rampage shootings as in all cases included in the previous two categories. Since there was very little information available on some of these cases, it is not impossible that there might have been Columbine references in some of these cases that were not reported in any of the sources that I was able to find. The category includes the only case in which the perpetrator was a female, as well as both cases in which the shooter was over 27 years old.

Most of the shootings are closely linked to the perpetrator’s personal situation. Some of them bear a trademark of targeted vendetta that has gone awry and led to other casualties. In one case, that of Odane Greg Maye (the perpetrator of the Hampton University shooting in 2009), we know that the perpetrator went to his former school with the intention of creating a no-way-out situation that would give him enough courage to commit suicide.[58]

Even if none of these perpetrators left behind political manifestos, not all shootings in this category, however, are completely devoid of political flavour. The case in point is the school shooting in Freising, Germany in 2002, perpetrated by Adam Labus. We know that Labus had been influenced by militarism and National Socialism. Despite his interest in politics, political motivation was ruled out by the police.[59] Labus is in fact not the only school shooter in this study who had dreamed (and tried) to become a soldier or mercenary, but had failed to make that happen.

Conclusion

This article set out to analyse the political elements in school rampage shootings. The first thing that the analysis makes evident is that the majority of school rampage shootings included in this study do not have explicit political elements. Even within the relatively homogeneous category of school rampage shootings, there are a lot of differences between the cases. Some of them have signs of political motivation, or at least politically coloured communication, while in other cases, there is little to support any

claims about political motivation. None of the school rampage shooters had been politically active prior to the shooting and only a minority had showed any interest in politics.

On the other hand, in four of these school rampage shootings, the perpetrators provided an explanation for their act that had undeniably political content. What should we think about this? Should we consider them as political acts?

One possible argument against interpreting these school shootings as political acts is that even if the school shooters explain their act in political or ideological terms, we should not really let ourselves be fooled by that. Their real motivation is not political anyway, but derives from the personal problems of the shooter. The political rantings are a mere topping and an attempt to legitimate their violent acts.[60]

A second way to view the political elements is to place them in the context of the perpetrators' other interests. It is not always clear whether the shooters' fascination with politics is more based on the content of ideologies and agenda, or rather their violent and spectacular manifestations. Several school shooters have been fascinated with mass murders, violent crime, and previous school rampage shootings. Their fascination with terrorist attacks and totalitarian regimes can also be seen in this light. For example, one can legitimately ask whether the fascination with Adolf Hitler should be read as support for Nazism. Ralph Larkin, for example, has suggested that Harris's fascination with Hitler "seems to derive from Hitler's ability to exterminate anyone who did not conform to his image of the world."[61]

These same questions are also discussed by Ramón Spaaij in his study on lone wolf terrorism. His case studies suggest that, also in the case of lone wolf terrorism, it is very typical that the perpetrators mix political ideologies and personal grievances. In one third of the cases included in his chronology, the ideological source remained unclear. This suggests that the political and ideological component in lone wolf terrorism is not always very distinct. In the words of Spaaij, "boundaries of lone wolf terrorism are inevitably fuzzy."[62] When there is no conclusive evidence, there seems to be a tendency in terrorism studies to classify acts still as terrorism if targeting, timing, or interpretations of the act in the public debate hint in that direction. The question of the mental health of the perpetrators and its significance in terms of understanding the violent acts is also a topic of discussion. There is some tentative evidence suggesting that mental health problems may be

more common among lone wolf terrorists than members of terrorist groups.[63]

How to view the school rampage shootings in the first category is thus closely linked with the question of how to deal with the criteria of political motivation in the case of lone wolf terrorism. The literature on terrorism does not have a lot to say about how to apply the definitional criteria that the attack has to be politically (or religiously) motivated. The criterion is evidently there in many definitions in order to distinguish terrorism from criminal and psychotic violence. Alex Schmid's discussion on the matter in the *Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* is tellingly vague and ends up with the statement that "'political' is an element that ought to be included in a definition of terrorism, but non-political terrorism should not be totally ruled out."[64] Determining whether this criterion is met has been somewhat easier in the case of group-based terrorism: if the attack is perpetrated by an organization that is known to have political objectives, the criterion is met. It needs to be discussed more carefully how to evaluate the nature of the attack in the case of lone operators. As the group context is often much more vague or even non-existent, the question is at least partially transferred to the realm of analyzing motivations of an individual which makes the evaluation much harder.

Besides the first category of shootings, also the second category, the Columbine-inspired shootings without explicit political communication, are interesting in this context. One possible reading of these cases is that they are copycat crimes[65] or suicides with a "cool factor," but there is another way to look at them that seems worth consideration. Even though the perpetrators have not explained their deeds politically, the references to Columbine may indicate that the perpetrator wanted his act to be placed in the larger context described in the Columbine shooters' communication. Besides providing an example of how to conduct a spectacular school shooting, "Columbine" as a reference point seems to have created a sense of tradition, continuity, and imagined community among these school shooters and their admirers.[66] While the question remains whether these shootings can be considered as political, the *de facto* dynamics and shape of this Columbine phenomenon are not necessary worlds apart from what is usually referred to as leaderless resistance.

Whatever we may think about the boundaries and linkages between school rampage shootings and lone wolf terrorism, the way the school shooters have

used the term illustrates the cultural significance and connotations of the term “terrorism.” That Auvinen labeled his act as political terrorism shows what kind of a status the word terrorism has acquired in today’s world, even in Finland where there has been hardly any terrorism to speak of since the Second World War. For people like Pekka-Eric Auvinen, terrorism does not appear to be a pejorative label, but rather a badge of credibility and worthiness, denoting a higher purpose, not unlike for the anarchists in the late 19th century, who used the term terrorism to separate themselves from ordinary criminals.

Acknowledgments

The author wishes to thank Caroline Werner for her valuable research assistance.

Notes

1. Pekka-Eric Auvinen, “Attack information.” This document and other writings included in his media kit are available at http://www.schoolshooters.info/PL/Original_Documents_files/Pekka-Eric%20Auvinen%20Online.pdf.

2. See, e.g., Katherine Newman, David J. Harding, Jal Mehta, and Wendy Roth, *Rampage: The Social Roots of School Shootings* (New York: Basic Books, 2004); Jonathan Fast, *Ceremonial Violence: Understanding Columbine and Other School Rampage Shootings* (New York: Overlook Press, 2008); Peter Langman, *Why Kids Kill: Inside the Minds of School Shooters* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Glenn W. Muschert, “Research in School Shootings,” *Sociology Compass* 1, no. 1 (2007): 60–80; and two early influential studies: Mary Ellen O’Toole, *The School Shooter: A Threat Assessment Perspective* (Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1999); and Bryan Vossekuil, Robert A. Fein, Marisa Reddy, Randy Borum, and William Modzeleski, *The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attack in the United States* (Washington, DC: U.S. Secret Service and U.S. Department of Education, 2004). Whether the theories and approaches for explaining school rampage shootings may be applicable to some cases of lone-wolf terrorism as well is discussed in Leena Malkki, “School Shootings and Lone-Wolf Terrorism,” in Michael Fredholm, ed., *Lone Wolf Terrorism: Past Experience, Future Outlook, and Response Strategies* (forthcoming).

3. See e.g., Benjamin Frymer, “The Media Spectacle of Columbine: Alienated Youth as an Object of Fear,” *American Behavioral Scientist* 52, no. 10 (2009): 1387–1404; Glenn W. Muschert, “The Columbine Victims and the Myth of the Juvenile Superpredator,” *Youth, Violence and Juvenile Justice* 5, no. 4 (2007): 351–366; Leena Malkki, “Suomessa Ei Ole Terrorismia, Koska “Suomessa Ei Ole Terrorismia”? 2000-Luvun Väkivallanteot ja Tulkintojen Merkitys” [There Is No Terrorism In Finland Because “There Is No Terrorism in Finland”? The Interpretation of Violent Incidents in the 2000s),” in Anssi Kullberg, ed., *Suomi–Terrorismi–Supo* (Helsinki: WSOY, 2011), 204–224.

4. E.g., Ramón Spaaij explicitly states that the Virginia Tech Shooting was not a terrorist attack even if it is sometimes erroneously labelled as such (Ramón Spaaij, *Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism: Global Patterns, Motivations and Prevention* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012), 11–12. One of the few contributions in which school shootings and terrorism are discussed together is Adam

Lankford and Nayab Hakim, "From Columbine to Palestine: A Comparative Analysis of Rampage Shooters in the United States and Volunteer Suicide Bombers in the Middle East," *Aggression and Violent Behavior* 16, no. 2 (2011): 98–107. They suggest that the differences between the American rampage school shooters and volunteer suicide bombers in the Middle East are more cultural and contextual in nature and that when it comes to underlying psychology and motivation, they are quite similar. See also Adam Lankford, "A Comparative Analysis of Suicide Terrorists and Rampage, Workplace, and School Shooters in the United States from 1990 to 2010," *Homicide Studies* 17, no. 3 (2012): 255–274.

5. For a typology of school shootings, see e.g., Muschert, "Research in School Shootings" (see note 2 above).

6. Some definitions also include shootings perpetrated by current or former employees of the school (e.g., Muschert, "Research in School Shootings" (see note 2 above)). This article is limited to the shootings perpetrated by former/current students only.

7. Newman et al., *Rampage: The Social Roots of School Shootings* (see note 2 above), 14.

8. Lépine's suicide note is available online at www.schoolshooters.info. See also, e.g., Katherine Ramsland, *Marc Lépine's Gendercide: The Montreal Massacre*, http://www.trutv.com/library/crime/notorious_murders/mass/marc_lepine/8.html.

9. Ralph W. Larkin, "The Columbine Legacy: Rampage Shootings as Political Acts," *American Behavioral Scientist* 52, no. 9 (2009): 1309–1326.

10. These chronologies include, e.g., Jessie Klein, *The Bully Society: School Shootings and the Crisis of Bullying in America's Schools* (New York and London: New York University Press, 2012); the school shooting data for Klein's book on http://jessieklein.com/images/resources/resources-dataonschoolshootings.pdf; Brian Van Brunt, *Ending Campus Violence: New Approaches to Prevention* (New York and London: Routledge, 2012); Herbert Scheithauer and Rebecca Bondü, *Amoklauf und School Shooting: Bedeutung, Hintergründe und Prävention* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011); Newman et al., *Rampage: The Social Roots of School Shootings* (see note 2 above); the Wikipedia lists on http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/School_shooting and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_school_shootings_in_the_United_States.

11. Larkin, "The Columbine Legacy" (see note 9 above), 1310. This means that all targeted shootings and shootings related to personal feuds and gang violence were excluded. Drawing the line is admittedly at times hard, because there is not always much evidence available on the motives and intentions of the shooter. All failed attempts or foiled plans were also excluded.

12. The excluded cases are the Vaestermalms High School incident in Sundsvall, Sweden in November 2001, which was a stabbing and not a shooting (his list was limited to shootings only, as is mine) and the Dawson College shooting in Montreal, Canada where the shooter was not a current or a former student of that institution.

13. Spaaij, *Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism* (see note 4 above), 20.

14. For a wider picture on school shootings and violence, see, e.g., Jessie Klein's school shooting data for 1979–2011, http://jessieklein.com/images/resources/resources-dataonschoolshootings.pdf.

15. Spaaij, *Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism* (see note 4 above), 110–116.

16. E.g., shooting at Oikos University in Oakland, U.S. on April 2, 2012 (Matthias Gafni, Thomas Peele, Joshua Melvin, and Matt Krupnick, "Oakland University Shooting: Accused Oikos University Shooter One Goh Was 'Troubled,' 'Angry,' Said those Who Knew Him," *Oakland Tribune*, April 3, 2012) and the Sandy Hook elementary school shooting in Newtown, U.S. on December 14, 2012 (N. R. Kleinfield, Ray Rivera anad Serge F. Kovaleski, "Newtown's Killer's Obsession, in Chilling Detail," *New York Times*, March 28, 2013).

17. "Student Shoots 3 in Greek College, Kills Himself," *Guardian*, April 10, 2009.

18. Here, especially the following article is helpful: Nancy Gibbs and Timothy Roche, "The Columbine Tapes," *Time*, December 20, 1999.

19. Harris ponders in his diary, "I wonder if anyone will write a book on me. Sure is a ton of symbolism, double meaning, themes, appearance vs reality shit going on here. Oh well, it better be

fuckin good if it is written.".

20. Gibbs and Roche, "The Columbine Tapes" (see note 18 above).

21. Ralph W. Larkin, *Comprehending Columbine* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2007), 153–154.

22. This point has been made forcibly by, e.g., Dave Cullen. See Dave Cullen, "The Depressive and the Psychopath: At Last We Know Why the Columbine Killers Did It," *Slate*, April 20, 2004, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/assessment/2004/04/the_depressive_and_the_psychopath.html.

23. Harris' diary is available transcribed at acolumbinesite.com/eric/writing/journal/journal.html.

24. Peter Langman, *Influences on the Ideology of Eric Harris*, http://www.schoolshooters.info/PL/Articles_files/Influences%20on%20the%20Ideology%20of%20Eric%20Harris%201.1.pdf.

25. Quote from Larkin, *Comprehending Columbine* (see note 21 above), 154.

26. Cullen (see note 22 above).

27. See, e.g., Larkin, *Comprehending Columbine* (see note 21 above), 126. Some months before the shooting, he was diagnosed with obsessive-compulsive disorder. This diagnosis has been disputed after the incident, e.g., by a FBI profiler who claims he was a psychopath. This is the conclusion also in Dave Cullen, *Columbine* (Tiverton: Old Street Publishing, 2009). See also Langman, *Why Kids Kill* (see note 2 above) and Fast, *Ceremonial Violence* (see note 2 above).

28. Fast, *Ceremonial Violence* (see note 2 above), 183.

29. Ibid., 192.

30. Sebastian Bosse's diary, November 17, 2006, http://staydifferent.st.ohost.de/diary.

31. Quote from his farewell video message: "There are two main reasons for that massacre: First reason, school, teachers, students, everything in the fucking building. Second, the politics. I want anarchy." The video is available online at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7ZrAiQMzkDY&feature=related.

32. The abbreviation refers to his school, Geschwister-Scholl-Schule.

33. Sebastian Bosse's farewell letter (written in German), http://www.n-tv.de/politik/dossier/abschiedsbrief-article199956.html.

34. Sebastian Bosse's diary, September 18, 2006.

35. Sebastian Bosse's farewell letter.

36. Sebastian Bosse's diary, November 19, 2006. Reb(el) and VoD(Ka) are nicknames that Harris and Klebold used of themselves. Elsewhere in his diary (September 26, 2006), he writes that "it is alarming how similar Eric was to me. Sometimes it seems to me as if I lived his life again, as if everything repeated itself. I am not a copy of REB, VoDKA, Steini, Gill, Kinkel, Weise or anyone else! I am the further development of REB! I learned from his mistakes, the bombs. I learned from his entire life." The other persons he lists are all previous school shooters.

37. Speech by the Minister of the Interior of North-Rhine Westphalia in the Committee on Internal Affairs of the federal state parliament, December 14, 2006, http://www.mik.nrw.de/presse-mediathek/aktuelle-meldungen/archiv/archiv-meldungen-im-detail/news/rede-von-innenminister-dr-ingo-wolf-in-der-sitzung-des-innenausschusses-des-landtags-nrw-am-1412.html; Armin Lehmann, "Die Gesichter des Jungen B.," *Tagesspiegel*, November 25, 2006, http://www.tagesspiegel.de/zeitung/die-gesichter-des-jungen-b-/778516.html.

38. Seung Hui Cho's personal history and mental health are described in detail in *Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech April 16, 2007. Report of the Review Panel. Presented to Governor Kaine, Commonweath of Virginia* (2007), 21–53. Available online at http://www.governor.virginia.gov/tempcontent/techpanelreport-docs/fullreport.pdf.

39. The text is available, e.g., on Peter Langman's internet site: http://www.schoolshooters.info/PL/Original_Documents_files/Cho%20manifesto.pdf.

40. This term was used to describe his text in the report of the review panel.

41. Edward J. Carvalho sees evidence in his manifesto suggesting "that Seung-Hui had a sophisticated understanding of 'culture jamming'" (p. 411) and reads his text as "designed to strike at the nerve center of Western sensibilities" (p. 421). Erik J. Carvalho, "The Poetics of a School Shooter: Decoding Political Signification in Cho Seung'Hui's Multimedia Manifesto," *Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies* 32 (2010): 403–430. While one can question how much of this was intentional, I share Carvalho's argument that it would be mistaken to label the text as "devoid of political significance" (p. 404). See also Douglas Kellner, *Guys and Guns Amok: Domestic Terrorism and School Shootings from the Oklahoma City Bombing to the Virginia Tech Massacre* (Boulder and London: Paradigm Publishers, 2008). He makes a similar point about how the political references of his manifesto have been largely ignored.

42. Seung Hui Cho's multimedia manifesto, available online at http://www.schoolshooters.info/PL/Original_Documents_files/Cho%20manifesto.pdf.

43. Ibid.

44. Pekka-Eric Auvinen, "Attack information." This document and other writings included in his media kit are available at http://www.schoolshooters.info/PL/Original_Documents_files/Pekka-Eric%20Auvinen%20Online.pdf.

45. Pekka-Eric Auvinen, "Natural Selector's Manifesto," available online e.g. at http://www.schoolshooters.info/PL/Original_Documents_files/Pekka-Eric%20Auvinen%20Online.pdf.

46. Ibid.

47. The quote is from the official report on the Jokela school shooting which is available also in English: Ministry of Justice, *Jokela School Shooting on 7 November 2007: Report of the Investigation Commission* (Helsinki: Ministry of Justice, 2009), 1, 17. The description of Auvinen's background and planning of his attack draws from this report, as well as the police investigation records on the Jokela school shooting (National Bureau of Investigation, 2008). The investigation material includes summaries of interviews with Auvinen's mother, his friends, fellow students, teachers, and other participants in the Internet forums frequented by him. Auvinen's background is also discussed elaborately in Atte Oksanen, Johanna Nurmi, Miika Vuori, and Pekka Räsänen, "Jokela: The Social Roots of a School Shooting Tragedy in Finland," in Nils Böckler, Thorsten Seeger, Peter Sitzer and Wilhelm Heitmeyer, eds., *School Shootings: International Research, Case Studies and Concepts of Prevention* (New York: Springer, 2012).

48. Oksanen et al., "Jokela: The Social Roots of a School Shooting Tragedy in Finland" (see note 47 above).

49. The similarities in the communication of school shooters is also pointed out, e.g., in Nils Böckler and Thorsten Seeger, *Schulamokläufer: Eine Analyse Medialer Täter-Eigendarstellungen und Deren Aneignung Durch Jugendliche Rezipienten* (Weinheim and München: Juventa, 2009).

50. See Katherine Newman and Cybelle Fox, "Repeat Tragedy: Rampage Shootings in American High School and College Settings, 2002–2008," *American Behavioral Scientist* 52, no. 9 (2009): 1286–1308. Newman and Fox claim that the high school shooters are typically failed joiners, while the college shooters are closer to the ideal type of a loner. Seung Hui Cho, the only college shooter in this category, was in reality very much a loner, but the narrative in his manifesto is in any case one of a failed joiner.

51. See, e.g., Kellner, *Guys and Guns Amok* (see note 41 above); Jessie Klein, *The Bully Society* (see note 10 above), Ralph W. Larkin, "Columbine: The School Shooting as a Postmodern Phenomenon," in Michael Flynn and David C. Brotherton, eds., *Globalising the Streets: Crosscultural Perspectives on Youth, Social Control and Empowerment* (Columbia University Press, 2008), 203–215.

52. The favourite bands that are often mentioned include, e.g., KMFDM, Rammstein, and Nine Inch Nails, video games Doom and Counterstrike, and movies *Natural Born Killers* and *Bowling for Columbine*. For an analysis of music and school shooting subculture, see Tomi Kiilakoski and Atte

Oksanen, “Soundtrack for the School Shootings: Cultural Script, Music and Male Rage,” *Young* 19, no. 3 (2011): 247–269.

53. On the Kauhajoki school shooting and Matti Saari’s background, see Ministry of Justice, *Kauhajoki School Shooting on 23 September 2008: Report of the Investigation Commission, Reports and Guidelines 10* (Helsinki: Ministry of Justice, 2010).

54. Steven Kazmierczak’s background and shooting are described in detail in a report commissioned by the Northern Illinois University (*Report of the February 14, 2008 Shootings at Northern Illinois University*, http://www.niu.edu/feb14report/Feb14report.pdf).

55. Karl-Heinz Gasser, Malte Creutzfeldt, Markus Näher, Rudolf Rainer, and Peter Wickler, *Bericht der Kommission Gutenberg-Gymnasium* (Erfurt, 2004), 26, http://www.thueringen.de/imperia/md/content/text/justiz/bericht_der_kommission_gutenberg_gymnasium.pdf.

56. Simone von Kaiser, “So Eine Wutt, so Eine Hass,” *Der Spiegel*, September 14, 2009.

57. E.g., J. Bone, “‘Nazi’ Student Calling Himself Angel of Death Shoots Nine Dead in Rampage at Red Lake,” *The Times*, March 23, 2005. Weise’s online communication is available at http://www.schoolshooters.info/PL/Original_Documents.html.

58. Peter Dujarin, “Former Student Gets 14 Years in Shooting,” *Daily Press*, November 11, 2009, http://articles.dailypress.com/2009-11-11/news/0911100086_1_maye-mental-illnesses-shooting.

59. Klaus von Brinkbäumer, Conny Neumann, Sven Röbel, and Andreas Ulrich, “Die Rache des Kleinen Rambo,” *Der Spiegel*, February 25, 2002.

60. Most of the school shooting literature appears to lean towards this explanation. See, e.g., Rebecca Bondü, *School Shootings in Deutschland: Internationaler Vergleich, Warnsignale, Risikofaktoren, Entwicklungsverläufe*. Inauguraldissertation zur Erlangung des Grades eines Doktors der Philosophie, Freien Universität Berlin (Berlin, 2012).

61. Larkin, *Comprehending Columbine* (see note 21 above), 136.

62. Spaaij, *Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism* (see note 4 above), 19–20.

63. Ibid., 49–50. See also Christopher Hewitt, *Understanding Terrorism in America: From the Klan to al Qaeda* (New York: Routledge 2003); Rafael Pantucci, *A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of Lone Islamist Terrorist* (London: ISCR, 2011), http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/1302002992ICSRPaper_ATypologyofLoneWolves_Pantucci.pdf. It is also good to bear in mind that it is very difficult to form credible post hoc evaluations of mental health. It is an open question whether the lack of diagnosis reflects the lack of mental illness or rather that the mentally troubled youth has not gotten proper help (Christopher Ferguson, Mark Coulson, and Jane Barnett, “Psychological Profiles of School Shooters: Positive Directions and One Big Wrong Turn,” *Journal of Police Crisis Negotiations* 11 (2011): 1–17).

64. Alex P. Schmid, ed., *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* (London: Routledge, 2011), 78.

65. For an interpretation of the school shootings as a copycat phenomenon that is powered by the media, see Loren Coleman, *The Copycat Effect: How the Media and Popular Culture Trigger the Mayhem in Tomorrow’s Headlines* (New York: Paraview Pocket Books, 2004).

66. On the online school shooting communication and fan clubs, see Nathalie E. Paton, “Media Participation of School Shooters and Their Fans: Navigating Between Self-Distinction and Imitation to Achieve Individuation,” in Glenn W. Muschert and Johanna Sumiala, eds., *School Shootings: Mediatized Violence in a Global Age*. Studies in Media and Communications, vol. 7 (Bingley: Emerald Books, 2012), 203–229.

Lone Wolf Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Examination of Capabilities and Countermeasures

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Today, the specters of lone wolves and autonomous cells acquiring and using chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons of mass destruction, whether in their traditional military forms or the more non-traditional industrial forms, seems less far-fetched. Fortunately, military CBRN agents and weapons are not normally accessible to lone wolves or autonomous cells and are often located in highly secured areas. Therefore, lone wolves and autonomous cells may be drawn to materials similar to CBRN located in less secure areas. These commonplace industrial chemicals, biological contaminants, and radioactive materials could be used to cause disruptions or mass casualties. The dual use nature of these materials and technologies enables them to be turned into weapons and delivered by nonmilitary means. Future "over-the-horizon" threats, such as the proliferation of new biotechnologies and amateur do-it-yourself capabilities, pose a risk that lone wolves could develop weapons at a time when travel, access to knowledge, and dual-use technologies, in the globalizing environment, make lone wolf terrorists more dangerous. Thus, the author explores existing countermeasures, such as laws, strategies, passive and active measures designed to stop these dangerous threats. In particular, capabilities to prevent, protect, respond, and recover from CBRN terrorist acts are examined.

Introduction

> *To a greater degree than at any point in history, individuals and small groups—from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) on the one hand, to criminal networks and terrorist organizations on the other—have the ability to engage the world with far-reaching effects, including those that are disruptive and destructive.*
>
> —Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report[1]

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In 1995, two incidents raised the specter of post-modern terrorism. First, on March 20, 1995, members of a nihilistic but well-financed cult—Aum Shinrikyo—released sarin gas in the Tokyo subway, killing nine persons and injuring many others. Just weeks later, a disgruntled U.S. Army veteran—Timothy McVeigh—destroyed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 persons. These two events prompted governments to take the issue of terrorism more seriously. For instance, the Anti-Terrorism Law of 1996 increased penalties for terrorism. Around this same time, then President Bill Clinton read Richard Preston's novel *Cobra Event*, about a rogue scientist who genetically engineered a bio terror agent. Suddenly, there was greater awareness of the potential threat posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD).[2] As the new century approached, the specter of terrorists employing WMD seemed less and less far-fetched. By the late 1990s, nihilistic and apocalyptic individuals wanting to create or help others create mayhem were emerging. People who only years earlier would have been excluded from the WMD club were now making headlines as potential terrorists with these capabilities.

This article examines the kinds of WMD attacks lone wolves and autonomous cells could conduct and some of the countermeasures that might be used to stop them. To understand what WMD are in the purview of lone wolves, we must first define what WMD are in the current military arsenals. However, because chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agents and weapons are normally located in highly secured areas, lone wolves and autonomous cells may be drawn to materials similar to CBRN that are often located in less secure areas. These variations of CBRN available to lone wolf terrorists will also be discussed. This article will also examine some "over-the-horizon" future threats that must be anticipated in a globalizing environment in which travel, access to knowledge, and dual-use technologies make lone wolf terrorists more dangerous. Finally, some countermeasures will be explored with a final analysis and recommendations.

WMD Defined and Traditional Classification

Currently, there is no widely accepted definition of the term “WMD,” even though it has been around for over 30 years.[3] Weapons of mass destruction can be generally defined as any military grade chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons capable of creating large-scale destruction against people, infrastructures, and property.[4] These kinds of “military grade” weapons are not normally accessible to lone wolves or autonomous cells. However, there are non-military CBRN materials available that fall into a more specific Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) definition of WMD. These are any materials that can be turned into weapons that disseminate or use explosives, poisonous chemicals and their precursors, any biological agent or toxins, and any radiation or radioactivity at levels dangerous to human life.[5] Historically, WMD were the province of nation states, and required vast amounts of resources, manpower, materials, and facilities to procure and weaponize these agents. During the Cold War, the United States and Russia had extensive nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs.

The first nuclear bomb was detonated on July 16, 1945 at Trinity Site in New Mexico, the culmination of the Manhattan Project. Since that morning, the world has been under the threat of nuclear calamity. Developing nuclear weapons is a demanding process that is monitored by various international agencies. The radioactive materials used for these weapons are uranium-235 (U-235) and plutonium-239 (P-239), which are products of the nuclear energy enrichment process. To date, nuclear weapons are confined to nation state programs; however, the proliferation of nuclear weapon technologies continues to be a threat. Terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons is still difficult, as the United States and other nations have made efforts to stop the spread of the technology.[6] Pilfering modern nuclear weapons is also difficult due to the extreme amount of security at nuclear weapons sites. For now, a nuclear weapon in the hands of a lone wolf terrorist or autonomous cell is a low threat.

Chemical agents, in their most basic forms, are within the realm of the lone wolf terrorist. Although not easy to make, the technology, industrial processes, and information to build them have been on the open market for years. There are five categories of military grade chemical agents: nerve, blister, choking, cyanides (blood), and incapacitants. Their names reveal how they physiologically affect the body. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union had large stockpiles of chemical weapons

which today are being destroyed to fulfill their Chemical Warfare Convention (CWC)[7] treaty obligations. Recent events in Syria's ongoing civil unrest have raised global concerns that Bashar al-Assad's regime has used a chemical weapon—Sarin nerve agent—against its own people,[8] a haunting reminder of Saddam Hussein's use of chemical weapons against his Kurdish populations. There is also growing concern about where these WMD weapons will go if the Syrian regime collapses. Could they end up in terrorist hands? The Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo successfully produced a low quality sarin nerve agent for their 1995 attack in Tokyo, Japan. They placed five plastic bags, to be punctured by a sharp point, on five subway trains that all intersected at a specified target. Fortunately, the crudity of these weapons limited their effectiveness, but the lesson for lone wolves is how the attack created a wave of fear.

The use of diseases as weapons has been around since wars began. However, by the 20th century countries began developing modern biological weapons using bacterias, viruses, and toxins. Bacteriological agents such as Anthrax (*Bacillus anthracis*), Bubonic Plague (*Yersinia pestis)*,[9] Tularemia (rabbit fever),[10] and Q Fever (a disease communicable from animals to humans) could be used as terrorist weapons.[11] Viruses most likely to be used in bioterrorism are smallpox, Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis, and Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers.[12] Toxins are harmful substances produced by living organisms (animal, plants, and microbes) and are generally more toxic than chemical agents.[13] However, they are less ideal for causing mass casualties. There are four categories of toxins: Botulinum, Staphylococcal Enterotoxin, Ricin, and Mycotoxins. Aum Shinrikyo's biological program worked with diseases such as anthrax, botulinum toxin, Q fever, and went as far as Africa—a failed attempt—to obtain the deadly Ebola virus.[14] These agents were used unsuccessfully in ten attacks,[15] demonstrating the difficulty in making such weapons. In the early 1980s, another biological attack was carried out by the Rajneeshee cult in Oregon. They were able to use their medical laboratory to acquire the salmonella bacterium that causes food poisoning to make a weapon. The Rajneeshee cult secretly field tested their bacterium at local restaurants. Over 751 people were recorded sick and admitted to local medical facilities.[16] While Aum and the Rajneeshee's attempts to make biological

agents were both costly and resource intensive they did, however, demonstrate what could be done by a group.

WMD Variations

With the difficulty in obtaining or making a military grade WMD, lone wolves and autonomous cells may look elsewhere and be attracted to hazardous materials to replicate traditional WMD weapon's affects. The dual use nature of these materials enables them to be turned into weapons and delivered by nonmilitary means. Common sprayers, public and private transportation modes, and a host of other technical devices could become delivery platforms for improvised weapons.[17]

Since chemical weapons are difficult to procure, a lone wolf might instead have greater success with industrial chemicals such as poisonous gases, flammable liquids, infectious organisms, and radioactive substances.[18] These hazardous industrial chemicals are problematic because they are transported in ways that expose them to possible sabotage that may result in destruction. They are often transported by railroad tanker cars and specially designed road trailers. Some are also transported through millions of miles of underground pipelines.[19] Any intentional act of terror could, in a worst case, replicate the 1984 Bhopal, India incident, in which the accidental release of the highly toxic chemical methyl isocyanate gas killed thousands. More recently, during the Iraq conflict, insurgents were using chlorine chemicals attached to bombs to create fear and death.[20]

An examination of accidents involving chemical carrying railcars could be very instructive to a would-be lone wolf terrorist. For example, a 2005 train accident in Graniteville, South Carolina, released approximately 60 tons of liquefied chlorine gas from several tanker cars. It cost the lives of nine people, forced the evacuation of 5,400 people, and led to 550 seeking treatment.[21] The cause? Someone forgot to toggle the switch to disconnect a spur from the main line, thus mistakenly diverting one freight train into a parked train.[22]

The biological approach also seems to be of interest to lone individuals. In 1995, Larry Wayne Harris—a self-proclaimed microbiologist—ordered three vials of *Yersinia pestis* (plague) from the American Type Culture Collection.[23] Suspicious federal authorities investigated him but could not

charge him since it was not a crime to have the agent at the time. However, since he misrepresented himself, he was charged with mail fraud.[24] Three years later in 1998, Harris was in the news again. This time he was arrested in Las Vegas for what officials thought was lethal "military grade anthrax," but instead it was a nonlethal veterinary vaccine strain.[25] In October 2001, four letters containing high grade anthrax powders were mailed through the United States Postal System. Passing through associated sorting facilities, they ended up at Senate offices in Washington, DC and news agencies in New York City and Florida. This attack killed five people and sickened 22. Occurring on the heels of 9–11, Al-Qaeda was first suspected; however, as the anthrax agent was examined, evidence suggested a homegrown source for this attack, possibly a microbiologist at a military laboratory. In 2008, the FBI identified Dr. Bruce Ivins, a research scientist at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) at Fort Detrick, as the individual who had sent the letters. Before being arrested, he overdosed on medication and later died in a local hospital.[26] This last case illustrates the possibility of a lone wolf actually being an "insider" possessing materials associated with WMD.

Ricin toxin is another agent lone wolves might attempt to make using cookbooks.[27] Extracted from the castor bean, ricin would never be considered a mass casualty weapon, but for smaller attacks it could be deadly. Ricin toxin is poisonous if inhaled, injected, or ingested. Ricin has also been developed by groups such as the Minnesota Patriots Council (1991)[28] in the United States, the London Ricin Cell (2003)[29] in London, UK, and Al-Qaeda in Yemen (2011).[30] An attacker could create a weapon that could be disseminated on unsuspecting victims. One only has to think about how the Soviet KGB in 1978 aided the Bulgarian Secret service in their effort to kill Georgi Markov, a Bulgarian dissident living in London. Using a sophisticated umbrella as a dissemination device, they were able to shoot a ricin-filled pellet into the body of Markov, which led to his death.[31] A lone wolf utilizing a similar device could attack people indiscriminately in crowds. Witness the effect the two Washington, DC Beltway snipers had on the region in 2002. Fear and paralyses abounded for three weeks until the perpetrators were caught.

One of the many fears law enforcement and response communities have is the detonation of a radiological dispersal devise (RDD), or "Dirty

Bomb." The military defines a RDD as "an explosive device that is intended to spread radioactive material from the detonation of conventional explosives."[32] Ideal radioactive sources—found in medical and industrial equipment—include radioisotopes with strong radioactivity such as Cobalt 60 (Co-60), Cesium (Cs-137), and Strontium-90 (Sr-90). Radioactive sources that have been removed from their controlled locations are called "orphan sources."[33] The intentional release of radiation or the detonation of an RDD in some public forum would be devastating. Casualties would be lower than other WMD attacks, but the negative psychological and economic effects associated with radiation contamination would be vast. An example of this was an accidental release of Cesium-137 in September 1987 in the city of Goiania, Brazil. This highly soluble Cesium chloride salt source was stolen and its shield ruptured, and the material was subsequently released in the city.[34] According to one report, the "dispersal of radiation was equivalent to what scientists would classify as a medium-size dirty bomb."[35] Four people died from exposure, 28 suffered radiation burns,[36] and over 112,000 people were monitored for possible exposure.[37] Many buildings had to be decontaminated or destroyed. A total of 3500 m^3 of radioactive contaminated materials was created.[38] The amount of Cesium that caused this mayhem was only 93 grams.[39] There are several cases of terrorists trying to make or use RDD weapons.

The most well-known RDD event happened in 1995, when Chechen rebels obtained some Cesium-137, wrapped it up with explosives, and buried it in Moscow's Izmaylovsky Park. The rebel leaders then notified the media of the unexploded device's location. In 2002, an Al-Qaeda operation to develop a dirty bomb was exposed. It involved a suspected Al-Qaeda terrorist, Jose Padilla, who was arrested and charged with planning an attack.

Over-the-Horizon Threats

Since the mapping of the human genome in the early 2000s, the biotechnological fields have grown dramatically.[40] A driver for this growth has been the convergence of engineering, physical sciences, and life sciences, creating a cross-pollination environment for the transfer of individual "tool sets from one science to another."[41] This of course is of

concern to military professionals who are worried that the proliferation of "biotechnology and life sciences—including the spread of expertise to create modified or novel organisms—present the prospect of new toxins, live agents, and bioregulators."[42] With these skills, it would be possible for a small group to take the convergence in sciences and "inflict untold damage if armed with the right unconventional weapon."[43] It is the dual nature of these dynamic technologies that could bring unforeseen horror if used improperly and "provide bad actors increased capacity to build and deploy more dangerous biological weapons."[44] As these technologies and sciences are diffused through more than 4,070[45] biotechnology companies, security professionals should be aware that a lone wolf insider could have access to these skills, especially since these technologies and knowledge are also being diffused to larger populations. In recent years, there has emerged a community of amateur do-it-yourself biologists "dedicated to making biology an accessible pursuit for citizen scientists, amateur biologists and biological engineers."[46] They provide the "mechanisms for amateurs to increase their knowledge and skills."[47] However, while the majority of these do-it-yourself biologist activities remain benign, there runs a risk that lone wolves could acquire this technology to develop a weapon.

In his book *Hot Zone*, Richard Preston points out how easy it is for diseases to move globally: "A hot virus from the rain forest lives within a twenty-four hour plane ride from every city on earth. All of the earth's cities are connected by a web of airline routes. The web is a network. Once a virus hits the net, it can shoot anywhere in a day—Paris, Tokyo, New York, Los Angeles, wherever planes fly."[48] In 2008, passengers travelled over 4,621 billion kilometers,[49] compared with over 1,500 billion kilometers in 1990,[50] and by 2028 it will rise to 12,090 billion.[51] If a lone wolf terrorist infected himself with an infectious disease, such as plague or a future DIY disease, and flew on a major airline through several major hubs, a serious pandemic could occur. Just note how the 2002–2003 outbreak of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)—starting in Hong Kong—became a global problem very quickly.

Health officials of modern countries have made great strides in ensuring safe food and water sources, but in recent years events have demonstrated that the global "farm to table" food chain continues to be vulnerable to contamination.[52] When this happens, the cascading effects are often

economic and psychological as people become scared to purchase food products for fear of contamination. Even the hint of possible contamination leaked into the media, or a false positive, could have a tremendous impact on the food industry. Witness the 2011 E. coli outbreak in Germany in which officials incorrectly identified cucumbers from Spain as the culprit, resulting in Spanish exporters losing approximately $200 million per week until the mistake was corrected.[53] In the future, a lone wolf individual could develop a DIY bacterium and contaminate any one of the distribution points in the food chain, replicating an untraceable outbreak. Ongoing investigations are still underway to find the individual(s) that contaminated Extra-Strength Tylenol capsules that killed seven people in Chicago 30 years ago (1982). As recently as May 2011, investigators have turned to "Unabomber" Ted Kaczynski as a possible suspect.[54]

Current Countermeasures

Before the early 1990s, our ability to deal with any WMD terrorist event was negligible. However, over the last ten years, and $36 billion[55] dollars later, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has worked hard building various capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist acts. The vast range of exploitable targets and threat actors, however, lessens the possibility of finding one countermeasure, one "silver bullet," and forces us to depend on a collection of countermeasures —acting like a web of obstacles—making it harder for terrorists. And these countermeasures appear to have worked, since there has not been a successful major terror attack in the U.S. since 9–11, but there have been many foiled attempts.

The foundation for many of the countermeasures starts with having the necessary laws that give Homeland Security and law enforcement agencies the authority and tools to prosecute illegal use of CBRN materials. Prior to the 1990s, there existed few laws addressing the use or possession of CBRN materials. However, after the Oklahoma City bombing and September 11 attacks, stronger laws were passed. For example, the "Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996" criminalized the use of nuclear materials, chemical or biological weapons, and regulated the distribution of pathogenic microorganisms and toxins.[56] Later, revisions and clarifications to *U.S. Code – Title 18: Crimes and Criminal Procedure* further addressed

specific threats. Section 175, known as the *Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act* (BWAT), details biological weapons.[57] Section 229 prohibited activities dealing with Chemical Weapons.[58] And a more general catchall rule is Section 2332a, *Use of Certain Weapons of Mass Destruction*, which makes it unlawful for any person to use, threaten, or attempt or conspire to use a weapon of mass destruction, including any biological agent, toxin, or vector.[59] The penalty for knowingly making, transporting, storing, or weaponizing any of these agents or toxins is imprisonment or punishment by death if the attack results in deaths. Other types of legislation such as the *Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996*—a.k.a. the "Nunn-Lugar Act"—equipped and trained law enforcement, fire services, and paramedics to deal with WMD terrorism.[60]

If laws provide the foundation for countermeasures, then strategies provide the structural framework and direction for enacting countermeasures. The guidance for the implementation of these countermeasures is embedded within the broader security strategies outlined by the White House and DHS.[61] Since the first *National Strategy for Homeland Security* was issued in 2003, a host of other strategies[62] have been generated. All of these strategies provide a clear vision for a secure homeland and a framework for how to protect the homeland. However, over time these strategies have evolved, always revolving around the tension between the "primary focus" on terrorism and the "broader focus" on terrorism, all-hazards, and border security. The latest strategic manifestation is DHS's *U.S. Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years (FY) 2012–2016*, which continues the focus of previous documents on preventing terror attacks, stopping the acquisition and use of CBRN within the United States, and reducing the threat against our critical infrastructure, key resources, and essential leadership.[63] However, laws and strategies by themselves cannot stop lone wolf terrorists or autonomous cells. More passive and active measures must be in put into action.

Passive countermeasures are necessary for safeguarding chemical, biological, and radiological materials located in facilities throughout the United States. To help protect chemical facilities, the Department of Homeland Security created the *Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards* (CFATS), designed to help over 4,500 chemical facilities[64] provide Security

Vulnerability Assessments for their at-risk facilities and associated security plans.

Another major concern is the response to biological events, since most of these attacks are time delayed. Thus, the countermeasures required to deal with a bio threat has to be multifaceted. Threat awareness is fed by the multitude of public health and intelligence information coming in from state and local partners through various channels and local fusion centers. One center is the *National Biological Threat Characterization Center*, which conducts assessments and laboratory experiments looking for gaps in information to better understand current and emerging biological threats.[65] Likewise, prevention and protection measures create layered approaches to mitigate the effects of bioterror attacks with programs like *Project BioShield*,[66] which helps the private sector develop CBRN medical countermeasures for a guaranteed federal market.[67] Other measures, like surveillance and detection, provide the necessary network and grid to identify the advent of bio attacks. Thus, the DHS *National Biosurveillance Integration Center* (NBIC) provides early detection and warnings of attacks.[68]

Radiological and nuclear countermeasures revolve around activities to either remove or secure radiological threats before a terrorist could access them. Central to these efforts are the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) *Orphan Source Initiative*[69] and the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) *Off-Site Source Recovery Project* (OSRP).[70] Both of these programs work to find and recover radioactive materials and keep them out of the hands of terrorists. It is up to the Department of Homeland Security's *Global Nuclear Detection Architecture* (GNDA) to detect terrorists trying to smuggle radioactive or nuclear materials around the United States, or through its borders.[71] As part of this architecture, *Radiation Portal Monitors* (RPM) and other types of radiation detection technologies are deployed at ports and mail facilities around the world to detect radiation before it gets to the U.S.[72] Within the United States, DHS's *Securing the Cities* (STC) initiative works to detect and prevent a radiological or nuclear attack in high-risk cities.[73]

Passive countermeasures alone will only slow down lone wolf terrorists or autonomous cells or cause them to look for softer targets. It is the active engagement of state and local law enforcement and other responders closest

to the threat that provides the first tangible countermeasures. However, the vast multitude and differences among law enforcement agencies creates problems for coordinating, communicating, and capturing information that could prevent a terrorist act. To correct this problem, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) created *Joint Terrorism Task Forces* (JTTF) to resolve this disconnection and provide a centralizing structure. Made up of investigators, analysts, linguists, SWAT experts, and other specialists from over 600 state, local, and federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies, the JTTF has 71 task forces based in 103 cities nationwide.[74] These task forces have been used to respond to all kinds of threats and incidents and provide a key factor to stopping potential lone wolves and autonomous cells. A more directed effort led by the FBI is their 2008 "Operation Vigilant Eagle" initiative to pre-empt lone-wolf individuals by identifying them before they can commit a terrorist act.[75] This program is spearheaded by the "Lone Wolf Initiative" program, which develops comprehensive information on possible lone wolves in an effort to disrupt their attacks before they are launched.[76] Limited information exists on both programs.

Another important countermeasure key to making it difficult for lone wolves to commit acts of terror is the proper preparation of the communities that surround them. It is true that one person is often harder to find than a group or a more organized terror cell that could present more leaks to law enforcement, but a prepared community is more able to identify possible threats. Therefore, the U.S. government has been making great strides to help communities become the eyes and ears that can detect anomalies before they actually become a threat. The FBI set up countermeasures called "tripwires," which are in essence outreach activities designed to create a network of frontline informants from medical, academic, and industry communities to alert the FBI of potential risks turning into a WMD threat.[77] Likewise, to help make communities part of the solution, DHS's homeland security enterprise is being built around four initiatives: a) *Fusion Centers* in 77 state and urban areas that will centralize information, analyze it, and then take action;[78] b) The *Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative* designed to train law enforcement to recognize behaviors associated with terrorism, analyze those observations, and improve sharing information;[79] c) The *Security Information Network* (HSIN) allows federal and local first responders to

share real-time information on a secure, Internet-based network;[80] and d) The "*If You See Something, Say Something*™" campaign to raise public awareness of behaviors related to terrorism.[81]

However, a key element of a terrorist attack is surprise, and a lone wolf terrorist using CBRN must be equally stealthy, so as to avoid capture, enabling an attack to occur anywhere in the United States. Therefore, the U.S. government has extended vast resources to build and outfit specialized WMD response teams as a countermeasure to deal with the threat. Coordinating the FBI's response capability is the *Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate* (WMDD), which also focuses on WMD preparedness and prevention.[82] The WMDD has access to two state-of-the-art technology response units. The *Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Sciences Unit* (CBRNSU) enables the FBI Laboratory to conduct detailed forensic assessments of dangerous CBRN materials and related evidence,[83] and the *Hazardous Material Response Unit* (HMRU) responds to criminal acts and incidents involving hazardous materials (HAZMAT).[84] Seeing the necessity of having these CBRN response capabilities nearer to a likely event, the federal government, under the *Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act*, authorized the creation of 55 high-tech *WMD Civil Support Teams* (CSTs). These National Guard WMD-CST teams are located in each state, two per state in some cases. These teams fall under the jurisdiction of the state's governor, with a mission to support civilian responders. They provide early assessments of a CBRN event, advise the incident commander, and facilitate request for assistance to bring in state and federal assets.[85]

A more direct capability to respond to biological attacks is the *Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's* (CDC's) *Strategic National Stockpile* (SNS). The SNS stockpiles and distributes medical countermeasures to affected areas. These resources are strategically located throughout the United States to be distributed when required.[86] Also of significance is the *Laboratory Response Network* (LRN), which provides a national capacity to test biological threat agents and hazardous toxins, in particular anthrax, smallpox, plague, and botulism. Laboratories within the LRN are classified as either a) a national laboratory—which characterizes special strains, conducts bioforensics, and handles infectious diseases;[87] b) a reference laboratory—150 state and local public health, military, international,

veterinary, agriculture, food, and water testing laboratories;[88] or c) a sentinel laboratory—approximately 25,000 private, commercial,[89] and hospital-based laboratories in the United States that test clinical specimens.[90]

Analysis and Recommendations

This article focuses on the issue of lone wolves and autonomous cells acquiring and using CBRN types of weapons, whether in their traditional military form or in the more non-traditional industrial forms. Lone wolves and autonomous cells could operate anywhere along these two bookends of the WMD spectrum; however, initial observations suggest that advanced security barriers make it difficult for sophisticated autonomous cells, unless insiders are involved, to gain access to such weapons. Lone wolves would have an even harder time acquiring or creating military grade CBRN weapons. Any attempt at acquiring precursor agents to make such weapons would certainly alert authorities. For the moment, it seems unlikely that a lone wolf or autonomous cells will get a modern WMD device; nevertheless, it should not be ruled out as completely impossible.

Lone wolves or autonomous cells may not have to pursue sophisticated, military grade CBRN agents. Instead, they could use industrial chemicals, biological contaminants, and radioactive material that are so commonplace as to cause disruptions rather than mass casualties. Fear and economic consequences might be the acceptable goal for a lone wolf or group. The emergence of new technologies and systems will continue to present possible alternatives to CBRN agents. As governments apply current and new countermeasures, there will be continuous tension in governments to allocate limited resources to support a terrorism focus approach or an “all hazards” focus. This has implications for all of the programs discussed above as funding becomes scarcer in a budget restraint era. However, the country must be continuously on guard for any CBRN terror attack and build national preparedness.

Further assessment points to the problem of lone wolves being hard to detect and stop before an attack. Lone wolves have no organization that can be exploited for information or penetrated by undercover agents. One former counter-terrorism expert alluding to this problem pointed out that the “lone wolf is arguably one of the biggest challenges to American law

enforcement. How do you get into the mind of a terrorist?"[91] Thus, countermeasures may have to become more intrusive into society to ferret out lone wolves and autonomous cells, especially if they are trying to obtain CBRN weapons. This creates a tension between what countermeasures can be used and the freedoms and civil liberties they are supposed to protect. Former President Bush addressed this tension when he said that "we know that [in] a free society—there's no such thing as perfect security. That's the challenge. To attack us, the terrorists only have to be right once; to stop them, we need to be right 100 percent of the time."[92] Being right 100 percent of the time must still include consideration of our freedoms, as Michael A. Clancy—of the FBI—says: "We must always act within the confines of the rule of law and the safeguards guaranteed by the Constitution. It is not enough to stop the terrorists; we must always do so while maintaining civil rights and civil liberties."[93] This will be an ongoing challenge as we balance countermeasures against lone wolf or autonomous cell acquisition of a CBRN weapon that could cause great destruction.

In order to be prepared, governments, law enforcement, security agencies, and first responder communities must continue to develop countermeasure strategies as a multifaceted, layered approach, understanding that no single approach succeeds by itself. In action, these measures follow a cyclical pattern in that authorities take initial measures to prevent WMD terrorism and actions to mitigate the impact of an attack on populations or infrastructures. The capacity of authorities and citizenry to bounce back after a WMD attack significantly aids the response effort to quickly save lives, protect property and the environment, and to meet basic human needs. The cycle comes full circle when the recovery process begins to restore and rebuild communities damaged by a lone wolf WMD attack. These measures can contract and expand depending on the event, and governments and communities must continue to develop the means to successfully deal with these threats.

Conclusion

A WMD in the hands of a lone wolf terrorist is a scenario we all hope will never happen. However, we live in a world where traditional WMD weapons are being proliferated and new Janus-headed technologies and systems can become weapons. The proliferation of WMD technology

through legitimate as well as illegitimate programs in recent years continues to warn us of the uncertain nature of who might be able to acquire such weapons in the future. A more clear and present danger may very well be from the more accessible sources of radiation, bacteria, or other industrial chemicals that are always in our communities. Do-it-yourself biology and access to other technologies might open the doors for newer forms of violent diseases that could spread through populations. The ease of acquiring the skills and knowledge to cultivate known diseases such as plague and anthrax are as close as a small university microbiology program. Access to dual-use miniaturized laboratory technologies is not as hard to obtain as it was in the past. The future possibility of cross-pollination between bad actors such as terrorist and criminals due to "a convergence of interests and methods"[94] will become more problematic and of grave concern to security practitioners. The requirement for security professionals to continue to develop their capacity to envision future threats based on technological advancements will become key to creating future solutions to potentially destructive new weapons.

Notes

1. DHS, "Today's Security Environment," in *Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland* (Washington, DC: Author, February 2010), 5.

2. Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg, *Plague Wars: The Terrifying Reality of Biological Warfare* (New York: Macmillan, 2000), 363; and Richard Preston, *About the Cobra Event,* http://richardpreston.net/books/ce.html.

3. Jeffrey A. Larsen, Eric A. Croddy, and James J. Wirtz, eds., *Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Encyclopedia of Worldwide Policy, Technology, and History, Volume II: Nuclear Weapons* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2005), 408.

4. *Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction*, Joint Publication 3-40 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 10, 2009), http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/doctrine/CDM%20resources/manuals/jps/jp3_40.pdf.

5. Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Weapons of Mass Destruction: Frequently Asked Questions,* http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/wmd/wmd_faqs.

6. International export control regimes have emerged to help stop the proliferation of WMD weapons technology: organizations such as the *Australia Group* that control chemical and biological technologies; the *Nuclear Suppliers Group and Z*angger Committee that watch nuclear technologies; the *Wassenaar Arrangement,* which is a multilateral export control regime monitoring conventional and dual use technologies.

7. The CWC was signed in 1993 and entered into force in 1997. The treaty aims to eliminate an entire category of weapons of mass destruction by prohibiting the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer, or use of chemical weapons by States Parties. It is administered by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), http://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/.

8. Kelsey Davenport and Daniel Horner, "U.S. Says Chemical Weapons Used in Syria," *Arms Control Association* 43 (July/August 2013), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_0708/US-Says-Chemical-Weapons-Used-inSyria.

9. USAMRIID, *Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook* (Blue book), 6th ed. (Fort Detrick, Frederick, MD: U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, April 2005), 56.

10. Ibid., appendix C, BW Agent Characteristics, C-1.

11. USAMRIID, *Medical Management of Biological Casualties* (see note 9 above), 64.

12. Ibid., 78.

13. Ibid., 116.

14. David E. Kaplan, "Aum Shinrikyo," in Jonathan B. Tucker, ed., *Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000), 213.

15. Ibid., 217.

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An Army of One: Assessing CBRN Pursuit and Use by Lone Wolves and Autonomous Cells

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In recent years, much of the literature on terrorist pursuits and use of unconventional weapons has focused on al-Qaeda and other Islamic extremist groups. Some scholars posit lone actors may differ from organizations when it comes to the observation that larger organizations are more likely to engage in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) activity, but leave this as an open question because of a prior lack of data on lone actors. Furthermore, new technologies and expanding networks may also spawn more deleterious lone actors, including what have been referred to as "super-empowered individuals." This article utilizes the Profiles of Incidents Involving CBRN by Non-State Actors Dataset and the Radiological and Nuclear Non-State Actors Database to illustrate the characteristics of CBRN pursuit by lone wolves and autonomous cells over time. Initial findings confirm the general perceptions that, historically, lone actors have engaged in cruder, smaller scale, and less frequent CBRN plots and attacks than their formal terrorist organization counterparts, but suggest that such actors do present a genuine threat, at least in terms of the potential for mass disruption. Additionally, while they share several similarities with more formal organizations, lone actors and autonomous cells tend to be motivated less by collective religious or ethno-nationalist concerns than larger organizations, focusing more on narrow or solipsistic drivers. Lone actors and autonomous cells also appear to largely calibrate their CBRN ambitions to their capabilities and their CBRN actions tend to receive better media coverage than formal terrorist organizations.

Introduction

At the strategic level, lone actors or isolated groupuscules[1] utilizing weapons of mass destruction (WMD)[2] would in many ways represent the apogee of armed asymmetry, potentially inducing tectonic shifts in how homeland and international security are conceived. Yet, even in the more prosaic (and far more likely) realm of individual attempts to use smaller scale, less sophisticated chemical, biological, or radiological (CBR) weapons, questions can be asked about whether the threat is increasing and whether law

enforcement is adequately equipped to address the threat. This article therefore explores the threat of lone wolves and small autonomous cells deploying unconventional weapons, including WMD, and the extent to which authorities are able to preemptively detect and interdict such behavior.

Emerging CBRN Technologies and Super-Empowered Individuals

The first question to answer is whence the concerns about the nexus between CBRN weapons and isolated actors come and whether these are overblown. The general threat of mass violence posed by lone wolves and small autonomous cells has been detailed in accompanying issue contributions, but the potential use of CBRN weapons by such perpetrators presents some singular features that either amplify or supplement the attributes of the more general case and so are deserving of particular attention. Chief among these is the impact of rapid technological development. Recent and emerging advances in a variety of areas, from synthetic biology[3] to nanoscale engineering,[4] have opened doors not only to new medicines and materials, but also to new possibilities for malefactors to inflict harm on others. What is most relevant in the context of lone actors and small autonomous cells is not so much the pace of new invention, but rather the commercialization and consumerization of CBRN weapons-relevant technologies. This process often entails an increase in the availability and safety of the technology, with a concurrent diminution in the cost, volume, and technical knowledge required to operate it. Thus, for example, whereas fifty years ago producing large quantities of certain chemical weapons might have been a dangerous and inefficient affair requiring a large plant, expensive equipment, and several chemical engineers, with the advent of chemical microreactors,[5] the same processes might be accomplished far more cheaply and safely on a desktop assemblage, purchased commercially and monitored by a single chemistry graduate student.

The rapid global spread and increased user-friendliness of many technologies thus represents a potentially radical shift from the relatively small scale of harm a single individual or small autonomous group could historically cause.[6] From the limited reach and killing power of the sword, spear, and bow, to the introduction of dynamite and eventually the use of our own infrastructures against us (as on September 11), the number of people that an individual who was unsupported by a broader political entity could

kill with a single action has increased from single digits to thousands. Indeed, it has even been asserted that "over time … as the leverage provided by technology increases, this threshold will finally reach its culmination—with the ability of one man to declare war on the world and win."[7] Nowhere is this trend more perceptible in the current age than in the area of unconventional weapons.

These new technologies do not simply empower users on a purely technical level. Globalization and the expansion of information networks provide new opportunities for disaffected individuals in the farthest corners of the globe to become familiar with core weapon concepts and to purchase equipment—online technical courses and eBay are undoubtedly a boon to would-be purveyors of violence. Furthermore, even the most solipsistic misanthropes, people who would never be able to function socially as part of an operational terrorist group, can find radicalizing influences or legitimation for their beliefs in the maelstrom of virtual identities on the Internet.

All of this can spawn, it is feared, a more deleterious breed of lone actors, what have been referred to in some quarters as "super-empowered individuals."[8] Conceptually, super-empowered individuals are atomistic game-changers, i.e., they constitute a single (and often singular) individual who can shock the entire system (whether national, regional, or global) by relying only on their own resources. Their core characteristics are that they have superior intelligence, the capacity to use complex communications or technology systems, and act as an individual or a "lone-wolf."[9] The end result, according to the pessimists, is that if one of these individuals chooses to attack the system, "the unprecedented nature of his attack ensures that no counter-measures are in place to prevent it. And when he strikes, his attack will not only kill massive amounts of people, but also profoundly change the financial, political, and social systems that govern modern life."[10] It almost goes without saying that the same concerns attach to small autonomous cells, whose members' capabilities and resources can be combined without appreciably increasing the operational footprint presented to intelligence and law enforcement agencies seeking to detect such behavior.

With the exception of the largest truck or aircraft bombs, the most likely means by which to accomplish this level of system perturbation is through the use of CBRN agents as WMD. On the motivational side, therefore, lone actors and small autonomous cells may ironically be *more* likely to select

CBRN weapons than more established terrorist groups—who are usually more conservative in their tactical orientation—because the extreme asymmetry of these weapons may provide the only subjectively feasible option for such actors to achieve their grandiose aims of deeply affecting the system. The inherent technical challenges presented by CBRN weapons may also make them attractive to self-assured individuals who may have a very different risk tolerance than larger, traditional terrorist organizations that might have to be concerned with a variety of constituencies, from state patrons to prospective recruits.[11] Many other factors beyond a "perceived potential to achieve mass casualties" might play into the decision to pursue CBRN weapons in lieu of conventional explosives,[12] including a fetishistic fascination with these weapons or the perception of direct referents in the would-be perpetrator's belief system.

Others are far more sanguine about the capabilities of lone actors (or indeed non-state actors in general) with respect to their potential for using CBRN agents to cause mass fatalities, arguing that the barriers to a successful large-scale CBRN attack remain high, even in today's networked, tech-savvy environment.[13] Dolnik, for example, argues that even though homegrown cells are "less constrained" in motivations, more challenging plots generally have an inverse relationship with capability,[14] while Michael Kenney cautions against making presumptions about the ease with which individuals can learn to produce viable weapons using only the Internet.[15] However, even most of these pundits concede that low-level CBR attacks emanating from this quarter will probably lead to political, social, and economic disruption that extends well beyond the areas immediately affected by the attack. This raises an essential point with respect to CBRN terrorism: irrespective of the harm potential of CBRN weapons or an actor's capability (or lack thereof) to successfully employ them on a catastrophic scale, these weapons invariably exert a stronger psychological impact on audiences—the essence of terrorism—than the traditional gun and bomb. This is surely not lost on those lone actors or autonomous cells who are as interested in getting noticed as in causing casualties.

Proven Capability and Intent

While legitimate debate can be had as to the level of potential threat posed by lone actors or small autonomous cells wielding CBRN weapons, possibly

the best argument for engaging in a substantive examination of the issue is the most concrete one of all—that these actors have already demonstrated the motivation and capability to pursue and use CBRN weapons, in some cases even close to the point of constituting a genuine WMD threat. In the context of bioterrorism, perhaps the most cogent illustration of this is the case of Dr. Bruce Ivins, the perpetrator behind one of the most serious episodes of bioterrorism in living memory, the 2001 "anthrax letters," which employed a highly virulent and sophisticated form of the agent and not only killed five and seriously sickened 17 people, but led to widespread disruption of the U.S. postal services and key government facilities.[16]

Other historical cases of CBRN pursuit and use by lone actors and small autonomous cells highlight the need for further exploration. Among the many extant examples:[17]

- Thomas Lavy was caught at the Alaska-Canada border in 1993 with 130 grams of 7% pure ricin. It is unclear how Lavy obtained the ricin, what he planned to do with it, and what motivated him.
- In 1996, Diane Thompson deliberately infected twelve coworkers with *shigella dysenteriae* type 2. Her motives were unclear.
- In 1998, Larry Wayne Harris, a white supremacist, was charged with producing and stockpiling a biological agent—*bacillus anthracis*, the causative agent of anthrax.
- In 1999, the Justice Department (an autonomous cell sympathetic to the Animal Liberation Front) mailed over 100 razor blades dipped in rat poison to individuals involved in the fur industry.
- In 2000, Tsiugio Uchinshi was arrested for mailing samples of the mineral monazite with trace amounts of radioactive thorium to several Japanese government agencies to persuade authorities to look into potential uranium being smuggled to North Korea.
- In 2002, Chen Zhengping put rat poison in a rival snack shop's products and killed 42 people.
- In 2005, 10 letters containing a radioactive substance were mailed to major organizations in Belgium including the Royal Palace, NATO headquarters, and the U.S. embassy in Brussels. No injuries were reported.
- In 2011, federal agents arrested four elderly men in Georgia who were plotting to use ricin and explosives to target federal buildings, Justice Department officials, federal judges, and Internal Revenue Service agents.

Two recent events may signal an even greater interest in CBRN by lone malefactors. First, based on one assessment of Norway's Anders Breivik's treatise, his references to CBRN weapons a) suggest that CBRN weapons could be used on a tactical level and b) reveal (to perhaps previously uninformed audiences) that even low-level CBRN weapons could achieve far-reaching impacts driven by fear.[18] Whether or not Breivik would actually have sought or been able to pursue CBRN, he has garnered a following in several (often far-right) extremist circles and his treatise might inspire other lone actors. Second, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) released

two issues of *Inspire* magazine in 2012. Articles, on the one hand, call for lone wolf jihad attacks to target non-combatant populations and, on the other, permit the use of chemical and biological weapons. The combination of such directives may very well influence the weapon selection of lone actor jihadists in Western nations.[19]

Prior Research and Available Data

Yet, while presenting prima facie evidence of the threat[20] and to some extent giving one a sense of the multiplicity of forms the threat might take, the anecdotal nature of such cases provide only limited operational guidance to those seeking to prevent and preempt CBRN attacks by lone actors and small autonomous groups. This is because focusing on a handful of prominent cases, however interesting or enlightening they may be, does not reveal anything about the generalizability of their perpetrators' characteristics, across either time or location.[21] This makes it difficult to derive any reliably diagnostic indicators that can be applied by law enforcement or intelligence agencies to detect future perpetrators and precursor behaviors. Part of the solution to this lies in collecting and analyzing the entire universe of past perpetrators (or at least a sufficiently sizable sample) in search of commonalities across cases, in order to identify possible candidates for indicators.

Unfortunately, this type of large-sample empirical analysis is relatively rare in CBRN weapons research, even when it comes to the CBRN behaviors of recognized terrorist organizations. It is, to the best of our knowledge, completely non-existent in the case of the pursuit or use of CBRN weapons by lone actors or small autonomous cells where current risk assessments related to terrorist pursuit and use of unconventional weapons generally focus on al-Qaeda and other Islamic extremist groups. That is, to date, there has been no systematic empirical assessment of CBRN incidents perpetrated by ideological lone wolves or small autonomous cells. Part of the reason for this lies in the very scant research—empirical or otherwise—that has been focused specifically on lone actors and CBRN. Indeed, apart from a single introductory book chapter that is over a decade old,[22] and several references to the potential threat of lone actors appearing in more general texts on CBRN terrorism,[23] the security research community has not engaged with this topic to any great degree.

More fundamental, perhaps, to an explanation of the lack of large-sample studies of this type, are the serious data and methodological limitations presented by the subjects of the research themselves. This is primarily because in order to develop indicators that rigorously distinguish between those lone actors that engage in violence from those that do not, one is required to collect data with variation on the dependent variable of lone actor pursuit of violence. Although it is possible to collect data on the perpetrators themselves, in the United States and several other countries there are legal and ethical restrictions on collecting similar comparison data on non-offending citizens, not to mention the methodological difficulties associated with collecting an unbiased, representative sample of "average" members of the public.

When considering formal terrorist organizations, databases do exist of all known terrorist organizations,[24] which can be analyzed to distinguish the characteristics of those that do engage in CBRN pursuit or use from those that do not. Factors making a terrorist organization more likely to pursue or engage in CBRN terrorism include embeddedness in alliance structures, being based in an authoritarian state with relatively strong connections to a globalized world, being relatively large and having more experience with terrorism in general.[25] Yet, there is no comparable dataset for lone actors or small autonomous cells. This has not gone unnoticed by the researchers themselves. Asal and Rethemeyer readily admit that "a sizeable number of individuals or tiny 'entities' who are not identified as belonging to any recognized 'terrorist organization' have engaged, or attempted to engage, in attacks that employ CBRN agents for political or ideological reasons,"[26] but restrict their analysis to "relatively structured organizations" due to data limitations. Similarly, Asal, Ackerman, and Rethemeyer[27] posit that lone actors may differ from established organizations when it comes to their observation that smaller organizations are less likely to engage in CBRN activity, but leave this as an open question because of a lack of the requisite data on lone actors.

Fortunately, recent developments go some way towards solving this problem. The construction of a database of CBRN events perpetrated by non-state actors, including lone actors and autonomous cells, for non-pecuniary purposes allows for a degree of comparison between those incidents perpetrated by different actor types and can provide some indications of whether the pre-event behavior of lone actors, for instance, is

similar to that of established terrorist organizations or not. Moreover, detailed data collected on some types of CBRN perpetrators allow for initial analysis of relevant attributes of the actors themselves that might serve as indicators. These datasets will be leveraged in the analysis presented below, not only to examine the substantive threat posed by lone actors and autonomous cells with respect to CBRN weapons, but also to demonstrate how empirical analysis of databases of this type can provide robust insights and indicators useful at the operational intelligence and law enforcement level.

Learning From CBRN Event Data

In order to obtain an overview of how the actions of lone actors figure into the larger context of CBRN terrorism, we begin by focusing on what has actually taken place in this regard, in other words, the CBRN events themselves. Over the last two years, the authors have constructed a dataset to help alleviate the data gap in CBRN terrorism. The Profiles of Incidents involving CBRN by Non-state actors Database (POICN), which will be released publically in 2014, is a relational, open-source database including information on terrorist plots, acquisitions, and attacks relating to CBRN agents. The initial version of the database focuses on CBRN terrorism cases occurring anywhere in the world between 1990 and 2011. Of the 458 events recorded in POICN, there are 474 perpetrator records,[28] including 146 unique perpetrators that have been identified, together with 99 unidentified perpetrators. The full database includes information on over 140 incident level variables, including event type, agent type, acquisition method, target type, perpetrator, and various casualty counts, making it the most in-depth open-source database of its kind. These core variables are related to the geo-spatial, temporal, motivational, operational, tactical, and consequence aspects of each CBRN terrorist incident.

POICN identifies each of the 474 perpetrators as “unknown,” “individual,” “unnamed cell,”[29] or by organization name in a variable named *Perpetrator Structure*. This disaggregation of perpetrator type allows for clarity in comparisons between potential lone actor or autonomous cells (LA/ACs) and organizations. To assist in determining the number of LA/ACs for the current study, the unknown perpetrators in the *Perpetrator Structure* variable were assessed on a case by case basis and re-categorized

as either being “probable organization,” “probable LA/AC” or “indeterminate” (i.e., potentially LA/ACs and potentially formal organizations since available evidence did not provide the capability to distinguish between them). Of the 99 unknown perpetrators, 42 were judged likely to be organizations, 51 were judged probable LA/ACs, and 6 were judged to be indeterminate.

The POICN Dataset includes a spectrum of events ranging from protoplots (an event where a perpetrator is exploring CBRN pursuit but has not reached the level of plotting) to use of an agent (where a perpetrator employed or disseminated a CBRN substance in the commission of an attack). Based on the data shown in the last two columns of Table 1, 53% of CBRN events perpetrated by known and probable LA/ACs were actual attacks, which is higher than the 42% rate of realized attacks perpetrated by terrorist organizations.[30]

Figure 1 shows a comparison of the annual number of CBRN uses and pursuits involving LA/ACs and formal organizations from 1990 to 2011.[31] In 2004–05, several events involving LA/AC actors reached the level of actual use of agent, while formal organizations were not involved in any CBRN use in these years.

Table 2 breaks down events by perpetrator category and agent type. In all perpetrator categories, the use and pursuit of chemical agents is far more likely than that of any other agent type. Thirty-one percent of events where a lone actor pursued a biological weapon were full attacks with agent dispersal. Yet, only 19% of biological events involving formal organizations reached the attack level. Only the probable LA/AC type perpetrated radiological attacks. It should be remembered though that these figures say nothing about the efficacy of the attacks or number of casualties caused, merely that the perpetrators succeeded in actually delivering an agent to a target.

In POICN, there is a high bar for coding an agent type as nuclear. To code fissile material (HEU or plutonium) as a nuclear agent, sources or context must provide evidence that the perpetrator intended to develop a gun type or implosion mechanism. In order for non-fissile material (such as low-enriched uranium) to be included as a nuclear agent, there must be some evidence of an intention to enrich the agent or otherwise produce a nuclear weapon. A threat to use a nuclear weapon is also coded as a nuclear agent. Under these criteria, however, no events involving a lone actor, autonomous

cell, or probable/possible LA/AC include a nuclear agent, an observation that will be returned to below.

When assessing the scale and significance of the attack or intended attack, there are significant differences between LA/ACs and formal organizations. LA/AC actors are less likely to be involved with attacks that meet a "heightened government interest"[32] threshold,[33] while Table 3 shows that LA/AC attacks and plots are, in general, of a much lower degree of sophistication[34] in terms of the weaponry and delivery system used than those of formal terrorist organizations.[35]

The POICN dataset provides the underlying motivation (ideological or otherwise) for the perpetrator engaging in violence. Disaggregating incidents by perpetrator type allows for the motivation category to be compared across perpetrator types.

Figure 2 shows that 56% of events perpetrated by formal organizations were carried out in support of a collective religious ideology, i.e., an ideology (at least loosely) based on religious beliefs and principles which are adhered to by a wider group than the perpetrators themselves. Another 19% of events perpetrated by formal organizations were committed to establish ethno-nationalist sovereignty or to bolster ethno-nationalist rights. In sharp contrast, for events perpetrated by LA/ACs only 14–18% were motivated by collective religious ideology and 0–2% by ethno-nationalist rights. Yet, 26–30% of events perpetrated by LA/ACs were motivated by issues concerning reproductive rights, animal and environmental rights, or other single issues, while these same categories constituted only 6% of organizational event motivation. Finally, 9–18% of LA/AC events were motivated by a grudge rather than any larger ideological purpose. Overall, LA/ACs events were more often motivated by narrow causes and individual aims.[36] It is important to note that at this time POICN does not include events that are committed exclusively for pecuniary purposes (i.e., "purely" criminal) events. If such events were to be included, the overall motivational distribution of LA/ACs could possibly shift dramatically, due partly to many cases of product contamination as part of extortion schemes. However, far less change is likely to be witnessed with respect to organizations, since only a small minority of the criminal events seems to have involved formal organizations.

Table 1. Event type by perpetrator type

Event type	Events perpetrated by lone actors	Events perpetrated by autonomous cells	Events perpetrated by probable LA/ACs	Events perpetrated by possible LA/AC	Events perpetrated by known, probable, and possible LA/ACs	Events perpetrated by formal organizations
Protoplot	2 (4%)	–	–		2 (2%)	13 (4%)
Plot	5 (11%)	1 (5%)	–		6 (5%)	33 (10%)
Attempted acquisition	4 (9%)	2 (9%)	1 (2%)		7 (6%)	28 (8%)
Acquisition (agent)	8 (17%)	12 (55%)	4 (8%)	1 (17%)	25 (20%)	42 (13%)
Acquisition (weapon)	1 (2%)	–	2 (4%)		3 (2%)	48 (14%)
Threat with possession	10 (22%)	3 (14%)	2 (4%)		15 (12%)	13 (4%)
Attempted use	1 (2%)	–	–		1 (1%)	15 (5%)
Use of an agent	15 (33%)	4 (18%)	42 (82%)	5 (83%)	66 (53%)	141 (42%)
Total	46	22	51	6	125	333



Figure 1. Formal organizations vs. LA=ACs in CBRN use vs. pursuit, 1990–2011 (color figure available online).

Table 2. CBRN event type by perpetrator type

CBRN event type	Events with lone actors	Events with autonomous cells	Events with probable LA/ACs	Events with possible LA/AC	Events with known, potential, or possible LA/AC	Events with formal organizations
Chemical (non-use)	18 (36%)	8 (38%)	5 (10%)	1 (14%)	32 (25%)	140 (38%)
Chemical (use)	11 (22%)	3 (14%)	35 (71%)	4 (57%)	53 (42%)	131 (36%)
Biological (non-use)	13 (26%)	4 (19%)	–	1 (14%)	18 (14%)	39 (11%)
Biological (use)	4 (8%)	1 (5%)	2 (4%)	1 (14%)	8 (6%)	9 (3%)
Radiological (non-use)	4 (8%)	5 (24%)	4 (8%)	–	13 (10%)	33 (9%)
Radiological (use)	–	–	3 (6%)	–	3 (2%)	–
Nuclear (non-use)	–	–	–	–	–	17 (5%)
Total	50	21	49	7	127	369

Table 3. Attack sophistication in events involving formal organizations and LA/ACs

Events	Low	Medium	High	Total
Events with formal organizations	86 (26%)	110 (42.8%)	61 (23.7%)	257
Events with LA/ACs	71 (65.7%)	32 (29.6%)	5 (4.6%)	108

CBRN terrorism is often misrepresented by the media—due to limited first-hand information, conflicting reports, and varying sympathies—which creates unreliable events data. POICN distinguishes itself from other CBRN and terrorist attack databases through its transparent classification of source validity and the inclusion of variables that rate the uncertainty oftentimes present within and between sources. Overall, 67% of events involving known or probable LA/ACs are judged to have the highest level of source-derived validity while only 46% of events perpetrated by known and possible formal organizations have this same source-derived validity level.[37] In incidents covered by the media, LA/AC events receive more quality reporting overall; this raises our degree of confidence that sufficient

information exists to create additional datasets on LA/AC “purely” criminal actors involved in CBRN.

While POICN does not focus on events with purely financial motives, this descriptive analysis offers some observations that may inform the strategies of operational security agencies tasked with identifying and interdicting LA/AC CBRN threats. First, events perpetrated by lone actors and autonomous cells pursuing and using CBRN seem less likely to be driven by collective religious ideology or ethno-nationalist goals than events involving formal organizations. In spite of the fact that the data does not include purely criminal actors, events involving LA/ACs are motivated by focused causes and individual aims more often than events involving formal organizations. Second, regardless of perpetrator type, the majority of events involve chemical agents. Third, LA/AC actors appear less likely to pursue far-fetched weapon-types beyond their capabilities and avoid nuclear pursuits altogether; however, events suggest that in the realm of biological terrorism, LA/ACs may have been relatively more successful in actually disseminating biological agents in their attacks.



Figure 2. Motivation category in CBRN events, 1990–2011 (color figure available online).

Learning From CBRN Actor Data

In addition to the lone actor CBRN information that can be gained from the events-based data in the POICN Database, analyzing datasets that are focused on the actors themselves as the unit of analysis can yield different, complementary insights and potential indicators. One of the only examples of this type of database that is specifically oriented towards CBRN perpetrators[38] is the Radiological and Nuclear Non-State Adversaries Database (RANNSAD).[39] RANNSAD is limited to radiological and nuclear perpetrators and thus any conclusions drawn from it may, but do not necessarily, apply to chemical and biological perpetrators.[40] The database contains detailed qualitative and quantitative information on the background, motivations, capabilities, and activities of 45 past RN perpetrators from 1970–2008 and, most importantly for our purposes, characterizes each perpetrator in terms of whether it is a "formal organization," a "small unaffiliated cell," or a "lone actor." RANNSAD also collects information on both criminal and ideologically-motivated perpetrators. Despite the relatively small sample size and the limitation that several individual-level[41] fields in RANNSAD remain sparsely populated with data, this inclusion of data on lone actors and autonomous cells on the one hand, and formal organizations on the other, allows for drawing inferences about the similarities and differences of the former when compared to the latter. Thus, even this preliminary analysis, which suffers from data limitations,[42] provides some insights that are potentially useful to law enforcement and other operational security agencies in identifying and interdicting LA/AC RN threats.

Of the 45 perpetrators in RANNSAD, 26 fall into the category of lone actors or autonomous cells,[43] 16 represented formal organizations and there were three cases where the nature of the perpetrator was unable to be determined. The most basic result is that, in the universe of past cases, there were over 60% more actors who were either lone actors or part of an autonomous cell than formal organizations (unlike when limited to non-criminal events only, as reflected in POICN). The preponderance of LA/AC perpetrators immediately argues for the importance of studying the LA/AC phenomenon and whether it differs from terrorism involving formal organizations. This preponderance is not the case, however, across both types of weapons. Table 4 shows that lone actors and autonomous cells are far more likely to be involved with radiological weapons, while established terrorist organizations seem to prefer pursuing nuclear weapons or both

types.[44] If one accounts for the fact that RANSSAD includes plots against nuclear facilities and some cases of nuclear materials smuggling under the "nuclear" category, there are no unequivocal cases where lone actors or autonomous cells even *attempted* to acquire or produce actual nuclear weapons.[45] This suggests that no matter how delusional or fanatic they may be, the vast majority of these types of actors are at least sufficiently self-aware to realize that they lack the capability to procure or produce a viable nuclear device.

Table 4. Perpetrator type and weapon choice (base model shown[a])

Perpetrator type	Radiological only	Nuclear only	Radiological and nuclear	Indeterminate[b]	Total
Lone actor/autonomous cell	18	2	4	2	26
Formal organization	4	3	6	3	16
Total	22	5	10	5	42

[a]There are nine cases that the coders of RANNSAD marked as potentially apocryphal. All analyses mentioned below were performed both including and excluding these potentially apocryphal cases and the text will note where this affects the results. The four models that were used in all of the analyses were: a) the model that included the 26 likely lone actors/autonomous cells and all cases (the base model); b) the model that included only the 19 confirmed lone actors/autonomous cells and all cases; c) the same as (a) but with apocryphal cases removed; and d) the same as (b) but with apocryphal cases removed.

[b]In certain cases, for instance where a perpetrator was interdicted in possession of raw uranium, it is unclear whether the intent was to use the material to construct a nuclear or a radiological weapon.

Beyond consideration of the basic difference in type of weapon pursued, how do LA/AC perpetrators seek to use their chosen weapon? Table 5 below shows the record of the ultimate intended use, where known, for both sets of actors in the base model. As is the case with respect to which RN weapon they select, LA/AC perpetrators generally appear to calibrate their attack modalities with their capabilities—with the least sophisticated delivery mechanisms being pursued, i.e., passive exposure to the agent and the contamination of food, water, or other consumer products.[46]

Understanding differences in the outcome of a plot is important for estimating the magnitude of the threat from this quarter. Most saliently, there is the question of whether there is any significant relationship between type of actor and the ensuing degree of "success" of its plot, with the relevant contingency table presented below as Table 6. Although a handful of

perpetrators were involved in more than one incident, the database records the highest degree of "success" achieved by each perpetrator across all the incidents in which he[47] was involved. The results strongly suggest that there is significant variance between the two sets of actors,[48] with the LA/ACs being far more likely to progress further up the scale than formal terrorist organizations. This might be at least partially explained by this type of actor's predilection for radiological weapons, which are orders of magnitude easier to disseminate, at least in a crude manner, than nuclear weapons.[49] In terms of success on the part of the counterterrorist forces, LA/AC perpetrators do appear to be somewhat more likely to be apprehended than perpetrators from formal terrorist organizations (89.5% versus 55.6% apprehension rate, respectively).[50]

Table 5. Perpetrator type and intended employment method (base model shown)

Perpetrator type	Blackmail/ coercion	Passive exposure	Radiological dispersal device	Nuclear explosion	Food/water/ consumer product contamination	Other	Total
Lone actor/ autonomous cell	1	5	1	0	7	3	17
Formal organization	0	0	5	2	1	0	8
Total	1	5	6	2	8	3	25

With respect to the number of casualties recorded, there have obviously never been any casualties from a nuclear explosion (which would invariably be a mass-casualty event), while the relatively small number of casualties when compared to conventional terrorism (one fatality and 79 non-fatal injuries from a total of 13 use cases) confirms the assertion of many scholars that radiological weapons constitute mass-disruption rather than mass-casualty weapons.[51] The lack of a significant relationship between the type of actor and the six incidents that led to casualties[52] means that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that LA/AC perpetrators are no different in this respect than formal terrorist organizations. Similarly, there does not seem to be any clear evidence of a significant difference between the type of actor and the level of disruption caused.[53]

Having explored some behavioral and outcome variables, the analysis can turn to the characteristics of the perpetrator, some of the results being more unexpected than others. In terms of the perpetrator's ideology, although actors across the ideological spectrum have pursued RN weapons or materials, there are significant differences between LA/ACs on the one hand and formal organizations on the other.[54] Besides the rather unsurprising result that all ten of the actors with personal or idiosyncratic motives fell into the LA/AC category, more notable is that all five of the perpetrators with criminal motives were also in this category, while none of the four ethno-nationalist and none of the seven religiously-motivated perpetrators were either lone actors or autonomous cells. Other ideologies (various single issues, and left- and right-wing) were split among the types of actor. While the sample size is too small to draw definitive conclusions, this suggests that those lone actors who pursue RN weapons are more likely to be driven by idiosyncratic or purely pecuniary criminal motives and less likely to embrace more collectivist religious or ethno-nationalist ideologies. It should be noted that many of the lone RN actors with idiosyncratic motives displayed signs of mental illness.[55]

Table 6. Type of perpetrator and highest level of RN activity achieved (base model shown)

Perpetrator type	Plot only	Attempted acquisition of material	Acquisition of material	Attempted use of material	Successful use of material	Total
Lone actor/ autonomous cell	2	2	9	1	11	25
Formal organization	7	2	2	1	2	14
Total	9	4	11	2	13	39

The age of the perpetrators[56] shows only a relatively small discrepancy depending on type of perpetrator. Known members of formal organizations who have had involvement with RN materials have an average age of 39, while the average age of LA/AC perpetrators is 35 (with a range of 23 to 50). In any event, probably owing to the small sample size (11) of

individuals whose age at the time of the event was known, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the two sets of actors have the same average age.

Handling and deploying RN materials effectively requires a certain degree of knowledge and expertise. First, there is robust evidence that LA/AC perpetrators are less likely to have knowledge of explosives, which would have provided them with great leverage in launching sophisticated RN attacks.[57] Second, although all five LA/AC individuals for which we have educational data possessed a post-graduate degree (as opposed to only one of the two individuals from formal organizations), this correlation is not statistically significant,[58] most probably as a result of the small sample size.

Conclusion

At the turn of the century, Walter Laqueur, the doyen of terrorism studies, analyzed the subject of terrorism and WMD and came to the conclusion that individuals or small groups of people were "the most likely candidates to use weapons of superviolence."[59] The 2001 "anthrax letter" attacks seemed to bear out his prognosis, but the lack of any subsequent CBRN attacks even close to this level of scale or sophistication caused some observers to doubt that lone actors or autonomous cells would ever pose a serious WMD threat.[60] In any event, the at least 29 uses[61] of CBRN materials as weapons by LA/AC perpetrators since Laqueur published this statement (not to mention the many foiled plots and unsuccessful attempts) attest to the fact that law enforcement and intelligence agencies cannot ignore these attacks, if only because of their potential for public fear and disruption.

So, what do we really know about lone actors or autonomous cells and CBRN weapons that extend beyond bald assertion or isolated anecdote? The —admittedly preliminary—exploration of the empirical data embarked upon here gives us some initial clues about the phenomenon. It shows that, while there are certain similarities across actor types, there appear to be several differences between LA/ACs and formal organizations when it comes to using or pursuing CBRN weapons. This implies that counterterrorism forces traditionally focused on combating formal terrorist organizations might need to recalibrate their frames of analysis when considering LA/ACs if they want to have a better chance of detecting and interdicting them prior to an attack.

First, the similarities. It appears that while both lone actors and formal organizations seek to use biological and radiological weapons, it is chemical

weapons which are the most likely weapons to be used or pursued by all types of non-state actor. There is also only a modest correlation between actor type and event type overall. Furthermore, in the more limited context of RN terrorism, there is no clear evidence of differences in the effects of RN activity (either in terms of casualties or disruption) between LA/AC actors and terrorist organizations. Nor was there sufficient evidence to conclude that there are any substantive differences between the different group types with respect to the average age of perpetrators.[62] The anticipated expansion of the actor-level data to include cases of chemical and biological perpetrators, thus adding substantially to the sample size, might allow us to obtain greater significance from statistical tests.

In terms of the differences between the types of actors,[63] we have found that fewer CBRN events involving LA/AC perpetrators are motivated by collective religious or ethno-nationalist concerns and more by narrow or solipsistic drivers than is the case with formal terrorist organizations. At the actor level, we found similar results, at least for RN terrorism, indicating that LA/AC actors engaged in RN behavior differ ideologically from formal terrorist organizations with similar RN aspirations in that they are far more likely to be driven by idiosyncratic or pecuniary criminal motivations and far less likely to embrace fanatic religious or ethno-nationalist imperatives as drivers of their behavior. LA/AC perpetrators are far less likely than members of formal terrorist organizations to have substantive knowledge of explosives, which would tend to constrain the scope and effectiveness of delivery system options for their plots (e.g., RDDs). On the other hand, they may be more educated,[64] which might allow them to innovate, learn quickly, and adroitly work around obstacles in this regard. Despite the doomsday plots of fictional super villains, LA/AC RN perpetrators appear to understand their inherent capability limitations and refrain from overreaching in either their choice of weapon type or delivery method. Perhaps, as a result of this calibration of plans to capabilities, LA/AC terrorists are in some ways more dangerous than their better-resourced cousins in large, formal organizations in that, although they may be less ambitious, they intend to be more successful in their radiological weapon (and potentially also their biological weapon) pursuits.

It also appears that, at least insofar as media cover these events, those involving LA/AC perpetrators do in general receive better quality coverage —and thus have greater credibility—than those committed by formal

organizations. Although this might be at least partially a function of a geographic bias, it does mean that we can generally have greater confidence in open source reports, and the subsequent data derived therefrom, regarding lone actor or autonomous cell CBRN involvement. This in turn implies that law enforcement and intelligence agencies do not need to rely exclusively on often less accessible classified information in order to derive operationally useful insights.

Our current data allow us to examine the attributes of LA/AC CBRN actors, both in their own right and relative to those of formal organizations who use or pursue CBRN. This provides some useful insights, including those just mentioned, but tell us less about why some lone actors embrace CBRN weapons and others do not, which is the key differential required for proactive law enforcement. This would require, as alluded to in the introduction, a concerted effort to collect actor-level data on a sufficiently large sample of individual terrorists who have engaged in conventional forms of terrorism. Such an effort has not yet been undertaken, and certainly not in a systematic manner with a globally, ideologically, and demographically representative sample.

Returning to the question of the overall threat, the data confirms the general perceptions that, historically, lone actors have engaged in cruder, smaller scale, and less frequent CBRN plots and attacks than their formal terrorist organization counterparts. In fact, the frequency of attacks and events seems to have decreased since 2005. Based on this experience, it appears as if LA/AC perpetrators temper their CBRN ambitions, at least in terms of the scale of the attack, and prefer to settle for a successful, albeit crude, attack that at least causes disruption and garners publicity rather than to attempt a true WMD attack. This is hardly the behavior of the super-empowered individual of our nightmares.

Yet, even though the probability of lone actors or autonomous cells possessing the technical and operational capabilities to deploy CBRN agents on the scale of a WMD is currently low, this should not lull security agencies into a sense of complacency with respect to the future threat. After all, the philosopher David Hume[65] and others have warned us not to put too much stock in prior experience—while historical patterns can often be valuable indicators, the future is an undiscovered country variously populated by Black Swans and Wild Cards.[66] This is especially true in the current technological environment. As described in the introductory section, rapid

and more importantly, accelerating technological advancement, suggests a dramatic rise in the number of alienated adepts with the capability to twist these advances to a baleful design. The probability that the wrong individual will come into contact with the wrong technology at the wrong time might thus be trending inexorably upwards. Several individuals have already tried and at least one, Bruce Ivins, came extremely close. So, even though current empirical data does not indicate a CBRN threat of catastrophic magnitude emanating from lone actors or autonomous cells, we need to at least remain cognizant of the possibility, to our disquiet, that it might be only a matter of time before a misanthropic individual or small, nebulous group becomes superempowered and attains a WMD capability. Given the colossal difficulties in an open and free society of interdicting these insidious actors before they strike, researchers and security agencies alike should be exerting the maximum effort to monitor developments in this area and evolve their own powers of detection if they wish to forestall the threat.

Acknowledgments

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Notes

1. Roger Griffin, “From Slime Mould to Rhizome: An Introduction to the Groupuscular Right,” *Patterns of Prejudice* 37, no. 1 (March 2003): 27–50.

2. We define “weapons of mass destruction” in this context as chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons that, if used, would inflict catastrophic casualties, widespread social disruption, or devastating economic consequences greater than those brought about by the largest conventional attacks carried out thus far. For a discussion of this definition and the merits of this term, see Gary Ackerman and Jeremy Tamsett, *Introduction to Jihadists and Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2009), xix–xxii.

3. The field of synthetic biology is concerned with designing and building new biological materials (e.g., enzymes, proteins, lipids not already found in nature), devices, systems, and/or functions, especially by (re)programming DNA circuits to manipulate cellular behavior.

4. Nanoscale engineering refers to designing, manipulating, and building nanoscale (objects measuring up to thousands of nanometers, which are one-billionth of a meter) materials, structures, and systems, and integrating these devices with other systems.

5. A chemical microreactor is a small-scale device (e.g., a square centimeter) in which chemical reactions take place using tiny channels and which can provide greater control over the temperature of

the reactions and allow for continuous flows of chemicals, in comparison with traditional large and often inefficient "batch" reactors.

6. Even the efficacy of traditional asymmetric methods such as poisoning and contamination (common since antediluvian times) required luck and precise targeting and was usually only limited to a single water or food source. Gary Ackerman, "Nuclear Terrorism: Assessing the Threat to the Homeland" Testimony before the United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Washington, D.C., April 2, 2008).

7. John Robb, *Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley Sons, 2007). In this regard, artificial intelligence theorist Eliezer Yudkowsky has only semi-jokingly stated that "the IQ level required for a single individual to destroy the world decreases by one point every year." Oxford University Global Risks Conference (Oxford, United Kingdom, July 19, 2008).

8. Thomas Friedman, one of the first commentators to engage with this phenomenon, in fact suggests that the base driving force behind the rise of these "super-empowered individuals" is globalization. The faster, cheaper, and deeper access that people have to "corporations, countries and individuals" has both radicalized and empowered some individuals in Western society. Thomas L. Friedman, *Longitudes and Attitudes: Exploring the World After September 11* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2002); Adam Elkus, "Night of the Lone Wolves," *Defense and the National Interest* Special, November 29, 2007, http://www.dnipogo.org/fcs/elkus_lone_wolves.htm.

9. As such, they are neither inherently good nor evil, but can be normatively defined by their actions.

10. Elkus, "Night of the Lone Wolves" (see note 8 above).

11. In the case of chemical weapons, for example, Smithson argues that "Whereas terrorist groups tend to be expedient and go for proven, readily acquired weapons, lone actors may relish the technical challenge of making a novel nerve agent" (79). Amy Smithson, "Indicators of Chemical Terrorism," in Magnus Ranstorp and Magnus Normark, eds., *Unconventional Weapons and International Terrorism: Threat Convergence in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 67–95.

12. John Parachini, "Comparing Motives and Outcomes of Mass Casualty Terrorism Involving Conventional and Unconventional Weapons," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 24, no. 5 (September–October 2001): 389–406.

13. See Sammy Salama and Lydia Hansell, "Does Intent Equal Capability? Al-Qaeda and Weapons of Mass Destruction," *The Nonproliferation Review* 12, no. 3 (2005): 615–653; also John Mueller, "Radioactive Hype," *The National Interest* 90 (September–October 2007): 59–65.

14. Adam Dolnik, "13 Years Since Tokyo: Revisiting the 'Superterrorism' Debate," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 2, no. 2 (2008): 3–11, 10.

15. In this regard, Kenney makes the important distinction between *techne* (technical knowledge that underpins specific applications) and *mētis*, which includes such factors as local knowledge, practical skills, and forms of cunning. Michael Kenney, "'Dumb' Yet Deadly: Local Knowledge and Poor Tradecraft Among Islamist Militants in Britain and Spain," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 33, no. 10 (2010): 912 and passim.

16. While some people have questioned whether Dr. Ivins was the true perpetrator of the anthrax letters or whether he did in fact operate alone based on certain inconsistencies in the official reporting of the case, no one has presented sufficient evidence to seriously undermine the U.S. government's version of events, which asserts that Dr. Ivins was the sole person responsible for the formulation, production, and dissemination of the deadly anthrax spores.

17. All of these examples are drawn from the POICN Database (see the following section for a full description). National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), *Profiles of Incidents involving CBRN by Non-state Actors Database* [data file] (College Park, MD: Author, 2012).

18. Charles P. Blair, Kelsey Gregg, and Jonathan Garbo, *Norway's Anders Breivik: Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Politics of Cultural Despair* (Washington, DC: Federation of American

Scientists 2011), http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2011/07/norways-anders-breivik-weapons-of-mass-destruction-and-politics-of-cultural-despair.php#.

19. "Al-Qaeda Magazine Urges Chemical, Biological Strikes Against Foes," *Global Security Newswire*, May 3, 2012.

20. In contradistinction to Spaaij (op. cit.), who asserts that there has only been a single case of threatened CBRN terrorism by a lone actor. Ramon Spaaij, "The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism: An Assessment," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 33, no. 9 (2010): 854–870. Indeed, as will be discussed below, the POICN Database contains at least 18 CBRN terrorist attacks by lone actors, let alone threats.

21. Especially when dominated by a few high-profile events, such as the "anthrax letters" or the 1995 sarin attacks on the Tokyo subway system by the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult, the potential for selection bias is high.

22. Jeffrey D. Simon, "Lone Operators and Weapons of Mass Destruction," in Brad Roberts, ed., *Hype or Reality: The 'New Terrorism' and Mass Casualty Attacks* (Alexandria, VA: Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 2002), 69–81. George Michael has an entire chapter in his book on Lone Wolf Terror and the Rise of Leaderless Resistance devoted to WMD, but this chapter is mostly a general survey of CBRN terrorism, not fully defining distinguishing characteristics between lone actors/autonomous cells and large terrorist groups in this regard. See George Michael, "Weapons of Mass Destruction and Leaderless Resistance," in *Lone Wolf Terror and the Rise of Leaderless Resistance* (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2012), 101–118.

23. See, for example, Jonathan B. Tucker and Amy Sands, "An Unlikely Threat," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 55, no. 4 (1999): 46–52; Jeffrey M. Bale and Gary A. Ackerman, "Profiling the WMD Terrorist Threat," in Stephen M. Maurer, ed., *WMD Terrorism: Science and Policy Choices* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009), 11–46; Dolnik, "13 Years Since Tokyo" (see note 14 above); and Bob Graham, Jim Talent, Graham Allison, Robin Cleveland, Steve Rademaker, Tim Roemer, et al., *World at Risk: The Report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism* (New York: Vintage Books, 2008).

24. Examples include TEVUS, BAAD, and TOPs: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), *Terrorism and Extremist Violence in the United States (TEVUS) Dataset* [data] (College Park, MD: Author, 2012); the Big Allied and Dangerous (BAAD) Dataset described in Victor H. Asal and R. Karl Rethemeyer, "The Nature of the Beast: Terrorist Organizational Characteristics and Organizational Lethality," *Journal of Politics* 70, no. 2 (2008): 437–449; and Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), *Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPs)* [data] (Oklahama City: Author, 2008), http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/.

25. Victor Asal, Gary Ackerman, and R. Karl Rethemeyer, "Connections Can Be Toxic: Terrorist Organizational Factors and the Pursuit of CBRN Weapons," *Studies in Terrorism and Conflict* 35 (2012): 229–254.

26. Victor Asal and R. Karl Rethemeyer, "Islamist Use and Pursuit of CBRN Terrorism," in Gary Ackerman and Jeremy Tamsett, eds., *Jihadists and Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2009): 335–358.

27. Asal, Ackerman, and Rethemeyer, "Connections Can Be Toxic" (see note 25 above).

28. In some cases, multiple perpetrators are connected to a single event, which results in the total number of (non-unique) perpetrator records being greater than the total number of events. However, no lone actors or autonomous cells are recorded as being involved in events with multiple perpetrators.

29. Unnamed cell applies when an event is perpetrated by an unnamed, unaffiliated cell with fewer than 10 people.

30. Assessing the relationship between actor type and event type yields a Gamma of 0.174 and a Somers' *d* (treating event type as dependent) of 0.128 at a 2.2% level of significance, which indicates a modest correlation between the two variables.

31. The peak of CBRN use by formal organizations in 1998 represents poisonings perpetrated by the East Turkistan Liberation Organization.

32. An event coded as heightened government interest must fulfill at least one of the following three categories: the event resulted in at least five total casualties; the event involved a CBRN agent that is classified as a warfare agent; or the event involved either the use of or a plot to create a weaponization of the agent in at least a moderately sophisticated manner.

33. When analyzing the relationship between actor type (with all probable and possible lone actors/autonomous cells included) and the heightened interest variable, the Gamma value is −0.314 at a significance level of 0.3%, while the Spearman correlation is fairly weak at −0.143.

34. Sophistication captures the overall level of complexity required in successfully acquiring, producing, and delivering the harm agent.

35. When analyzing the relationship between actor type and attack sophistication, one obtains a Gamma of −0.581 at a significance level of <.001 and a Somers' *d* value (treating attack sophistication as the dependent) of −0.373.

36. Analyzing the relationship between actor type and motivation yields a Cramer's V of 0.668 at a level of significance of <.001, indicating a fairly strong relationship.

37. High source validity is equal to three or more independent sources or two independent sources with competing biases used for coding data.

38. There are several general examples of perpetrator-based databases in the terrorism and political violence field, for example Big Allied and Dangerous (BAAD) Dataset and United States Extremist Crime Database (ECDB). POICN has a component that maps longitudinal data on perpetrators, but so far this is limited to established organizations.

39. Gary A. Ackerman, Charles P. Blair, and Maranda Sorrells, *Radiological and Nuclear Non-State Adversaries Database (RANNSAD)* (College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2011). The database can be accessed from http://start.umd.edu/start/announcements/announcement.asp?id=396 or the Dataverse Network at http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/start/faces/study/StudyPage.xhtml?globalId=hdl:1902.1/16258&studyListingIndex=0_e274926257afe9192bedd589b32b.

40. A companion database, the Chemical and Biological Non-State Adversaries Database (CABNSAD) is currently under development and is scheduled for completion in 2013.

41. RANNSAD contains at least some information on 63 lone actors or members of groups.

42. In addition to the relatively small sample size and missing data, one must remain mindful of the potential for selection bias. For example, although the majority of unsuccessful plots appear to have been interdicted (19) rather than abandoned (1), this may simply be because the former activity is more likely to appear in open-source reports.

43. The database as it is available lists 14 perpetrators as being of unknown type (with 19 recognized lone actors/autonomous cells and 12 formal organizations making up the total), but the authors, by closely examining the qualitative descriptions of each case, were able to classify 11 of these unknowns into likely categories of actor. All statistical analyses, however, were performed on both sets—the more conservative one consisting of 31 perpetrators of known type and the more extensive one consisting of 42 perpetrators of likely type. We will note wherever the substantive results differ.

44. Performing tests of association on the data (excluding indeterminate cases) yields a significant difference between the two different sets of actors, with Cramer's V = 0.43 and significant at the 5% level in the base model, and similar results in the other models (although the model using the likely categorization and excluding the potentially apocryphal events is only significant at the 7.1% level). However, these results are somewhat suspect since the Chi-square test yields 5 of 8 cells with an expected value of less than 5.

45. For example, the cases listed under the "Nuclear Only" and "Radiological and Nuclear" category in Table 4 include a break-in at a South African nuclear facility and an attempt to smuggle

enriched uranium in France that *might* have had a connection to a terrorist group (see RANNSAD cases 25 and 32).

46. The relationship between the variables in the base model is significant at the 0.4% level, with Cramer's V = 0.828, which indicates a strong correlation. The other models yield similar results.

47. All individuals or group members in the database are male.

48. Since the Highest Activity Type is an ordinal variable (after removing unknowns from consideration), the Gamma and Somer's *d* tests were indicated. Treating the Highest Activity Type as the dependent variable, the Somer's *d* value for the base model was 0.53 at a significance level of <1%, while the symmetric Gamma measure was 0.64. The other three models showed similar results. One potential cause for concern is that the limited number of incidents led to the Chi-square test, while strongly significant, having 70% of its cells with an expected count of less than 5.

49. Indeed, when a perpetrator pursued a radiological weapon, he almost always proceeded to at least the acquisition of material stage and often to the use stage as well.

50. Measures of association are equivocal in this case, with the more conservative categorization (models (b) and (d)) having significance at the 5% level for certain measures (e.g., Spearman correlation), but not others. The other models show far lower levels of significance.

51. In May 2002, Gu Jiming, a nuclear medical researcher at a hospital in Guangdong Province, China hid a container of radioactive Iridium-192 pellets above the ceiling panels of the office of a business rival in order to sicken him through radiation poisoning. A total of 75 people at the hospital suffered radiation sickness (RANNSAD Case 17), making this the largest recorded instance of intentional radiological injuries caused by a non-state actor. Although not meeting the common threshold of 100 casualties for a mass-casualty incident, it does show that large numbers of casualties are possible (although few of these will ever end up being non-stochastic radiological fatalities). The remaining 12 use cases in RANNSAD caused a total of 5 casualties.

52. None of the four models was significant, even at the 10% level.

53. None of the four models was significant, even at the 10% level.

54. The degree of association is very strong, with Cramer's V = 0.91 and significant to <0.1% in the base model, and similar results in the other three models.

55. This aspect has received far less attention in the literature on RN terrorism.

56. For perpetrators consisting of multiple individuals, if age data was available for more than one member, the average for the individual members was used.

57. For the base model, Somer's *d* is −0.824 and significant at less than 0.1%, while the Gamma is −1 at a similar level of significance. The other models yield substantially similar results.

58. None of the four models was significant, even at the 10% level, when tested using the Somer's *d* and Gamma tests, which are appropriate for ordinal data.

59. Walter Laqueur, *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999), 269.

60. Spaaij, "The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism" (see note 20 above) declares in 2010 that "there is no empirical evidence to support Laqueur's claim that lone individuals are among the most likely candidates to use weapons of mass destruction."

61. POICN; includes both confirmed and probable LA/AC actual attacks.

62. It should be noted that this does not mean that there are in fact no differences in these variables, but that with the data currently available to us, there was no statistically meaningful difference.

63. One of the observations, that, post-event, LA/AC RN perpetrators are more likely to be apprehended than members of traditional terrorist organizations (perhaps because of more meager logistical resources like safe havens and forged documentation) is interesting, but not particularly relevant to preventing the attacks in the first place, except of course with respect to preventing follow-on attacks.

64. Level of education was not significant in our small sample. However, this might prove to be a key distinguishing variable and it is recommended that future research return to investigate it when a

larger sample becomes available. After all, as the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism report states in the context of bioterrorism, but could apply equally to other weapon types: “the United States should be less concerned that terrorists will become biologists and far more concerned that biologists will become terrorists.” Graham et al., *World at Risk* (see note 23 above), 11.

65. David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, eds. L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch, 3rd. ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1777 (1975)).

66. These are terms often used by futurists to describe high-impact events with small, yet unknown, probabilities of occurrence, often representing a discontinuous leap from prior experience. See Nicholas Taleb, *The Black Swan: How the Improbable Rules the World and Why We Don’t Know It* (New York: Random House, 2007); John Petersen, *Out of the Blue: How to Anticipate Big Future Surprise* (Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1999).

Detecting Linguistic Markers for Radical Violence in Social Media

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Lone-wolf terrorism is a threat to the security of modern society, as was tragically shown in Norway on July 22, 2011, when Anders Behring Breivik carried out two terrorist attacks that resulted in a total of 77 deaths. Since lone wolves are acting on their own, information about them cannot be collected using traditional police methods such as infiltration or wiretapping. One way to attempt to discover them before it is too late is to search for various "weak signals" on the Internet, such as digital traces left in extremist web forums. With the right tools and techniques, such traces can be collected and analyzed. In this work, we focus on tools and techniques that can be used to detect weak signals in the form of linguistic markers for potential lone wolf terrorism.

Introduction

While terrorism carried out by lone actors remains a marginal, albeit deadly, phenomenon, the acts of Norwegian terrorist Anders Behring Breivik on July 22, 2011, have placed it high up on the agenda of many security services and police forces. Ramón Spaaij,[1] however, notes that so-called "Lone Wolf Terrorism" is both uncommon—making up less than two percent of the terrorist incidents in his sample—and less lethal on average than acts carried out by groups and organizations. Nonetheless, there seem to be reasons to be worried. One such reason is that there is a strong argument to be made that the capability threshold for individuals to carry out advanced attacks is becoming lower with time due to the power of the Internet to bring critical information, such as tutorials on bomb-making or geographical information, "to your fingertips." There is also a concern that the Internet is making it easier than ever to engage in the study and dissemination of extremist views. Finally, a third reason is that many

methods employed by security services and police to uncover and prevent group plots are of little use when the perpetrator is acting alone.

One initial conclusion that can be drawn from this is that there is, or will be, a need for new methods within the domain of counter terrorism. A seemingly promising arena for such method development is the Internet, and this will also be our focus in the current article.

There are several examples of cases in which the Internet has been used by lone wolves to spread their views and opinions before an actual attack. One such example is the anti-abortion activist Scott Roeder, who in 2009 killed the physician George Tiller in Kansas.[2] Tiller was one of the few doctors in the United States who performed late-term abortions, and before the attack, Scott Roeder wrote a column on a web page critical of abortion in which he expressed his views against abortion and Tiller's work. Another example of a lone wolf using the Internet to express his views is James von Brunn, also known as the Holocaust Museum shooter.[3] Von Brunn was a white supremacist who was in charge of an Anti-Semitic website where he expressed his views long before the attack. Other examples of how the Internet is used to express views and intents can be found in the literature on school shootings, a phenomenon related to lone wolf terrorism. In the work by Semenov et al.,[4] for example, the authors state that a majority of school shooters in the samples they have analyzed announced their intentions on forums before their actual attacks (including cases such as Pekka-Eric Auvinen and Matti Juhan Saari in Finland and Matthew J. Murray in the United States).

Searching for potential lone wolf terrorists on the Internet is often compared to searching for a needle in a haystack. The Internet contains an overwhelming amount of information, and to manually find and read the content of all sites that might indicate intent or preparation for an act of terrorism is practically impossible. An interesting question is therefore whether automated techniques can be used to find web forums or other kinds of websites where extreme opinions are exchanged, and to automatically or semi-automatically detect if some individual is planning to commit an act of violence based on analysis of the content of such sites.

In addition to all the material that analysts can find through the use of various search engines, there are also enormous amounts of information in the so-called hidden or Deep Web, i.e., the parts of the Internet that are not indexed by the search engines' web spiders (e.g., due to password

protection or content that is generated dynamically when accessing a webpage). To produce fully automatic computer tools for detecting lone wolf terrorists on the Internet is, in our view, not possible, both due to the enormous amounts of data (which is only partly indexed by search engines) and due to the deep knowledge that is needed to really understand what is discussed or expressed in written text or other kinds of data available on the Internet, such as videos or images. However, in this work we argue that semi-automatic tools potentially could be of great use for intelligence analysts in their search for traces of lone wolf terrorists and other kinds of extremists on the Internet. Data available on the Internet is obviously only one type of information that can be of interest when trying to detect a possible lone wolf terrorist. Other information that may come from sources which are not publicly available, such as medical records, memberships in gun clubs, procurement of guns, records of obtaining bomb-making material, etc. is of course also of utmost importance. However, in this work we only focus on open source information that can be readily accessed through the Internet.

Attacks on public figures, mass murders, and acts of lone wolf terrorism are often signalled by a set of more or less detectable behavioural markers, some of which are preparatory actions, others linguistic expressions of attitudes, motivations, and intentions. Based on a typology of so-called *warning behaviours* presented by Meloy et al.,[5] we discuss the possibility of tracing three different forms of behavioural markers for radical violence in written text in social media (or other kinds of web content).

A Typology of Warning Behaviours for Radical Violence

The study of behavioural markers for radical violence, also labelled *warning behaviours*, is an essential part of assessing the threat of lone wolf terrorism. Meloy et al. broadly define warning behaviours as any behaviour that "precedes an act of targeted violence, is related to it, and may, in certain cases, predict it." As such, warning behaviours can be viewed as indicators of increasing or accelerating risk. Meloy et al. define eight different warning behaviours, namely (a) pathway warning behaviour, (b) fixation warning behaviour, (c) identification warning behaviour, (d) novel aggression warning behaviour, (e) energy burst warning behaviour, (f) leakage warning behaviour, (g) last resort warning behaviour, and (h)

directly communicated threat warning behaviour. Here, we will discuss the possibility of detecting *leakage*, *fixation*, and *identification* warning behaviours in social media, since these three in our view have the greatest potential to be discovered with text analysis methods applied on public information accessible from the Internet. The actual techniques that can be used to identify such warning behaviours are presented more thoroughly below.

Leakage

Leakage, the communication to a third party of an intent to do harm to a target, usually infers a preoccupation with the target and may signal the research, planning, and/or implementation of an attack. Data suggest that leakage commonly occurs in cases of targeted violence, ranging from school shootings to attacks on public figures. Leakage can be intentional or unintentional, and more or less specific with regards to the act.[6] Studies on public figure attacks and assassinations have, according to Meloy and O'Toole, found a suggestive pattern of leakage, in which an attack has often been preceded by indirect, conditional, or direct threats aimed at people associated to the target, or bizarre or threatening communication to politicians, public figures, or police forces. However, according to the same study, threats are typically not posed directly at the target. In different studies, the occurrence of pre-attack leakage ranges from 46% to 67% (and even higher for school shootings[7]). Leakages and threats before school shootings often seem to be more explicit than for many other kinds of terrorist acts. Newman et al.[8] report how Andrew Golden stood on a table in the cafeteria in Jonesboro, Arkansas and announced: "You're all going to die" the same year that the shooting took place. Just the day before the shootings, some other students heard the other shooter, Mitchell Johnson, say that he "had a lot of killing to do." These kinds of direct threats seem to be more common among young mass murderers than in other cases related to lone-wolf terrorism.

Case studies also show that leakage is often accompanied by other warning behaviours.[9]

Fixation

Meloy et al.[10] define fixation warning behaviour as any behaviour indicating an increasingly pathological preoccupation with a person or a cause, for instance increasing perseveration on the object of fixation, increasingly strident opinion, or increasingly negative characterization of the object of fixation. The fixated person expresses a preoccupation with the group or person considered responsible for the subject's grievance by allocating large amounts of time to discussing, theorising about, or studying the perceived enemy. The subject may have gathered an extensive number of facts about the target. For instance, anti-abortionist Clayton Waagner spent several months gathering target information on 42 different abortion doctors, planning to kill them with stolen firearms, before settling for another approach, i.e., sending more than 500 letters with faux-anthrax to abortion clinics across the U.S.[11]

Sometimes the subject gathers information with the explicit purpose of using it for preparing an attack. At other times, fact-gathering may start as an expression of fixation, with the idea and planning of an attack taking place after, and sometimes as a result of, the subject having gathered enough information to make it possible.

Identification

Identification warning behaviour is defined as a behaviour indicating a desire to be a "pseudo-commando," have a warrior mentality, closely associate with weapons or other military or law enforcement paraphernalia, identify with previous attackers or assassins, or identify oneself as an agent to advance a particular cause. Narcissistic ideas and fantasies about oneself are also counted in this group of warning behaviours. This rather broad definition shows the complexity of the phenomenon. Here, in order to make it more manageable, the concept of identification, as defined by Meloy et al., is divided into two subcategories: *identification with radical action* and *identification with a role model*. Since *group identification* is considered an essential part of the radicalisation of lone wolves as well as organized terrorists (cf. Ginges et al.[12] and Moskalenko and McCauley[13]), it is added as a third subcategory of identification.

Identification with radical action ("warrior mentality"). Lone wolf terrorists and attackers of public figures often tend to identify themselves as

a kind of warrior, a person who is prone to use structured violence for a "higher cause." In these cases, use of military terminology and a strong interest in weapons, military strategies, and paraphernalia can be seen, usually combined with a narcissistic fantasy of oneself as a rescuer, the one who sees what is wrong and does something about it.[14] Timothy McVeigh's collecting of weapons and other military paraphernalia, together with his expressed desire to be "the ultimate warrior" and "the first hero," is a telling example of this kind of identification warning behaviour. There are many examples of images and videos posted on the Internet in which lone wolf terrorists pose with weapons long before the attack, such as the pictures of Anders Behring Breivik wearing a compression sweater and pointing an automatic weapon toward the camera.

Identification with role model. The subject may be much influenced by, and, to an extent, identify him or herself with some other radical thinker or leader, seeking to emulate their style, ideals, or actions. Anders Behring Breivik, for instance, was highly influenced by the Norwegian anti-Islamic blogger Fjordman, whom he quoted extensively in his manifesto.[15] Similarly, many school shooters have been inspired by previous attacks (most notoriously the Columbine massacre by Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, which according to Larkin[16] has become a cultural script for many subsequent school shooters).

It is also common for radical thinkers to act as influencers and encourage people with the same radical views to take actions. An example of this is when an al Qaeda spokesman, Adam Gadahan, appeared in a video entitled "Do Not Rely on Others, Take the Task Upon Yourself." In the video, Gadahan urged Muslims in the United States to take advantage of the relaxed firearm laws to buy guns and carry out attacks on their own.[17] It is important to note that these individuals, when they are serious about going operational, often seek foreign contacts. This pattern is widespread, with the U.S. as epicentre for non-Islamist movements and the Middle East (especially Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the ungoverned territories between) for Islamists.

Group identification. Though acting alone, a lone wolf terrorist does consider him or herself part of a larger group, namely the group for the benefit of which the terrorist action is committed. Even in cases when the

subject is not part of the “beneficial” group (as for instance anti-abortionists), there is usually a very strong sense of moral obligation toward the group, which can be construed as identification with a cause.[18] In any case, identification needs to be strong to motivate radical violence. Strong identification with the in-group often equates to collectivistic values, where the needs of the group override the needs of the individual, which, for some, may justify violence against innocents. Moral commitment to the in-group and values associated with group identity appear to be strong indicators of potential radical violence. For instance, a positive correlation between collective commitment values and willingness to take part in political violence has been noted among Israeli settlers on the West Bank.[19] Group identification can be so strong that it borders on the ego-dissolving. The subject’s collectivistic values make him or her prone to self-sacrifice, which is usually necessary for someone to actually follow through with an act of political violence.[20] The somewhat paradoxical combination of selfless, collectivistic thinking and a grandiose, narcissistic self-image seems to be present in the attitudes of most known attackers. Negative identification with the enemy group is another important part of radicalization, since it facilitates demonizing or dehumanizing the perceived enemy, which subsequently facilitates the justification of violence.

Text Analysis Techniques for Analysing Social Media

In order to build systems that can help intelligence analysts with monitoring and analysing social media or other parts of the Internet in the search for digital traces of violent extremism, there are a number of tools and techniques that are needed, including web crawlers for collecting the relevant data and various natural language processing techniques for analysing the content. Here we give an overview of a number of text analysis techniques, which can be of great use for intelligence analysts when analyzing the content of websites or social media.

Translation Services

Rapid progress has recently been made in the research field of text analysis and natural language processing. Most people will have noticed the progress that has been made in the area of machine translation, by which

free services such as Google Translate offer quick and automatic translation between a large number of languages. A factor that strongly contributes to these developments is the change from using only traditional linguistic-based methods that require much work and expert grammatical knowledge, to combining them with methods based on statistics that make use of the enormous amounts of text available from the Internet and other places (e.g., translations of various EU documents to all official EU languages). This type of machine translation can be very useful for translating texts from extremist websites, reducing the need for the analyst to be fluent in the original language of the text. The results obtained from this kind of automatic translation service are seldom as good as if a human expert had translated the content of a website, but the great advantage with automatic translation is obviously the speed with which large amounts of data can be processed, making it possible to analyze many more websites than would have been possible if the process had been done fully manually. Automatic translation gives an analyst the opportunity to process text written in nearly any language.

Sentiment Analysis

Text analysis techniques referred to as sentiment analysis or opinion mining methods have become an increasingly popular way for companies to determine what opinions regarding their products or brands have been expressed in social media. An important part of sentiment analysis is to retrieve relevant posts and make a classification of whether it contains positive, negative, or neutral opinions regarding the brand of interest. In a similar way, one can make use of machine learning to “teach” computer algorithms to learn the difference between radical or non-radical texts, and to identify threats targeted to specific individuals or (ethnic or religious) groups. This kind of technique has, for example, been used in comparing the levels of violence, anger, hate, and racism expressed in various web forums.[21] However, the use of sentiment analysis for identifying radical text still needs a lot of research in order to obtain reliable results.

Mapping Websites

Text analysis can also be used for automatic discovery of potentially "problematic" websites (e.g., those that contain material related to violent extremism), and for creating networks of such websites and their relationships to each other. Computer algorithms can be used to identify radical content on both websites and on individual postings in web forums, in order to identify users (web aliases) that express themselves in such a way that human analysts may want to do further investigations. This issue is further described by Brynielsson et al.[22] It is, however, important to note that in order to determine relevant keywords that actually indicate radicalism, an in-depth knowledge of the milieu in question is required.

Author Recognition

Since people who are commenting on discussion forums and other kinds of social media are most often using aliases, the discovery of someone who expresses violent radical behavior does not necessarily mean that the police can identify whom to investigate further. In fact, in general it ranges from hard to impossible to identify a unique individual based only on the discovery of an interesting alias. There are usually good opportunities for users to create aliases without any traceable connection to themselves. Even when the users are required to verify their identity with a valid email address, nothing prevents them from creating an email address only for this purpose. Even though the actual IP address used for the creation of the email account or the forum posting may be stored, and possibly also handed over to the police when a serious crime is suspected, the individual can make use of various types of anonymous surfing services or Internet cafes in order to avoid being traced.

A text analysis technique that is not mature enough to utilize at present but that may become relevant in the future for connecting an alias to a physical individual is author recognition or author identification. In this research area, the algorithms used extract various features from texts, such as the frequency of specific words or word stems (lexical features), parts-of-speech tags (word classes), or other kinds of sentence constructions (syntactic features), and use them to identify the author of the text. The idea with this is that the writing style of each individual is unique, vaguely similar to the use of fingerprints. This type of technique is at present useful for determining who, out of a small set of potential authors, has written a

certain text, or from which kind of community (e.g., youths or highly educated) the author comes. However, the techniques are today not good enough to be used for determining who out of a large number of potential authors has written a piece of text, and the majority of available research focuses on large texts rather than short pieces of text. Nevertheless, the research is progressing quickly in this area, and one can expect these methods to become much more useful also on a larger scale in the next few years. A very interesting example of progress in that direction is the recent paper by Narayanan et al.,[23] in which promising results are shown for Internet-scale author identification.

If a person is active on a number of websites, forums, or other kinds of social media, it is common that several different aliases are used. It is therefore of importance to have techniques that can help an analyst to detect individual authors that use several different aliases. Dahlin et al.[24] suggest a number of techniques that can be combined for matching multiple aliases to the same individual. In the paper, it is suggested that an author using different aliases can be identified using several features:

1. alias names used,
2. the users an alias is connected to (social network analysis),
3. a profile of the time when the posts were made, and
4. a stylometric fingerprint of the messages written by the author using author recognition techniques.

All the techniques that have been briefly discussed above, including the techniques for alias matching, are used in our framework for detection of lone wolf terrorists on the Internet. This framework is described in more technical terms by Brynielsson et al.[25]

Linguistic Markers for Identifying Warning Behaviours in Social Media

Much of a terrorist’s behaviour preceding an attack takes place in real life, wherein the subject engages in preparations (e.g., buying fertilizer to make a bomb, buying guns, or gathering information about the target) or expresses opinions and values consistent with radical action. However, the subject may also communicate opinions, values, and sometimes also actual intent on the Internet, as argued earlier. Certain mindsets or attitudes,

previously observed among known perpetrators of radical violence, might also be detectable in the way the subject expresses him or herself on, for instance, blogs or discussion boards. We refer to these expressions of attitude or mindset as *linguistic markers for radical violence.* As stated above, the warning behaviours we believe to be most easily detectable in the subject's written communication in social media (e.g., extremist discussion boards) are leakage, fixation, and identification. We have identified a set of linguistic markers for each of these warning behaviours. The linguistic markers can be used as input to computer algorithms so that they may be able to recognize signs of radical violence.

Linguistic Markers for Leakage

Leaked information of intent is likely to contain auxiliary verbs signalling intent (i.e., "I will …," "… am going to …," "someone should") together with words expressing violent action, either overtly or, perhaps more likely, through euphemisms.

Based on these observations, we think that this kind of leakage potentially can be detected by using a quite simple approach in which the posts are extracted and after stemming or lemmatization (reducing the end of a word in order to return the word's common base form) are matched against a predefined word list of violent actions. Since a large number of synonyms can be used for the verbs signalling a violent intent, we additionally propose the use of an ontology (such as the well-known lexical database WordNet), in which semantic relations between synonym sets are expressed. An example of such a semantic relation would be that the verb "massacre" belongs to the same synonym set as the words "mow down" and "slaughter." By using such knowledge, the number of words that must be explicitly defined in the word list of terms to search for can be substantially decreased. Since the occurrence of a single word expressing a violent action is far from enough for classifying a sentence as being a linguistic marker for leakage, we also propose taking the part-of-speech tagging into account when searching for indications of leakage. This kind of text analysis method obviously has a hard time coping with ironic statements, leading to a risk of false positives wherein jokes are classified as a potential marker or leakage. However, by restricting attention to sites or forums that through automated content analysis or prior knowledge are

known to contain content related to violent extremism, we think that the false positives can be kept at an acceptable level.

Linguistic Markers for Fixation

Fixation can be observed as a tendency to fixate on an issue or a person, which in written communication would result in text whereby one person, group, or issue is mentioned by the subject with a significantly higher frequency than it is mentioned by other discussants. Also, frequent combinations of certain key terms, for instance “Jew” and “communism,” can reveal a fixation with a certain idea. Fixation taking the form of extensive fact-gathering can only be detected in communication if the subject chooses to share some of the information.

In order to find this kind of fixation in text, we propose counting the relative frequency of key terms relating to named entities such as persons, organizations, etc. To find out which words relate to named entities, algorithms for so-called named entity recognition can be used. Implementations of such algorithms are available in free natural language processing toolkits such as NLTK and GATE.

Linguistic Markers for Identification

Identification with a group or cause can be expressed for instance by a usage of positive adjectives in connection with mentioning the in-group. Similarly, a usage of negative adjectives in connection with mentioning of a group or person may indicate negative identification. Activists tend to feel stronger than others about the cause, expressing more anger or grief when something negative happens to the in-group, and greater joy when something positive happens,[26] another indicator of identification. The linguistic correlates of strong emotions related to group identification might be an indicator of the strength of the identification. In order to find out which positive or negative sentiments are present in a text, or which kinds of emotions are expressed, sentiment and affect analysis techniques can be used, as explained in Section 3.1. References to the in-group can be detected by investigating the use of first person plural pronouns (“we” and “us”), while much use of third person plural pronouns (e.g., “they” and “them”), according to Pennebaker and Chung,[27] can be used as an indicator

of extremism. In that work, the software LIWC is used to analyse the content of al-Qaeda transcripts.

The so-called warrior mentality can probably be spotted through a certain terminology, while a sense of moral obligation can be expressed through the usage of words related to duty, honour, and justice, etc.

Identification with another radical thinker can, aside from frequent quotations and mentions, be expressed by a similarity in language. The subject may use the same terminology as the role model, and may possibly even adapt a similar sentence structure. In these cases, it is possible to use author recognition techniques to identify similarities.

Discussion

The techniques and tools that have been presented in this work have the potential to support intelligence analysts in their work with finding potential lone wolf terrorists before they strike. However, before such a tool is implemented and put into operational use, there are a number of issues that have to be considered.

Both rights-based and consequentialist ethical traditions acknowledge the moral weight of privacy. In the setting of Internet surveillance and terrorism, however, there is an obvious conflict between this bearer of moral value and the avoidance of harmful consequences of terrorism or, in a rights-based context, the duty of government agencies to protect their citizens. If lone wolf terrorism is truly changing the calculus of privacy vs. harm, then there may indeed exist strong reasons to reconsider what kinds of extensive government surveillance we should allow. At this point, however, it is far from clear that such justification is in place.

Traditionally, at least from a European perspective, invasive methods such as wire-tapping have only been allowed when the police have had independent reasons to believe that a crime has been committed or is being planned. Permission for the interception must be obtained from a court of law. However, such a procedure requires that the police know the identity of the suspect. This is not possible when searching for lone wolves with unknown identity, where it is instead necessary to watch a larger number of posts, the vast majority of which are in all likelihood completely innocent. The problem can in many respects be compared to camera-surveillance of public places. The cameras are meant to be used to detect criminal

behaviour, but have the drawback of also monitoring innocents. It also challenges the feeling of a place—in our case the Internet—being truly public, in the sense of allowing and accepting the presence of people who fall outside of current norms. A recurring worry is the function creep of surveillance systems: will they really only be used to reduce criminality or will they in fact become powerful tools of oppression? And who will eventually pay the price?

If police or intelligence agencies should be allowed to use social media monitoring and analysis techniques in order to find digital traces of potential lone wolf terrorists, in what way ought we restrict and control such monitoring? To continue the comparison with cameras, the impression is that while automatic surveillance in public places often generates controversy and discussion, patrolling police officers seldom do. We may need to look closer at such phenomena as an important task ahead is to search for ways in which Internet surveillance can be carried out with the same sense of legitimacy as well-accepted forms of law enforcement and crime prevention.

Another issue to consider is what level of accuracy is required from such a tool before it is put into operational use. If the techniques that have been presented here can be used to detect a lone wolf terrorist before he strikes and prevent innocent people from being killed, is that reason enough to implement such a system? Does it depend on the false positive rate (i.e., the number of innocent people who are labelled as potential lone wolves)? If so, how high can we allow this false positive rate to be? Again, there are many questions without obvious answers. One thing that we would argue strongly for at this point is that we should not aim for a fully automated system; the human intelligence analyst has to be the one who should make the decision of whether or not to investigate someone further, not least due to legal reasons. However, semi-automated systems would be of little use if the classification performance of the recommendations were wrong too often. We therefore see a clear need for investigating what performance levels can be achieved before putting such a system into operational use.

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